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This research focuses on the role of the SPLM/A in the negotiating process that 
eventually brought about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.  It 
uses a comparative study methodology to present a precise description and 
explanation of the processes involved in the design and implementation of the 
CPA and its predecessor, the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA), signed in 1972. It 
takes an interpretative constructivist approach to underline the importance of 
studying the process by which peace agreements are made, particularly the 
concept of 'learning by doing'. The study concludes that the process by which the 
CPA was achieved challenges the widely held conviction in conflict resolution 
theories that armed conflicts are ended when the warring parties have reached a 
stalemate or when international pressure is high. The Sudanese experience 
suggests that a true peace agreement comes when the parties mutually acquire 
confidence through social interaction in the negotiating process. It was the back-
and-forth dynamic of ‘learning- by-doing’ through negotiation that was as 
important as any rationally-based deal reflecting costs and benefits. Through 
these negotiating sessions the belligerent delegations were able to build mutual 
confidence and trust and were able to reciprocate and adjust their positions; a 
clear indication that both sides were increasingly able to compromise on their 
positions – something that had been lacking when negotiations began. Continuous 
interaction between opposing sides is, therefore, a vital element in conflict 
resolution. During these negotiations and the ongoing interaction they required, 
Vice President Ali Osman Taha and the leader of the SPLM/A, Dr John Garang 
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de Mabior, developed a personal relationship to the extent that they learned to 
trust one another. The IGAD mediators ensured that the gains made as a result of 
this personal relationship between the principal negotiators would lead to the 
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Definitions of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AAA  Addis Ababa Agreement 
 
BFPS  Berghof Foundation for Peace Support 
 
CCI  Compagnie des Constructions Internationales 
 
CIDCM Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
 
CDR  Commander 
 
Col  Colonel 
 
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 
DoP  Declaration of Principles 
 
ELF  Eritrean Liberation Front 
 
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
 
EU  European Union 
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Gen  General 
 
GoS  Government of Sudan 
 
GoSS  Government of Southern Sudan 
 
IAFF  International Association of Fire Fighters 
 
ICG  International Crisis Group 
 
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
 
INGOs International Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
IRIN  Integrated Regional Information Network 
 
IPF  International Partners Forum  
 
KPA  Khartoum Peace Agreement 
 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
 
NANS  National Alliance for National Salvation 
 
NCC  National Constitutional Conference 
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NCP  National Congress Party 
 
NDA  National Democratic Alliance 
 
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
NIF  National Islamic Front 
 
NRA  National Resistance Army 
 
OAGs  Other Armed Groups 
 
OLS  Operation Lifeline Sudan 
 
PAF  People’s Armed Forces 
 
PMHC Political Military High Command 
 
PRIO  Peace Research Institute of Oslo 
 
SAF  Sudan Armed Forces 
 
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
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SRSG  Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General 
 
SSLM  South Sudan Liberation Movement 
 
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
 
UN  United Nations 
 
USA  United States of America 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Research Questions and Methodology 
 
At the beginning of 2005 the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudan 
Government, thus ending two and a half decades of civil war in the country. The 
CPA addressed issues of governance aimed at bringing peace and security to the 
country, in order to realise the vision of a new Sudan; a democratic, secular 
country, based on justice and racial equality in which the marginalization of its 
peripheral populations by a governing elite in Khartoum would be abolished. The 
CPA, which was negotiated under the auspices of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD)1, set forth specific governance, security and 
political arrangements through joint national institutions between the North and 
South of the country through a ‘one-country-two-systems’ model 2  and a 
subsequent referendum for self-determination for the Southern Sudanese at the 
end of a six-year interim period. The referendum produced a popular demand for 
independence from Sudan and the newly independent state came into being on 9 
July 2011 as the youngest member of the United Nations, the Republic of South 
Sudan. 
 
The CPA, in short, provided a framework to resolve ‘the fundamental problem of 
                                                     
1 IGAD was founded in 1986 by the following countries to encourage regional development: Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.. Eritrea was admitted in 1993 following its 
independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan was admitted in 2011 following its independence from 
Sudan. 
2
 The term is taken from the Chinese experience of integrating Hong Kong into Mainland China after 
the British colonial presence there ended in 19993 Adar, K. G. (2000) Conflict Resolution in a 





Sudan’ and to realise the two-fold objective of the Machakos Protocol: the 
establishment of a new Sudan with a self-determination option for Southern 
Sudan. The CPA was ostensibly a liberal peace agreement that sought both the 
democratic transformation of Sudan as “New Sudan” and sustainable peace in the 
country through specific power sharing and security arrangements as well as a 
referendum for self-determination for the South. The CPA negotiations were 
based on reciprocal models for both the SPLM/A and for the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) in Khartoum. However, whereas the SPLM/A obtained the self-
determination option, as well as military and political control over South Sudan, 
the North successfully retained the contentious issue of the preservation of Sharia 
Law, thus making a new, secular vision for the whole of Sudan more elusive. 
Critics have therefore argued that the CPA did not really solve the grievances 
between North and South Sudan, but became, instead, a tool to transform the two 
warring parties into ‘partners for peace’, separately exercising political and 
military control over the north and south of the country. 
 
In order to achieve the CPA, which was to result in the secession of South Sudan 
from its northern neighbour, the people of Southern Sudan had to take a long and 
arduous journey. Since the nineteenth century the black African Southern 
Sudanese had been subjected to severe marginalization as a result of the slave 
raids supported by northerners under the aegis of the Turko-Egyptian 
administration. As Deng notes: “The enslaveable groups were the Black Africans 
in the non-Arab, non-Muslim South, who practiced indigenous religious beliefs, 
and were therefore viewed as heathens and infidels.”3 These slave raids were 
                                                     
3 Deng, F. M. (2010). New Sudan in the Making? Essays on a Nation in Painful Search of Itself. The 
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brought to an end as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, which was to 
replace the Turko-Egyptian administration. Aware that the southern Sudanese had 
faced marginalization inside Sudan, the new colonial administration developed a 
policy, known as the Closed District Ordinance, which sought to develop the 
southern regions of Sudan and to curb Islamic incursions into Southern Sudan and 
British- administered East Africa. Despite the good intentions of the new colonial 
administration, the Closed District Ordinance did not prevent Southern Sudan 
developing at a slower pace than its northern neighbour which had already 
benefitted from the higher education institutions and training centres that existed 
there. The disproportionate development that ensued led to discontent in the south 
of the country, as well as its continued marginalization. This, in turn, led to 
southerners calling for federalism in order to safeguard southern interests as well 
as to ensure continued development in the south of the country. 
 
The southern calls for federalism, which was discussed at the 1947 Juba 
Conference, were ignored by the colonial administration and the northern-
dominated Sudanese Government, in which was to mean that Sudan achieved 
independence in 1956 under a centralized system of government. Indeed, as Dau 
notes, Northern Sudanese “decided that the benefits of the federal form of 
government were fewer than its disadvantages” therefore “the Southern case for a 
federal system that could have guaranteed its equal participation in the affairs of 
the nation was rejected.”4 Having failed to achieve their goals through dialogue, 
the southern Sudanese then turned to arms as a means of expressing their 
discontent through the Anyanya rebellion that ultimately resulted in the 1972 
                                                                                                                                                        
Red Sea Press, Eritrea. p.101 
4 Dau, I. M. (2003). Suffering and God: A Theological Reflection on the War in Sudan. Nairobi, 
Kenya: Paulines. p.37. 
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Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA). The AAA brought about southern regional 
autonomy for a decade, after which the Government of Sudan abrogated the terms 
of the agreement and the people of the south turned again to armed resistance led 
by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Initially 
conceived as a movement for the creation of a new political dispensation for the 
whole of Sudan, the SPLM/A later turned its attention to the pursuit of self-
determination as an option when negotiating with the Government of Sudan. The 
incorporation of self-determination in the CPA was a culmination of a series of 
meetings between the SPLM/A and the Government with the support of regional 
and international actors who helped to broker the 2002 Machakos Protocol, which 
was to become the basis of the CPA in 2005. 
 
Research Questions, Objectives and Methodology 
This study focuses on the role of the SPLM/A in the negotiating process that 
eventually brought about the CPA and uses a comparative study methodology to 
present an account of the peace processes involved in the evolution of the CPA 
and its predecessor, the AAA, signed in 1972. The choice of these two case 
studies enables me to investigate the changes that took place in the SPLM/A’s 
decision-making relating to how to end the conflict with the Government of 
Sudan. Although the AAA and the CPA were a result of the same contentious 
issues – political, religious and economic non-inclusivity – the processes that led 
to the two peace agreements were distinctly different from each other. Whereas 
the AAA was negotiated over a two-week period, the CPA took two years to 
complete and was supplemented by almost two decades of dialogue between the 
SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. Furthermore regional and international 
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actors spearheaded the CPA process with significant direction being provided by 
the IGAD member-states, whilst the AAA was primarily an internal Sudanese 
affair, with nominal support from the World Council of Churches. The direct 
impact of the second Sudanese Civil War on Sudan’s neighbouring countries, as a 
result of the influx of refugees and the accusations and counter-accusations of the 
neighbours’ support to dissidents, made the second Sudanese Civil War a regional 
matter. Shifts in US global policy towards a more aggressive anti-terrorist 
campaign as a result of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and the terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 made Sudan into a 
country of interest because of US suspicions that Sudan was providing “support 
for Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic organisations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, 
Gamaat Islamiya, and Abu Nidal.” 5  Ultimately, regional and international 
pressure encouraged the belligerents to negotiate in good faith and to uphold the 
terms of the CPA, which led to South Sudan seceding from its northern neighbour 
in 2011. 
 
This dissertation uses an empirical comparative analysis to study the different 
approaches taken by the Anyanya and the SPLM/A in their pursuits of a lasting 
peace with the Government of Sudan. Whereas the AAA provided the southern 
region of Sudan with relative autonomy, it fell short of guaranteeing the option of 
self- determination, a shortcoming that acted as the catalyst for the Civil War. The 
CPA, on the other hand, provided the southern Sudanese with the option of self- 
determination, which ultimately resulted in southern cessation on the July 9, 
2011. In order to achieve a comprehensive peace with Sudan, I suggest that the 
                                                     
5 Adar, K. G. (2000) Conflict Resolution in a Turbulent Region: The Case of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan, ACCORD, p.48 
 
18 
SPLM/A had learned from the previous experiences of the Anyanya and the 
process by which it had reached an agreement with the Government of Sudan, 
which was ultimately abrogated within a decade. Keen to avoid a similar 
unworkable solution to southern Sudanese grievances, the SPLM/A approached 
warfare and negotiations in a manner that was significantly different from that of 
the Anyanya. Unlike the Anyanya, whose cadres received hardly any formal 
training during the First Sudanese Civil War, at its inception in 1983 the SPLM/A 
established a general training base and an officers’ cadet training centre in Bonga, 
Ethiopia, under the supervision of the Ethiopian Government. Furthermore, two 
years after its inception, the SPLM/A sent cadres for political and military 
training to Cuba. Throughout the First Sudanese Civil War, Anyanya’s military 
campaign was restricted to Sudan’s borders with Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, thus limiting its impact on Sudan and allowing it to be 
perceived as a localized conflict. The SPLM/A, on the other hand, fought a war 
on many fronts spanning all three regions of southern Sudan and encroaching on 
the traditionally northern territories of Blue Nile, Southern Kodorfan (Nuba 





Figure 1: Anyanya I’s theatre of operations 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates Anyanya I’s theatre of operations, which focused on Sudan’s borders with 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.6 
 
The CPA was to prove to be more durable than the AAA largely because much 
more care and time were devoted to its negotiation. As Dr John Garang recalled 
during the signing of the CPA, “there are both external and internal guarantees, 
organic external guarantees that will ensure the implementation of this 
agreement.” 7  Although the SPLM/A and the ruling National Congress Party 
(NCP) signed the CPA, the CPA was an inclusive agreement that was owned by 
all Sudanese, irrespective of their political or military affiliations, and it sought to 
negate future internal wrangling by ‘spoilers of peace’. Having witnessed the 
                                                     
6 Map drawn to the author’s specification by Mr. Sebastian Ballard in Hampshire, England in April, 
2016 
7 Speech of Dr John Garang De Mabior during the signing of the CPA on  January 9, 2005 
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internal wrangling that afflicted the AAA, Dr John Garang De Mabior wanted the 
CPA to unite the people of southern Sudan, explaining during the signing of the 
CPA: 
“Finally, on issues that concern southern Sudanese, I want to say a little on 
south-south dialogue. On building national consensus, the SPLM will also 
spearhead the south-south dialogue. This dialogue, above all, is to heal the 
wounds and restore fraternity and mutual respect so as to create a healthier 
political environment that is accommodative of all southern Sudnese 
political forces, both at the level of southern Sudan and at the national 
level.”8 
 
This thesis starts with the proposition that ‘learning’ is a significant dynamic in 
relation to a protracted conflict such as that under investigation. This is 
understood to be the procedure of modifying actual positions in the negotiation 
process through learning from prior mistakes, experiences and relationships, and 
applying such lessons to the subsequent evolution of the process; in other words, 
an iterative approach through which a negotiating process is refined through a 
repetitive procedure of comparing initiatives against outcomes in order to adjust 
further initiatives appropriately to achieve desired outcomes or an acceptable 
compromise. The negotiation process between the SPLM/A and the Government 
was a series of multi-tiered, four-phased engagements over a substantial period of 
time, which refined the positions of both parties to the extent that a compromise 
could be reached in the form of the CPA. Engagements that led to the CPA began 
with workshops that helped the parties to discuss the root causes of the conflict. 




Once an agreement on the root causes of the conflict was reached, a framework 
for future discussions was developed at the level of the representatives of the two 
parties. Once a framework for discussions had been established, senior 
representatives at the level of chief negotiators were introduced into the 
discussions to tackle contentious issues. The final stage of negotiation took place 
at the leadership level, in which the SPLM/A, represented by its chairperson, Dr 
John Garang De Mabior, and the Government of Sudan, represented by First 
Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, engaged in a high-level dialogue which led to 
the final agreement. 
 
I seek below to justify the methodology used to investigate the topic of this thesis. 
Learning as a dynamic can be discerned at the level of decision-makers and 
leaders of organisations as well as organisations as such. The ability of an 
organisation and the decision-makers within it, to learn and adapt is affected by 
the conflict environment and the organisation’s capacity for flexible adaptation to 
change. Furthermore, the capacity for learning arises from the way in which the 
organisation and its decision-makers are prepared to learn from experience. Thus, 
to identify learning–from-experience and the use of the lessons learned to 
improve decision, design and implementation, we must also trace strategic 
changes that took place in the conflict environment. As the focus of this 
investigation is the SPLM/A, questions of interest relate to the leadership of the 
organisation, and specifically Dr Garang and the organisation itself as the 
negotiators’ constituency. Strategic changes were reflected in the organisational 
structure of the SPLM/A, as well as through its diplomatic, military, and political 
strategies and tactics during each phase of its insurgency. As a result, identifying 
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such changes will form a major part of this study. 
 
The treatment of this issue, as developed here, provides the basis for an empirical 
investigation; identifying factors which may explain the protracted nature of 
negotiations and the behaviour of the SPLM/A during each phase of the conflict, 
exploring the individual and organisational learning process that took place in 
between successive peace talks between disputants, and describing how previous 
interactions impacted on the strategic choices the disputants made, as well as the 
third party decision-making process in response to the conflict. This approach is 
important because, rather than trying to fit empirical facts into preconceived 
theoretical propositions, as is normally done in case-studies – with the painful 
consequence of either having to discard the facts or the propositions when 
contradictions arise – the approach adopted here allows for conclusions to be 
derived directly from the facts themselves, such that the conclusions might have 
relevance for broadly analysing similar situations elsewhere. This study, 
therefore, aims to ensure the systematic empirical investigation of the various 
negotiating positions that the SPLM/A adopted over the course of the negotiation 
process as well as of the reasoning behind the shifts in position that occurred. 
 
Source Material 
This study will rely on actual conversations (as reported in interviews) with the 
actual participants (mainly from the SPLM) in the CPA negotiation process. This 
study will also rely on the primary documents signed between the SPLM/A and 
the Government of Sudan, minutes of meetings, tapes of speeches by the SPLM/A 
leader from the SPLA Radio [1985-1991], SPLA revolutionary songs, official 
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reports and SPLA booklets. Care was taken to crosscheck material obtained from 
interviews against comments on the topics concerned from other active parties  
and against archival sources where they existed, in order to avoid inaccuracies. 
The author has chosen to investigate the experiences of senior SPLM/A members 
through interview as they provided a ready access to primary source material. 
Their insights into the second Sudanese civil war, as well as into the CPA 
negotiation process, provided information on sensitive matters that have not 
received academic treatment up to this juncture.  The author compared and 
analysed the information that he received from the various interviewees in order 
to identify the points of consistency. It was these points of consistency that the 
author then used to draw the conclusions within this thesis. Given the author’s 
experiences as a member of the SPLM/A since its inception, the interviewees 
were able to freely discuss their experiences with him in an environment of trust 
that had been cultivated over a two-decade period. Most of these resources have 
never been treated rigorously in academic study before, mainly because of 
difficulties of access. However, having been a part of the SPLM/A since its 
inception in 1983, the author has the contextual knowledge necessary to critically 
analyse the available source materials and draw well-considered conclusions 
based on his personal experiences. The author’s current position as a senior 
military official in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army puts him in the unique 
position of being able to discuss the key military battles that paved the way to the 
signing of the CPA. Archival research was also undertaken in the British National 
Archive in Kew where documentation related to British rule in Sudan from 1989 
to 1956 and other materials on the conflict in Sudan were examined, together with 
other related documentation on the Sudan.  The Military Colonial Archives in 
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Egypt were also consulted. 
 
Some of the sources used in this analysis may seem unusual but may have a much 
greater relevance than at first would appear to be the case. I note, for example, 
that given the role songs play in traditional societies, SPLA revolutionary songs, 
expressing shared experiences of the fighting men and women are very useful in 
understanding the core issues in the Sudanese conflict. They express very directly 
the processes of learning and adaptation that took place within the SPLM/A, even 
among the most ignorant fighters on the battlefields. Each of the SPLA’s 
battalions has its own revolutionary songs, which it used to boost morale under 
conditions of warfare. The SPLA revolutionary songs, like the SPLM/A 
manifesto, counter regional aspirations and preach a national vision of 
transforming the whole country from the centre. The revolutionary songs were 
composed as a reminder to the leadership of the SPLM/A of the experiences of 
the people of southern Sudan and as a method for spreading the message of the 
SPLM/A to the predominantly illiterate guerrilla fighters who were unable to 
access the SPLM/A’s written literature. Such a dramatic shift in beliefs about a 
violent protest, initially a regional protest for recognition of rights but 
subsequently an ideological protest spearheaded by the South, can best be 
explained as a learning process. 
 
Secondary sources relating to the negotiation process and to Sudanese conflicts in 
general were of particular value for the third chapter of this thesis. Also, 
secondary source materials concerned with organisational learning, cognitive and 
social psychology, conflict, negotiation and mediation are important for the 
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theoretical framework in Chapter 2. Though there are numerous books on the 
Sudanese conflicts, only a handful constitute objective analysis while the authors 
of the remaining studies fall into other categories, such as journalists whose 
accounts aim at nothing more than recounting stories of conflict [often with 
alarming inaccuracies], active politicians whose accounts aim at improving their 
political reputations, or Westerners and international NGOs whose accounts are 
one-sided because they had become aligned with the internal politics of the 
SPLM/A. Having been involved in the SPLM/A since its inception, the author of 
this thesis is able to draw upon his personal accounts of events and his personal 
experiences in order to select sources that provide an accurate and objective 
portrayal of the Second Sudanese Civil War and the negotiation process that led 
to the CPA. This study will show that the peace process leading up to the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 was not just a rational 
negotiation, but the result of a learning process through the interaction between 
opponents in the conflict environment. 
 
Research Questions 
The study examines the peace process to answer the following research question: 
How was the SPLM/A able to negotiate an agreement that included principles that 
successive Governments since Sudnese Independence in 1956 had previously 
refused to consider? This question, in turn, involves a series of subsidiary 
questions, answers to which form an integral part of the response to the main 
research question, namely: 
1) How did the SPLM/A use the flaws it perceived in the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement to adapt its war strategies and bargaining mechanisms in 
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negotiating the CPA some thirty years later? 
2) What were the political, diplomatic and military strategies that the 
SPLM/A adopted as a consequence of what it had learned from the 
previous experience linked to the Addis Ababa Agreement? 
3) What led the SPLM/A to shift its stance away from the concept of a 
unified New Sudan9 in the 1980s and to advocate, instead, the right to 
southern self- determination in the 1990s? 
4) How did learning help the SPLM/A to manage its relations with regional 
and international bodies? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis has been divided into eight 
chapters. The first three chapters serve as an introduction to the substance of the 
thesis by highlighting the key questions it raises, exploring the theoretical 
perspectives on conflict resolution, describing the methodology that the author 
has used and providing a historical overview of Sudan and the factors that 
contributed to two civil wars in the post-colonial state. The following three 
chapters rely on both primary and secondary source materials, including songs 
composed by SPLM/A fighters, speeches and interviews by SPLM/A leaders, 
interviews with high-ranking members of the SPLM/A and other eminent 
personalities closely engaged in efforts at mediation between the SPLM/A and its 
opponents. The author, however, places significant weight on material gained 
from his interviews with key figures from the SPLM/A and with individuals who 
were involved in the negotiation process. Chapters four to seven inclusive also 
explore the learning experiences of the SPLM/A and how these experiences 
                                                     
9 ‘New Sudan’ was a term coined by Dr John Garang that visualized a new political dispensation in 
Sudan that called for a non-racial, secular and non-discriminatory system of governance 
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shaped its relationship with its constituents, its engagement with northern Sudan 
and its regional and international strategies. Given the level of empirical analysis 
required in order to ascertain whether the SPLM/A learned from the previous 
experiences of the Anyanya, in these chapters the author relies mainly on his 
interviews with senior SPLM/A officials10. In order to verify the information 
collected during the interviews, the author utilises his personal experience as a 
member of the SPLM/A since its inception and as, currently, a high-ranking 
member of the SPLA. The eighth and final chapter of the thesis provides an 
overall conclusion to the study. 
 
In answering the research questions that it poses, this thesis argues that the back-
and- forth dynamic of interaction between the SPLM/A and the Government of 
Sudan led to numerous social interactions, which in turn built confidence between 
the delegates and the trust that was garnered through this process led to the 
signing of the CPA. As Galtung observe: “peace depends on transformation of 
another relation between parties.”11 In other words, peace requires a development 
of relations, which can be attained through regular engagement. The process 
through which the CPA was achieved should add an important element to the 
academic study of conflict resolution since the CPA negotiation process led to an 
agreement that brought independence to the people of southern Sudan who had 
experienced conflict with their northern neighbours ever since the Turko-
Egyptian slave raids of the 19th century, In addition, relatively little qualitative 
                                                     
10 Interviews with senior SPLM/A officers, decision makers and members of the various SPLM/A 
negotiation teams allowed the author to gain access to primary source information that has not received 
academic treatment thus far.  
11  Galtung, J. “Introduction: peace by peaceful conflict transformation – the  TRANSCEND 




research in the field of Sudanese conflict studies has considered the role of 
‘learning’ in the management of conflict situations. While some authors have 
investigated learning in conflict resolution (see for example, a suggestive article 
by Yaacov Bar-Siman Tov, 1994), the dynamics involved have not been subject 
to the detailed scrutiny in relation to a specific conflict. My aim in this study is to 
provide an investigation of the place of learning in achieving a successful 
outcome to a negotiation process. An examination of the initial positions of the 
SPLM/A and the Government at the outset of war and of their positions in the 
July 2002 Machakos Protocol and the subsequent January 2005 CPA reveals that 
the two parties moved from distinctly differing positions to a common point of 
agreement. This suggests that the dynamics of back-and-forth interaction in the 
actual negotiating process played a key role in moving the parties from their 
extreme positions to one that was perceived to be of mutual benefit. The activities 
involved in negotiation gave the disputants the opportunity to ‘cool off’ and to 
modify their views, which was why previously rejected proposals were eventually 
accepted virtually unaltered in terms of their substance. In demonstrating this 
‘learning-by- doing’ process, this study focuses primarily on two peace 
agreements - the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) in 1972 and the subsequent 
CPA in 2005 – to provide a basis for the examination of the range of contributory 
factors which led to the achievement of peace in Sudan. By adopting this 
approach, the thesis explores the place of ‘learning’ as this relates to the 
leadership of the SPLM in its negotiations with the North, the leadership’s 
internal relations with the organisation, the SPLM/A, both its military and 
political wings, and the leadership’s engagement with regional and international 
actors. Timing was clearly of tremendous importance in the Sudan negotiations 
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that culminated in the CPA. However, what made the timing significant was the 
culmination of both local and international dynamics, those pertinent to the 
conflict as well as international issues that could now be mobilized effectively by 
the SPLM leadership. 
 
For a conflict resolution theorist such as Zartman, the success of peace initiatives 
lies in the timing of efforts, noting that: 
“Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when 
alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are 
blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly 
predicament.”12 
 
Henry Kissinger, a proponent of the importance of timing to negotiations, once 
said, “stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement.” 9 However, the 
experience of the CPA demonstrates that the back-and-forth nature of 
engagements was the most important factor in the success of the Sudanese peace 
process. Furthermore, the learning experience of the AAA allowed the SPLM/A 
to negotiate subsequently from a position of knowledge, which strengthened the 
movement’s ability to bargain effectively with the Government of Sudan. 
 
The objectives of this thesis are therefore: 
1) To understand and analyse the process leading to the CPA; 
2) To identify the role of ‘learning-by-doing’ in the evolution of the CPA; 
and 
                                                     
12 Zartman, W. I. The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments, The Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 2001, p.8 
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3) To explain how learning from the experiences of the AAA helped the 
SPLM/A to manage relations internally, regionally and internationally 
 
An understanding and analysis of the process leading to the CPA is vital to the 
field of conflict resolution, given the lessons it provides over the process itself. 
Indeed, identifying the role of ‘learning-by-doing’ will help academics in the field 
to understand the ability of the SPLM/A to shift its positions in accordance with 
realities on the ground. Furthermore, an exploration of the manner in which the 
SPLM/A learned from the experiences of the AAA demonstrates the importance 
of critically analysing the lessons of prior historical experience. 
 
Historical Background to the CPA 
The disputants in the Sudanese conflict initially defended their interests 
vigorously during peace negotiations that began as early as the late 1980s. Both 
sides took what seemed to be deeply entrenched positions on various issues, with 
little sign of willingness to compromise and with every intention of solving the 
confrontation militarily. Doubting that the warring parties would ever agree on a 
compromise, several commentators, as well as the parties themselves, were 
convinced that the Khartoum government would not “abandon Sharia, and that 
the south refuses to be governed by it.”13 Young for instance, pointed out that 
negotiators on both sides were playing a complicated game of positioning 
themselves, each expecting the worst of the other. 
 
However, to the surprise of many, in 2002, in the Kenyan town of Machakos, the 
                                                     
13 Young, J. (2005). John Garang's Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A & the South. Review of 
African Political Economy, 32(106), 535-548; p.32 
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disputants began to comply with solutions proposed by the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) – a regional body tasked with mediating an 
end to Sudanese conflict. With a shift in US external policy as a result of its 
global fight against terrorism and those countries perceived to be supporters of 
terrorism, there was substantial pressure on the Government of Sudan to find a 
peaceful solution to its conflict. The change in US policy coincided with the rise 
of African sub-regional bodies such as IGAD, which Korwa G. Adar describes as 
“...increasingly performing tasks which go beyond socio-economic functional 
arrangements to those that fall within the general purview of realpolitik security 
perspectives.”14  For Adar, the rise of IGAD led to a “...shift away from the 
concept of African solutions to African problems: to African sub-regional 
solutions to African sub-regional problems.”15 The existence of IGAD meant that 
the US and the international community had a ready ally in finding a lasting 
solution to the Sudanese conflict. 
 
Brosché suggests that the experience of the CPA indicates that involving both 
regional actors and the broader international community could constitute a fruitful 
approach towards reaching an agreement.16 With a push from the United States, 
the United Nations Security Council decided to hold a two-day meeting on the 
situation in Sudan in Nairobi, Kenya in 2004. Indeed, the role of international 
actors appears to have been crucial, as Einas Ahmed affirmed, when he pointed 
out that regional and international actors pressured Sudan’s adversaries into 
joining the dialogue for a peace agreement by helping to resolve what had 
                                                     
14 Adar, K. G, (2000), Conflict Resolution in a Turbulent Region: The Case of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan, ACCORD, South Africa, p.43 
15 Ibid. p.43 
16 Brosché, J. (2009). Sharing Power – Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan's Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement 2005. Uppsala: Uppsala University; p.13 
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become a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (the phrase is Zartman,W. (2000)) through 
their intervention. However, David Keen has argued that various regional and 
international actors did not contribute to producing a mutually hurting stalemate 
because many of them were doing very well out of the war. 17  The USA in 
particular used the stick of implicating Sudan in terrorism in the wake of the 
events of 11 September 2001 to coerce it into agreeing to an independence 
referendum in the South although it had not lost the war. 
 
The chief mediator of the CPA, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, on the other hand, 
claims that the agreement was the result of skilful mediation.18 Brad Honoroff et 
al19, however, argued that the field of mediation is haunted by a lack of a widely-
accepted understanding of the skills required to mediate effectively, a view which 
casts doubt on General Sumbeiywo’s assertion. In essence, they suggest, a skilful 
mediator must be aware of the political process involved in mediation as well as 
how to deal with different actors during the negotiation period. Sumbeiywo’s 
ability, therefore, to achieve the desired outcome of the negotiating process had to 
be undertaken in a situation where he was aware that the warring parties were 
suspicious of each other. This would have required a highly skilled and 
experienced mediator, an aspect of his activities that he did not emphasize, 
although he recognized that there were envoys participating in the meetings 
whose countries were not at peace with each other: 
“The Ugandans, for example, were in conflict with the Sudanese 
Government over its support to the Ugandan rebels, the Lord’s Resistance 
                                                     
17 Keen, D. (2001). The Political Economy of War, Oxford University Press; pp.1-21 
18 Sumbeiywo, L. (2013) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, Nairobi, 17 April 
19
 Honoroff, B., Matz, D. & O'Connor, D. (1990). Putting Mediation Skills to the Test. Negotiation 
Journal, 6(1), pp.37-46. 
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Army. In addition, Eritrea and Ethiopia had just ended a border war with 
each other. There were also accusations and counter-accusations between 
Sudan and Eritrea over support to their respective dissidents.”20 
 
In short, there was a lack of harmony within the mediation team itself, let alone in 
the international community, which wanted to hijack the negotiations. As General 
Sumbeiywo recalled, “After the Machakos Protocol everybody wanted to come 
in: the French, the Dutch, the South Africans, the Arab League. But the doors had 
to be closed.”21 The interest of all these would be participants had to be balanced 
by General Sumbeiywo who recalled during an interview with ACCORD: 
“But what I’m saying is get everybody to buy into the ideas, not bring 
everybody to the table… So I said that if the parties agreed then they 
would be accepted. But the two parties said, “look, you are putting this 
problem on us and we really don’t want to appear like we’re refusing 
anybody. But what will do is this: you forward whatever people apply and 
we will not reply.” So I would tell the would-be interveners, “I’m still 
waiting for the parties.” And they would ask me which party so they could 
sort it out, and I would say “both parties haven’t replied.””22 
 
Einas Ahmed points out that: “Apart from international pressure, the CPA would 
probably not have been concluded successfully if it had not been for the personal 
ambitions of the main two negotiators, the late Dr John Garang de Mabior, 
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  of  the  SPLM/A, and  the former  First Vice 
                                                     
20 Sumbeiywo, L. (2013) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, Nairobi, 17 April 
21 The Mediator’s Perspective: An interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, (2006) ACCORD, p.26 
22 Ibid. p.26 
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President Taha.” 23  Mike Jobbins agrees that, “[t]hough a success for the 
international community, the CPA was nonetheless a Sudanese agreement, and 
appeared to be a major step forward by the leadership both of the rebel Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP)-
led government (Jobbins, 2006).24 Indeed, the personalities of the leaders (Garang 
and Taha) played a significant if not a primary role. Even while he was still a 
rebel leader, many regional and international actors accorded John Garang de 
Mabior the same respect as any Head-of-State. For instance, he was addressed as 
“His Excellency” in the signing ceremony of the CPA in 2005. 
 
Although the negotiation process was subject to various setbacks, resulting in the 
intensification of war between 1998 and 2002, the prospects for a decisive 
military or political victory of one side over the other diminished over time, and 
this came to be better understood by both the National Congress Party (NCP) in 
North Sudan and the SPLM/A. The SPLA captured Torit in 2002 to demonstrate 
that it was not negotiating out of weakness, but the Sudanese Armed Forces then 
retook it to demonstrate that they were not negotiating out of weakness either. But 
the back-and–forth military struggle over the control of towns really revealed a 
situation of military deadlock, which eventually facilitated an atmosphere of 
commitment to a peace deal. As Jarstad and Nilsson have suggested, when the 
parties to a conflict engage in costly concessions by implementing unsustainable 
military and territorial decisions, peace is more likely to prevail.25 
                                                     
23 Ahmed, E. (2009). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the dynamics of post-conflict political 
partnership in Sudan. Africa Spectrum, pp.133-147 
24 Jobbins, M. (2006), The CPA Implementation: Talking Stock in Conference Proceedings from 
September 11th, 2006 Symposium entitled Sudan’s Peace Settlement Progress and Perils, p.7 
25 Jarstad, A. K., & Nilsson, D. (2008). From words to deeds: The implementation of power-sharing 




Achim Wennmann argues that this reflects a strategy designed to gain at the 
negotiating table what could no longer be won on the battlefield. 26  This 
perspective implies, therefore, that the move from violence to the negotiating 
table represented a deliberate strategic option chosen by the two parties, both of 
whom made concessions to each other in a bid to maintain political power in their 
respective domains of sub- national dominance by sharing national power 
between them. However, although the CPA catered to the continued political 
dominance of the NCP, it also provided for a significant opening of the political 
space between it and the SPLM/A, and the sharing of state power and wealth 
previously controlled by the NCP between them as well. After two decades of 
playing this game, both sides lost faith in their chances of winning militarily and 
began to see an opportunity for cutting their losses and achieving satisfaction 
through accommodation. Such a loss of faith forced both sides to give more 
weight to the need to redress the grievances of their followers, who grew more 
weary of war than their initial commitment to the cause would have suggested, 
thus making negotiations possible. Zartman sums this up nicely: “In a situation of 
continuing uncertainties, parties negotiate when they change their estimates of 
future potentialities.”27 Aware of the regional and international repercussions of 
continuing the civil war, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A were willing 
to engage in internationally backed negotiations as a means of settling their 
grievances. 
 
                                                     
26 Wennmann, A (2009) Wealth Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan's North-South Peace 
Process CCDP Working Paper: (The Graduate Institute, Geneva, The Centre on Conflict, Development 
and Peace building), p.18 




The NCP had first tried to make an alternative peace with the then non-SPLM/A 
political groups through the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, but that had 
failed because these parties were not widely accepted as representatives of the 
Southerners, a failure which boosted the identity of the SPLM as the sole 
representative of Southern Sudan and this left the NCP with no alternative but to 
accept to negotiate with the SPLM. Also, the Government of Sudan (GoS) was 
internationally isolated, largely due to being named a state sponsor of terrorism 
by the US State Department in 1993. Indeed, whilst Khartoum was undoing 
earlier SPLA victories between 1991 and 1994, it also sheltered Osama bin Laden 
and Al-Qa’ida, an action which stimulated fears of American action after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 
A similar interpretation centers on the relation between the outbreak of war in the 
West (Darfur) and East (Beja), and oil revenues. The availability of oil resources 
(the oil wells at Unity Field were producing 160,000 bpd) to the NCP made it 
easier for it to afford and obtain sophisticated weaponry for the war, which the 
SPLM/A could not match.28 Another consequence was that the SPLM/A began to 
run short of manpower, although it was never clear whether this was by design or 
simply a lack of resources. Thus, in a meeting in Rumbek in 2004, a top SPLA 
commander disclosed that he had no army under his command.29 His remark was 
interpreted to imply that there was a lack of troops. However, one could also 
argue that the commander was suggesting that he was never given full powers to 
command the army by the SPLM/A leader and Commander-in-Chief, John 
                                                     
28 Lino, M. (2014) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, South Sudan, 7 July 
29 We are here referring to the current South Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit who by then held the 
position of the SPLA Chief of General Staff. 
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Garang de Mabior. This was not the first time such comments had come from 
senior members of the movement. In 1991, Dr Riek Machar, a member of the 
Political High Command broke away from the movement with two of his 
colleagues, 30  accusing the Movement’s leader of dictatorial behaviour. 31 
Logistical and political weaknesses such as these would clearly hurt the SPLM/A 
if it insisted on continuing the fight. 
 
On the other hand, the NCP could not afford to fight on so many fronts - in the 
East, the West, and the South of the country - simultaneously, so it was in its best 
interests to abandon the war in the South in order to focus on threats closer to 
home. It is difficult to argue that the SPLM/A would have taken such a war 
strategy had it not learned from the experiences of the First Sudanese Civil War. 
Indeed, for Francis Deng the SPLM/A had developed a learning culture: 
“In the first years of its struggle, the SPLM/A set out an analysis of 
Sudan’s problems as a conflict between the center and periphery that drew 
on the neo- Marxist dependency theories of the day. After the cold war, 
however, the SPLM relinquished Marxism and turned instead to African 
tradition, emphasizing the cultural rather than the economic difference 
between the center of Sudan and the South.”32 
 
Roque echoed similar sentiments: “The SPLM has shown that it can be pragmatic 
and is able to adapt its institutional framework and rhetoric when confronted with 
                                                     
30 These were Commander Dr Lam Akol Ajawin and Commander Gordon Kong Chol. Both were 
members of the Political High Command 
31 This was published on the 28th of August, 1991 in a document titled: ‘Why Garang Must Go’ by the 
SPLM/SPLA-Nasir Faction led by Dr Riek Machar Teny 
32 Deng, F. M. (2010) The Paradox of southern Independence – Some Personal Reflections. Heinrich 
Bol Stifung, Democracy, Vol. 8, pp.7-11 
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moments of internal crisis, as was the case after the 1991 split and the 2004 
leadership crisis in Rumbek.” 33  The SPLM/A’s strategy of political 
accommodation has led to the amalgamation of different political forces and 
interest groups into an over-inflated institutional structure, which continually 
threatened the cohesion and ideology of the SPLM. Dr John Garang’s policy of 
accommodating political forces was well articulated in his speech at the signing 
of the CPA when he stated: 
“I want in conclusion to quote, in terms of this inclusiveness, the gospel 
according to St John, that says in St John Chapter 14, Verse 1 and 2: Do 
not be worried and upset, Jesus told them, believe in God and believe also 
in me. There are many rooms in my father’s house and I’m going to 
prepare a place for you. I would not say if it were not true. So I say to all 
southern Sudanese on the occasion of this signing of this comprehensive 
peace agreement, that there will be many rooms in an SPLM-based 
government in southern Sudan and all are welcome.”34 
 
The issue of political accommodation reflects a wider problem in terms of the 
way in which the SPLM/A demonstrates its popular legitimacy. Since its 
founding in 1983, it has struggled to establish legitimate internal democratic 
processes and instead has had to rely on ever-shifting alliances to maintain 
stability.35 This contradiction represents an ongoing problem for the movement 
that it has still not been able to resolve. In fact, the interpretations given in the 
extant literature on the Sudanese conflict do not reflect the complexity of the 
                                                     
33 Roque, P. C. (2012). The SPLM: Political Transformation or Strategic Adaptation? Sudan after 
Separation, p.68 





situation or the reasons why the SPLM/A eventually complied with the idea of 
compromise over its objectives. Indeed, Matthew LeRiche has noted that Oystein 
and others have identified this compliance as a source of ongoing confusion over 
the Movement’s ultimate objectives or, in fact, over those of its opponents. He 
adds that it is still not clear what changed in the political and military 
environment to make concessions on self-determination feasible for the NCP and 
the acceptance of Sharia possible for the SPLM/A.36 In reality, the position of the 
SPLM/A could not have been captured better than in a public letter John Garang 
de Mabior wrote in 1998, stating that: “we in the SPLA are not interested in half 
solutions, for history has taught us: either a just and final peace or no peace at 
all.”37 As will be shown, the SPLA was not only learning from past history, as 
noted by Garang, but it was also learning through interacting with its opponent at 
the negotiating table. Otherwise there would be no other way of explaining why 
the SPLM/A finally accepted a ‘half solution’ by allowing for Sharia to remain in 
force until the end of the interim period before the referendum. The aim of this 
thesis is to place the lens on the dynamic of ‘learning’ in the SPLM/A’s strategic 
decision-making in the South Sudan negotiations. 
 
Both the SPLM/A’s negotiators and the Sudanese government had to learn how to 
construct a viable agreement to end the war, not just in terms of rational decision-
making, but also with the context of the socio-political environment in which they 
operated. To appreciate this, attention needs to be paid to the actual evolution of 
the conflict and its resolution and to the way that those involved in its resolution 
                                                     
36 LeRiche, M. (2013) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, England, 21 August 
37 CDR Dr John Garang de Mabior’s letter to all SPLA units dated October 16th, 1998. Accessed from 
South Sudan Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya on 13 November 2013 
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learned from previous experiences, namely the Addis Ababa Agreement. The 
beginning of new negotiations in early 2002, which were eventually to lead to the 
CPA, were marked by a phase in the negotiating process when both parties had to 
adopt a pragmatic attitude towards each other and had to accept concessions in 
good faith. Good Faith during negotiations by warring parties is an essential 
aspect of conflict resolution as Webel notes: 
“…Conflicts may, perhaps paradoxically, promote and increase peace and 
diminish violence if the conflicting parties negotiate in good faith to reach 
solutions to problems that are achievable and tolerable, if not ideal.”38  
 
In this respect the experiences of the SPLM/A were quite different from those of 
its predecessors who had lived through the AAA in 1972 when it was they who 
had to concede to the intransigence of Northern negotiators. 
 
The SPLM/A’s delegates to the peace talks had learned that what mattered was 
not simply the process of reaching an agreement but how it was reached in terms 
of the identities and interests of the parties involved in the mediation, the 
sequencing of issues at the negotiating table and the successful negotiation of 
implementation modalities. In other words, for the SPLM/A, at least, negotiating 
techniques as applied in the construction of the CPA were the consequence of a 
learning as a reflection on past failures that had been defined by past failure as 
well as learning at the negotiating table from the enemy and third parties. 
 
At its inception, the SPLM/A was fighting to establish a unified and inclusive 
                                                     
38 Webel, C. “Toward a philosophy and metapsychology of peace” in Webel, C. and Galtung, J. eds., 
2007. Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies. Routledge. p.3 
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New Sudan, which was a shift away from the historic southern call for secession 
that had triggered the Anyanya movement. However, the 1991 split within the 
SPLM/A’s ranks, in which the newly formed SPLM/SPLA-Nasir Faction called 
for southern self- determination, saw the SPLM/A respond to the popular 
southern call for secession and accept it as one of the possible solutions to ending 
the war. For constructivist theorists, Dr John Garang’s decision to embrace 
southern secession as a possible outcome of the war was a result of his exposure 
to widespread southern demands and to the views of those SPLM/A members that 
had defected to the SPLM/SPLA Nasir Faction. Indeed, as Albert Bandura argues, 
“New patterns of behaviour can be acquired through direct experience or by 
observing the behaviour of others.”39 
 
The ultimate goal of the Anyanya movement had been restricted to southern 
secession rather than to changing the political dispensation of Sudan. It was a goal 
that ultimately restricted its appeal to southern Sudanese alone and ignored 
marginalized northern groups that were also dissatisfied with the Government of 
Sudan. Not only did Anyanya’s message of secession fail to attract marginalized 
groups in northern Sudan, but it also failed to appeal to African sentiments or to 
attract international support. The lack of regional or international involvement 
in the First Sudanese Civil War resulted in a hastily negotiated peace agreement 
that did not involve any regional or international guarantors. Furthermore, the 
Anyanya movement failed to engage regional and international actors when 
negotiating peace with the Government of Sudan because of its restricted vision. 
The SPLM/A’s approach was grounded in its ability to learn from past 
                                                     
39 Bandura, A. (1971) Social Learning Theory, New York: General Learning Press, p.3 
 
42 
experiences in Sudan, paying particular attention to the shortcomings of the 
Anyanya movement, both to inform its approach to fighting the war and to 
negotiating a peace settlement with the Government of Sudan. 
 
The learning process relates to three different dimensions of the SPLM/A’s 
actions. Firstly, it had to persuade its internal constituency of the viability of its 
approach, an issue that is addressed in Chapter 4. Secondly, it had to develop 
tools through which to engage with the Government of Sudan as is discussed in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis. Finally, it had to co-opt support from the international 
community in the process of achieving a viable and permanent solution to the 
conflict in which it was engaged, as indicated in Chapter 6. 
 
Lessons Learned from the CPA 
Looking at the history of the Second Sudanese Civil War, one can argue that the 
Sudanese peace process, which led to the signing of CPA in 2005, began as early 
as 1986. The 1986 Koka Dam Declaration saw Northern and Southern Sudanese 
stakeholders agree on key issues that included the repeal of the imposition of 
Sharia Law in Sudan and the establishment of an inclusive constitutional-making 
process. It would however take almost two decades and numerous other 
engagements for the CPA to be signed by the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLM/A. Looking at the example of the CPA, it is clear that peace processes can 
take a significant period of time and numerous engagements to succeed. Perhaps 
the time and continuous engagement was critical to developing trust between the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A thus creating an environment for 
compromise. These regular interactions were made possible through international 
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funding without which, the SPLM/A would have faced significant challenges in 
mobilising resources to travel to the various meeting venues. 
 
The latter stages of the CPA brought together decision-makers from both sides 
namely, First Vice President Ali Osman Taha on behalf of the Government of 
Sudan and Dr John Garang de Mabior on behalf of the SPLM/A. Having 
decision-makers at the negotiating table negated the constant back-and-forth that 
was evident during the Abuja I Peace Talks of 1992, the Abuja II Peace Talks of 
1993 and the various other engagements between the Government of Sudan and 
the SPLM/A. It is worth noting that the negotiations at the level of decision-
makers occurred within the backdrop of international pressure from ‘respected 
countries’ 40  that provided pressure throughout the negotiations process and 
support to both parties during the implementation of CPA.  
 
Theoretical Models and Peace Agreements 
The advent of the Cold War witnessed a considerable number of peace 
agreements aimed at ending conflicts worldwide. Examples can be drawn from 
the 1993 end of Apartheid in South Africa, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that 
led to a ceasefire between the British Government and the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the 1995 Dayton Agreement that led to the end of 
the Bosnian War. As Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke point out: “the Post 
Cold War years have witnessed a steady proliferation of peace processes and 
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agreements aimed at ending violent social conflict.” 41  Various theoretical 
approaches have attempted to explain conflict resolution. Zartman for example 
argues that conditions must be ripe for a peace settlement to occur.42 This study 
argues however, that the adoption by the SPLM/A of a strategy leading to a 
negotiated outcome of the war in Sudan was the result of a learning process 
undertaken by the Movement in response to the failure of its predecessor, 
Anyanya, in the 1972 AAA as well as the result of learning at the negotiating 
table. In order to demonstrate this I see learning as a part of a process of social 
interaction, after pointing out the shortcomings of other theoretical analyses of the 
conflict in Sudan. In developing such an analysis, I consider the relevant literature 
on the Sudanese conflict and on social learning processes by notable writers such 
as Francis Mading Deng, Douglas H. Johnson, Robert Collins and others in order 
to present an analysis of the way in which the SPLM/A negotiated a viable peace 
agreement. 
 
Inadequacies in the Literature 
Recent literature has revealed the ontological weakness of the liberal discourse in 
conflict resolution and the assumption that conflicts ‘can be brought to an end’ 
through the imposition of Western liberal democracy.43 Fetherstone suggests that 
a reconsideration of the premises of liberal peace-building is essential, starting 
from its language. The liberal discourse has been supported by a dichotomist 
notion of peace and conflict that sees conflicts as inherently ‘bad’ that need ‘to be 
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solved’. Heathershaw disassembled the idea of liberal peace to show that the 
peace sought for in liberal peace-building is no longer a social event but the result 
of conflict practices: “from the end of the Cold War a shift occurred from an 
understanding of peace as a state of affairs in a given territory to peace as a 
process of post conflict intervention.”44  Anthropology has given an important 
contribution to the formulation of the debate. Richards proposes an ethnographic 
approach to conflict and peace “which brings war back within the range of social 
possibilities” whereby peace-war- peace should be examined in a continuum.45 
The language of conflict transformation supported the argument, as it seemed to 
describe the dialectic nature of social conflicts, lodged naturally in human 
relationships, better than conflict resolution. 46  Liberation movements such as 
SPLM/A are then seen as an expression of their state and society and of agents of 
change. Kriesberg talked of ‘constructive conflicts’ and proposed an interpretative 
approach to look at the way in which people can increase the benefit of social 
conflict in order to reduce its destructive component.47 Conflict transformation 
has not received enough scholarly attention but the meaningfulness of relationship 
and social interactions is increasingly seen as a powerful tool in the practice of 
peace building and more relevant, given emerging notions of local peace- 
building.82 State and society relationships in fact have emerged as an important 
lens through which to understand political as well as developmental dynamics in 
relation to peace and conflict in contemporary Africa.48 
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In supporting the debate on the ontological weaknesses of conflict resolution 
theory with its state-centric, ideologically liberal, Hobbesian bias and in 
strengthening the scant theory on the transformation of rebels into partners in 
peace processes, this thesis uses a one-case study methodology to provide as 
precise an explanation as possible of the process of transformation of the 
SPLM/A through the implementation of the CPA. 
 
The critical military, diplomatic, and political changes in strategy that the 
SPLM/A undertook during different phases of its insurgency demonstrated the 
Movement’s ability and capacity to learn and adapt. Sociologists and 
psychologists have identified pain as the mobilising factor that makes people and 
organisations change behaviour and the SPLM/A has certainly had its share of 
painful crises as the result of both external and internal factors, namely the fall of 
of Mengistu’s Government in 1991 and the split within the SPLM/A in the same 
year. This has helped it to appreciate the importance of learning to be flexible in 
its approaches to the problems it has faced. 
 
Furthermore, once a transformative crisis of the kind experienced by the SPLM/A 
develops, the painful consequences of it are felt throughout the Movement so that 
the need for strategic or tactical change is made clear. However, it requires the top 
leadership to take the necessary action to absorb changes in the conflict 
environment and to act on that information with appropriate political, diplomatic, 
and military responses. In essence, therefore, the leadership depends on the 
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movement’s capacity for institutional learning – the process whereby decision-
makers can change shared mental models of their organisation, their strategies, 
and their operational environment. Conversely, the ability of decision-makers 
within an organisation to learn and adapt to changed circumstances is also 
affected by the conflict environment and the capacity of the movement to make 
such modifications in its behaviour.49 
 
From the 1960s to the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number of 
guerrilla movements have emerged in Africa.50 Some of these armed groups did 
not succeed while others obviously succeeded in obtaining their goals, in part or 
in full. What made the difference? A series of articles edited into a book by 
Christopher Clapham showed that a number of guerrilla movements such as the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) in the 1990s tended to be more successful when the 
liberators were actively learning from the environment in which they were 
operating. 51  Recent research on organisational learning by Lise Howard has 
argued that: 
“Rather than seeking to impose preconceived notions about how the 
missions should unfold, peacekeeping is at its best when the peacekeepers  
– both civilians and military – take their cues from the local population, 
and not UN Headquarters, about how best to implement mandates.”52 
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Since its formation in 1983, the SPLM/A can be said to be one of the most 
successfully organised rebel movements in the world. 53  Bona Malwal, a 
prominent Southern Sudanese politician who lived in exile during the Second 
Civil War, admitted that: “Garang may well not enjoy the support he would need 
to defeat Sudan’s Central Government forces and seat himself in Khartoum, but if 
history is any guide, neither will the impoverished Sudanese Government defeat a 
guerrilla army which already seems better organised and better manned than 
anything the Sudan has yet seen.”54 James Wani Igga, one of the top leaders of 
the SPLM/A asserted that “the popularity of this unique People’s Liberation 
Struggle that became evident hardly one year after its birth was due to its 
sweeping military victories.”55 
 
What explains the sweeping military victories enjoyed by the SPLM/A is an 
interesting question. The key internal development for the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement was that it learned to adapt to changing circumstances 
during the early years of liberation process and was then able to tailor its 
objectives to fit realities. 56  This flexibility of approach was possible largely 
because of the Movement’s organisational capacity to institutionalize change and 
to adapt to changing domestic and international conflict environments. In part it 
was a consequence of ‘learning’ – from the experience of dealing with the North 
and appreciating the changing nature of government there, from Jaf’ar Nimeiri to 
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Sadiq al-Mahdi and Hassan Turabi and finally to Omar al-Bashir. The resumption 
of the conflict after the failure of the AAA offered the SPLM/A a chance to ‘get it 
right this time around.’ It started the new round of conflict by correcting what had 
gone wrong during the Anyanya war, particularly the organisational 
shortcomings, but it was confronted by its own internal contradictions. This led to 
a split eleven years after it had been founded and this event, amongst others, led 
the movement to radically adapt its organisational structures in order to ensure 
ultimate success. 
 
Learning and Constructivism 
This thesis will not review the various pedagogical models of learning in the 
discipline of Education. However, these are useful pointers that will help in 
developing a model of learning that is relevant in the context of conflict 
resolution. Two schools of thought – behavioural psychology and cognitive 
psychology – approach the concept of learning from differing angles. Learning, 
according to behaviourism, is seen as a change in the behavioural dispositions of 
an organism. Learning behaviours, according to behavioural psychologists, can be 
shaped by selective reinforcement. Because learning is equated with behavioural 
outcomes, behavioural laws exclude the role of mental operations.57 Unlike the 
behaviourists, who are only concerned with what learners do, cognitive 
psychologists are interested in what learners know and how they come to acquire 
their knowledge. In this latter perspective, the learner interacts with the 
environment and acquires knowledge, skills, and competence from it.58 
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Constructivist Psychologists view learning as an active constructive process. In 
other words, individuals actively construct or create their own subjective 
representations of objective reality. For Constructivist Psychologists such as 
Bruner, new information is linked to prior knowledge, suggesting that learning is 
a subjective process whereby the learner processes information based on his or 
her prior experiences.59 Therefore, Constructivism sees ‘knowing’ as a process of 
actively interpreting and constructing individual knowledge representations. How 
one constructs knowledge is a function of previous experiences, of mental 
structures, and of beliefs that one uses to interpret objects and events. 60 
Constructivism claims that learners can only interpret information in the context 
of their own experiences, and that what they interpret will to some extent be 
individualistic, for learning is internally controlled and mediated by the learner. 
Constructivism holds important lessons on how to interpret the results of learning 
and how to design environments to support learning. Those environments must 
engage learners in negotiating meaning and in socially constructing reality.61 
 
Like Constructivist Psychologists, Behaviourists view learning as being 
subjective by emphasizing that changes in behavior are a result of stimulus-
response to information by the learner. As Parkay and Hass note: “an individual 
selects one response instead of another because of prior conditioning and 
psychological drives existing at the moment of the action.” 62  Constructivist 
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Psychologists and Behaviourists diverge in their view of how learning takes place 
however. Cognitive Psychologists consider learning as an inner cognitive process, 
whereas Behaviourists see learning as a result of acquired habits. 
 
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, the chief mediator of the IGAD mediated 
negotiation, in Machakos, told the author that the disputants arrived at the talks 
with no goals because they were not expecting an agreement.63 An interview 
given by John Garang de Mabior to the press in Nairobi two years prior to the 
talks at Machakos confirmed this when he said: “the Khartoum government will 
not abandon Sharia, and the South refuses to be governed by it.”64 It is clear in 
this statement as in many others made by Garang, that there was little expectation 
that an agreement could be reached. Certainly international pressure, together 
with realities of the situation on the ground, drove the parties to the negotiating 
table, but objectives and goals only emerged from the actual activity of 
negotiation. It was only through the process of negotiations that the SPLM/A and 
the Government of Sudan were able to develop positions, which ultimately led to 
the signing of the CPA. Constructivist theory would argue that the SPLM/A 
shaped its negotiation stance in terms of the experiences gained through its 
interactions with the Government of Sudan and the lessons it learned from such 
experiences. 
 
Madaus, G. F., Scriven, M., & Stufflebeam, D. L. developed the concept of goal-
free evaluation in 1983, arguing that in evaluating programmes one should not 
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take into account the goals of the programme because that might contaminate the 
findings and prevent the evaluator from identifying unexpected consequences and 
effects. 65  In addition, evaluation in constructivist environments is context 
dependent.66 However, one of the weaknesses and criticisms of the constructivist 
approach is its apparent inability to evaluate learning.67 Eisner argues that in some 
instances specifying objectives is very useful and appropriate, but in most cases 
those objectives will emerge from the activities of the class itself.68 
 
The various approaches to constructivism in International Relations69 all argue 
that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give 
meaning to the material world.70 Constructivists believe that the human capacity 
for reflection or learning has its greatest impact on the manner in which 
individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world and cognitively 
frame the world they know, experience and understand. 71  This distinction 
between individual and social actors leads to differentiation between personal 
constructivism and social constructivism. The major difference between the two 
approaches has to do with the locus of knowledge construction. For personal 
constructivists, knowledge is constructed in the head of the learner while he or 
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she is re-organizing his or her experiences and cognitive structures.72 For the 
social constructivists, knowledge is constructed in communities of practice 
through social interaction. 73  For the purpose of this thesis, I will assume, 
following Charalambos Vrasidas, that knowledge is constructed both through 
social interaction and in the learner's mind.74 Since the identities, interests and 
behaviour of political agents are therefore socially constructed by collective 
meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world as well as being 
internally generated75, the main goal of constructivist explanations will be to 
provide theoretical and empirical explanations of social institutions and social 
change, through the combined effect of individual agents and social structures.76 
 
The Sudanese Experience 
The SPLM/A was formed in July 1983 as a politico-military movement with a 
primary political objective – the liberation of the Sudanese peoples from 
exploitation by the central government in order to establish a New Sudan, which 
would be united, secular, socialist and democratic. Through this New Sudan 
vision its commander and founder, Dr John Garang de Mabior, reframed the 
‘Southern question’ that had fueled the struggle of the Southern Sudanese against 
Khartoum since 1947, as ‘the fundamental problem of Sudan’. 
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The SPLM/A was a military organisation which by necessity started in Southern 
Sudan but became a national liberation movement, championing the freedom of 
marginalized Southerners and Northern African populations, Arab democrats, 
secular communists, women and youth fighting to liberate themselves from the 
socio- economic and political marginalisation imposed by regimes in Khartoum.77 
The New Sudan vision was both a political ideology and a method, as well as an 
objective of the struggle. During the civil war, the SPLM/A encompassed 
socialist and liberal ideas in search of ideological allies to achieve this New 
Sudan, shifting its ideological preferences from East to West at the end of the 
Cold War. As a result, given the absence of a clear political ideology, the 
SPLM/A remained a military movement during the conflict while its political 
organisation was never properly institutionalised. The SPLM, as a movement was 
really only used as an institutional cover for diplomatic initiatives, for 
mobilisation throughout Sudan and abroad, and for humanitarian assistance in the 
liberated areas but not as an ideological vehicle. 
 
The New Sudan vision gained sympathy in the international arena but created 
internal rifts within the leadership and amongst the southern populations 
concerned only with independence for Southern Sudan from the North. For a 
decade the SPLM/A split into two main factions and other local groups, while 
some Southerners allied with Khartoum against the SPLM/A, increasing the 
militarisation of Southern Sudan and weakening the core group’s demands. 
During the 1990s the vision of the SPLM/A was redefined to include the right of 
self-determination for the southern Sudanese as affirmed in the SPLM/A’s first 
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ever convention, the 1994 Chukudum Convention. That led to the reunification of 
the various factions but the New Sudan vision was not thereafter consistently 
shared by all in the Movement. Nonetheless given its normative vision of a united 
Sudan, the SPLM/A could put itself forward as a viable negotiating partner for the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) so that the CPA could be signed in January 2005, 
thus ending one of longest civil wars on the African continent. 
 
The CPA provided a framework to solve ‘the fundamental problem of Sudan’ and 
to realise the dual objectives of the SPLM/A struggle – a New Sudan and the self- 
determination option for the Southern Sudanese. The CPA was a liberal peace 
agreement that sought both the democratic transformation of Sudan and 
sustainable peace throughout the country through specific power-sharing and 
security arrangements and a referendum for self-determination for South 
Sudanese at the end of a six-year interim period. In reality, however, the CPA 
negotiations amounted to a compromise for both the SPLM/A and the 
Government of Sudan involving minimal adherence to the New Sudan vision for 
either side. Whereas the SPLM/A obtained the self-determination option and the 
military and political control over Southern Sudan, it could not obtain the 
abolition of Sharia Law, making the realisation of a new secular Sudan much 
more of a challenge. The CPA thus did not resolve the grievances between North 
and South, but became a tool to end the war by creating a transitional ‘one-
country-two systems’ model, with the two warring parties and now partners in 
peace individually retaining political and military control of their own major 
constituencies. The CPA thus effectively transformed the SPLM/A into a 
nationwide political party alongside the ruling party, the National Congress 
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(NCP), in the new Sudan institutions, marginalizing the opposition and civil 
society at the national and Southern levels, in order to ‘make unity attractive’ 
within the interim period of six years in order to realise the dual objectives of the 
New Sudan as enshrined in the agreement. The actual structure of the CPA, 
however, together with the military postures of its signatories, made those 
objectives – sustainable peace and democracy in Sudan - exceptionally difficult to 
achieve. 
 
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to identify the learning process experienced by 
the SPLM/A and the subsequent negotiations that led to the CPA. The thesis first 
uses the existing literature to establish the existing explanations of the processes 
by which peace agreements are achieved and then applies them to the Sudanese 
conflict to establish what are the inadequacies in such explanations before 
proposing amendments to them to answer the following questions: 
1) How was the CPA made possible and why did it occur in the way in which 
it did? 
2) How did the SPLM/A use the flaws it perceived in the Addis Ababa 
Agreement to adapt its war strategies and bargaining mechanisms in the 
CPA negotiation process some thirty years later? 
3) Were patterns of political, diplomatic and military strategies adopted by 
the SPLM as a consequence of what it had learned from its previous 
experiences of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and what had changed in its 
behaviour? 
4) How did the learning process involved help the SPLM/A manage its 




As the prominent southern Sudanese politicians Joseph Oduho and William Deng 
Nhial observed, conflict in Sudan was a result of the northern policy of political, 
administrative, educational, economic, social and religious subjugation of the 
southern Sudanese. 78  For liberal conflict resolution theorists, removing the 
subjugation faced by southern Sudanese would automatically result in peace in 
Sudan. Newman et al view the “...promotion of democracy, market-based 
economic reforms and a wide range of other institutions associated with ‘modern’ 
states as driving force for building ‘peace’.”79 
 
The capacity of negotiations to terminate a conflict, as opposed to confirming a 
military victory, is rather a controversial matter in itself, especially if the expected 
outcomes relate to sustainable peace and self-determination. Quantitative research 
has revealed the weakness of conflict resolution as a mechanism to achieve 
sustainable peace and self-determination, at least as far as the twentieth century is 
concerned. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) together with the Peace 
Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management (CIDCM) used a longer timeframe to show that whilst 
there had been a decline in conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the frequency 
of armed conflict in 2006 was still roughly twice what it had been in 1946.80 The 
wave of enthusiasm for conflict resolution was, furthermore, tempered by the 
realisation that peace agreements are not a universally recognized way of 
formally ending conflict; violent intrastate conflicts are ended more frequently 
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without formal agreements. 81  Indeed, conflicts that terminate in a negotiated 
settlement are generally more prone to failure; a study of such formal peace 
agreements between 1989 and 2005 reveals that 40 per cent of conflicts ended by 
negotiated settlement returned to violence within five years. Finally, within the 
range of peace agreements that have been achieved, liberal solutions based on 
solely political approaches to resolving conflict are the least successful. 82 
Evidence from Africa demonstrates this; the number of conflicts in the continent 
increased after 1990, mainly because of failed attempts to resolve prior conflict 
through political mechanisms.83 Peace agreements, in fact, tend to freeze local 
dynamics, thus forcing social conflict into patterns that are easily interpretable 
within the Liberal Paradigm. Yet most African states are trapped in a circle of 
underdevelopment, which stimulates societal conflict so that the liberal agenda 
confronts ‘massive challenges to its successful realisation’.84  
 
External attempts to export replicas of Western liberal democratic states can, 
ironically enough, repress popular accountability of government and thus the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens: yet state legitimacy is the key to 
building peace in post-conflict situations. 85  By interlinking peace-building 
strategies with the wider project of state-building, Western intervention can have 
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the adverse effect of undermining the sustainability of peace. The de-
politicization of ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ through such liberal assumptions has 
permitted the introduction of universal and technical solutions to resolve conflict 
situations. These disregard local power relations, politics and history – 
reproducing what Adorno has called the ‘administrated state’ within a political 
vacuum – hence missing the goal of achieving sustainable peace and 
democracy.86 
 
In addition, in the Third World, global security concerns have superseded state 
sovereignty and the political process, preventing a natural evolutionary process in 
conflict resolution to emerge, as it had done in Europe, where the survival 
imperative reinforced the internal legitimacy and authority of the state.87 Liberal 
peace agreements thus become the symbol of the mechanical and de-
contextualized implementation of liberal peace and democracy as a normative 
ideal, against the complexity of ‘new wars’ encountered on the ground.88 The use 
of such agreements was justified by a liberal optimism, which allowed for a 
subjective and short-term evaluation of outcomes solely in terms of the 
institutions provided for in an agreement – political parties and a Weberian state – 
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irrespective of their effectiveness in practice.89 Conflict resolution literature has, 
however, begun to acknowledge that past evaluations of successful outcomes 
have often been short- term in their approach and has focused on formal technical 
implementation issues rather than internal social dynamics (namely on issues such 
as security reform, market liberalization and electoral practices; in other words, 
on issues of speed of introduction of ad hoc institutions regardless of their actual 
functioning). 90  Stedman has recognised that the narrow focus of conflict 
resolution misses the possible long- term benefits of peace-building and has 
pointed out that: 
“Priority should be given to demobilisation of soldiers and the 
demilitarisation of politics, which is the transformation of soldiers into 
civilians and warring parties into political parties; in the absence, civil 
wars cannot be brought to an end.”91 
 
However practitioners have read Stedman’s warning as an invitation to strengthen 
security sector reform and disarmament programmes as opposed to understanding 
the complexity that the study of human relations and agencies entails. The 
defenders of the liberal democracy paradigm have explained their predicament 
over the failure of their preferred model as a consequence of the tendency of post-
conflict Third World countries to establish one-party states de jure or de facto It 
has been this tendency, they contend, that has blocked the democratization they 
had anticipated. Their focus, therefore, switched to the problem of how to 
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strengthen ‘weak parties’ – previously the rebel movements – so that they would 
contest elections rather than threaten democratic stability.92 After all, as Reilly 
points out, ‘It is difficult to imagine how the governance of modern states could 
be accomplished without meaningful political parties.93 A study of the internal 
dynamics of rebel groups during a struggle, their underlying motives in signing a 
peace agreement, the strategic interests of the parties in using an agreement as an 
extension of the dynamics of war, or leadership motivations, strategies and 




This thesis seeks, in effect, to determine the role of learning in conflict situations 
and in their management. We shall use the experience of the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLM/A), in negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that led to 
the achievement of independence of South Sudan as the case study. It took South 
Sudan some forty years to establish an equitable basis for relations with the 
North, the Republic of Sudan. This long period of adjustment to a new political 
reality was due both to misperceptions of the nature of the struggle within the 
liberation movement in the South and to the inability of the government in the 
North to appreciate its own failures of governance – as, for over forty years, 
successive governments in Khartoum endeavoured to unite a disparate nation 
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through the policies of Arabization and Islamization.94 This latter concern was 
particularly evident in its response to popular mobilisation in the South. For 
instance, Anyanya started as a force a few hundred strong in 1955 but when the 
first stage of the conflict ended in 1972 its strength had risen to several thousands 
fighters. This upward growth in the numerical strength of rebel groups was 
repeated with the rise of the SPLA in the early 1980s. This had begun through 
mutinies involving a few hundred men but rapidly grew to a numerical strength of 
over one hundred thousand by the time the war ended in 2005. The repeated 
inability of the Central Government in Khartoum politically to contain rebellions 
at moments when they were still manageable, and the recurrence of insurgencies 
demanding solutions to the unchanged issues revealed its serious lack of will to 
resolve the conflict which one of my interviewees described as “Khartoum’s 
failure to demonstrate any change of attitude towards the South.”95 But Khartoum 
must have eventually changed its attitude towards the South in order to sign the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which forced it to share power with the rebels 
it had sought to destroy for more than twenty years. 
 
For over two decades, efforts to resolve the intractable Sudanese conflict that had 
begun in 1983 proved to be exercises in futility until 2002, when both the 
SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan underwent changes of attitudes, admitting 
that the nature and the history of the conflict meant that a military solution could 
not bring lasting peace and stability.96 This thesis aims to show that part of the 
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difficulty in reaching this consensus was due to the fact that one party, the 
SPLM/A, was determined to reach an agreement with the North based on its 
knowledge of past southern experiences. In other words, the SPLM/A resolved 
never to repeat the mistakes associated with the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. 
It did not want to end up with another flawed peace settlement as that would 
amount to nothing more than a pause in the conflict as the Anyanya movement 
had discovered. The CPA on the other hand brought a lasting peace for Sudan. As 
Dr John Garang affirmed during the signing of the CPA, “your movement, the 
SPLM-SPLA, and the National Congress Party government have delivered to you 
a comprehensive peace agreement. A just and honourable peace which we have 
signed today and which you have all witnessed.”97 
                                                                                                                                                        
April 17th 2013 




Chapter 2: Learning in Conflict Resolution 
 
International Relations theorists such as Viotti and Kaupi, Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, and Both and Smith view the field of International Relations from 
either an empirical or normative approach. The empirical approach seeks to 
explain why certain phenomena occur through a review of cause and effect. 
Whilst the normative approach prescribes what should be done in dealing with 
those phenomena.98 And since we need a theory to support our argument it is a 
purpose of this chapter to present a theoretical and conceptual framework 
focusing on a learning model, which this thesis tends to employ throughout.  In 
essence, it argues that the adoption by the SPLM/A of a strategy leading to a 
negotiated outcome of the war in Sudan was the result of a learning process 
undertaken by the movement in response to the failure of its predecessor, 
Anyanya, in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA). In order to demonstrate 
this, a constructivist approach is adopted, seeing ‘learning’ as part of a process of 
social interaction, after having demonstrated the shortcomings of other theoretical 
analyses of the conflict in Sudan. In developing such an analysis, it considers the 
relevant literature on the Sudanese conflict and on social learning processes, in 
order to develop a novel interpretation of the way in which the SPLM/A’s 
negotiators learned how to construct a viable agreement to end the war in the 
creation of South Sudan through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a 
point that has been overlooked by virtually all previous analyses of the CPA. First 
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alternative theoretical approaches to the Sudanese conflict are examined before 
considering the intellectual evolution that the SPLM/A underwent as it 
learned to avoid the pitfalls of the AAA in the negotiations leading up to the 
CPA. The chapter concludes by examining what ‘learning’ is and then develops a 
concept of learning by doing to demonstrate how this concept helped in the 
negotiating process. 
 
Perspectives on the Sudanese Conflict 
The Sudanese conflict can be understood by looking back into what has been 
written about the conflict itself, its root causes and its management. But lets first 
ask what is a theory? A theory is an attempt to reach general conclusions about a 
broad body of material.99 While a comprehensive survey of conflict resolution 
theories would take up more space than is available here due the fact that the 
study of conflict has been the Centre of focus for over two thousand years100, a 
brief classification of the literature may help to clarify the purpose of this 
dissertation and situate it within the wider field. In the following sections, the 
major approaches that have been adopted by scholars of the Sudanese conflict in 
order to explain its nature are outlined. But before that, it is worth mentioning that 
the North-South distinction and the deep-rooted hostility between the two regions 
were grounded in religious conflict as well as a conflict between peoples of 
differing culture and language. The language and culture of the North were and 
still are based on Arabic and the Islamic faith, whereas the South had its own 
diverse cultures, religious beliefs and languages. The apparent differences 
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between the Northern and Southern regions of Sudan were reflected in the British 
colonial administration’s policy towards the Sudan. Indeed, “Until 1946 British 
administrators sought to develop the South along its own lines, building up a 
series of self-contained tribal units based upon traditional customs and 
organisations.” 101  The Christian missionaries that were introduced to Sudan, 
along with the British administration, to provide education and healthcare to the 
southern regions of the country influenced the religious dispensation of the 
southern Sudanese who converted to Christianity and thus further entrenched the 
differences that existed between them and their Northern countrymen. 
 
Root Causes of the Sudanese Conflict 
The root causes of the Sudan conflict are interrelated and are best explained by 
the Liberal Paradigm, which emphasises inequality as the root cause of modern 
conflict. In the Sudan, it is clear that marginalisation, in terms of political, 
economic, social, ethnic, cultural and religious are the root causes of Sudan’s two 
civil wars. This marginalisation can be traced back to when its border was 
artificially drawn by a series of foreign invaders. Foreign influence in the Sudan 
began when a group of Arab traders arrived in the Sudan in the 16th Century. This 
influence was deepened when Egyptians sailed up the Nile and established 
contact with the already settled Arab population especially along the bank of the 
Nile. The Egyptian presence in Sudan paved the way for the arrival of Turks who 
formed the Turko-Egyptian administration in the mid-19th Century. The late 19th 
Century saw an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium established in Sudan, replacing 
the previously existing Turko-Egyptian rule. For Britain, its alliance with Egypt 
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was critical to its successful colonization of Sudan. Indeed, as Dowden notes: 
“The British had the guns to seize Sudan but not the manpower to rule it. 
So they used Egyptian civil servants and kept in place and retrained 
Sudanese officials who had served the Mahdi and Ottoman rulers.”102 
 
The end of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium resulted in forced unity between 
the North and the South, with General Fabian Agamlong Guem acknowledging 
that, “when the British added the separate entity of the South to the rest of Sudan 
they used the excuse that it was part of the Ottoman Empire.”103 
 
Traditional approaches to conflict analysis in Africa observes that, “all armed 
conflict in Africa are ethnic, tribal, cultural or religious.”104 As Levinger notes: 
“Intrastate conflict is particularly likely in countries whose leaders are able to 
control a state for the exclusive benefit of their clan or ethnic group, as in post-
independent Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq and contemporary Sudan.”105 
 
Ashutosh Varshney in an article titled Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and 
Rationality notes that ethnicity “is used in two different ways. In the narrower, 
popularly understood sense, ethnic groups are racial or linguistic groups.” 106 
There is however, a broader meaning as well. As Donald Horowitz states: “all 
conflicts, based on ascriptive – that’s birth based group identities, real or 
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imagined – race, language, religion, tribe or caste can be called ethnic.”107 On his 
part, Nagel defines ethnicity in a broad way to subsume nationalism, race, 
religious and linguistic groups, while pointing to the historical and contextual 
fluidity of these terms and, therefore, to their socially constructed character.108 
 
Writing in 1990, Pederson noted that, “ethnic conflict, political violence, and 
wars that presently shape many parts of Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America have deep-seated structural causes.”109 Furthermore, proponents of the 
Primordialist school of thought argue that conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is a 
result of an internal issue based on ethnic suspicions.110 Bowd and Chikwanha 
take this argument further by observing that the outbreak of intrastate conflict can 
arise when ethnic groups seek greater autonomy or strive to create an independent 
state for themselves.111 Lake and Rothchild on the other hand argue that conflict 
can arise when “ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty.”112 In other 
words, when there is social uncertainty or social strife, ethnic communities band 
together and form cohesion along ethnic lines in order to face potential threats 
from ‘outsiders’. 
 
Conflict in Sudan can be explained as a war based on differences. As Oduho and 
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Deng observed “the Southerner feels himself to be an African, while the ruling 
Northerner is proud of his Arab connections… This is why Southerners see the 
problem today as a fight for racial equality.”113 As Hauss explains: “ southern 
resistance flared up again in 1983, when the government imposed sharia on the 
entire country the southerners, being Christians; opposed the use of Muslim law 
and the oppression of their people that came with it.” 114  However, a recent 
research paper by Pagalia (2013), has argued that ethnicity does not, in itself, 
explain conflict, but that exploitation of such factors by political actors for 
political and economic purposes shapes conflicts as being ethnic in nature. 115 
Although religious and ethnic differences may provide leaders with the rhetoric 
for mobilisation, they do not sufficiently incorporate the roles of other factors in 
contributing to civil conflict. For Anders Breidlid, “The implementation of the 
Sharia Law was a major blow to the Addis Ababa Agreement and the 
Constitution of 1973 and was therefore a trigger to the ‘Second Civil War’.”116 
Indeed, the removal of the so-called September Laws, which had introduced 
Sharia Law, had been one of the unyielding demands of the South since 1983. 
 
It can also be argued that the Sudanese state underwent a crisis of identity, which 
pitted the North against the South and thus triggered the two Sudanese civil wars. 
The people of Northern Sudan identify themselves as an Arab and Islamic people, 
whereas Southern Sudan is inhabited by Black Africans who embraced 
Christianity as a result of British administration. Explanations of identity have 
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tended to be adopted to explain the internal wars of African states, in particular, 
given the unalterable nature of African frontiers, decided upon by heterogeneity 
of many African states untouched, thus severely hindering effective nation-
building.117  
 
Francis Deng defined identity as the way individuals and groups defined 
themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, 
language and culture. 118  Typically, such crises of identity are said to be 
engendered by the complex ethnic and sectarian structures of many post-colonial 
African states. Francis Deng supports this analysis and argues that cultural 
heterogeneity and differences in identity were the causes of division within the 
population.119 He highlighted the domination of the minority ‘Arabized’ section 
of the population over the non-Muslim, non-Arab majority as the underlying 
cause of conflict, explicitly stating that, “It was the attendant exclusiveness with 
an imbibed form of assimilation and rejection of other elements aside the 
dominating sect that depicts the cause for struggles.”120 Thus, this was the way in 
which the foundation of crisis in Sudan was established.121 Yet, whilst issues of 
identity influence the development of civil conflict, like ethnicity issues they do 
not fully capture every aspect for they ignore objective considerations, such as 
resource access and subjective factors such as the competing political behaviours 
of elites and leaderships. 
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Muhammad Ihsan Qadir and Rafique A Khan suggest that most of the conflicts in 
Africa emerged as an expression of economic and social deprivations. 122 
According to Francis Stewart, there are three types of social and economic factors 
that can provoke civil wars: namely, group inequality; private motivation and 
failure of the social contract. 123  As such, proponents of Greed Theory view 
conflict as a result of “sharp horizontal inequalities between groups in conflict, 
with economically underprivileged groups denied access to political power.”124 
Collier and Hoeffler, who have written widely on the economic background to 
conflict, particularly in Africa, have argued that most wars are usually caused by 
struggles for resources, for they provide potent reasons for division in otherwise 
homogeneous societies.125 Their work also argued that heterogeneous societies 
are no more prone to factionalism than homogeneous ones, thereby contradicting 
Francis Deng’s characterization of the Sudanese conflict as being caused by 
competing visions of multiple identities.126  As soon as Collier and Hoeffler’s 
thesis on economic causes of civil war was published, a number of scholars 
applied its arguments to the Sudanese conflict. Francis Stewart for example 
concluded that the root causes of violent conflict in developing countries like 
Sudan are usually not far removed from economic and social costs they 
involve.127 In a similar fashion, Suleiman argues that, “The war in the South is 
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best understood as resulting from opposing political approached to the reality of 
diminishing resources.”128 
 
Switzer has argued that competing claims over access to and control over the oil 
fields exacerbated the conflict in Sudan.129  The argument has to be nuanced, 
however, for the conflict actually began prior to the discovery of oil, so that the 
chronology of the conflict is also of importance in determining the role that oil 
played. For example, the word ‘oil’ does not appear in the Addis Ababa 
Agreement text, yet the discovery of oil contributed to the collapse of the 
Agreement, thus highlighting an important lesson in our understanding of peace 
agreements: peace can fail as a result of unforeseen consequences. The only hope 
of reversing such an event depends not on built-in mechanisms but rather on the 
willingness of actors to continue to cooperate in addressing future crises. In 
reality though, one side’s greed prevented it from being able to share oil wealth 
with the other; instead it used its revenues to finance the conflict, thereby dashing 
any hope of an equitable peace. 
 
Yet, even if economic factors did figure prominently in the Sudanese conflict, the 
Greed Theory “… disregards the dynamics of resource distribution within states 
and therefore the formation of economic group inequalities has largely been 
overlooked.” 130  Another instance that challenges this theory of economic 
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opportunism is as follows. The then President of Sudan, Nimeiri, offered a peace 
package based on the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement to the SPLM/A in the mid-
1980s, offering the SPLM/A’s leader, John Garang, the position of Vice President 
of Sudan, including a free hand to administer Southern Sudan on Nimeiri’s 
behalf, but Garang, in a public response, assured the Southern Sudanese that the 
SPLM/A would never betray the Sudanese people by negotiating a bad peace with 
their oppressors.131 
 
In a recent research paper, Aleksi Ylonen criticizes Greed Theory as applied to 
Sudan pointing out that it was not principally rebel economic opportunities that 
lay behind the two southern rebellions, but rather rebel socio-economic 
grievances derived from culturally and regionally imposed political 
marginalization, which sparked off the conflict. 132  Ylonen explains that the 
mutiny in the oil-rich region in the South was expressly related to Sudanese 
government policies designed to undermine Southern autonomy, rather than to 
insurgent economic opportunism. Ylonen argues that the Collier-Hoeffer 
framework is insufficient for interpreting the Sudanese conflicts because it cannot 
accommodate culturally and regionally defined political marginalization or the 
socio-economic consequences that follow these factors. 133  Equally, Qadir and 
Khan have challenged the application of the Collier-Hoffler Greed Theory, 
arguing that Greed Theory has selective relevance instead of universal 
application.134 In the same vein, William Reno noted that, “violent appropriation 
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of resources can emerge as part of a larger set of political strategies that predate 
these rent-seeking opportunities, rather than a cause of conflict in the first 
instance.”135 
 
Although Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall support the Coiller-Hoffler argument 
observing that, “...most African conflicts are caused by the combination of 
poverty and weak state institutions”136, the Collier-Hoeffler model is too narrow 
to explain the root causes of Sudan’s North-South conflict because a combination 
of factors underpinned its civil wars. Indeed, Douglas Johnson observes that 
“...religion, local perceptions of race, and social status, economic exploitation, 
and colonial and post- colonial interventions are all elements in Sudan’s civil 
war.”137 This returns us to the importance of the Liberal Paradigm in explaining 
conflict, since for writers such as Johnson; there were a number of factors that 
underscored conflict in the Sudan. 
 
A year after the signing of the Comprehensive peace Agreement in 2005, the 
Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (2006) concluded that “The root causes of 
the communal inter and intra-tribal and ethicized regional conflicts in Sudan 
could be seen in the competition over meagre and dwindling natural resources and 
political power positions.”138 Similarly, Baker (2011), on the eve of the secession 
of South Sudan from Sudan, noted that, “Mutual distrust, repeated retaliation, 
unfair allocation of resources, and poor governance have resulted in a devastating 
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civil war.”139 Le Riche and Matthew Arnold, in a recent book, argued that 
the root causes of the Sudanese conflict were exponentially expanding 
grievances driven by ever widening numbers of actors. 140  No doubt all these 
factors - ethnicity, sectarianism, identity, and resources access - can, in general, 
play a part in inciting conflict but they do not, either individually or collectively, 
allow us to generate a convincing explanation for the way in which the SPLM/A 
was eventually able to find a solution to the conflict. For that to be achieved, 
attention needs to be paid to the actual evolution of the conflict and to the way 
that those involved in its resolution learned from experience how that could be 
achieved. Furthermore, serious scholarly work on the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), has exclusively focused on the character of the agreements 
themselves, pointing out the weaknesses and strengths of each whilst completely 
ignoring aspects of the process by which they were achieved. 
 
In the case of the Sudan, it is clear that inequality, whether social, economic, 
ethnic, cultural, political or religious precipitated the conflict. These various 
contributing factors to the Sudanese conflicts can be addressed through the 
application of the Liberal Paradigm on conflict Resolution. Levinger 
acknowledges the mitigation of inequality in developing countries such as 
Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, Nigeria, India, Bolivia, Cambodia and Malaysia, 
which developed a formula of inclusiveness.141 This formula encompasses power 
sharing within the central government, a federalist or decentralised system of 
governance and the development of checks and balances to govern majority rule. 
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If one is to accept the Liberal Paradigm, then it could be argued that the Sudanese 
conflict may have been averted if the government of Khartoum established a 
system of governance that negated inequality. 
 
What is Learning? 
Levy defines learning as "…a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in 
one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result 
of the observation and interpretation of experience."142 This definition is limited 
in scope as it focuses on individual learning and yet organisations also learn143 
and organisational structures help enhance or hinder individual learning.144 In the 
managerial literature, organisational learning refers to changes taking place within 
an organisation. Generally the learning literature emphasizes learning as a 
mechanism through which organisations can enhance performance145 despite the 
recognition that learning may be “…equally about how to negotiate current 
relationships.”146 
 
These definitions are applicable to this case study because the SPLM/A is an 
organisation comprising individuals who make decisions. There is also general 
agreement that organisations learn through individuals and that individual 
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learning is a fundamental building block of organisational learning.147 Individuals 
and the social processes through which they interact, both within and outside their 
own organisations, either facilitate or constrain organisational learning.148 At the 
same time, individual learning, at some level may be irrelevant to organisational 
learning: “Individuals learn all the time and yet there is no organisational 
learning.”149 
 
In this case study, I demonstrate the difficulty in differentiating between Garang’s 
learning as an individual and the SPLM/A’s learning as an organisation.. A 
number of the interviewees150 in this study believed that the learning process 
undertaken by Garang was automatically transferred to the SPLM/A as an 
organisation because Garang imposed his ideas, through his charismatic 
leadership, on the organisation. The inseparability of the individual and the 
organisation can lead to conflict within an entity. This was evidenced by the 
violent conflict that took place between the SPLM/A and Anyanya in 1983 and 
the split within the SPLM/A in 1991, whereby Garang’s alleged monopoly over 
the movement’s policies resulted in the formation of the SPLM-Nasir Faction, 
which rebranded itself as the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). In 
spite of Southern calls for separation by the SPLM/A’s splinter factions, Dr John 
was steadfast in his call for a united and secular Sudan. A number of factors such 
as a negative experience involving repeated failures, disappointments, the 
attainment of new information that may call into question current beliefs and 
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policies, or past policy successes, could all trigger learning.151 Garang’s refusal to 
adopt secession as an SPLM/A policy was not an indication of the absence of 
both individual and organisational learning, but rather was a result of his 
reflections from his experiences during First Sudanese Civil War and subsequent 
AAA. Garang was cognisant that calls for Southern independence would portray 
the Second Sudanese Civil War as a conflict between the North and the South as 
opposed to a conflict between Sudan’s marginalized groups and the minority 
clique regime in Khartoum. Indeed, the Anyanya movement focused on the 
separation of the South from the North, which had the effect of uniting Northern 
Sudan against this Southern separatist group. The SPLM/A addressed this by 
calling for a change of the governance system in the whole country. As Levy 
would argue, learning may also strengthen a decision-makers' current attitudes 
and beliefs and thereby discourage a policy change.152 
 
In defence of his concept of a united New Sudan, Garang reflected on the 
experiences and history of the Sudan: 
“The objective of the Movement has been used as the excuse for the 
Nasir153 betrayal. I know as well as they do that the South feels strongly 
about its quest for independence. There are valid reasons for their wish but 
strength of passion is not the same as the practicality of the proposition at 
this time. We must base our approach on the objective realities facing us. 
The National Islamic Front (NIF) has dropped the hint that it would be 
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ready to let the South break away if the Nasir removed John Garang and 
abandoned the call for the New Sudan. A little thinking could have made 
our brothers realize that the NIF was being as typically deceptive as its 
predecessors. When Southerners demanded a federal system as their 
condition for supporting the independence of the Sudan in 1956, the Arabs 
promised them ‘due consideration.’ That promise was contemptuously 
disregarded after independence. Do we have to repeat the same mistake in 
1991? Why would the government cede territory to them after the 
successful destruction of the SPLA? The very fact that the NIF detests the 
concept of ‘New Sudan’ confirms that we have touched the right 
button.”154 
 
Scholars of learning organisations acknowledge that there are several approaches 
to defining learning organisations 155  Researchers in the field of learning 
organisations have identified the following four perspectives on learning 
organisations: Systems Thinking; Learning Perspectives; Strategic Perspectives; 
and Integrative Perspectives. Senge for example adopts Systems Thinking to 
define learning organisations as organisations that possess not only adaptive 
capacities but also the ability to create alternative futures.156 Pedler, Burgoyne 
and Boydell on the other hand focus on the Learning Perspective, and define 
learning organisations as organisations that facilitates the learning of all of its 
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members and continuously transforms itself in order to meet its strategic goals.157 
Garvin’s Strategic Perspective views learning organisations as an organisation 
skilled in creating, acquiring and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its 
behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights.158 Watkins and Marsick provide 
an Integrative model of learning organisations, whereby they define learning 
organisations as one that learns continuously and transforms itself.159 
 
Although there are different approaches to defining a learning organisation as 
demonstrated in the preceding paragraph, some common characteristics such as 
adaptability, flexibility and learning from experience can be identified. In the case 
of the SPLM/A, the movement’s experiences encompassed all four approaches to 
learning organisations. The SPLM/A demonstrated is adaptive capacity by 
diverging from the historic Southern call for secession from Northern Sudan 
through its 1983 Manifesto that called for the creation of a unified New Sudan 
governed through a new political dispensation. Through Garang’s charismatic 
leadership, the SPLM/A as an organisation was able to transform the strategic 
goals of Southern revolutionaries to accommodate the demands of marginalised 
Sudanese citizens as a whole. The fall of Mengistu, the end of the Cold War and 
the independence of Eritrea influenced the SPLM/A to amend its strategic goals 
during its first conference in Chukudum in 1994. It was during this Conference 
that the SPLM/A reflected on regional and international realities and aligned its 
goals to new demands such as the potential for Southern self-determination and 
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the change to the SPLM/A’s internal governance structures to adopt democratic 
ideals. It is clear that Garang had borrowed from the various models of learning 
organisations. 
 
One fundamental premise underlying organisational studies is that the behaviour 
of organisations mimics that of the actors that inhabit them.160  This premise, 
however, should also be set against the view that, even if this is the case, 
organisations as collective enterprises, may also have greater capacities than those 
of the individual actors who comprise them, even if individuals can act as 
decision- makers within them. Thus observation and interpretation of experience 
may lead to a change in decision-makers' attitudes and beliefs and the change in 
attitudes and beliefs may, in turn, lead to consideration of a policy change when 
decision-makers acknowledge that this is necessary to reach their objectives.161 
For example, the collapse of the SPLM/A’s communist ally, the Mengistu 
Government, in May 1991 and the end of the Cold War, which resulted in the 
global promotion of western ideals, forced the SPLM/A to shift its attention 
towards garnerning pro-democracy western allies. This, in turn, forced the 
SPLM/A’s decision-makers to convene a convention at Chukudum in 1994 to re-
evaluate its policies and strategies, especially issues related to democracy and 
human rights that would appeal to Western states. Having realized the importance 
of legitimacy by this time, the SPLM/A also turned to its local support base. But 
the local support base required the leadership to refine its war goals. The SPLM/A 
leadership obliged by admitting that it had made mistakes and added to its 
objectives the rights to self-determination for Southern Sudan, Southern 
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Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile and the District of Abyei. 
 
Members of an organisation can, therefore, become a collective catalyst for 
change in themselves and members’ initiatives, as part of sustained internal 
pressure, can bring about change. Such internal pressure could come in the form 
of a threat to defect from the organisation if changes are not instituted, as it was 
the case with the splinter group from the SPLM/A in 1991. Alternatively, change 
can occur by the removal of influential members who constitute an obstacle to 
such a process. In the SPLM/A’s case, this occurred with the removal of its 
deputy leader, Kerubino Bol and of its fifth most senior leader, Arok Thon. 
Change can also come about under pressure from the local support base, as was 
the case at the Chukudum Convention in 1994 when 800 delegates forced the 
movement to institute changes in policies and objectives. We shall subsequently 
examine cases of change resulting from internal factors to determine whether or 
not they were really grounded in the learning process and brought about new 
learning once they had been introduced. 
 
Most authors in the field, however, seem to feel that external factors are often a 
necessary condition for change.162 In the case of the Second Sudanese Civil War, 
the threat of US action against Sudan in the light of its alleged links to Arab 
extremism can be viewed as a necessary external factor that convinced Sudan to 
negotiate with the SPLM/A. A military crisis is often a very effective catalyst of 
change in a liberation movement, but there is no guarantee that the changes will 
draw on learning or contribute to learning, for they may be no more than quick-
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fix solutions in an atmosphere of crisis management. In the case of the SPLM/A, 
military crises as noted above, did contribute to learning as was demonstrated by 
the transformative measures undertaken at the Chukudum Convention in 1994 
and in subsequent years. Other external pressures may, however, bring about 
more substantively informed and considered changes. Analysts such as Korwa 
Adar believe that the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 forced Khartoum to 
acquiesce in demands from Washington, which exerted pressure to end the 
Second Civil War in Sudan.163 
 
The overarching argument of this thesis is that the SPLM/A learned from the 
experiences of the Anyanya. In essence, what took place was an example of 
learning by doing. This thesis relies on the individual learning of Garang to 
explain the evolution of the SPLM/A. Garang demonstrated individual learning 
through his reflections from his time as a junior officer in the Anyanya. During 
the first civil war Anyanya was a fractured movement that did not have a clearly 
defined central command. Indeed, Anyanya was a loose coalition of regionally 
organised (by territory) fighting forces, whose alliance was based on the existence 
of a common enemy (Northern Sudan). As Douglas Johnson observes: 
“Unlike the pattern of the old Anyanya in the early years of the first civil 
war, the SPLA by and large did not allow newly incorporated groups to 
run autonomous operations in their own territory”164 
 
In order to ensure that the Second Civil War was fought with a unified command, 
Garang used force to pacify diverging opinions as to the purpose of the South 
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Sudanese resistance, the manner in which the war should be fought and the 
leadership structure for the southern resistance movement. 
 
Aware of the diplomatic shortcomings of the Anyanya, Garang sought to develop 
an SPLM/A message that was palatable to the regional and international 
community. As Johnson notes: 
“One of the old Anyanya’s greatest problems throughout the 1960s was 
the political isolation that it suffered as a result of its separatist goals. Its 
call for self determination for the South meant that it could not develop the 
tentative pro-federalist alliance which Southern politicians had begun with 
other regions of the Sudan prior to the military take-over of 1958; nor 
could it rally the support of the Sudan’s neighbours, which faced their own 
secessionist movements.”165 
 
To counter this, Garang employed a more flexible approach of calling for a united 
New Sudan that would maintain the territorial integrity of Sudan, but usher in a 
new political dispensation in the country, whereby political power was not 
determined by ethnicity or religion. This approach greatly appealed to Ethiopia, 
which had been fighting the secessionist Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) since 
1961. 
 
Garang was acutely aware of the shortcomings of the AAA. On the eve of the 
signing of the AAA, Garang penned an open letter to the leader of the Anyanya 
outlining his personal observations on the weaknesses of the Agreement. The 
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letter saw Garang implore General Joseph Lagu to not accept the terms of the 
AAA, unless the Government of Sudan made fundamental concessions. These 
concessions ultimately served as the SPLM/A’s guiding principles during the 
CPA negotiation period. Indeed, unlike the AAA, the CPA stipulated the 
importance of two separate armies during the transitional period; an explicit 
formula for wealth sharing and power-sharing; and the establishment of Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs) as well as a number of other key concessions. By 
reflecting on the failure of the AAA, Garang put in place a number of safeguards 
that allowed for the success of the CPA and the eventual independence of South 
Sudan. 
 
Dr John was keen to dispel the notion of the Second Sudanese Civil War being a 
Southern struggle. This was a view held by many quarters when discussing the 
First Sudanese Civil War, whereby the Anyanya was perceived as a Southern 
movement. Speaking during an SPLM/A radio broadcast after the overthrow of 
Sadiq El Mahdi in 1989, Garang highlighted that Bashir “must discard this 
perception of a Southern problem.”166 One way in which Dr John dispelled this 
notion was through the SPLM/A’s war strategy; in which it recruited widely 
throughout the Sudan (both North and South) and established military operation 
theatres as far south as the Equatoria region, as far west as Darfur and in the 
central areas of Nuba Mountain. 
 
One can argue that the SPLM/A owes “a great deal to individual initiative” as 
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opposed to organisational learning. 167  As already illustrated above, Garang’s 
ideology was based on his experiences from his days in the Anyanya. Clapham 
observes that the success of guerrilla movements is dependent on the strength of 
their leaders. Indeed, when writing about guerrilla movements, Clapham states 
that they are: 
“…organisations which owe a great deal to individual initiative: they are 
formed in opposition to established political structures, and allow their 
leaders a great deal of choice over how they be organised and how they 
should operate.”168 
 
Based on the importance that the SPLM/A placed on Garang, it is difficult to 
argue that the SPLM/A, as an organisation, displayed organisational learning in 
its purest form. Indeed, Southerners “were fortunate to have an effective and 
charismatic leader” in Dr John Garang.169 Nevertheless, by extension of Garang’s 
reflections, the SPLM/A was able to evolve and display learning. At its inception 
in 1983, the SPLM/A moved away from the Southern traditional call for 
secession, and towards a notion of a unified secular ‘New Sudan’. However, 
through the SPLM/A’s engagements with the Government of Sudan within the 
IGAD framework in the mid-1990s, the SPLM/A reconsidered its unified position 
and began to embrace the possibility of self-determination. As Deng Alor 
observed: 
“Realities began to shift both internally and externally. Internally, voices 
from both the North and the South were concerned about the human and 
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economic cost of continuing the Second Civil War for the purpose of 
uniting Sudan, viewing separation instead as a practical option to end the 
war. Externally, countries within the region, particularly Eritrea, which 
had attained independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s, were 
beginning to call for the possibility of Southern self-determination. Such 
calls from the African continent were echoed by the United States.”170 
 
Operationalizing Learning 
In the existing literature on organisational learning, there seems to be little 
available on indicators of learning, although it does argue that a learning 
organisation would not repeat the same mistake twice and an improved capacity 
to anticipate change could be an indicator of learning.171 However, in the unstable 
conflict environment, in which liberation movements operate, there are no regular 
standardized tests that could measure learning over time. Nevertheless, a set of 
changes in strategies and policies that the SPLM/A undertook points to a learning 
trajectory. Firstly, although founded by former members of the separatist 
Anyanya movement, the SPLM/A dropped the call for separation from Khartoum 
and adopted the revolutionary goal of fighting to change the governance system in 
Khartoum without changing the borders of the country, as described in Chapter 
One. 
 
Secondly, one of the disadvantages the South faced during the Addis Ababa talks 
was the issue of technical competence. Having learned from this experience the 
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SPLM/A formed specialized committees to handle issues of wealth sharing and 
power sharing during the CPA negotiation process. As a result, the SPLM/A did 
not merely focus on the ratio of ministerial positions for each party, but 
rather the importance of the ministerial portfolio involved. The SPLM/A thus 
demanded that it be allocated a share of key ministries such as defence, finance, 
interior, petroleum, cabinet affairs and foreign affairs. In Sudan, decisions are 
made in the Presidency and the SPLM/A, having learned from the failures of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, demanded the incorporation of Southerners into 
decision-making at the Presidency itself. The SPLM/A’s demand for the 
existence of an independent army in the South was born out of past experience 
as well. Fearing that the North could play Southern leaders off against one 
another, as it had done with Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu, the SPLM/A allowed 
only one person to hold the position of First Vice President of Sudan together 
with the position of the President of the Government of Southern Sudan. 
 
Constructivist and Rationalist Approaches to Learning 
The underlying theoretical issue for the CPA negotiations was whether rationalist 
or constructivist analytical approaches provided the most appropriate models or 
whether some alternative approach would be more useful. Thus, since the 
disputants in the Sudanese conflict had initially defended their interests 
vigorously during the peace talks that had begun as early as the late 1980s, 
several commentators doubted that they would ever agree on a compromise. 
However, to the surprise of many, in 2002 the disputants began to comply with 
solutions proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
– the regional body tasked with mediating an end to Sudanese conflict. This 
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compliance, apparently rationalist in nature, was therefore explained in terms of 
the coercion and the sanctions exerted on bargaining agents by regional and 
international organisations. 172  Whilst this may have been a relevant factor, it 
nonetheless provides an incomplete picture of the negotiating process because it 
denies the disputants’ ownership of the negotiation process and thereby 
underestimates its complexity. In other words, the parties to the dispute were 
active participants in it, as well as being subject to externally-induced coercion 
and any explanation of the way in which a solution was eventually achieved must 
reflect this reality. 
 
The broader constructivist literature hints at a very different compliance dynamic: 
social learning. 173  Here, learning and social interaction, rather than political 
pressure and individual choice, lead to agent compliance with normative 
prescriptions. 174  The processes involved are based on notions of complex or 
double-loop learning, drawn from cognitive and social psychology.175 Learning 
leads the parties to embark on calculating future potentialities based on current 
benefits, for the parties will agree to settle only when, according to their 
calculations, a peace settlement would offer a potentially better alternative than 
the continuation of conflict. This was something that both the SPLM/A and the 
Sudanese government had to learn to do, not just in terms of rational decision-
making but within the context of the socio-political environment in which they 
operated. While this approach has been applied to explaining the process of 
negotiations within the context of the European Commission with a degree of 
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success the same approach has never been applied to Sudanese peace negotiation 
processes as described above and this thesis seeks to undertake this task.176 
 
The starting point for developing a theoretical approach to social interaction and 
learning is Haas’s early work on international organisation, which explored the 
role of social interaction in bargaining agents’ compliance choices. 177  He 
emphasized collective learning as the dynamic producing compliance, through a 
redefinition of interests that took place during the process of interaction itself. As 
Cherkel points out, the subsequent literature stresses that agents' compliance 
choices can only be fully understood by considering the social context and the 
non-instrumental interaction that occurs during negotiations.178 In discussing the 
negotiating process in the European Union, he points out that successful outcomes 
arose not only from calculations of rational choice but, more importantly, from 
the ability of negotiating partners to internalize international norms and 
principles. In the Sudanese context, it was the latter process that enabled the 
SPLM/A to realize, unlike Anyanya before it, that simple demands for secession 
would be inadequate when the essential problem that had to be addressed was the 
nature of governance in Khartoum itself. 
 
Quite apart from its knowledge of the past behaviour of its counterpart, the 
SPLM/A also had to have some sense of what would be the outcome of 
negotiations. In explaining the outcome of a negotiation, institutional analysis 
literature, and more specifically, liberal inter-governmentalist theory stresses that, 
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“agreements are reached on the basis of bargaining power and mutual concessions 
in a given bargaining space.”179 The extant literature on bargaining distinguishes 
between formal bargaining models versus models developed through institutional 
research. The former uses game theory to predict the bargaining outcome on the 
basis of plausible axioms. But this axiomatization is not comprehensive enough as 
it is strictly normative rather than explanatory. As Kochan and Wheeler note: “a 
second problem with many formal bargaining models is that they are normative, 
rather than descriptive or explanatory.”180 Kochan and Wheeler argue that, instead 
of incorporating propositions that explain how negotiators act, the formal 
bargaining models simply predict how the parties ought to behave given 
certain assumptions about such factors as rationality, information and 
preferences, for example in the case of bargaining between a sample of city 
governments and locals of International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) the 
choice was between viewing the outcomes from the union, management, or public 
point of view. Also Ashenfelter, Johnson, and Pencavel used trade union growth 
and number of strikes as proxies for bargaining power in a study of aggregate 
wage outcomes in manufacturing. 181  Given these ambiguities, a new text 
exploring and reflecting upon primary theoretical perspectives is likely to 
emerge.182 In other words, appropriate models can only be developed through an 
investigation of how institutions actually react in bargaining situations – through 
institutional analysis, in short. 
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In this study, we define bargaining power along the line of institutional analysis 
as an “…exogenously determined force, which affects positively the party’s 
ability to realize a gain over and above the disagreement outcome.” 183 
Quantifying the distribution of bargaining power for each party in the Sudanese 
conflict presented no difficulty in terms of the military strength of each side. 
Throughout most of the two decades of the civil war in Sudan, the balance of 
military power was seasonally determined, with the SPLA having the upper hand 
during rainy seasons, for the government war machine became immobile as a 
result of the weather and was, thereby, confined to fortified towns. 184  The 
government, in short, eventually had no choice but to accept negotiations and the 
choice of the moment when that could be best done lay with the SPLA for it then 
enjoyed the dominant bargaining position. 
 
However, although it enjoyed the dominant position over the timing as to when 
the negotiating process should start, this did not mean that it could predetermine 
its outcome. 
 
Important components of a negotiation process, therefore, include searching for a 
mutually acceptable settlement for the disputants, a division of the fruits of 
cooperation - which is determined by the bargaining power of the parties - and 
‘game- playing’ (the actual pattern of the process itself) which is governed by 
prescribed rules as determined by a mediator who must be accepted by both 
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parties as perquisites for engaging in the negotiation enterprise. It is only once the 
parties have reached a common understanding of the ground rules that violence 
and bitterness can be overcome through negotiation. However, the process by 
which the parties arrive at a common understanding of the ground rules for 
negotiation is not sufficiently emphasized in the literature, which lays more 
emphasis on the division of the fruits of cooperation than on getting parties to 
cooperate. The importance of the latter issue is illustrated best by Eising in his 
discussion of the way in which negotiations occur within the European Union: 
“EU decision routines provide standardized mechanisms for resolving conflicts 
and facilitate policy learning by increasing the amount of information available 
about policy consequences. As a result of these learning processes, member states' 
basic policy preferences can change. Both the mechanisms of conflict resolution 
and the changes of preferences support a cooperative outcome, even though, in 
the end, member states' approval of an EU directive hinges greatly on their 
perceptions of its impact on their domestic settings.”185 
 
Indeed, it is important for negotiators to learn the rules of negotiation and play by 
them because “…by inadvertently breaking an unwritten rule, he [the negotiator] 
may even terminate the negotiation altogether if the other party interprets his 
action as evidence of bad faith or an unwillingness to play the game fairly.”186 
This misinterpretation of behaviour can disrupt the process, delay settlement or 
even destroy any hope of reaching an agreement. In 2002, whilst peace talks were 
progressing quite well, the SPLA attacked and captured the southern town of 
                                                     
185 Eising, R. pp.87 




Torit from Khartoum. While this event could have been interpreted in the light of 
the general negotiating behaviour of the SPLA, in that it negotiated only when 
having the upper hand militarily, Khartoum withdrew from the talks in protest, 
accusing the SPLA of bad faith. Khartoum and the SPLA had engaged with one 
another in numerous unfruitful peace talks previously and should, thereby, have 
learned each other’s negotiating behaviour, yet their imperfect understandings of 
each other’s bargaining behaviour continued to prevail. This ran counter to what 
is predicted by the extant literature; namely that negotiators with long experience 
of one another can be expected to have learned a great deal about the other’s 
bargaining strategies and to have used this knowledge in planning their own 
behaviour patterns. 187  Furthermore, most models of bargaining require that 
disputants engaged in negotiation must have full information about each other; 
something that does not exist in real situations. To bridge this gap in information 
acquisition about the real preferences of opponents, negotiators, in addition to 
using the help of a mediator or a third-party, engage in the negotiation process to 
learn about their opponents in order to arrive at “…bargaining strategies which 
will maximize the expected return to themselves.”188 It is therefore important 
for actors to determine and pursue strategies that accelerate learning. For instance, 
if the disputed issues in a negotiation are settled in sequential order, then the flow 
of information between negotiators is greatly increased, thereby allowing each 
party to gauge the expectations of the other with much more confidence than is 
possible if the only available information reflects early and undoubtedly 
exaggerated ‘payoff’ demands. Yet, here too there are pitfalls. 
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Thus, the case study in question - that of Sudan – shows that the process of 
determining the sequencing of issues could also delay a settlement. The talks 
between the SPLM/A and Khartoum broke down more than once because the two 
sides could not agree on whether the first issue to be discussed should be the 
status of religion in the country or self-determination for the Southern region.189 It 
is nonetheless clear, however, that a certain ordering of issues maximizes the total 
value of the settlement for each party, even if determining the order poses 
additional problems. In the Sudanese case, the whole negotiation enterprise was 
eventually reduced to searching for a sequencing of disputed issues acceptable to 
both sides. As General Sumbeiywo, the chief mediator of the CPA recalls, “I used 
to get the parties to write papers on issues. Only after they had given me their 
extreme positions would I try to bring them closer together.”190 Yet this can pose 
considerable difficulties when the number of issues involved is relatively large 
and not fixed, for more issues can be generated as the talks mature. In the 
Sudanese case, rather than viewing sequencing as a means for increasing the flow 
of information, the SPLM/A’s negotiators approached the negotiating table with a 
‘lessons learned’ attitude, believing that the failure of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement had been rooted in the sequencing process. The most important issue, 
namely security arrangements was discussed towards the end of the actual 
negotiating process and was not, therefore, given sufficient time to be fully and 
effectively resolved. The SPLM/A reversed this and ensured that security matters 
were at the top of the agenda during the CPA negotiating process. 
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Social and Psychological Approaches to Learning 
The question of how parties learn within a conflict environment presents a 
challenge to research into decision-makers’ behaviour because the conflict 
environment can be highly dynamic whilst the information available to decision-
makers may be imperfect. This can cause decision-makers to base their actions on 
past experience and on the rewards associated with it, as individual rationalism 
would suggest. We assume, however, that, in constructivist terms, strategic 
choices made by decision-makers are informed by rules that are formed and 
continuously adapted through a learning process, whilst engaged in and as a result 
of their interaction with the conflict environment. As Albert Bandura notes, new 
behavioural patterns can be acquired either through direct experience or by 
observing other people’s behaviour.191 Yet one of the dilemmas for a decision-
maker with imperfect information is the choice between constructivist exploration 
and rationalist exploitation of current knowledge. This, in turn, becomes a 
question of deciding whether to settle now or to hang on until appropriate 
conditions emerge for negotiators. For a constructivist, the overthrow of Nimeiri 
in 1985 signalled that the right environment for peace to prevail in Sudan had 
emerged since he had been responsible for the Southerners’ decision to return to 
war in 1983 as a result of his abrogation of the AAA. However, a rationalist 
would argue that the fall of Nimeiri, in itself, would not have addressed the root 
causes of the North-South conflict. He would therefore prefer to propose that the 
antagonists engage in in-depth dialogue for a lasting settlement in Sudan. 
 
Thus, learning can become a tool for evaluating conflict developments by 
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decision- makers that may lead them to change their attitudes, beliefs, and even 
behaviour towards conflict resolution. 192  It establishes an interactive dynamic 
between the disputants’ behaviours at the negotiating table as well as in their 
behaviours on the battlefield. This is an important insight, for the literature has 
generally made the erroneous assumption that disputants are similar in their 
understanding of and insight into the bargaining process and into one another’s 
behaviour.193 This is clearly too definitive an assumption as, for instance, in the 
North-South Sudanese conflict under consideration, the two sides in the conflict 
had notable differences in their learning capabilities about one another. Almost all 
of the decision-makers in the SPLA camp were either educated in or had worked 
in Khartoum and they possessed, as a result, a better understanding of their 
opponents than their opponents did of them! Indeed, learning involves a thorough 
reassessment of fundamental beliefs and values, something SPLM/A leaders were 
able to achieve but which the government of Sudan singularly failed to do.194 
Thus, in order for conflict management to be effective, the warring parties must 
learn to refine their goals in more realistic ways and to change their modes of 
thinking about the conflict, preferably by abandoning their faith in winning 
through military means and seeing, instead, peaceful means as  the only effective 
solution – hence the fact that the Sudanese conflict ended through negotiation 
rather than military victory. 
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As we have demonstrated the shortcomings of greed theory, identity theory and 
ripeness theory as independent and unique tools to analyse the Second Sudanese 
Civil War. However, by combining the three conflict resolution theories and 
supplementing them with learning theory we should be able to provide an 
effective explanation of the dynamic nature of Sudan’s civil conflicts, which 
spanned a period of over fifty years, during which new issues emerged as a result 
of unforeseen developments or as a consequence of the failure of attempted peace 
settlements. The narrow focus of some theories such as the identity crisis theory 
of Francis Deng or the ethnicity theory popular in the Western media has a 
potential to restrict the scope of any analysis of a peace settlement. A proper 
explanation of the causes of the Sudanese conflict, in  short, is bound to be multi-
faceted as we have sought to demonstrate. This, however, is only part of the story, 
for the conflict was also interrupted by peace agreements between the two sides, 
often mediated by actors in the international community. Yet this process has also 
been subject to inadequate interpretation in the literature, as well as to poor 
understanding of the nature of mediation and negotiation on the ground. Using 
social psychological and constructivist approaches to understand the role of 
learning in the Sudanese conflict, we seek to offer a new interpretation to the  
Sudanese conflict. The SPLM/A’s reversal of the Anyanya’s liberation goal of 
seceding from Sudan into fighting to structure the governance in a united Sudan 
between 1983 to 1994; its ultimate openness to pursue the goal of fighting for the 
rights to self-determination for the Southern region after it faced a split 
within its ranks in 1991 over the issues of liberation objective and leadership; its 
transformation from being a predominantly military movement into one 
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committed to governance as well; and its ultimate realisation that compromise at 
the negotiating table would have to replace confrontation on the battlefield are 
important learning processes arising from the Addis Ababa Agreement, which 
influenced the way in which the SPLM/A was to re-interpret its strained relations 
with Khartoum throughout the second civil war from 1983 to 2005. Nor was this 
a simple matter of individualistic rational choice on the part of the leadership 
when confronted with a coercive environment. It was, instead, the consequence of 
a learning process throughout the movement in which normative principle 
eventually determined acceptable outcomes, in that negotiated compromise was to 
be preferred over violent confrontation. 
 
In the chapters that follow, I shall use the concept of ‘learning’ described above to 
demonstrate the ways in which the SPLM/A was able to develop techniques in 
resolving the Sudanese conflict that avoided the errors that had marked the 
negotiating process for the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. The learning process 
will be shown to have related to three different dimensions of the SPLM/A’s 
actions. Firstly, it had to develop tools through which to engage the Government 
of Sudan. Then it had to persuade its internal constituency of the viability of its 
approach. Finally, it had to co-opt support from the international community in 
the process of achieving a viable and permanent solution to the conflict in which 
it was engaged.   All of these processes, as will be shown, were not merely the 
result of the rational choices that the movement made. More importantly, they 
reflected the way in which the SPLM/A’s own approach was grounded in its 
ability to learn through a process of interaction with its social and political 






Chapter 3: An Historical Analysis 
 
This chapter provides an historical analysis of the period between 1821 and 2005, 
which, towards the end of this period, saw the Sudan embroiled in two successive 
civil wars. This chapter will also provide an analysis of the manner in which the 
SPLM/A organised itself to address the lessons learned from the shortcomings of 
the AAA which had brought the first civil war to a close but which had also 
ushered in the second. Furthermore, this chapter highlights the eventual 
realisation by the SPLM/A of the importance of embracing the popular Southern 
demand for cessation from Northern Sudan and for the creation of an independent 
South Sudanese state. Prior to this, the SPLM/A had advocated the creation of a 
‘New Sudan’; a concept that hinged on the establishment of a unitary secular 
Sudanese state that guaranteed equality for all. 
 
While recorded history as well as oral history (through vernacular songs, for 
instance) do speak of a ‘past’ that cannot be forgotten, the extent to which the 
awareness of such a past influenced the SPLM/A’s decision-makers who 
negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 which brought 
the second civil war to an end is nevertheless striking. Perhaps this is not 
surprising for a movement whose objective was to correct the narrative of 
national history, as noted by Dr John Garang de Mabior in a Radio SPLA address 
when he said: “The history of the Sudanese people from time immemorial has 





The history of Southern Sudan can be presented as colonialism under three 
separate types of rule: Turko-Egyptian (1821-1881), Anglo-Egyptian (1898-
1956), and Northern Sudanese (1956-2005). The first two phases saw Egypt play 
a role in the administration of Sudan, whose land the waters of the River Nile 
traverse before reaching Egyptian territory. The final phase was essentially what 
could be termed ‘internal colonialism’ – where the Sudanese administrations had 
had ample opportunities to change the course of the governance system but failed 
to do so. In short, the Northern rulers who inherited power from the former 
colonial rulers after the declaration of Sudanese independence chose instead to 
merely fill the vacuum in leadership that had been left behind when the colonial 
administration ended. Everything else left by the colonial administration remained 
intact. Ultimately, the Southern region as well as other peripheral regions became 
marginalised and had little opportunity to engage in the country’s governance; 
thus making a bad situation inherited from colonialism worse. 
 
Turko-Egyptian Era (1821-1881) 
Before the Turkish (Ottoman Empire) arrival in Sudan, hardly anything was 
known of the historical engagement between the Northern and the Southern 
regions. It was only after the Turko-Egyptian conquest of Sudan that the South 
came into direct contact with the North. Subsequently large parts of the Arab 
world, and what is known today as South Sudan, became part of the Egyptian 
Empire.  However, the administration in the South, introduced by the Turko-
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Egyptian Condominium, was left unchallenged. The Nilotic tribes living along the 
South Sudanese frontiers, namely, the Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer, resisted the 
invading Turkish, Egyptian and Northern forces and frustrated efforts at 
establishing early strongholds in Southern Sudanese territory. As Isaiah Majok 
Dau notes, the strong resistance of nilotics “…whose territory extended to the 
location of the modern town of Dueim in northern Sudan, hampered this 
penetration for a long time.”196 However, the Nilotic resistance could not prevent 
the invading forces from eventually establishing their authority in the South by 
forging an alliance with the Arab North to exploit the South. 
 
The search for slaves, ivory and ostrich feathers in Southern Sudan by the Turks, 
Egyptians and the Arab Sudanese was underpinned by the economic realities 
faced by the Turko-Egyptian administrators and the Northern Sudanese during the 
period. Indeed, as Mark Nikkel states, “…With the Northern Sudanese economy 
already dependent on slavery, trade networks were established to meet Egypt’s 
urgent domestic, commercial and military needs.” 197  The slave trade was 
characterized by brutality towards the locals, but the racist attitudes behind their 
quest for resources created the sense of a hierarchy of slaves and slavers.198 The 
concept of slavery thereby acquired new significance within the Sudanese context 
in that the Turko- Egyptian slave trade left behind a sense of superiority and 
inferiority within the population that still manifests its effects – even now – 
between the divided communities. It is this inferiority and superiority complex 
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which was the root cause of the rift and eventually the conflict between the South 
and the North as the situation evolved beyond slavery into a crisis of identity. 
 
However, the sad tragedy of Sudan’s history arose not only from this human 
exploitation by foreign administrators but also from the fact that some of the 
participants in the exploitation of Sudan became the authors of its history. 
Colonial writers such as Sir Harold MacMichael seem to have believed that, 
without government intervention to undertake minimal reform, the ‘masses’ 
would have engaged in genocidal conflict.199 Furthermore, Britain approached the 
question of Sudan with three goals in mind: firstly, to end the debilitating slave 
trade that had proved such a scourge to Southern populations; secondly, to curtail 
the growth of Islam in sub-Sahara Africa; and thirdly to control the River Nile, as 
was subsequently evidenced by Egypt’s desire in the 1980s and 1990s to 
encourage the construction of the Jonglei Canal, a task that had been made easier 
by prior British action which had “concluded treaties with other colonial 
powers.”200 While it is widely recognized that there is a deep-seated suspicion 
between the two sides of Sudan engineered by the legacy of colonialism, colonial 
writers tend to blame it on every colonial regime other than their own. For 
instance the Briton, Charles Armine Willis, Governor of the Upper Nile Province 
in the late 1920s, noted in his diaries: “That the Southern Sudanese would be 
suspicious of strangers from the North is not unreasonable. The probably never 
will forget the slave raids and the slave trade.”201 Indeed, the sixty years of Turko-
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Egyptian rule (1821-1881) in Sudan created strong Southern antipathy towards 
the North. However, although it is true that slavery did contribute to the conflict 
there were other historical injustices, some of which were inflicted upon the 
southern region, unknowingly or knowingly, by the British Government that also 
contributed to fuelling the North-South conflict. During British rule new 
institutions, and new elites, emerged in Sudanese societies in response to the 
particular needs of colonial administration. 
 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1898-1956) 
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in Sudan began as a result of the final 
British victory over the Mahdiyya in the Battle of Omdurman in the autumn of 
1898.202 Earlier, in 1885, the British, Belgians, Germans, French and Italians had 
concluded their agreements at the Berlin Conference, which defined future 
colonial spheres of influence in East Africa. 203  With these agreements Sudan 
became a full British colony to be known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
because of the nominal role of Egypt, then under British occupation. The Anglo-
Egyptian invasion of Sudan after 1882 had two main strategic purposes. Firstly 
Britain sought control over Sudan to prevent the seizure of the Nile and the 
Sudanese Red Sea coast - on a major route to British India – by other European 
colonial and imperialist powers. Secondly, the aim was to stop slavery in Sudan. 
In line with this second objective Sir Samuel Baker, a British national, had been 
appointed Governor General of Equatoria Province in 1869. His mission was to 
eliminate the slave trade in Sudan and to restore order there, but this became 
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almost impossible to accomplish because of the militant resistance of the local 
Arab Northern Sudanese slave traders; in particular, Zubeir Rahma and his son 
Seliman.204 Zubeir had attacked Anglo-Egyptian forces and driven them away 
with heavy losses. In 1874, General Charles George Gordon, another British 
national, succeeded Baker in order to continue with his frustrated mission. Zubeir 
Wad el Rahma Mansour, another Northern Sudanese slave trader, had already 
established himself as a power in the land several years before Gordon’s 
appointment but, despite Zubeir’s hostile attitude towards his anti-slavery forces, 
Gordon proceeded sharply to reduce the slave trade. He was unable to end it 
completely because of the continuous resistance he encountered from the Arab 
Northern Sudanese slave traders such as Zubeir and, after a long struggle, Gordon 
was forced to introduce an appeasement policy. He entered the service of the 
Khedive in 1873 (with British government approval) and later became the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, where he did much to suppress revolts and the 
slave trade. Exhausted, he resigned and returned to Great Britain in 1880; but in 
December 1883 he was called back to Sudan to take up the post of the Governor 
General once again, following the Mahadist revolt. Unfortunately he was unable 
to contain the revolt in order to evacuate the garrison and he was eventually killed 
in Khartoum on 26th January 1885. 
 
Implicit in British anti-slavery policy was an assumption that Northern and 
Southern Sudan were, in practice, quite different and referred to the areas 
inhabited by the Arabs and Africans respectively. It is a geographic and ethnic 
division that has generated constant debate inside Sudan itself. Mansour Khalid, 
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for example, suggests that Sudan is not racially or culturally divided into clear-cut 
Northern Arab and Southern African factions. 205  His argument is based on a 
population census conducted in 1956, which revealed that there were over 600 
tribes throughout the country, often intermixed and showing mixed ethnic origins. 
In ethnic terms, the census determined that Sudanese of Arab origins formed 39% 
of the total population and those of African origin provided the balance of 61%. 
Chaudhri,  (1975) concluded that it was not until Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
rule was established in Sudan that the South began to evolve as a separate 
political entity from the North.206 Slavery was outlawed, an initiative that was 
reluctantly accepted, but the prevention of further expansion of Islamisation and 
Arabisation did not go unchallenged, for these isolation policies posed a threat to 
religious and nationalist leaders, such as Abdel Rahman El Mahdi and Ali El 
Mirghani. They had increased their religious and political influence in West, East 
and Central Sudan by then and saw no reason why this should not be done in the 
South as well. Whilst intended to protect the South from the North, the policies of 
isolation encouraged unequal development between the two parts of the country 
in all aspects of daily life. 
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Figure 2: Turko-Egyptian Slave-Trade Routes 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates routes into the Southern Sudanese territory utilised by the 
Turko-Egyptian Administration between 1821-1881.207 
 
In the run-up to Independence, the British colonial administration introduced a 
Sudanization policy culminating in the handing over of power to the Northern 
elites, who would fail to manage the socio-economic diversity British policy had 
                                                     




created208 and forced the North and the South into a single political unit – Sudan. 
This change of policy was introduced in order to prepare Sudan for Independence. 
The British colonial administration supported nascent Sudanese aspirations for 
independence in the hope of gaining the allegiance of the growing professional 
class of Northern Arabs and of forestalling a union between Egypt and Sudan that 
would have threatened British interests in the region. 
 
Southern politicians, who were initially opposed to the idea of independence for 
Sudan under a unitary state system, later relented because of promises made to 
them as part of the price for supporting the independence package: promotion of 
Southern cultures; acceleration of education and economic development; equality 
of citizens, and above all, federalism as the system of governance. It was a 
massive, impressive and attractive package that the South would never want to 
lose. The motion for independence in which the measures were enshrined became 
a binding law when unanimously voted for by all the members of the Parliament. 
 
In the years following Independence, the federal pledge proved elusive for it 
turned out not to have been a genuine commitment by the central government. 
Instead it appeared to have been a ploy to postpone a crisis – the difficulty of 
passing a declaration of independence without the needed support of the South. 
 
Post-Independent Crisis of Political Structure 
Quite apart from the specific issue of federalism the gravest Southerners’ 
grievances were by-products of Islamic cultural assimilation policies adopted by 
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successive post-independence governments in Sudan, which failed to 
acknowledge the diverse nature of the country. Arab Muslims dominated the 
North and Africans who, in their majority, were not Muslim, populated the South 
and, for historical reasons linked to slavery, these distinctions were expressed 
through Northern attitudes of racial superiority, in which non-Muslims and non-
Arabs were viewed as inferior citizens. Shortly after independence, the new prime 
minister of Sudan, Isma’il al Azahari, abandoned the promise of creating a federal 
state. He mobilized Northern members in Parliament, who constituted the 
majority, to vote against federalism when they came to approve the country’s new 
constitution. 
 
The Southern Sudanese presence in the parliament declined after independence 
because Southern politicians would often boycott elections since the central 
government failed to adhere to its previous commitments on Southern affairs. As 
seen above, the fears of the Southern Sudanese elites, first raised when the 
declaration of independence was tabled for debate in 1955, eventually 
materialized. The lesson learned by Southern Sudanese politicians was 
unmistakable: ‘The central government cannot be trusted’ and this deep distrust 
shaped the nature of the many subsequent peace negotiations between the two 
sides. In 1958, for example, members of the Northern Sudanese sectarian parties 
in the redrafted Constitution Committee and in the Constitutional Assembly were 
mandated to consider the federal proposal. They drafted instead a constitution for 
an Arab Islamic State, and the Southern calls for a federal system of government 
were consequently excluded.209 
                                                     




By the end of 1958 Southerners who were still advocating for federalism were 
either jailed or exiled.210 With Southerners demanding for the federation of the 
country and the North fighting for a unitary system, the independent country was 
to be born in constitutional crisis over the definition of the State. Shaddad, for his 
part, views the North-South Sudan crisis to be a ‘crisis of political structure’ that 
followed Independence. 211  In 1958 General Ibrahim Abboud led a bloodless 
military coup, ousting the government of Prime Minister Isma’il al-Azhari. As 
soon as he took power, General Abboud dissolved Parliament and prohibited 
political activity. Southern hopes for federalism were frustrated and the situation 
turned into one of confrontation. Abboud’s authoritarianism forced many 
Southern politicians into exile, where they began to plan resistance to the new 
dictatorship. 
 
The Anyanya Movement and the First Sudanese Civil War 
In 1962, the Sudan African National Union (SANU), the Southern party led by 
William Deng, set up its offices in Uganda in order to coordinate its political 
activities. Organised, as opposed to sporadic, military resistance to Northern 
troops only really began in the South in 1962, a process symbolized by the 
guerrillas’ successful capture in September 1963 of an army post at Pochalla after 
a three-day battle. The new guerrilla organisation was called the Anyanya, which 
took up arms with the aim of achieving the total liberation of Southern Sudan. 
One of its leaders was Colonel Joseph Lagu, an officer who graduated from the 
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Sudanese Military College and later joined the Anyanya movement in the bush 
in Equatoria Province205 and started to organise them into a force which could 
systematically harass Northern security forces in the South. The Anyanya 
movement grew in numerical strength and attacks continued to increase, although 
the development of the campaign was handicapped by external indifference to the 
regional struggle in Sudan and a consequent lack of arms and resources, a 
problem that was partially solved in 1965 by the acquisition of arms from the 
defeated ‘Simba’ rebels in the neighbouring Congo (Zaire) and later, in 1969, by 
the Israelis who offered to supply arms and to train officers through Uganda. This 
latter development materially assisted Lagu in drawing together various groups 
within the Southern resistance and thereby eased the problem of a lack of 
consolidated leadership and organisation, which had bedevilled the Anyanya 
forces up to then. 
 
The vigour with which the Khartoum government pursued the military aspects of 
the conflict varied with the regime in power at the time. The Abboud regime 
pursued a policy of sustained repression of Southern leaders and politicians. By 
1964 all Christian missionaries operating in the South had been expelled, leaving 
an educational vacuum there. As if this was not enough, Abboud moved to target 
Southern intellectuals and the village infrastructure in the South as well. 
Indiscriminate arrests, torture and killing of intellectuals became the daily activity 
of the army, as did the destruction of villages. The Government’s inability to 
control the behaviour of the military led to massacres in Bor, Yei, Maridi, Wau, 
Kodok and elsewhere in the South. 212  Those massacred in Bor included the 
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Paramount Chief of Greater Bor, Ajang Duot Bior, the Anyidi Court President, 
Chief Alier Leek Agoot and the Executive Chief of Anyidi, Ayom Dor Yor.213 As 
Ambrose Riiny Thiik narrates, “I recall an incident in my home town of Wau 
during the1960s where Government troops stormed a wedding that I was 
attending and began shooting at civilians indiscriminately.”214 Such repressive 
activities increased opposition to the Government and forced many more 
Southern Sudanese into exile – mainly to the East African countries of Uganda 
and Kenya. The situation worsened and civil strife intensified.215 
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Figure 3 illustrates areas where atrocities were committed by the Sudan army against the 
people of Southern Sudan.216 
 
After the Abboud regime was forced to step down in 1964, the democratic 
process was restored in time for the 1965 elections, in which William Deng’s 
SANU participated and won ten seats in the South. After the elections a coalition 
government comprising the Umma Party
210 
and the National Unionist Party  
(NUP) 217  was formed. Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, a representative of the 
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Umma party was elected Prime Minister. During this period the Northern-
dominated parliament passed a resolution authorising the coalition government to 
restore law-and-order in Southern Sudan. This was tantamount to condoning any 
action taken by the security forces to fulfil that goal. It was a direct challenge to 
the South and, as a result, effectively led to a declaration of war not just against 
the Southern Anyanya rebels but also against all Southerners. The civil war 
continued unabated and the sustained fighting negatively impacted the army’s 
morale, a factor that was compounded by Sudan’s economic decline during the 
period. The subsequent government of Sadiq al Mahdi pursued a similar policy 
towards the Southern problem when it came to power in 1966. 
 
By 1969, the Sudanese desire for change had reached its peak. The Umma Party 
and the NUP in the coalition government were preoccupied with their own 
internal problems, and personal rivalries replaced political vision. The 
Government paid no heed to the rising human and material costs of the North-
South conflict. At midnight on 25 May 1969, a group of mid-level officers staged 
a surprise, bloodless coup under the leadership of Colonel Jaafar Muhammad 
Nimeiri, who was inspired by Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s pan-Arab socialist 
revolution. Economic realities compounded by the First Sudanese Civil War 
created a conducive environment for a change in government. Nimeiri was 
therefore able to secure the support of the masses immediately following the 
announcement of the coup. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Unionist Party (NUP)—and the Umma Mahdist group quickly rekindled old suspicions and deep-
seated hatreds that soured Sudanese politics for years and eventually strangled parliamentary elections. 
In 1952 Ismail al Azhari was made president of the National Unionist Party (NUP), which won an 
overwhelming victory in the elections of 1953. Al- Azharī became the first Sudanese prime minister in 
January 1954. The Unionist Party advocated Sudan-Egypt union. However it became clear to al-Azhari 
that union with Egypt could be achieved only at the risk of a civil war, given the anti-union opposition 




The hardships of the First Sudanese War led to a shift in Northern attitudes from 
supporting a military solution to exploring a peaceful settlement. This call for a 
peaceful solution pressurized Nimeiri’s government into seeking dialogue with 
the Southern rebels. Although there were internal differences within the new 
regime over policy towards the South, the military government in June 1969 
recognized that historic differences did indeed exist between the North and South 
of Sudan, and put forward a proposal that the South should be granted some 
unspecified degree of local autonomy. This was to be realized as a result of the 
1972 AAA. 
 
The Anyanya fighters and Southern politicians, on the other hand, had failed to 
forge viable political organisations in the South because most of them possessed 
limited leadership abilities and a narrow vision unable to define, let alone 
articulate, a future that would unify the South against the North. This inability of 
the Southern leaders to form a unified political movement to represent the 
Southern aspirations, goals, and tactics contributed to the longevity of the conflict 
because it bedevilled Northern efforts both to produce a coherent policy towards 
the Southern problem and to find a representative body with which to negotiate. 
The only progress recorded in this respect occurred when Joseph Lagu took over 
control of both armed and political wings of the Southern resistance, as 
represented by the Anyanya and the South Sudanese Liberation Movement 
(SSLM) respectively. 
 
One of the most interesting examples of twentieth century international conflict 
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management was the process which led to the signing of a peace agreement at 
Addis Ababa in February 1972 between representatives of the Sudanese 
Government and the South Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM) led by 
General Joseph Lagu, itself representing an amalgamation of smaller secessionist 
and guerrilla movements from Southern Sudan’s three most southern provinces. 
The Agreement brought to a halt the civil war between Arab Northerners and 
African Southerners. It established a considerable degree of regional autonomy 
for the South. The Agreement also made arrangements for a ceasefire and a 
subsequent integration of the military wing of the SSLM (the Anyanya) into the 
Peoples' Armed Forces (PAF) of the Sudan. 
 
In a separate initiative, General Lagu had written to the Israeli premier, Levi 
Eshkol, proposing that Anyanya should open a second front in Southern Sudan 
against the Arabs in return for arms from Israel. The General’s overtures were 
well received in Israel; and he was invited to visit Tel Aviv whilst Israel began to 
deliver weapons to Anyanya’s bases via Uganda and Ethiopia. Indeed, the 
determining factor in resolving the internal wrangling in the South in favor of 
General Lagu was this support from the Israelis. However, such heavy reliance on 
foreign support was to prove problematic for Lagu’s foreign backers, who 
realized the economic hazards of a sustained armed conflict and eventually 
pressured Lagu into signing a hastily negotiated agreement. 
 
Direct international military support to Anyanya predominantly came from Israel, 
particularly after 1969, in the form of supplying arms for the struggle. Israel’s 
choice of Lagu's faction as the main conduit for these arms did much to help his 
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group become dominant within the Southern forces. The objectives of the Israelis 
appear straightforward: their support to the Anyanya was both a part of their 
attempt to undermine or divert potential members of an Arab or Islamic anti-
Israeli bloc and of their drive to win friends and influence in sub-Saharan Africa. 
While never substantial, Israeli aid was undoubtedly an important factor in the 
Southerners' ability to continue the fight. 
 
The Making of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
In general, post-independent governments have prioritised the rights of those at 
the centre of the state at the expense of those at the peripheries. The reaction from 
Southern Sudan has generally been to violently resist such policies despite the 
fact that Khartoum-based regimes have resolutely dealt with such resistance 
piecemeal by using divide-and-rule tactics adopted from colonial practice. In 
1972 however, in what could be seen as a change of policy from repression to 
conciliation, after 17 years of brutal war that had claimed the lives of 
approximately 500,000 people with over a million people displaced from their 
homes.218 The government of Sudan and the SSLM – the political wing of the 
Anyanya movement – decided to negotiate an end to the conflict. The Agreement 
was negotiated with mediation from Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, the 
World Council of Churches and the All-African Council of Churches.219 The 
process began in August 1970 with informal contacts between representatives of 
the two sides based in London: Abdin Ismail, the Sudan Government’s 
                                                     
218 The lack of proper records on losses of the first civil war - the SSLM/ Anyanya war - has always 
led to the numbers reported fluctuating with some suggesting death tolls at a million while others 
suggested half a million. 
219 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973), Peace and Unity in the Sudan, Sudan: University of 
Khartoum Press, p.14 
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Ambassador in London, and Mading de Garang, the Anyanya representative 
there. 220  A further meeting followed that brought Joseph Garang, Sudan’s 
Minister for Southern Affairs together with Mading de Garang. Both Joseph 
Garang and Mading de Garang hailed from the Southern region but were 
unrelated as they came from Jurchol (Luo) and Dinka tribes respectively. Having 
Southerners on both sides of the negotiating table would become Khartoum’s 
favourite negotiating tactic, which played directly into local politics in the South. 
By doing this Khartoum extended its policy of dividing the enemy and setting 
each side against the other, a technique, which Khartoum had deployed on the 
battlefield and the negotiating table. On this occasion, because it had not given up 
on outright military victory over the Southern rebels, Khartoum frustrated the 
peace initiative so that peace was delayed while conflict continued for another 
two years until 1972. 
 
Nonetheless, these contacts still had significance. Anyanya used them to assess 
the Government’s real interest in peace and also to find out what the Government 
was actually prepared to offer them. Besides, Anyanya was able to establish 
whether the Government was tricking them into a surrender deal, which may 
backfire, as had been the case for Southern Sudanese in 1955. Indeed, in 1955, 
following the Torit Mutiny, a political deal was reached which required the 
Southern mutineers to surrender to the Government in return for amnesty. The 
                                                     
220 Initial contacts between the Khartoum Government and the SSLM's representative in London 
began as early as August 1970, originally under the auspices of the Movement for Colonial Freedom 
(MCF). By January 1971, Colonel Lagu's and the SSLM's decision to accept some settlement “...within 
the framework of one Sudan...” had been communicated to Khartoum, although the nature of this offer 
did not become generally known in government circles until April, shortly before the attempted anti-
Nimeiri coup by the SCP. In May a WCCIAACC delegation had agreed with members of the 
Khartoum Government that it would try to contact southern leaders with a view to arranging formal 
negotiations, and when the delegation returned to Khartoum in October 1971 it was able to report that 
southern leaders were prepared to agree. 
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mutineers responded to the call only to find that those who did so were persecuted 
and either sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Not surprisingly therefore, 
the experience of the Torit Mutiny became a factor of profound distrust towards 
peace agreements proposed by the Sudanese government. 
 
It should be recalled that the South had asked for federalism as a pre-condition for 
its support of the declaration of Independence. The North had promised this as 
well as other safeguards that the South had requested but nothing had materialized 
and Southern complaints were ignored after Independence had been achieved 
with Southern support. The South had soon learned that, without an army of its 
own, it could not guarantee the implementation of any peace deal. As a result, at 
the Addis Ababa meeting, the SSLM insisted upon a separate army, commanded 
by Southern officers. The government delegation absolutely opposed any such 
force, fearing that its formation would be the first step towards separation. 
 
On the government side, the contacts were intended to sell its suggested special 
arrangement for the South in the form of regional autonomy within a single 
Sudan. It was also a way of determining the general views of Anyanya on the 
issue of unity for the country since Anyanya’s objective had been to establish an 
independent Southern Sudanese state. It also served as a way of gathering 
intelligence that the government lacked on the political and military strength of 
Anyanya. More importantly these secret contacts were a useful way for the 
government to find out whether exiled Southern groups were organised under a 
definable single common leadership with which it could negotiate, or whether it 
would have to negotiate with different political groups. Additionally the 
 
121 
government used these contacts to study the general trends in Anyanya’s political 
and ideological orientation, since Sudan by then was a contested region between 
communists and democratic forces.221 
 
The historic negotiations leading to the AAA opened on February 16, 972 in the 
Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel and ended eleven days later. In short, a conflict that 
had spanned a period of 17 years was brought to a halt by negotiations that lasted 
barely two weeks. Such urgency meant that important and contentious issues were 
glossed over and the whole agreement was reduced to “…a series of compromises 
designed to give sufficient regional powers to appease the South while creating 
enough ties to bind the region into Sudan as a whole.”222 At the start of the peace 
process Southerners demanded a federal state with a separate Southern 
government and an army that would operate under the federal government’s 
command only in response to an external threat to Sudan. The Government of 
Sudan however was not willing to accord this much authority to the South. 
The talks deadlocked on February 19, 1972 over this contentious security issue, a 
development, which starkly revealed the deep distrust existing between the 
Northern and Southern Sudanese. 
 
The terms of the Agreement proposed by the North were a single national 
(central) government with a great deal of local autonomy for the South, including 
an elected Southern Regional Assembly and a High Executive Council appointed 
by the President, whose leader would run the region and be the Second-Vice 
                                                     
221 In July 1971, when NimeiriNimeiri was returned to power after a short lived coup supported by the 
Communist Party, he severed all the connections with the socialist countries and rushed headlong to 
embrace the West and the prospects held out by its free market economy philosophy. 
222 Woodward, P. (1990). Sudan, 1898-1989: The UnStable State. Lynne Rienner, p.143 
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President of the country. The Agreement stated that all the natural resources 
would belong to the central government. It made arrangements for Southerners to 
have continued representation in central government institutions in Khartoum, 
and established terms for economic assistance from the North to the traditionally 
underdeveloped South. The Agreement also made arrangements for a ceasefire 
and the subsequent integration of the military wing of the SSLM (Anyanya) into 
the People’s Armed Forces of the Sudan. 
 
Internal Perceptions of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
The Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) was ratified on 3 March 1972 and succeeded 
in halting the sound of guns in the South’s jungles for a decade. However, as far 
as addressing Southern grievances were concerned it only scratched the surface of 
the problem and many Southerners never accepted it in the first place. Notable 
sceptics included Captain John Garang de Mabior, then already a member of the 
Anyanya movement. Lieutenant General Gier Chuang noted that the AAA was an 
agreement imposed on Anyanya as a result of weaknesses within its organisation, 
including limited external support.223 The lack of a strong organisational structure 
had prevented the Anyanya movement from mobilizing a sufficiently large force 
to mount high-intensity warfare during the 1960s. Yet there were good reasons 
for both sides to reach a settlement. Khartoum did not want to continue bearing 
the additional and destructive costs of open conflict, while Anyanya feared 
suffering from restricted capacity because it had to face the risky outcome of 
battle for which it had limited external military support. The Israelis had provided 
some military support in the late 1960s, including training a small number of 
                                                     
223 Chuang, G. (2013) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, South Sudan, 12 June  
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Anyanya officers, but the Anyanya had no ‘springboard’ – a base from which to 
launch attacks – because African leaders were not ready to fight the Arabs of the 
North of Sudan, given the general understanding of the conflict in Sudan as a war 
between Arabs and Africans. The Khartoum government learned of the 
shortcomings haunting the Anyanya movement and adjusted its conflict strategy 
accordingly, switching from war to peace whenever the latter would be 
considered to provide it with a swift victory, rather than an agreement marked by 
compromise. This in turn influenced other regional governments, especially that 
of Ethiopia, to encourage the signature of an Agreement on its own terms. In his 
1987 interview with the Heritage Foundation, Dr John Garang de Mabior 
supported this position by concluding that: 
“We calculated that the clique in Khartoum would erode the government 
in Juba because its objective in the Agreement was first to absorb the 
Anyanya into the National Army, second to integrate it after absorption 
and third to destroy it. So you have the process of achieving a cheap 
victory over the Anyanya forces.”224 
 
There was no room for friends of the South to put their support unequivocally 
behind Anyanya because it lacked a convincing goal. Separation as an 
independent state, which was the Anyanya’s sole objective, could not be openly 
advocated in the external environment that existed at the time.225 There was an 
agreement amongst African states that the borders that existed during the colonial 
period should be maintained: a sentiment that was well captured in the OAU 
                                                     
224 Dr John Garang, (SPLM/A leader) Interview with Arop Madut, "Colonel Dr John Garang Speaks 
To Heritage On War and Peace in the Sudan, Nov. 2, 1987. 
225 The OAU Cairo Agreement 17-21 July 1964 formally supported the Addis Ababa Declaration of 
Principle of acceptance of the frontiers left by the colonial administrations – the principle of respect for 
the territorial integrity of African states. 
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Charter, which committed the signatory governments to safeguard the “territorial 
integrity of our states.”226 Southern Sudanese who supported the AAA did so 
with a view that any agreement would be better than no agreement at all, whilst 
others like John Garang de Mabior maintained that war was better than a bad 
peace, a view he expressed in his letter dated January 24
th 
1972 to General Joseph 
Lagu, where he stated that “The Anyanya and Southern Sudanese people are 
capable and ready to fight on for another nine years or more if no acceptable 
solution is found.”227 On Anyanya’s part, the rebels accepted the AAA simply 
because they had no better alternative, given that there was a possibility that they 
could be defeated militarily. The leadership hoped to use the opportunity to 
reintegrate into Sudan and participate in the governance of the country. There it 
would plan to reorganise and return to the bush to fight again at a time of 
strength. The Government on the other hand believed that it would reintegrate 
Anya- Nya and deal with the Movement at close range, dismantling it from within 
(OAU, 1964).228 
 
The main weakness of the AAA was the lack of any international guarantee. The 
short interval of less than two weeks in which the negotiations leading to it were 
undertaken did not allow for a careful analysis of its proposed content. The 
rebels’ worries were rooted solely in fears of what would become of them if they 
did not sign and they did not fully appreciate that signing a flawed settlement 
could also be dangerous. The Agreement only lasted a decade because the 
                                                     
226  Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, signed 25 May, 1963 accessed at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf 
227 Captain John Garang de Mabior’s letter to Joseph Lagu, the Anyanya Commander in Chief, 24 
January, 1972 
228 Chuang, G. (2013) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, South Sudan, 12 June 
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Southern Sudanese were weakened militarily due to the absorption of Southern 
troops to the predominantly Northern army. Moreover, the Southerners also 
lacked a forum in which to raise their concerns due to an under-representation of 
Southerners in the central government and the National Assembly and the lack of 
a legal mechanism through which Southerners could voice their grievances. In 
addition, in the post-agreement period, the Sudanese political environment 
became anarchic in the sense that there was no arbiter to appeal to – each side was 
on its own. Indeed, this was what the Khartoum had counted on when it signed its 
deal with the Southern rebels. 
 
Abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement 
Nimeiri’s regime faced uncompromising political opposition from all the political 
factions in Northern Sudan and he therefore sought to strengthen his political 
power base by cutting a deal with the South.229 Bringing the Southern rebels back 
into the purview of the Khartoum government would have allowed Nimeiri to 
direct all his efforts to dealing with his enemies within the regime, as the rebels in 
the South would no longer have posed a security threat and resources which were 
to be used to fight Anyanya could then be directed towards other developmental 
projects to save the collapsing Sudanese economy. Nimeiri, however, 
miscalculated on two counts. First, South Sudanese support did not carry much 
political weight because the entire Southern region had played a very minimal 
role in the governance of the country, given the historical injustices in terms of 
access created by colonial powers. For instance, despite representing a third of the 
population of the country, the Southern presence in any pre-AAA government and 
                                                     
229 Shaddad, M. (1987). Some Recent Trends. In Deng, FM. The Search for Peace and Unity in the 
Sudan, Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC, 35. p.29 
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in the armed forces was negligible.  Second, the AAA promised to accommodate 
‘traditional outsiders’- as Southerners were considered by Northern Sudanese to 
be – a proposal, which increased Nimeiri’s enemies in the North. 
 
The AAA had halted a seventeen-year-old conflict through less than two weeks of 
negotiations – a process that was so rushed that the negotiators inevitably glossed 
over some of the most contentious issues. These defects in the Agreement soon 
appeared when it was implemented and were eventually to negate its utility in 
creating the conditions for major economic development because it failed to 
provide the necessary security to the state. The most contentious articles in the 
Agreement concerned security arrangements, which at one point during the 
negotiations had caused a deadlock and would eventually cause the whole 
Agreement to fail. It was to be an experience that, for the South, would have all 
the qualities of a nightmare, an experience that Southerners would be careful to 
never repeat in subsequent diplomatic engagements with successive central 
Sudanese governments after Nimeiri had left the political scene. 
 
But there were also problems for the North. For instance, it had been agreed that 
Southerners who had been fighting in the bush would be integrated into the 
police, the prison service and the army but the degree of disquiet that this would 
cause Northerners, particularly the issue of integration into the army, had been 
sorely misjudged. Prior to the Agreement, the representation of the Southerners in 
the national army had been negligible and this apparent discrimination was one of 
the Southerners’ grievances, which had encouraged separatist attitudes. Although 
the Agreement would overcome this particular problem it excited, instead, 
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Northern anxieties because Northerners viewed Anyanya fighters as bandits and 
terrorists, for whom there was no room in the armed forces. The problem was that 
the Agreement had been foisted upon Northern sentiment by the determination of 
the President and did not emanate from a genuine desire to resolve the conflict 
through genuine collective compromise. Northern extremists would accept the 
provisions of the accord that were beneficial to them while those that threatened 
their interests were rejected outright. 
 
Nonetheless, by signing the AAA, President Nimeiri believed that he had 
successfully resolved Southern grievances. He felt that conditions were now ripe 
to tackle the long unsettled question of a permanent constitution to replace the 
temporary post- independence constitution, and a first draft was tabled for debate. 
The two central issues that generated the greatest heat were issues of identity and 
religion in Sudan, for they had been resolved to the dissatisfaction of many in the 
North because the religious dimension of the State had been suppressed in the 
draft. The final draft described Sudan as a unitary, democratic, socialist and 
sovereign republic, a part of both the Arab and Africa entities. As far as unity and 
managing diversity were concerned, this was a good start and very important in 
getting to the heart of the problem that had been troubling the independent 
Sudanese state. Yet this permanent secular constitution, like many of the other 
arrangements authored by President Nimeiri during his time in office, had a short 
lifespan for he would replace it with one inspired by Islam, a development which 
would add another degree of separation between South and North, thus creating a 




These were problems for the future, however, and the cessation of hostilities 
brought about by the Agreement produced a dramatic reorientation of the 
economy in the short-term. One large development project that the revolutionaries 
would use to galvanize local support for their cause and to attract international 
attention was the beginning of petroleum exploration in a concession of 200,000 
square miles of Southern Kordofan and the Upper Nile by Chevron Overseas 
Petroleum Incorporated (COPI). In 1978, the American media aired a striking 
piece of news that: “Commercial quantities of oil had been discovered in the 
Southern part of Sudan which would be piped 900 miles to Port Sudan for the 
international markets.”230 There was anxiety in the North about the consequences 
of such news, which soon turned out to be justified, as separatist sentiment in the 
South was outraged. Street protests there demanded that the pipeline should pass 
‘southern oil’ through Southern Sudan to Mombasa in Kenya. The government’s 
response made matters worse. Despite Southern sensitivities the Nimeiri regime, 
in a flagrant violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, sought to redraw the 
boundary between North and South in July 1980 to include the oilfields of the 
Upper Nile and the Bahr al-Ghazal provinces in the North. As Garang declared 
during his speech after the creation of the SPLM/A: 
“He (Nemeiri) unconstitutionally and unsuccessfully tried to change the 
boundaries of the Southern Region via his 1980 People’s Regional 
Government Act. By this way he wanted to deprive the South of mineral 
rich prime agricultural land such as Hofrat el Nhas, Kafia Kingi, Northern 
Upper Nile, Bentiu…”231 
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Figure 4: Resource-rich Areas in the Southern Sudanese Territory that the 
Government of Sudan Attempted to Annex to the North 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the three resource-rich areas of Bentiu, Raja and Renk that the 
Government of Sudan attempted to annex to the North due to their oil, mineral and 
agricultural wealth.232 
 
Nimeiri’s unilateral decision to change the boundaries of Southern Sudan 
                                                                                                                                                        
Announcement on Radio SPLA on the 3rd of March, 1984, Bilpam, Ethiopia. 




triggered yet another protest from Southern students, who were to form the first 
battalions in the soon-to-be-established revolutionary movement in the South that 
would renew the struggle against the Government in Khartoum. On June 5
th 
1983, 
President Nimeiri abruptly announced over prime time national television his 
Republican Order Number One, which divided the Southern Region into three 
provinces – Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and the Upper Nile. This set the stage for 
the final dismantling of the Agreement. Then in a series of decrees, Nimeiri 
redefined Sudan as an Arab-Islamic state by ensuring that Sharia Law was to be 
the basis of the constitution. 
 
The imposition of Sharia Law on non-Muslims redefined the identity of a multi-racial 
and multi-religious, country as Arab and Islamic, non-Arabs and non-Muslims 
were politically excluded from the new Arab- Islamic Sudan. Theoretically, 
scholars understand that race is a social (rather than a biological) construct in 
which the meanings attached to racial categories are influenced by different 
historical and social forces. 233  Although scholars generally recognize the 
complexity of race at the theoretical level, empirical studies in the social sciences 
generally do not reflect this understanding. Since the whole of the Southern 
region was comprised of non-Arabs and non-Muslims, various Southern voices 
were raised bitterly against the September Laws, as the Islamic laws introduced 
by Nimeiri came to be known. This prompted the formation of the SPLM/A, 
which waged war against the government of Nimeiri, proposing its own version 
of national identity and vowing to replace the identity imposed by Nimeiri 
through the force of arms. Aware that he no longer had Southern support due to 
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his abrogation of the AAA, Nimeiri turned to the force of arms against the South 
in order to ensure Northern sentiment. Ironically, Jaafar Nimeiri ultimately lost 
power two years later in a popular uprising championed by the same group of 
Northerners that he had wanted to appease. This popular uprising was induced by 
the harsh economic realities brought about by the Second Civil War. 
 
The Birth of the SPLM/A 
Between 1972 and 1974 relative peace and calm had returned to Sudan, 
especially to the South as a result of the Agreement that the Government and the 
Anyanya movement had signed. But from 1974 onwards, a series of rebellions 
began to emerge in the South, including that of Lieutenant Benson Kuany Latjor 
and Sergeant Bol Kur in Akobo and the Juba Airport mutiny in 1976 for which an 
Anyanya veteran, Samuel Gai Tut, was held responsible. Also in 1976, Captain 
Alfred Aguet Awan rebelled in Wau and began to fight the government in the 
North. In short, by the time that President Nimeiri had decided to introduce the 
division of the South into three small and weak autonomous provinces, the 
situation had significantly deteriorated. 
 
For the South, it was force of arms that had forced President Nimeiri to create the 
Addis Ababa Agreement but the absence of such force later led him to abrogate it 
and institute a policy of political exclusion instead. Southern activists were now 
ready to return to the bush to voice their grievances through rebellion as the only 
viable way forward.234 Nimeiri, with a recently re-equipped army, believed that 
                                                     
234 Anyanya II, a group of dissatisfied former Anyanya fighters was already operating in some parts of 
South Sudan as bandits and robbers - hardly a viable force that could challenge the powerful military of 
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he had nothing to fear and had a plan to eliminate the Southern armed forces in 
the South. He ordered them to move to the North and West (Darfur) of the 
country on the principle of keeping one’s enemies close in order to properly 
monitor their activities. Mutinies, however, were brewing in Southern towns of 
Bor, Pochalla, Akobo, Pibor and Ayod. 
 
In January 1983, the 105
th 
Battalion of the 1
st 
Division of Southern Command at 
the Bor garrison refused to accept orders transferring it to the North. The first 
response, from the Division Headquarters in Juba, was to punish the battalion by 
withholding its April salaries. Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, the commander of 
the 105
th 
Battalion, arrived to take command of the Bor garrison which was by 
now on the brink of mutiny. He immediately fortified the town. In order to 
address the Bor crisis, President Nimeiri and his National Defence Council in 
Khartoum took aggressive action. The 105
th 
Battalion’s soldiers were branded as 
mutineers who were to be dealt with in accordance with army’s regulations. 
Forces were to be sent to Bor to forcibly disarm them. On 8th May Major 
Kerubino forbade a army barge carrying a force to dock at Bor, suspecting that it 
had been sent to disarm his garrison. The army barge returned at dawn on 16
th 
May 1983 to launch an assault on the 105
th 
Battalion garrisons at Bor and Pibor. 
At Bor, fierce fighting continued throughout the day until the 105
th 
Battalion led 
by the wounded Major Kerubino left its barracks and disappeared into the bush, 
only to reappear later in Ethiopia. The 105
th 
Battalion at the Pibor garrison 
abandoned their post the following day whilst the Pochalla garrison crossed the 
Akobo River into Ethiopia with their arms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
vacuum for any kind of political or ideological guidance.  This led to its quick eliminationby the 




Figure 5: Map Indicating Where the SPLM/A Began in 1983 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the three towns in former Jonglei Province where the SPLM/A began 
its rebellion in 1983.235 
 
The mutineers were to eventually form the SPLM/A in Ethiopia under the 
leadership of Colonel John Garang de Mabior. The Movement unveiled a three-
pronged military strategy: to fight the government of Sudan with the undivided 
support of the Southern masses; to consolidate Garang’s control over the 
leadership of the Movement; and to assert the SPLM/A’s presence in Sudan and 
internationally. In order to obtain international attention, the SPLM/A launched 
attacks on projects with international investment, namely the Jonglei Canal and 
                                                     




the oil fields within the Upper Nile Region. 
 
Figure 6: The Jonglei Canal 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the Jonglei Canal, which served as a major target for the SPLM/A in  
order to curtail the Government’s developmental project for the region.236 
 
The shortcomings of the first civil war and the failure of the peace agreement that 
ended it in 1972 not only forced the former Southern fighters to return to the bush 
to fight but caused them to change the nature of their seperatist armed struggle to 
an inclusive ideological movement that appealed to the marginalised Sudanese. 
 
                                                     




Following mass recruitment into its bases in Ethiopia from 1984 to 1989, the 
SPLM/A waged a number of attacks on Sudan’s military posts along the Sudan-
Ethiopia border as evidenced by the assaults on Jekou, Akobo and Malual-Gaoth 
in 1984. This all-out military strategy caused war casualties to multiply rapidly, 
creating subsantial losses that were only mitigated by the exponential growth of 
new recruits into the SPLM/A’s training camps. With many Southerner’s willing 
to join the SPLM/A for reasons that included acquiring arms in order to protect 
their properties and lives from internal cattle-raiding combined with Mengistu’s 
commitment to provide secure bases and to facilitate the passage of military 
supplies and weapons from the SPLM/A’s allies (among them Libya, Russia, and 
Cuba), the SPLM/A convinced  itself that military victory was certain and 
imminent. This military single-mindedness caused the SPLM/A to invest very 
little in alternative means of resolving the conflict. 
 
As a result, the SPLM/A military operations traced a pattern that clearly pointed 
to a military deadlock: a number of strategic garrison towns exchanged hands 
several times. Over the course of the protracted conflict, expanding areas of 
permanent control proved very difficult for both the Government and the 
SPLM/A. Despite the irrefutable statistics showing that military victory was 
impossible for either of the two sides, what was baffling were the heightened 
delusions through which both sides expressed their faith in the future success by 
force of arms. The SPLM/A’s strategy sought to undermine the Government and 
its various militias in the South by mounting protracted operations that would 
wear the Government’s forces down. Part of the strategy, too, was to hamper the 
Government’s development projects in order to expose its weaknesses. The 
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Compagnie des Constructions Internationales’ (CCI) 237  construction of the 
Jonglei Canal and Chevron’s exploration of oil in the Southern Region were 
halted by the SPLM/A in early 1984, finally convincing Chevron that the 
Government was incapable of defending the oil wells, so that the company 
suspended its oil activities in Bentiu. 
 
                                                     
237 The digging of Jonglei Canal began in 1978, after a 1976 agreement between the Government of 
Sudan and the French engineering firm Compagnie  des Constructions Internationales (CCI). The 
Canal was designed to   divert about 25 million cubic meters of water a day from the southward flow of 
the upper Nile waters just North of Bor and channel it through a cut of 369 km which would deliver at 
Malakal a water flow of about 4.7 billion cubic meters annually. 
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Figure 7: Map of Oil-Rich Regions Targeted by the SPLM/A 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the oil blocks in Southern Sudan. Block 5A and Block 7 were the two 
operational oil blocks in the Southern Sudanese region. The SPLM/A focused its efforts 
on disrupting oil production in these two blocks in order to starve the Government of oil 
wealth, which it used to finance the war.238 
 
The SPLM/A’s military operations applied two tactical military approaches: 
                                                     




permanent occupation of captured towns and hit-and-run guerrilla tactics in order 
constantly harass their enemy. The SPLM/A’s engagement of Government forces 
exhibited a familiar pattern: surround an army garrison, block the enemy’s lines 
of reinforcement and overrun, seize and administer the locality. Then move on to 
the next strategic town until the whole of Sudan would be within its grasp. 
 
Critics within the SPLM/A expressed concern with the movement’s use of mass 
numbers, which led to high numbers of casualties at a very early stage of the 
movement’s history. This led to the SPLM/A having to mobilize and recruit more 
men to replenish heavy losses. This early SPLM/A tactic brought into question 
the capability of SPLM/A top commanders who ascended to leadership of the 
movement, but had not attended rigorous military training, as evidenced by their 
over-reliance on all-out mass attacks. 
 
Between 1984 and 1985 the numerical strength of the forces in the field was in 
the Government’s favour. However, this did not pose a significant problem to the 
SPLM/A’s morale because officers and men deployed from the SPLM/A’s 
training camps were highly motivated due to the spirit of revolution that was 
encouraged at the SPLM/A’s training camps. The SAF numbered over 56,000 
men by 1985 while the effective fighting force of the SPLM/A numbered fewer 
than 10,000 troops with another 20,000 recruits in the training camps in 
Ethiopia.239 Despite its clear numerical advantage, the Government at the time led 
by the Transitional Military Council (TMC), which took over following the fall of 
Nimeiri in 1985, “lacked the resources to mount a major offensive against the 
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SPLA, preferring to remain on the defensive” as “troops were equipped with 
obsolete weapons, were inadequately supplied by air, and felt deeply 
demoralized.”240 Whatever the specific reasons for the inability of the SAF to halt 
the military advances of the SPLM/A, the Southern movement also proved that it 
was a force to be reckoned with as by 1985, it effectively controlled all of 
Southern Sudan’s rural areas. 
 
By 1989 the SAF numbered about 65,000 of which no more than half could be 
deployed in the war zones of Southern Sudan at any one time due to the existence 
of conflicts in other regions of Sudan such as Darfur and the necessity of securing 
Sudan’s borders. The SPLA’s numerical strength grew to over 70,000 by 1989, 
thus allowing the SPLM/A to outnumber the SAF in the field – a highly unusual 
situation in the history of guerrilla movements. Aware of its numerical inferiority, 
the Government of Sudan introduced compulsory recruitment into its Popular 
Defence Forces, which supplemented SAF’s ranks. Not only were the SPLA 
forces more numerous, they were also well equipped and well trained as a result 
of the logistical support received from Libya, Cuba and Ethiopia and training 
from the Ethiopian and Cuban militaries. Although the SPLM/A was receiving 
external logistical support, capturing SAF garrisons also served as a means of 
replenishing to the SPLM/A’s stockpile of arms. As the famed guerrilla fighter, 
Che Guevara notes, “the guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that the 
enemy must serve as the source of arms and ammunition.” 241  This principle 
required that a guerrilla band carried the same weapons as its enemy. Overlooking 
this had proved to be a mistake that had placed Anyanya at a disadvantage but the 
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SPLM/A had learned not to repeat it by subsequently varying its sources of 
supply of weaponry and ammunition. Nonetheless, the fact that the initial fighters 
to join the SPLM/A had defected from the Government of Sudan with their 
weapons made initial logistical provision in the terms described by Guevara easy 
for the movement’s army. 
 
With its emphasis on numbers, equipment and training, the SPLM/A was able to 
build a large and strong army within two years of its formation, which 
significantly boosted the morale of the young guerrilla movement. Dr John 
Garang de Mabior was keen to develop a large guerrilla force. His reasoning for 
this was based on his experiences during his time as an Anyanya officer. 
Compared to the SPLM/A, the Anyanya’s relatively small fighting force was 
insufficient to cover the large land mas of Southern Sudan. Furthermore, Dr 
John’s experience as a SAF officer gave him the knowledge that the SAF being in 
a defensive position held an advantage over the SPLM/A who were on the 
offensive. To mitigate this disadvantage, Dr Garang often relied on deploying 
large numbers to attack the SAF’s positions. This approach often resulted in the 
SPLA sustaining larger casualties than would have been the case if traditional 
guerrilla tactics were employed. A good example of the excessive loss of life can 
be seen in the battle of Jekou in Upper Nile Province on 3 March 1985, when the 
Koryom Division, led by Lt. Col. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, incurred heavy 
casualties when he successfully captured the town. In spite of the heavily losses 
incurred, the SPLM/A was able to cross the White Nile to Bentiu in January 1984 
and interrupted oil explorations in the Southern oilfields in order to deprive the 




In June 1984 the SPLA’s Tiger Battalion, led by Major Salva Kiir Mayardit and 
the Timsah Battalion, led by Major Arok Thon Arok captured Pochalla and Pibor 
respectively to secure the SPLM/A’s logistical routes to and from Ethiopia and to 
demonstrate to the government that the SPLM/A was capable of waging a 
successful war on many fronts. 
 
Development was also a part of Garang’s strategy in order to gain support from 
the civil population by providing the services that the Government of Khartoum 
had failed to provide. Under his personal supervision, the SPLM/A constructed 
roads between Panyido and Pachalla, and Bongo, Raad and Dima in 1987. From 
Pachalla to Boma through Okello, the SPLM/A bulldozed and graded another 
road, which made it possible for the movement to capture areas in South Eastern 
Sudan. The SPLM/A’s ambitious development programme was brought to a halt 
due to a lack of resources, since acquiring military logistics was a priority for the 
movement. 
 
The Strategic Military Significance of Equatoria 
Southern Sudan’s weather and topography is conducive to guerrilla warfare. It 
experiences seasonal rainfall, which is influenced by the annual shift of the Inter- 
Tropical Convergence Zone that tends to last six months between April and 
September. The end of the rains does not automatically signal dry land in certain 
Southern regions. In the former Upper Nile province for example, the Sudd plains 
result in the region remaining swampy for most of the year. The rains and the 
swamps that they cause significantly hinder movement and mobility. The natural 
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conditions of Southern Sudan therefore provided the SPLM/A with an advantage 
over the government of Sudan. Due to these natural conditions, the government 
focused its efforts on the dry season, which essentially led to it conducting 
warfare for only half of the year. The weather-induced advantage that the 
SPLM/A enjoyed was further bolstered by the topography of Southern Sudan in 
the Equatoria Province, which had many mountainous areas and thick vegetation 
that allowed the SPLM/A to effectively employ guerrilla tactics. 
 
Figure 8: Topographical Map of the Equatoria Region 
 
 
Figure 8 provides a topographical illustration of the Equatoria region.242 
 
                                                     




Given its location, Equatoria was to prove to be the key to the SPLM/A’s 
strategy. There were still problems, not least those connected with the distances 
over which logistical supply had to take place. The usual weapons held by the 
SPLM/A forces at the inception of the war were mostly light weapons. A 
battalion sent into the operational zone with such weapons ran the risk of running 
short of ammunition because of the distance between Ethiopia and some of the 
operational zones, such as Western Equatoria or Bahr al-Ghazal, let alone the fact 
that the whole resupply situation had to depend on pure muscle power, using 
porters with heavy loads through unfavourable terrain. 
 
James Wani Igga, the SPLA commander and a member of the Political Military 
High Command (PMHC) 243 , who was given the mission of penetrating the 
Central and Western Equatoria operational zone, noted that: “The issue of 
ammunition was a problem right from the time we left Bonga.”244 
 
This problem of ammunition supply was to foil many attempts at penetrating 
Equatoria. Nonetheless, since the SPLM/A was determined to engulf the whole of 
Sudan in the war, it continued to attempt to move into Equatoria. Until late1984, 
however, the SPLM/A did not have a presence in Equatoria and its early attempts 
were disastrous, resulting in two of its units, totalling 3,000 men, being forced 
back to the Bor area in the Greater Upper Nile Province by Government forces, 
assisted by local militias from the Mundari and Acholi tribes. Arok Thon led the 
SPLM/A Zindiyia battalion into Eastern Equatoria mainly for recruiting purposes. 
                                                     
243 The Political Military High Command (PMHC) was the highest body in the movement which 
formulated policy related to war. It initially had five members but was later on increased to 13 of which 
five members were permanent and eight were alternate members. 




He kept the new recruits with his battalion with the hope of sending them to the 
training camps at an opportune moment, as his forces reached Owinykibul, the 
former Anyanya headquarters. A Government expeditionary force attacked the 
Zindiyia battalion which sustained heavy casualties in human and materiel terms 
but eventually forced SPLM/A troops into the Lobone mountains, as a result of 
the arrival of another enemy contingent which had been sent against the SPLM/A 
from Torit. Having exhausted their ammunition during the Owinykibul battle, the 
SPLM/A forces were forced to retreat towards Bor. New SPLM/A recruits took to 
their heels and returned to their villages. In another move towards Equatoria the 
SPLM/A’s Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Makor Lual led the Cobra Battalion into 
Central Equatoria and the battalion managed to capture Terekeka Town, some 60 
miles north of Juba, in December 1984. The Government’s counter-attack flushed 
the SPLA forces out, mainly because of their shortage of ammunition and their 
mistake of looting the town as well as stealing cattle belonging to the Mundari 
tribe, which prompted Mundari youth to side with the Government forces. 
 
Despite the earlier disasters in Equatoria, Colonel Garang knew, having learned 
that the survival of the Anyanya was a consequenc of the rough Equatorian terrain 
that no serious liberation would survive without a foothold in Equatoria because 
of its strategic geographic importance. The Equatorias – Eastern, Central, and 
Western – form Sudan’s southern border with the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The Equatoria region had also suffered 
more than most other parts of Southern Sudan from the First Sudanese Civil War 
because it had served as a focal point for the struggle, and the general 
headquarters of the Anyanya movement had been at Owinykibul, deep inside 
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Equatoria, and then relocated to Labone after the movement was dislodged from 
Owinykibul. 
 
Equatoria Province was significant to the SPLM/A’s military strategy throughout 
the Second Sudanese Civil War. Not only was the topography critical to the 
SPLM/A defensive military strategy but its ample rain and rich fertile soil 
provided the SPLM/A with a unique opportunity to ensure a constant food supply 
for its troops, which supplemented the ready food source provided by the region’s 
wildlife population that included buffalo, antelope, elephant and hippopotamus. 
 
Furthermore, the Equatoria Province provided a trade route to Uganda and Kenya. 
The SPLM/A actively encouraged trade between the Southern Sudnaese populace 
and Uganda by safeguarding the lives and properties of traders travelling through 
the SPLM/A-held zones to the Ugandan border. This sent a very clear message to 
the people of southern Sudan: the SPLA-held areas provided safe cross- border 
trade with Uganda. Over the years, traders as far as Bahr el Ghazal Province 
would travel through the SPLA-controlled areas to Equatoria Province to engage 
in cross-border trade with Uganda. 
 
The Equatoria Province also provided a conduit through which the SPLM/A was 
able to replenish its ranks with recruits from the Kakuma Refugee Camp in 
northwestern Kenya, and internally displaced Southerners on the Sudan-Uganda 
border of Laboni, Mugali and Yundi. The SPLM/A was also able to exploit the 
subsoil resources within Equatoria Province through its National Economic 
Corporation (NEC), which it established in 1992 to trade gold found in Kapoeta 
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and Southern Bari and the ample timber within Western Equatoria. With respect 
to the topography, the mountainous terrain of Equatoria Province and its dense 
vegetation provided ideal shelter for armed fighters. As a result, strategically 
important areas such as the Aswa River became the scenes of significant battles 
whereby the SPLM/A was placed at a significant advantage over the SAF. Indeed, 
the SPLM/A launched its most successful operations from its positions along the 
Aswa River that saw the SPLM/A capture Kapoeta in 1995, Yei in 1999 and Torit 
in 2001. These assaults culminated in the SPLM/A laying siege to Juba on several 
fronts, which undoubtedly pressed the government into engaging the SPLM/A in 
serious negotiations within the framework of the IGAD-led peace process. 
 
By the end of 1985 the Agreb battalion, under the command of Nyachigak 
Ng’achiluk, had captured the town of Boma in Jonglei State near the Ethiopian 
border, which became the SPLM/A’s headquarters. In 1987 the Shakush Battalion 
led by Major James Wani Igga and assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin 
Makor Lual, with John Kong Nyuon and Dau Manyok commanding the two task 
forces making up the battalion, penetrated the Central and Western Equatoria 
Zones (CWEZ). “In CWEZ, we sometimes ran short of ammunition so much that 
we depended on whatever was captured from the enemy” wrote Commander Igga 
in 2010.245 This effectively made the Government of Sudan into another supplier 
of weaponry to the SPLM/A, along with Cuba, Libya, and Ethiopia and in later 
years, Uganda and Eritrea. On November 11th 1987, the Eagle Battalion under 
the command of Kerubino Kuanyin Bol captured the town of Kurmuk and, in the 
aftermath of that victory, overran the town of Qaissan. Kurmuk is a commercial 
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crossing-point on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border only 450 miles southeast of the 
capital, Khartoum, and not far from Damazin and the Rosieres Dam, which 
supplied 60% of Khartoum’s electricity.246 The SPLM/A’s capture of Kurmuk 
placed the southern Blue Nile region under the SPLM/A’s control and 
demonstrated that the Government was incapable of operating a successful war 
against the SPLM/A. The importance of Kurmuk to both sides could be seen in 
the fact that the town changed hands three times in the course of the two decades-
long armed conflict. 
 
Figure 9: Key SPLM/A Logistics Routes 
 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the SPLM/A’s logistics routes to Ethiopia and Uganda.247 
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Reconciliation and Management of Internal Conflicts within the Southern 
Resistance 
The SPLM/A’s decision to shift from an aggressive approach to dealing with 
internal opposition to establishing reconciliatory dialogue the Southern resistance 
movement, which translated to gains on the battlefield. Indeed, the AAA was not 
embraced by all segments of Anyanya I. Elements of the guerilla movement 
refused integration into Sudan’s organised forces, choosing instead to take up 
arms once more in order to realize the rebel movement’s original separatist 
political objective. Under the command of Benson Kuany Latjor, the remnants of 
Anyanya I adopted the name Anyanya II in 1978. A clash between the newly 
formed Anyanya II and the SPLM/A was inevitable on ideological grounds since 
Benson Kuany Latjor’s forces were fighting for separation from northern Sudan, 
whereas Dr John Garang’s newly established SPLM/A were firmly behind the 
creation of a new political dispensation in Sudan. The diverging objectives of 
Benson Kuany Latjor and Dr John Garang led to a power struggle as to who 
would control the anti- government resistance. Having articulated a desire to keep 
the borders of Sudan intact, the SPLM/A successfully appealed to the sentiments 
of President Mengistu Hailemariam of Ethiopia who was fighting against a 
separatist movement at the time. The arms supplied to the SPLM/A by Ethiopia 
helped Dr John Garang to defeat the Anyanya II at their base in Bilpam, which 
was situated in Ethiopian territory. 
 
Benson Kuany Latjor’s group take up arms once again in southern Sudanese 




territory. The government exploited the southern division, eventually forging an 
alliance with Anyanya II, providing them with arms, logistical support and 
training in order to frustrate the SPLM/A’s war effort by creating a pro-
government militia. In doing so, the government was reverting to its tried and 
tested divide-and-rule tactic of positioning southern Sudanese against one 
another; a constant theme during the AAA peace negotiations. Keen to avoid 
fighting a war on multiple fronts, the SPLM/A engaged the Anyanya II in 
dialogue. Dr John Garang shifted away from his earlier tactic of finding a military 
solution to the Anyanya II ‘problem’. Instead, the SPLM/A used its senior Nuer 
officers to establish contact with the Anyanya II’s leadership, which was 
predominantly comprised of members of the Nuer ethnic community. The 
dialogue and subsequent negotiations resulted in the signing of a unity accord 
between the SPLM/A and the Anyanya II in January 1988. Unity amongst the 
different anti-government fighters was to make the SPLM/A much stronger and 
would contribute to its ultimate victory. In order to create awareness amongst the 
rank and file of the SPLM/A and to widely disseminate the unity accord, the 
SPLA Radio announced the merger of Anyanya II into the SPLM/A. As part of 
the agreement, Beson Kuany Latjor was integrated into the SPLM/A at the rank 
of Commander and Gordon Kong Chol was appointed a member of the SPLM/A 
Politico-Military High Command and a Zonal Commander of the Nasir and 
Maiwut area in Upper Nile Province. The merger strengthened the SPLM/A’s war 
effort since Anyanya II brought with them significant numbers, which further 
boosted the SPLA’s military momentum and paved the way for a number of 
victories against the Government that changed the course of the conflict in the 
middle of 1989 with the SPLM/A successfully capturing Nasir, Adong, Ulang, 
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Anakdiar, Maban and Melut in Upper Niler Province; Yirol, Rumbek, Gogrial 
and Tonj in Bahr el Ghazal Province; and Torit, Kapoeta, Magwi, Ngalngala, 
Liria, Maridi, Yambio, Rasulu and Mundiri in Equatoria Province. 
 
Another tactic that the SPLM/A employed during the civil war was to lay siege to 
a town in order to minimise its casualties. This tactic effectvely created a no-
man’s land of approximately four hundred meters around the town, cutting off 
supplies and making it impossible for the enemy to parachute supplies in. By 
doing this, “The enemy faced a very hard time, not so much from the SPLA 
offensive as from starvation,” according to Commander Igga (2010). He 
continued, “We intensified the siege and that was the surest way to dislodge the 
enemy. We succeeded in capturing Torit on 24 January 1989.” The capture of 
Parajok, Gemmaiza, and Nimule in early March, Mongalla on 17
th 
March in the 
same year, of Akobo on 17
th 
April, and Waat on 2
nd 
May followed until the whole 
of the Ethiopian border from Jekou to Kapoeta was liberated with the three 
former provincial capitals – Torit, Bor, and Nasir – controlled by the SPLA. By 
the end of 1989 the SPLA controlled a large swathe of territory from Eastern 
Equatoria to Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, which allowed it to besiege Juba. 
 
Encouraged by these sweeping territorial gains, the SPLM/A altered its strategy 
from guerrilla to conventional warfare. Having secured access to Kenya through 
Kapoeta and to Uganda through Nimule, the SPLM/A’s direct links to 
neighbouring countries improved its logistical supply routes. By March 1990 the 
SPLM/A had captured the important towns of Kajo-keji, Kaya, Morobo, and Yei. 
Not only were these towns located near the Uganda border but they also left Juba, 
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the de-facto capital of Southern Sudan, vulnerable to attack by the SPLM/A. For 
the first time in its history, the government now employed a two-prong approach 
– fighting the SPLM/A on one hand and seeking a negotiated settlement to the 
war on the other. The government also sought regional intervention and asked 
President Mobutu of Congo to mediate an end to the North-South conflict. The 
government’s revised approach was based on the following analysis: mediation 
underpinned by a successful government offensive would strengthen its 
negotiating position; alternatively, mediation would provide the perfect 
opportunity for the government to regroup and strengthen its forces prior to a 
reinvigorated onslaught against the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A was not convinced by 
the sudden calls for mediation as noted by James Wani Igga, who was then sixth 
in the SPLA command hierarchy and the Commander of the Equatoria region, 
recalling that “such a transparent gimmick did not deceive us.”248 The SPLM/A 
chose instead to continue the war effort whilst accepting a regional mediation 
effort in principle. Ultimately, the government’s attempts to invite regional 
mediation through President Mobuto did not succeed and regional mediation did 
not occur until the IGAD member states concluded that an immediate resolution 
of the Sudanese civil war was required, for it threatened to destabilize Sudan’s 
neighbouring nations. 
 
The Road to the CPA 
The poor economic situation in Sudan, coupled by the Second Sudanese Civil 
War led to a popular political uprising, which culminated in President Nimeiri 
being overthrown in 1985 and a fifteen-member Transitional Military Council 
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(TMC) emerging. Aware of the debilitating cost of war and in light of Sudan’s 
poor economic conditions, the TMC proposed a negotiated settlement. Progress in 
finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict was registered in March 1986 when 
the SPLM/A and the National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS) endorsed 
the Koka Dam Declaration, which had been facilitated by the Ethiopian 
government. The NANS, which was led by Awad El Karim Mohamed, 
represented 14 political parties and 22 trade unions, but excluded Mohamed 
Osman Al Mirghani’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Hassan Al Turabi’s 
National Islamic Front (NIF). The Koka Dam Declaration sought to create a 
conducive atmosphere for convening a National Constitutional Conference (NCC) 
to discuss issues pertaining to governance in Sudan. 
 
The NCC failed to convene during the lifespan of the TMC, which officially 
handed power to Sadig Al Mahdi’s Umma Party after Sudan’s 1986 general 
elections. Between 1986 and 1988 a series of initiatives were undertaken by 
regional countries to find a peaceful resolution to Sudan’s civil war. The 1986 
meeting between Prime Minister Sadig Al Mahdi and Dr John Garang in 
Ethiopia, the 1987 Kampala Quest for Peace and the Nairobi Search for Peace 
and the 1988 Addis Ababa Peace Forum collectively maintained the focus of the 
Sudanese on a negotiated solution to the conflict. The various initiatives 
culminated in the SPLM/A, which was the de facto representative of the southern 
Sudanese region due to its territorial gains on the battlefield 249 , softening its 
position on the repeal of Sharia Law and accepting the freezing of hodoud 
priciples (Sharia Law punishments) enshrined in the September 1983 Laws during 
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153 
the Sudanese Peace Initiative in 1988. The Egyptian government facilitated the 
Sudanese Peace Initiative between the SPLM/A and the DUP. The  DUP, which 
was not a party to the earlier Koka Dam Declaration, now supported the 
SPLM/A’s call for Sudan to convene the NCC. The Sudanese Peace Initiative was 
significant because all of Sudan’s political forces, barring the NIF who “...had 
never supported peace” 250 , now adopted the singular approach of finding a 
negotiated settlement to the civil war as the “...principles laid down in Koka Dam 
were further developed and strengthened.”251 
 
Hopes for a negotiated settlement to the civil war were dashed after the military 
coup led by Brigadier Omer Hassan Ahmed El Bashir in 1989 seized power from 
Sadig El Mahdi’s democratically elected government. The inclusive political 
peace process, “...which had reached an advanced stage”252 was brought to an 
abrupt end when the coup leaders “...banned all political parties, dissolved all 
Trade Unions, shut down all non-military press, suspended the constitution, 
imposed martial law and vested all legislative, executive and judicial powers in 
one man.”253 Sadig Al Mahdi’s inability to resolve the civil war had acted as a 
major catalyst for the 1989 coup. The NIF supported the coup and served as the 
“...fundamentalist political force behind” it.254 However, the NIF and the military 
wanted to overthrow the government for different reasons. For the NIF, the reason 
was fear that the Islamic identity of the country was under threat. The NIF’s 
desire to ensure that Sudan remained an Islamic state came to the fore in 1988 
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when it “...manoeuvred the Constituent Assembly and forced it to pass a 
resolution formally rejecting” the Sudan Peace Initiative.255 The military coup 
plotters, on the other hand, were disappointed by the government’s “inability to 
end a six-year-old civil war in the south” militarily.256 Brigadier Bashir was keen 
to reverse the SPLM/A’s gains in southern Sudanese territory and bring to an end 
the war “...which Government forces appeared to be losing.”257 
 
Having secured power domestically, Omer Hassan El Bashir turned his attention 
to weakening the SPLM/A through two clearly defined approaches. The first was 
to weaken the SPLM’s largest benefactor by supporting the anti-Mengistu forces 
in Ethiopia, which led to the fall of his government in 1991. The fall of Mengistu 
led to the SPLM/A being forced to leave Ethiopian territory in which its training 
facilities and logistics were located. The second approach was to support the 
SPLM/A’s breakaway groups. The internal SPLM/A conflict that broke out 
shortly after the fall of Mengistu saw Riek Machar and Lam Akol engineer a coup 
against the SPLM/A leader, Dr John Garang de Mabior, accusing him of 
dictatorial practices. Towns that the SPLM/A had captured earlier but which now 
came under control of the two renegades were handed over to the Bashir 
government. Bashir had reverted to the Northern tried and tested method of 
divide-and-rule tactics and took advantage of the SPLM/A’s internal chaos in 
order to register military successes against the SPLM/A. 
 
Encouraged by its military successes, the NIF decided to ignore the SPLM/A and 
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instead began to initiate contacts with leaders of the breakaway factions, notably 
Riek Machar. Riek Machar having lost the trust of Southerners because he had 
turned over Southern towns previously controlled by the SPLM/A to the NIF, and 
because he had transferred the allegiance of his men to the NIF so that they would 
fight against their fellow Southerners, decided swiftly to sign a peace accord with 
Khartoum to exonerate himself. He signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 
1997, which the Sudanese Government undermined, an act that shattered Riek’s 
popularity even further and reduced the little influence he had on Southern affairs 
to virtually nothing as a result. 
 
The failure of the 1997 peace accord, Riek Machar’s subsequent non-compliance 
with the government and the intensification of the civil war left the government 
with no choice but to now accept the IGAD peace initiative that was launched in 
1993 as the basis for negotiations. The IGAD peace initiative was the result of a 
summit in Djibouti that was geared towards finding a lasting solution to conflicts 
in the region. Although the government had obtained the military upper hand 
against the SPLA as a result of the fall of Mengistu’s government and the internal 
chaos in the SPLM/A as a result of Riek Machar and Lam Akol’s coup, it had 
failed to translate its military advantage into the annihilation of the SPLM/A. In 
consequence, the government requested Ethiopian and Eritrean mediation in the 
hope that both would support its diplomatic position with regards to the civil war.  
However, the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia, well versed in Sudanese conflicts, 
rebuffed the NIF’s negotiating formula, suggesting instead, “…that any peace 
process in which they would be involved would have to address the root causes of 
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the conflict.”258 In a move that further contradicted Sudan’s stance, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia “…candidly argued the case of the people of the South that they had not 
been involved in Sudan’s self-determination, and were therefore entitled to 
determine their destiny.”259 The notion of southerners determining their destiny, 
which had been introduced by Eritrea and Ethiopia, permeated the ideological 
stance of the SPLM/A and resulted in the SPLM/A accepting secession from the 
North as an option for the first time since its inception during the National 
Convention of New Sudan in April 1994. The Convention was the first of its kind 
for the SPLM/A and brought together over five hundred SPLM/A delegates to the 
town of Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria to “discuss and address national 
matters.”260 The SPLM/A had therefore resolved in Chukudum that all future 
peace negotiations should include demands for southern self-determination. 
 
Throughout the course of the conflict, the SPLM/A continually sought a peaceful 
resolution to the civil war. Dr John Garang was keen to finding a an internal 
‘peace from within’ that would bring on board Sudan’s political stakeholders as 
evidenced by the Koka Dam Declaration and the Sudan Peace Initaitive, which 
had won “...popular support in the country and served as a rallying point for all 
peace-loving forces” in Sudan.261 However, Dr John Garang was open to the 
possibility of a regionally mediated solution to the war as demonstrated by the 
SPLM/A’s involvement in the Abuja I and the Abuja II peace talks in 1992 and 
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1993 respectively which were facilitated by President Babangida of Nigeria. The 
peace talks discussed the governance and economic principles to be adopted in 
Sudan. The SPLM/A’s willingness to engage in regional mediation efforts 
ultimately resulted in the IGAD-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005, itself also based on the principles enunciated in the Abuja I and Abuja II 
talks. 
 
The SPLM/A’s position on regional mediation was dictated by realities on the 
ground. The SPLM/A was particularly keen to negotiate with the government 
when it held a strong military position. After a series of successful campaigns 
after 1983, the SPLM/A engaged in a series of regionally mediated efforts to find 
a lasting solution to the civil war. Between 1986 and 1991 the SPLM/A was 
involved in nine regionally facilitated peace initiatives in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Uganda and Egypt. Although the SPLM/A welcomed regional efforts geared 
towards peace, there were instances when Dr John Garang rejected external talks. 
The SPLM/A chose to reject Eritrean and Ethiopian mediation after the split in its 
ranks in 1991 that subsequently saw the SPLM/A lose significant towns to the 
government. The refusal to engage in talks stemmed from the SPLM/A’s 
weakened position and a belief that the Khartoum government was not interested 
in genuine peace negotiations. As highlighted by Deng Alor Kuol, the SPLM/A’s 
representative at the time to Ethiopia, “The Sudanese Government was not 
interested in finding solutions to the concerns raised by the SPLM/A in the early 
1990s.”262 The SPLM/A’s decision to reject talks with the government ultimately 
resulted in international condemnation, given the number of refugees caused by 
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the civil war, which the UNHCR estimated at 500,000.263 
 
Ultimately, the Sudanese civil war was brought to the attention of IGAD264 , 
which in 1993 mandated Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea to undertake the 
task of peace negotiations, under the chairmanship of President Daniel arap Moi 
of Kenya. IGAD established a standing committee to find a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict in Sudan in 1994, and negotiations between the SPLM/A and the 
government began in Nairobi in the same year. Little progress was registered 
during the first round of negotiations however, because disagreements over the 
issue of southern self-determination prevented discussions from proceeding as the 
“...Sudanese government threatened to boycott if the issue of self-determination 
was on the agenda.”265 As noted by Kosti Manibe, then a SPLM/A representative 
to the 2005 CPA talks, the issue of southern “...self-determination was not an 
option that the Khartoum Government was ever willing to consider.”266 
 
Fearing another collapse in talks, the IGAD mediators assumed the role of 
arbitrators for the second round of negotiations, given the antagonism between the 
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two sides, and presented the parties with the Declaration of Principles (DoP). The 
overarching themes of the DoP included: making the unity of Sudan a priority, 
provided that there was a democratic and secular system of governance; the 
equitable distribution of resources, transitional arrangements; and the southern 
right to self-determination through an internationally supervised referendum. 
 
Although the SPLM/A immediately endorsed the DoP, the Government 
delegation however was “...less than enthusiastic about the south’s demands, 
particularly the issue of self determination.”267 Indeed, the DoP called for “...the 
rights of self- determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their 
future status through a referendum must be affirmed…”268 The government was 
concerned that the inclusion of self-determination in the DoP would not only 
entitle southerners to the basic right to decide their fate as enshrined in the 1945 
United Nations Charter, but it would also lead to a referendum “...that would all 
but guarantee the automatic secession of southern Sudan.”269 In fact, the issue of 
self-determination had led to the collapse of the 1993 Abuja II talks, with 
Mohamed Al-Amin Khalifa famously stating during the Nigerian-led mediation 
that “...southern self determination will only be achieved by the barrel of the 
gun.”270 As the SPLM/A’s representative to the Abuja II talks recalls, the issue of 
southern self-determination was forced onto the negotiating table “...as a result of 
Ethiopian and Eritrean pressure, which was later supported by the Ugandan and 
Kenyan representatives to the IGAD-mediated talks.”271 
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It would take years of concerted effort by the IGAD delegates, tasked with 
finding ways of resolving the conflict, to exert enough pressure to drive the 
warring parties back to the negotiating table once again. The external pressure 
from IGAD as well as the internal pressures due to the deteriorating economy and 
the cost of the war forced the government to be more receptive to discussing 
southern self-determination. As the then USAID Sudan Program Director recalls 
“the terrible economic situation brought about by the civil war placed significant 
pressure on the Government of Sudan.” 272  The military balance had tilted in 
favour of the SPLM/A by 1997, which together with its new ally, the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA)273, launched two major offensives, sweeping through 
much of the Eastern Equatoria region in the South and gaining much ground in 
Blue Nile Province, thus bringing war closer to the two important government 
centers of Juba in Equatoria Province and Damazin in Blue Nile Province. These 
offensives enjoyed the covert external support of the USA and neighbouring 
countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda)274, despite their formally neutral status in 
charge of a negotiated solution to the conflict. Covert American support for the 
SPLM/A resulted from its more aggressive stance against terrorism due to the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing. Sudan became a target of America’s anti-
terrorism offensive as a result of its policy of hosting known terrorists such as 
Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahri, Omer Abdel Rahman, and Carlos the 
Jackal through an umbrella organisation known as the Peoples’ Arab Islamic 
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Congress (PAIC). The NIF’s principal ideologue, Dr Hassan Al-Turabi, asked all 
regional. Islamist groups to: “…collaborate in order to establish a springboard 
state, designed to provide a base and launching pad for other conquests.”275 
 
By the late 1990s both the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan were both 
ready to return to the negotiating table for differing reasons. The SPLM/A had 
gained significant advantages on the battlefield in the second half of the 1990s, 
which it hoped to leverage in order to achieve a favourable resolution to the 
conflict. Having lost significant ground on the battlefield, the government hoped 
to use peace in order to safeguard itself. These changed military realities pushed 
the two sides back to the negotiating table where the IGAD’s DoP was 
unanimously endorsed as the basis for discussion, which became a turning point 
on the road to peace as “it was the first time ever in the history of attempted 
conflict resolution in Sudan where external mediators established operational 
goals for the negotiations. Without that initiative, the peace negotiations would 
have fizzled out as the countless negotiations that had preceded it.”276 
 
Although the SPLM/A’s victories demonstrated that the movement was a force 
which the North could not ignore, its interests were largely viewed there as being 
primarily Southern – a view forcefully stressed in negotiations. For the 
government, allowing the SPLM/A to be viewed as a national resistance 
movement would prove problematic since it would allow the guerilla movement 
to appeal to the sympathies of other marginalised communities such as the people 
of Darfur, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Wadi Halfa to the north of Sudan. The 
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SPLM/A on the other hand was keen to be an inclusive Sudanese movement 
that could represent all marginalised Sudanese people as evidenced by the 
SPLM/A’s press statement in 1987 in which it stated “The East, West, and 
extreme northern part of the Sudan are in the same basket in terms of oppression 
and neglect by the central government.”277 The expansion of SPLM/A control into 
the border areas of the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile region helped 
to bolster the SPLM/A’s image as the movement for Sudanese irrespective of 
ethnic origin or religious affiliation. The secular approach of the SPLM/A sharply 
contrasted with the ideology of the NIF, which firmly believed that the state and 
religion were indistinguishable entities. Dr Francis Deng writes: “More than any 
other regime in the history of Sudan, the NIF has been the most uncompromising 
in its pursuit of the Islamic agenda.”278 
 
The NIF authorities viewed themselves firstly as Muslims and secondly as 
Sudanese. As one interviewee noted: “Islam is their salient identity, which they 
want to make the identity of the rest of the country.”279 This identity was to be 
imposed on everyone inside the country through force of arms, and a jihadist 
militia group – the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) – was to be the main vehicle 
for achieving the dream. In 1994 the NIF regime issued the Nationality and 
Passport Law, granting Sudanese citizenship to any Muslim prepared to accept 
the principles of an Islamic state.280 With the gate to Sudan thus left ajar, alleged 
terrorists forced their way to Khartoum, which eventually became the Achilles 
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Heel of the NIF since it led to the US government sympathizing with the 
difficulties that the southern Sudanese were facing, which led to the 
resettlement of 4,000 young southern Sudanese across the USA at the turn of 
the new century.281 These youth, commonly known as the ‘lost boys’ of Sudan, 
represented the largest group of unaccompanied refugee minors to have been 
resettled in the USA, in search of better opportunities such as education. In the 
late 1980s, the Sudanese civil war had forced the lost boys to flee their villages 
firstly to the Ethiopian refugee camps of Itang and Dimo and then to the Kenyan 
Kakuma Refugee Camp following the overthrow of the Mengistu government in  
1991. It was in the Kakuma Refugee Camp that their journey to the USA, with the 
help of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), started. 
African-Americans and evangelical Christians were sympathetic with the plight 
of the predominantly Christian south and pressured the American government to 
help them by resettling the lost boys. The presence of the lost boys in the US 
helped to mobilize public opinion and draw attention to Sudan’s ongoing civil 
war. 
 
The religious fervor of the NIF leadership proved to be problematic when the US 
shifted its attention from the war on communism to the war on terrorism in late 
2001. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, President 
Bush declared war on terror in his address to a joint session of Congress where he 
remarked, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government 
that supports them”, further observing that “Every nation, in every region, now 
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has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”282 It 
was now clear that the NIF would have to soften its Islamic ideology in order to 
survive the shift in US policy. Having been previously designated by the US 
Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993, and the 
increased interest in Sudan by the US as a result of the September 11 attacks, the 
NIF’s radical religious stance could no longer survive. The shift in US policy 
favoured the SPLM/A as the Khartoum government was under increasing 
pressure to find a lasting solution to the protracted civil war. US pressure is well 
evidenced by the Sudan Peace Act, 2002, which was signed into law by President 
Bush on October 21, 2002 and recognized that “A viable, comprehensive, and 
internationally sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents 
the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of human rights 
and a self-sustaining Sudan.”283 It was now clear to the Khartoum government 
that negotiations were the preferred outcome and that continued attempts to 
impose its position militarily was not acceptable to the US government and the 
wider international community. 
 
Pressure to find a solution to the civil war also emanated from Sudan’s 
neighbouring countries, which were hosting thousands of Sudanese refugees who 
had fled from the war. The destabilizing impact of hosting refugees “given the 
high levels of material and psycho-social deprivation”284  made the search for 
peace a matter of urgency for Sudan’s neighbours. Indeed, as of 2006, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo (DRC), and Uganda were providing shelter for over a million Sudanese 
refugees, including 240,000 Darfur residents driven from their homes by armed 
Janjaweed militias and the Sudanese military forces. 285  Furthermore, the 
economic cost of maintaining the war continued to rise, as Colonel Garang 
acknowledged over Radio SPLA: 
“The war has drained our human and material resources. You cannot have 
a healthy economy when more than 20 million Sudanese pounds a day are 
devoured by the war machine. You cannot have economic stability when 




, 2002, in a conference room filled with a frigid atmosphere of 
suspicion, IGAD delegates gathered in Machakos, 70 kms outside Nairobi, to 
design a road map to a peaceful resolution of the North-South conflict. Minister 
Idris Mohammed and Nhial Deng Nhial represented the Sudanese government 
and the SPLM/A respectively. Not only had the on-going conflict heightened the 
level of suspicion between the two warring sides, but some of the non-Sudanese 
delegates were partisan supporters of one side or the other – a factor which, in 
turn, introduced yet another level of complexity into the negotiations and 
regionalized the Sudanese civil war. The neutrality expected of the delegates 
proved to be an exercise in futility for each of the states concerned had disputes 
with its neighbours. The Ugandans, for instance, were in conflict with the 
Government of Sudan over the Lord’s Resistance Army, which was fighting the 
Ugandan government from its bases in Sudan. The Sudanese government and 
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Eritrea maintained suspicions as “Eritrea started to support the Sudanese armed 
and non-armed oppositions, such as the National Democratic Alliance of the 
Sudan, whereas Sudan supported Islamist armed Eritrean oppositions.”287 
 
Figure 10: NDA Logistics Routes from Eritrea 
 
Figure 10 illustrates Eritrean support routes to the DA. The NDA was comprised of a 
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number of Northern opposition political parties and the SPLM/A.288 
 
Peace settlement theorists such as Janice Stein believe that, for negotiations to be 
effective, the issues to be resolved must be clearly identified and separated from 
non- resolvable issues.289 In an absence of clear guiding principles, however, the 
Sudanese negotiations became bogged down over petty issues and degenerated 
into a tedious affair. As Deng Alor Kuol recalls “Finding common ground with 
the Government of Sudan proved extremely difficult. It was only after both 
parties received sustained diplomatic pressure that we were able to come to an 
agreement.” 290  To assist proceedings, the former American president, Jimmy 
Carter, lent much-needed support to the chief mediator, General Sumbeiywo, 
advising him on ways to stay focused by suggesting that the mediators draft a 
single negotiating text to serve as the cornerstone from which all subsequent talks 
could be built. Acting on this advice, the chief mediator drafted a single 
negotiating non-paper dubbed ‘one country, two systems’. The mediators began 
the task of compiling the key issues of the Declaration of Principles into a Single 
Negotiating Text, which would provide the parties with a basis from which to 
negotiate. Looking back at his experience mediating the Sudan peace 
negotiations, General Sumbeiywo recalls that, for a negotiation to be successful, 
mediators must “...help the parties build their own capacity to negotiate credible 
agreements. The conceptualization has to come from the parties themselves rather 
than from the mediator.”291 
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The ingredients of the Single Negotiating Text included issues pertaining to the 
transitional period and the pre-transitional period, as well as to the need for a 
process of reconciliation and for the equitable sharing of natural resources. The 
text stopped short of stressing the right to self-determination or a possibility of 
secession for the South, as the SPLM/A would have preferred because this would 
have stirred up a hornet’s nest. According to Deng Alor Kuol, “The delegation of 
the Government of Sudan was not willing to entertain any notion of southern self-
determination, which they equated to automatic southern secession.” 292  The 
SPLM/A however viewed the removal of self-determination from the agenda as 
undoing the gains of the Declaration of Principles. As General Sumbeiywo 
recalls, “The SPLM/A was furious and the United States hit the roof” when the 
issue of self-determination was omitted from the agenda of the negotiations.293 
For the SPLM/A, the removal of self- determination from the agenda of the 
negotiations was a red line since it had compromised on the issue of maintaing 
Sharia Law as the legal system in the Republic of Sudan. Having used the AAA 
as a learning experience, the SPLM/A was keen to ensure that it did not make 
similar mistakes when negotiating with the Government of Sudan. Mansour 
Khalid recalls that “having gone through various trials and errors in autonomous 
governance, the SPLM/A’s steadfastness during negotiations in demanding full-
fledged autonomy should not have come as a surprise.”294 
 
The SPLM/A had always insisted on the removal of Sharia Law from the 
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constitution as the condition for participating in any peace initiative and the 
refusal of the Sudanese Government to accept this demand had always been the 
cause of deadlock in talks between the two sides. For southerners, “if unity 
becomes a basis for oppression, subjugation, and indignity, then it cannot be 
legitimate”295  and other avenues such as self-determination would need to be 
explored. In such circumstances therefore, the South would be left with no option 
but to choose to separate from the rest of the country, but the conditions for an 
amicable divorce from the North ought, the SPLM/A believed, to be determined 
in the peace negotiations. The SPLM/A believed, in any case, that the division of 
the country was imminent unless separation of state and religion could be 
effected.296 Since most of the legitimacy enjoyed by the National Islamic Front 
(NIF), the party representing the government of Sudan at the negotiations, and 
their appeal to the masses emanated from this religious principle enshrined in the 
constitution, its position on the issue of separation of state and religion was 
immovable; the two parts of Sudan were inseparable, as it had always maintained 
since it came to power. The mediators also appeared inadequately informed over 
the root causes of the North-South conflict; causes which were as complex as the 
challenges of resolving them. As a result, several of the SPLM/A delegation 
expressed the following views to the mediators during heated debates concerning 
the identity of the people of the north and south of Sudan: “We are not Arabs; we 
are a separate people. The names of those in the South are not Islamic. They are 
Christian.” 297  In response to the sentiments of the SPLM/A delegation, the 
government delegation highlighted that by agreeing to negotiate, they too had 
                                                     
295 Deng. F. War of Visions. p.6 
296 Waihenya, W. (2006). The Mediator: Gen. Lazourous Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace 
Process. East African Educ Press. p.86 
297 Sumbeiywo, L. (2013) Interviewed by Malual Ayom Dor, South Sudan, 16 April 
 
170 
made a significant compromise, pressing upon the SPLM/A to compromise on the 
issue of Sharia Law. Indeed, for the government delegation, “...choosing peace 
was a risky business, but we have taken it.”298 
 
Fearing another collapse, the chief mediator was advised to allow the two teams 
to tough out their disagreements with words – their weapons had been luckily left 
behind in Sudan. In order to protect the peace talks from collapse, General 
Sumbeiyo adopted a new approach to mediation in which he asked the parties to 
respond to the following questions “What does it mean to be an African? What 
does slavery mean to you? What does self-determination mean to you?”299 The 
negotiators’ heartfelt responses lowered the tension even if they did not moderate 
their positions. As General Sumbeiywo remarked “Although positions still 
continued to harden there was at least a ray of light.”300 Eventually a compromise 
was reached and a single negotiating text was produced, known officially as the 
Machakos Protocol, which would provide the framework from which the CPA 
would eventually be derived.301 The Machakos Protocol, which was signed in the 
Kenyan town of the same name on the July 20, 2012 included two key elements: 
the separation of religion and state for the people of Southern Sudan; and the 
possibility of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan, who would 
then be able to decide their destiny in a referendum. 
 
Having agreed to include self-determination in the Sudanese peace negotiations, 
the parties then turned their attention to discussing the length of the transitional 




301 See Annex 1 
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period and the timing of the proposed southern vote on whether to separate from 
the north. The Sudanese government wanted the referendum to take place after 
ten years while the SPLM/A demanded a two-year transitional period. As Kosti 
Manibe recalls: 
“Finding a compromise for the timing of the referendum proved difficult 
for negotiating parties. Ultimately, the mediation team took the mean of 
the sum of the years suggested by the negotiating parties and thereby 
determined that the date for the plebiscite on self-determination would be 
six years after the signing of the CPA.”302 
 
This was a major breakthrough because it marked the first time since 1997 that 
the two parties would be able to sign a peace agreement.303 This culminated in the 
signing of CPA on the 9th of January 2005. 
 
The pitfalls of the AAA in 1972 guided the SPLM/A’s approach to negotiating 
the CPA in 2005. Although Anyanya fought for the creation of an autonomous 
Southern Sudan, the AAA was silent on the issue of self-determination. 
Furthermore, the High Executive Council 304  and the People’s Regional 
Assembly305, which were both established by the AAA, were not involved in 
decisions of concerning military, fiscal or international matters. Moreover, the 
AAA empowered President Nimeiri to appoint and relieve the president of the 
High Executive Council, thus essentially taking away the southern region’s ability 
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to select its own leader. Aware of these shortcomings   in the AAA, the SPLM/A 
focused its engagement with the Government of Sudan on the following six 
thematic areas: 
1) Self-determination: The South was given the opportunity to become 
independent through a referendum in 2011; until the referendum, the South 
was to have autonomy status within Sudan; 
2) Power-sharing: The leader of the SPLM was to be the first vice-president 
of Sudan as well as being the president of the government of South Sudan; 
28% of the seats in the Government of National Union were to be given to 
the SPLM and elections were to be conducted in 2009; 
3) Wealth-sharing: Revenues from the oil in the South were to be shared on a 
50:50 basis between the North and the South of the country; 
4) Religious freedom: Sharia Law was to be applied only in the North of the 
country and only to Muslims; 
5) Security arrangements: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) would be the only legal armed groups 
in the country; they should remain separate from each other although some 
integrated units were to be formed; the government would withdraw 
91,000 troops from the South within two and a half years of the signature 
of the CPA and the SPLA would have eight months to withdraw its troops 
from the North; 
6) Financial freedom: The North and the South were to have separate 
banking systems and currencies.306 
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The CPA was certainly ambitious in its scope in seeking to resolve two decades 
of war and a much longer history of economic, social and political 
marginalization for South Sudan. The agreement addressed the issue of 
modalities of implementation by providing for forty new commissions charged 
with overseeing its implementation. For the SPLM, this desire for detail was 
driven by its memory of the failure of the 1972 AAA. 307  Jobbins correctly 
observes that the SPLM entered the 2005 Naivasha308 talks with a long memory, 
seeking a longer and more elaborate understanding on the transition period 
necessary for the new agreement to come into operation. 309  In addition, the 
beginning of new negotiations in early 2002, which were eventually to lead to the 
CPA were marked by a phase in the negotiating process when both parties had to 
adopt a pragmatic attitude towards each other and had to accept concessions.  In 
this respect the experiences of the SPLM/A were quite different from those its 
predecessors had lived through with the AAA in 1972 when it was they who had 
to concede to the intransigence of Northern negotiators. 
 
What was responsible for this attitudinal change? Zartman310, one of the leading 
authorities on how peace-agreements are negotiated, argues that settlements are 
achieved when the moment is ripe and belligerents reach a mutual hurting 
stalemate. Ripeness is a situation in which conflicting parties are prepared for 
peace making. The focus of the theory is essentially on the timing of conflict 
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resolution attempts rather than on the content of the proposals for a solution. 
According to Zartman, timing is a key consideration as substantive answers are 
fruitless until the moment is ripe.311 In other words, timing is more important than 
the content of peace proposals. According to Kelly, identifying this period of 
‘ripeness’ is the first step to successful peace negotiations. 312  So was the 
Sudanese conflict ripe for resolution when negotiations for the CPA actually 
began? Recent assessments of the CPA contradict the basic principles of the 
theory of ripeness. For instance, Wennmann argues that the CPA was not brought 
about because of any “mutually hurting stalemate but rather a strategy to gain at 
the negotiation table what could no longer be won on the battlefield.”313 This 
perspective implies, therefore, that the move from violence to the negotiating 
table represented a deliberate option and strategy chosen by the two parties, both 
of whom made concessions in a bid to maintain political power in their respective 
domains of sub-national dominance by sharing national power between them. In 
fact, the research community is divided as to the efficiency of power-sharing, as, 
quite apart from allowing each of the two protagonists to preserve superiority in 
specific domains through the process of power- sharing, this might also work as a 
necessary compromise between the warring parties, reflecting their military 
capabilities, which could help to secure commitment to an accord and thereby 
assure the security of the weaker parties.314 As Brosché suggests, “One positive 
asset with power sharing is that it can build trust between former enemies, but if 
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an exit option of this cooperation is included in the agreement, the potential 
for trust-building is reduced; power-sharing agreements should thus preferably 
not include such options.”315 127 Out of 83 peace agreements signed between 1989 
and 2004, 70 involved power sharing.316 Walter suggests that this is a mechanism 
that can be used to resolve commitment problems in a context of severe mistrust. 
In her examination of power-sharing, she finds that parties are 38% more likely to 
sign an accord if it includes a guarantee to be part of the future government.317 
This perspective implies, therefore, that the move from violence to the negotiating 
table represented a deliberate option and strategy chosen by the two parties, both 
of whom made concessions in a bid to maintain political power in their respective 
domains of sub-national dominance by sharing national power between them. In 
fact, the research community is divided as to the efficiency of power-sharing, as, 
quite apart from allowing each of the two protagonists to preserve superiority in 
specific domains through the process of power- sharing, this might also work as a 
necessary compromise between the warring parties, reflecting their military 
capabilities, which could help to secure commitment to an accord and thereby 
assure the security of the weaker parties.318 As Brosché suggests, “One positive 
asset with power sharing is that it can build trust between former enemies, but if 
an exit option of this cooperation is included in the agreement, the potential 
for trust-building is reduced; power-sharing agreements should thus preferably 
not include such options.”319 Out of 83 peace agreements signed between 1989 
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and 2004, 70 involved power sharing.320 Walter suggests that this is a mechanism 
that can be used to resolve commitment problems in a context of severe mistrust. 
In her examination of power-sharing, she finds that parties are 38% more likely to 
sign an accord if it includes a guarantee to be part of the future government.321 
Hartzell and Hoodie (2007) argue that settlements with power-sharing and power-
dividing elements are more likely to generate enduring peace.322 
 
Zartman’s ripeness theory claims that conflicts are resolved once the moment is 
‘ripe’. The reliance on a ‘ripe’ period serves to ensure that the conflict is never at 
fault if a conflict remains unresolved, as failure to resolve conflict is intrinsically 
linked to failure to spot ripeness. This removes the importance of the quality and 
skill of negotiators and mediators who may be involved in finding peaceful 
solutions to a conflict. Looking at the CPA, it is clear that its success was a result 
of multiple factors. The war fatigue experienced by the warring parties can be 
inferred as a mutually hurting stalemate. However, other factors, such as 
international pressure, the economic cost of maintaining a war and regional 
political changes, all played a significant role in ending the Second Sudanese 
Civil War.  
 
Although the CPA catered for the continued political dominance in Northern 
Sudan of the NCP, the effective single political party in Sudan prior to the CPA, 
until elections were held there, it also provided for a significant opening of 
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political space, and the sharing of state power and wealth previously controlled by 
the NCP with the SPLM/A in the South. Brosché observes that the threat of 
democratic elections for the broadly unpopular NCP, and the expected Southern 
vote for independence, appear to have left the NCP with little hope of peaceful 
political survival unless it changed its political strategy.323 Brosché also disagrees 
with Wennman since he argues that, “When the CPA was signed, the moment 
was ripe and GoS and SPLM/A had indeed reached a mutual hurting stalemate, 
largely due to external pressure, especially as the United States had given priority 
to the issue.”324 He adds that the experience of the CPA process suggested that 
involving both regional actors and the broader international community could 
constitute a fruitful approach towards reaching an agreement.325 He adds that the 
experience of the CPA process suggested that involving both regional actors and 
the broader international community could constitute a fruitful approach towards 
reaching an agreement.326 
 
Indeed, the role of international actors appears to have been crucial, as Einas 
(2009) has affirmed in pointing out that regional and international actors 
pressured Sudan’s adversaries into joining the dialogue for a peace agreement by 
helping to resolve a mutual hurting stalemate through their intervention.327 Apart 
from external pressure, another mutual hurting stalemate also figured 
prominently; for both the SPLM and the NCP realised that a military victory 
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could not be achieved. This, in itself, facilitated an atmosphere of commitment to 
a peace deal. Quite apart from considerations of stalemate and international 
pressure, other factors were crucial to the process and success of the negotiations 
of the CPA. Chief amongst these was a question of leadership. As Einas (2009) 
further points out,  “Apart from international pressure, the CPA would probably 
not have been concluded successfully if it had not been for the personal ambitions 
of the main two negotiators, the late Garang and the current Vice President 
Taha.”328  Jobbins (2006) agrees that, “Though a success for the international 
community, the CPA was nonetheless a Sudanese agreement, and appeared to be 
a major step forward by the leadership both of the rebel Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP)-led 
government.”329 
 
In addition, future difficulties in the implementation of the CPA were anticipated 
during the negotiation process, so that different strategies were developed to try to 
overcome them. The strategy of the IGAD mediation team and its international 
partners was to balance the NCP’s expected reluctance to implement the CPA by 
having a strong SPLM minority partner in the national government, and by using 
the continued engagement of the international community to guarantee the 
agreement (ICG, 2006).330 As the International Crisis Group argued in 2009, “The 
SPLM’s main strategy for ensuring the implementation of the CPA was to 
maintain a strong and credible military threat against an NCP abrogation of the 
agreement. This was cemented in the CPA by allowing the SPLA to remain a 
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separate army alongside the SAF.”331 This strategy was a result of the lessons 
learned from the AAA when the Anyanya rebels had unsuccessfully demanded a 
separate army to protect the Agreement from the machinations of adventurers in 
Khartoum who might attempt to destroy it. Had the SPLM/A failed in ensuring 
that a separate army would be created, the CPA would not have been signed. 
 
There were problems over implementation, too. For example, three years of 
almost daily contact at the Naivasha negotiations did build significant trust 
between the representatives of the two parties but this appeared to dissipate 
during the implementation phase (Borsche, 2009). Newman and Richmond 
(2006) reported that, the lack of adequate political institutions and their poor 
performance become spoiling factors as political institutions emanating from the 
CPA are the victims of disagreements between the peace custodians, namely the 
NCP and SPLM. Wassara (2009) argues that the CPA provided for the 
institutions, which were crucial in creating a new political environment after a 
prolonged period of social disharmony in the Sudan. However, it has been the 
problem of attitudes that hindered progress in establishing the necessary political 
institutions. The main challenges were to banish distrust and fear among the 
custodians of the CPA in the competition for influence and control in the 
territories where they prevailed. These were all psychological barriers to the 
implementation of the agreement, which contributed to the underdevelopment of 
functional institutions through which its provisions could be implemented. 
 
The final issue of implementation was, in a sense, the culmination of the CPA 
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itself, for it involved a popular exercise for self-determination in January 2011. 
Yet the political environment was less than encouraging for such a bold decision. 
Why, then, did South Sudan’s population choose that option amidst impediments 
such as violence in the borderlands or the fact that South Sudan was a land-
locked region, and faced massive underdevelopment? Southern Sudanese viewed 
self-determination, despite all the challenges it might present, as an end to the 
internal colonialism created by political, administrative, educational, economic, 
social and religious subjugation. For Issam Mohamed, southern Sudanese selected 
secession because they did not want to live under the yoke of a merciless regime 
that did not recognize agreements, treaties or the human rights of minorities, 
different religions, race or colour.332 
 
In a more recent analysis, McEvoy and Lebrun (2010), in Uncertain Future! 
Armed Violence in Southern Sudan, highlighted current and probable future 
sources of insecurity as the country moved toward national elections and the 
referendum. These included a contested North-South border, potential failure to 
hold a referendum, a unilateral declaration of independence by the South in 
protest at election or referendum rigging; and failure to implement the results of a 
referendum. Young argued, on the other hand, that neither the government nor the 
SPLM/A expected the CPA to be honoured, as negotiators on both sides were 
playing a complicated game of positioning themselves, each expecting the worst 
of the other.333 
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Analytical Oversights With Respect to the AAA and the CPA 
Indeed, the reality is that the CPA was eventually successfully implemented and 
the new state of South Sudan was born. The question then arises as to why and 
how analysts, such as Young, were so wide of the mark in the pessimism that they 
demonstrated about its probable failure. In effect, while some studies have 
determined that security issues were relevant to the explanation of failures of 
peace agreements in Sudan, none of them have looked specifically into the 
evolution of the role of the military as decisive in their collapse or survivability. 
In other words, it was the acquisition by the SPLM/A’s leaders of an 
understanding of how to develop an effective solution to the conflict that 
explained why the AAA failed whereas the CPA was to succeed. In short, neither 
can the collapse of the AAA be adequately explained simply by defects in 
guarantees for South Sudanese self-determination, nor can the survivability of the 
CPA be explained by a sufficiency of guarantees for self- determination for the 
South. 
 
One reason for this is a consequence of analytical method. Most studies on 
negotiation processes combine both theoretical and empirical approaches, 
pointing to the specific characteristics of the issues under dispute and to the 
nature of conflict to clarify the degrees of difficulty involved in negotiating a 
peaceful end to conflict. They argue that identity or ideological issues, for 
instance, are more difficult to resolve than economic or political issues because 
they provoke deeper levels of commitment and are less amenable to 
compromise.334  Licklider 335 , for instance, points to arguments supporting the 
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proposition that it is more difficult to negotiate identity issues than economic or 
political issues. Francis Deng, a prominent Sudanese scholar who has written 
extensively on national identity issues in the Sudanese conflict, supports this 
argument.336  Indeed, the difficulties in resolving the issue of identity led the 
SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan to agree on separate governance systems 
that saw the South being administered as a secular region and the North applying 
Sharia Law. Reaching such a compromise took a significant period of time. In 
1972, however, the AAA took less than two weeks to conclude, despite the fact 
that the issue of identity having been at the centre of the First Sudanese Civil 
War. 
 
It can also be argued that the difficulty in negotiating the CPA was partially due 
to the parties’ insistence on a particular sequencing of issues, as well as an 
insistence on establishing agreements on implementation modalities, modes of 
negotiation and the restricted natures of mandates given to the negotiating teams.  
In other words, the CPA was a much more comprehensive agreement than its 
predecessor, the AAA. These procedures were all measures taken by the SPLM to 
avoid repeating past failures. Many groups in the South shared the view that the 
Government of Sudan, which had, over the years, participated in a number of 
negotiated agreements, basically as a means for lessening military, diplomatic or 
political pressure on it, would never implement a full-blown peace agreement. 
Even the SPLA foot-soldiers, singing in Dinka, echoed this sentiment: “Arepee 
jam be tipaklooi, cii Jon be gam; bi gam kadikuce paandaria akketheer ci rot 
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beer nyok,” “The government of Sudan calls for peace talks but John will not 
reciprocate because that ‘yesterday’s event’ must not be allowed to repeat 
itself.”337 ‘Yesterday’s event’, incidentally, is code for the AAA. 
 
During the negotiations for the CPA, the challenge for the SPLM/A delegation 
was to establish how to negotiate more effectively in order to prevent the past 
history of non- implementation of negotiated agreements from repeating itself. It 
can be argued that the difficulties that arose in the negotiations leading to the 
CPA were due to this fear of a repetition of the experience of the AAA – not 
merely because identity issues, which admittedly dominated the talks, were 
inherently so difficult to resolve, as conflict resolution literature suggests. The 
SPLM/A delegates to the peace talks had learned that what mattered was not 
simply the process of reaching an agreement but how it was reached in terms of 
the identities and interests of the parties involved in the mediation, the sequencing 
of issues at the negotiating table and the successful negotiation of implementation 
modalities. 
 
Existing research on conflict and peace in Sudan has focused on the role of socio- 
economic politics and leadership, together with the process of peace negotiation, 
as the main factors behind the failures of peace agreements there. Studies on the 
CPA have tended to be limited to its weaknesses and no research so far has 
looked into the links between the structure adopted in the CPA and past events. In 
other words, for the SPLM/A, at least, negotiating techniques as applied in the 
construction of the CPA were the consequence of a learning process that had been 
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defined by past failure. Indeed, the role of learning in the negotiations, which 
eventually led to the CPA has been virtually absent in the current literature. 
Approaches by conflict resolution theories such as Greed Theory, Identity Theory 
and the Ripeness Theory fail to analyse the role of learning in peace negotiations. 
This omission prompts questions as to the degree to which current literature in 
the field of conflict resolution can be applied to the CPA negotiation process. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The history of Sudan has been one of tension between the peoples of the northern 
and southern regions of the country. For the Turko-Egyptian rulers, Sudan was 
rich in both natural and human resources that could be exploited for financial 
gain. Since the Quran forbade the use of Muslim slaves, the Turko-Egyptian 
administration turned their attention towards the people of southern Sudan who, 
up until that point, were practicing traditional religious beliefs. For the Turko-
Egyptian administration, enslaving southern Sudanese was acceptable and was 
ultimately made possible as a result of collaboration between the Turko-Egyptian 
administration and the northern Sudanese region. The slave trade was extremely 
profitable and “...enhanced the position of the traders, who were generally 
northerners.”338 Ultimately, this debilitating trade, which was “accompanied by 
force and violence”339 sowed the seeds of animosity and “...deepened the racial 
divide between Northern and Southern Sudan.”340 The sense of divide between 
the peoples of northern and southern Sudan, which was buttressed by the slave 
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trade, left the southern Sudanese feeling discontented with their neighbours to the 
North. For Francis Mading Deng, the slave trade resulted in southerners 
associating their northern countrymen “...with nothing less than the total 
destruction of their society.”341 
 
With the defeat of Mahdiyya in the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium became responsible for administering Sudan. Through 
British influence, the new colonial administration sought to eradicate the slave 
trade and to curb the encroachment of Islam into the southern regions of Sudan. 
As Francis Mading Deng observes: 
“The British sought first to suppress the trade in slaves through their 
influence on the Turko-Egyptian administration, then after the re-conquest 
of the Sudan in 1898, to abolish it; also, British occupation meant that the 
North’s efforts to spread Islam southwards were confined to urban centers 
and in the end were significantly frustrated.”342 
 
Despite the success of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in stamping out slavery 
in Sudan, the differences between the northern and southern Sudanese persisted as 
a result of the manner in which the two territories were administered by the new 
colonial administration. The Anglo-Egyptian era saw the colonial administration 
institute the Closed District Ordinance, popularly known as the British Southern 
Policy, which sought to curb Arab influence in southern Sudan. Instead, the 
Southern Policy “...attempted to preserve the culture and language of the non-
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Arab majority in the Sudan.”343 Although the colonial administration believed 
that the Southern Policy would benefit the people of southern Sudan because of 
the “...asymmetrical historical developments in the Sudan before the British 
invasion”344, the Policy ultimately exaggerated the differences between the north 
and south Sudan. 
 
In 1956, the colonial administration granted Sudanese independence with the 
result that the northern Sudanese elites inherited control of Sudan’s affairs. Once 
again the people of southern Sudan found themselves marginalized at the expense 
of their northern countrymen. There was a feeling amongst the southern Sudanese 
that a disparity in development and education existed between the northern and 
southern parts of Sudan, which excluded the southern Sudanese from effectively 
engaging in the administration of independent Sudan. In a petition forwarded to 
the British governor-general by the co-founder of the Liberal Party, Abdel 
Rahman Sule, southerners observed that “We in the South are still undeveloped 
economically, socially and politically.” The petition went on to say that 
southerners had no other option but to “...ask for federation with the North. 
Failing to federate, we shall ask as an alternative for the appointment of a high 
commissioner from the British Foreign Office to administer the South.”345 The 
discontent faced by the southerners as a result of this continued marginalization 
led to the birth of Anyanya, which waged a war against the Sudanese government 
from 1955-1972. 
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The AAA brought an end to the first Sudanese civil war, also known as the 
Anyanya War. As part of the agreement, southern Sudan was given limited 
regional-autonomy whereby southerners were now able to administer their own 
affairs. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the AAA, partly due to the manner in 
which the agreement was negotiated, allowed the central government to regularly 
interfere in the affairs of the south culminating in President Nimeiri using his 
constitutional powers to “...override and then abolish the Southern Region.”346 
 
The failure of the AAA resulted in the people of southern Sudan turning once 
more to arms in order to fight for a new political dispensation in the Republic of 
Sudan under the banner of Dr John Garang De Mabior’s SPLM/A. Initially 
fighting for a secular Sudan, the SPLM/A eventually turned its attention towards 
the possibility of southern cessation from its northern neighbour. The government 
initially refused to engage in dialogue concerning possible southern cessation, but 
both regional and international realities forced the Government of Sudan to 
eventually accept southern self- determination, which was the final outcome of 
the CPA. 
 
Unlike the AAA, the CPA was the culmination of a series of negotiations between 
the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. Furthermore, the CPA involved a 
number of regional and international actors, which applied the necessary 
diplomatic pressure to both sides and helped to focus the scope of the 
negotiations. Having learnt from the failure of the AAA, the SPLM/A sought to 
                                                     
346 Ibid. p.18 
 
188 
ensure that the CPA was a more detailed agreement which addressed the various 
concerns of the people of the south, namely: clearly defined power-sharing; 
inclusive governance; wealth-sharing and comprehensive security arrangements. 
For Dr John Garang, the CPA “At the political level, this peace agreement affirms 
the right to self of self determination for the people of South Sudan.” 347
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Chapter 4: The Internal Constituency and Organisation of the 
SPLM/A 
 
The CPA could not have been achieved without the SPLM/A developing the 
appropriate internal structures through which the processes that led to an eventual 
consensus over adopting negotiations rather than conflict as the way forward 
could be developed. An understanding of these structures is thus essential in 
appreciating the ways in which the movement was able to formulate such a 
strategy for resolving the conflict. It was only through these structures that it was 
able to internalize the lessons of the 1972 AAA, as well as accommodate the 
essential demands of the population for eventual secession alongside its own 
original preference for revising the governance process throughout a unified 
Sudanese state. This chapter, therefore, is primarily devoted to an analysis of 
these features. 
 
The key internal development for the movement was the way in which it learned 
to adapt to events as they took place and how it was able to tailor its objectives to 
fit realities on the ground – the popular demand for independence of South Sudan 
in the South on one hand and the Northern desire for the unity of Sudan on the 
other. In part this adaptation or the change in policy by the SPLM/A leadership 
was a consequence of ‘learning by doing’ based on the past experiences of the 
Anyanya movement with the North in 1972 and the changing nature of 
government in Khartoum; from the Nimeiri regime to the combined Mahdi/Turabi 
government and, eventually, the Omar al-Bashir regime instead. Learning is an 
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inherent feature of decision-making policy for it is the way in which decision-
makers uncover a range of values and principles governing policy formation and 
come to understand how they can complement or conflict with each other. 
Learning, therefore, is critical to each of these situations. In order to demonstrate 
the SPLM/A’s learning, this chapter will present both the strategy and the 
organisation that the SPLM/A adopted to manage the war and the southern 
population.348 It will then argue that the SPLM/A projection of a double- handed 
approach – for a united New Sudan on the one hand, and for a referendum of self-
determination for South Sudan on the other – resulted in the SPLM/A enjoying 
popular support both in the north and the south of the country. We first begin by 
presenting SPLM/A political strategy, followed by the organisation that the 
SPLM/A leadership adopted to carry on the war. Subsequently, a comparison will 
be made between the strategies and organisational structures of the SPLM/A and 
other guerrilla movements in Africa. 
 
These realities compelled the SPLM/A to be pragmatic in order to adapt and 
incorporate the use of parallel languages (unity or/and referendum) to 
accommodate those who wanted unity and those who wanted secession. This was 
also necessary in order to convince the SPLM/A’s own civilian population that 
they must identify with the aims of the war to the point of martyrdom and this 
was not a simple task for it to achieve. This flexibility of approach was to prove 
to be key to achieving the ultimate goal - the independence of South Sudan on 9 
July 2011. However, this was not an unchallenged process – there were several 
attempts to wrest control of the movement away from John Garang de Mabior so 
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that the New Sudan vision championed by him and his supporters would have 
been reversed with the result that the movement’s objective would have been 
geared solely towards achieving the independence of South Sudan from 
Khartoum. 
 
The SPLM/A’s New Sudan Political Strategy 
The SPLM/A leadership, especially Garang, deliberately shaped the Movement 
on the basis of his understanding of the causes of previous failures in the 
strategies and tactics of earlier movements in the South. Central to this approach 
was the New Sudan Political program of political education, which all senior 
members of the movement, especially those who joined it when they were already 
government employees, underwent during their compulsory six-month training at 
the Zinc Marxist-Leninist Political School in the Gumbella region of Ethiopia. 
The Zinc training was followed by one year of advanced training at the Derg’s 
Yakatit Political Ideology School, and others were sent to Cuba for degree 
courses in Marxist–Leninist political ideology. As the former Chief of Staff of the 
SPLA, General James Hoth Mai, recalls, “I remember that there were over 100 of 
us from the SPLM/A’s rank and file attending different courses ranging from 
combat intelligence, command courses, closed protection units and so forth.”349 
As in the case of the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), the school 
socialized former government employees into an organisation and moulded their 
views of society and history. Political orientation based on Marxist-Leninist 
ideology alongside military training was an essential part of the SPLM/A strategy 
of turning people with various social backgrounds into committed SPLM/A 
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cadres. It was during these training periods that the ideology of the New Sudan 
was indoctrinated, a key internal development for a Southern organisation, which 
was once seen as separatist and fighting for self-determination of the South Sudan 
people but now sought a shared political dispensation for the Sudanese state 
instead. The SPLM/A policy for the New Sudan came from past experiences, 
and the SPLM/A was able to learn to adapt to circumstance to tailor its 
objectives to fit the realities of the day. Unlike Anyanya the SPLM/A became a 
melting pot for all of Sudan and, for the first time, many different groups were 
able to identify with a shared national objective. Whether this objective was 
expressed in the form of one united Sudan or a “New Sudan” did not matter much 
for, in terms of political and military organisation and in the articulation of its 
political challenges, the SPLM/A was a better organised political and military 
instrument than was Anyanya II, as the successor to Anyanya itself. 
 
While the SPLM/A under Garang fought for unity of the country, its concept of 
the New Sudan became controversial and a subject of debate not only among 
Sudanese but also among scholars. For example, historian Douglas Johnson in his 
analysis of the SPLM/A stated that it was difficult to classify SPLM/A as a 
separatist movement, an insurgency directed towards reform, or a state-
consolidating or state- subverting insurgency (Johnson, 1998). Whether the 
SPLM/A under the leadership of Garang adopted the philosophy of New Sudan as 
propaganda to divide Northerners and gain their support in its effort to liberate 
South Sudan, is a consideration that needs further investigation but it is worth 
noting that the SPLM/A committed itself to and saw itself as an integral part of 
 
193 
the struggle of all marginalized groups throughout Sudan.350 
 
Propaganda throughout the twentieth century, of course, has been one of the 
crucial tools of warfare and has been enlisted to manipulate ideas and attitudes.  
Importantly, in the context of South Sudan, however, the vision of a new united 
state was not left unchallenged by the Southern forces, which was, after all, the 
stronghold and constituency of the SPLM/A. Thus there were several attempts to 
wrest control of the movement from John Garang de Mabior by radicals who only 
believed in Southern Sudan seceding from the North. In 1983, at the formation of 
the SPLM/A, there was a group of former Anyanya I veterans led by Akuot Atem 
de Mayen and Samuel Gai Tut who called for the cessation of the south and 
rejected the leadership of Dr John Garang and his policy of a unified New Sudan. 
Furthermore, in 1991, the SPLM/A suffered another break in its ranks led by Dr 
Riek Machar Teny and Dr Lam Akol who called for southern self-determination 
whilst denouncing Dr John Garang. It is therefore important to note that, although 
Garang’s New Sudan vision had a specific purpose and was the dominant view 
inside the movement, it was not favoured by many Southerners who remained 
under his leadership, for the driving force for the fighting men and women had 
been separation.351 In other words those who supported his policy often did so 
reluctantly and, in response, settled for their own interpretation of the vision. As 
Francis Deng notes: “The fighting men and women of the South took it (the New 
Sudan Vision) at best as a clever ploy to allay the fears of those opposed to 
separation within the Country, in the African region, and in the international 
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community.” 352  Even though Garang was talking in terms of creating a new 
united Sudan, Southerners were still fighting for the separation of the South from 
the North. During 1994, the vision was refined to include the right of self-
determination of the Southern Sudanese, to meet the demands of the strongest 
constituency within the SPLM/A. Nonetheless, given its vision of a new united 
Sudan, the SPLM/A became a viable negotiating partner with the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) so that the CPA could be signed in January 2005, ending one of the 
longest running civil wars of the African continent. 
 
The first internal challenge to Garang’s leadership and his aim of a united New 
Sudan came from Anyanya I veterans who regrouped themselves in the bush 
under the name of Anyanya II prior the formation of the SPLM/A. Anyanya I, II 
and the SPLM/A were formed against a social background which profoundly 
affected the ways in which they articulated the struggle. The original Anyanya 
Movement, with its agenda of Southern Sudanese liberation, emerged after 1955. 
It was formed at the time that the majority of African nations were calling for 
decolonization, which might have influenced Anyanya’s separatist thinking. The 
majority of African movements calling for decolonization occurred in the late 
1950s but the Anyanya movement actually coalesced as a defined movement only 
in 1962, in the wake of the 1955 Southern rebellion involving the Torit garrison, 
the event that marked the beginning of the first Sudanese civil war. While 
Anyanya I and II had both called directly for the independence of South Sudan 
from Sudan itself, in the second Sudanese civil war the SPLM/A demanded the 
restructuring of the country, with the creation of a new united Sudan on a basis of 
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equality between its constituent components. As was stated in the first manifesto 
of the SPLM/A: 
“The immediate task of the SPLM/SPLA is to transform the Southern 
Movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and 
concerned only with the South, and self-interests to a progressive 
movement led by revolutionaries and dedicated to socialist transformation 
of the whole country. It must be reiterated that the principal objective of 
the SPLM/SPLA is not separation for the South. The South is an integral 
and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has been fragmented sufficiently 
enough by colonialism and neo-colonialism and her further fragmentation 
can only be in the interests of her enemies.”353 
 
As Suliman further notes: “the SPLA, unlike the Anyanya I and II movements, 
announced that it was not fighting for an independent South; its declared aim was 
a unified secular and democratic Sudan.”354 This call appealed to the North and 
the New Sudan vision legitimised the rebellion in the wider international arena 
but it created internal rifts within the leadership of the SPLM/A and divided the 
Southern population along the ideological lines of those supporting separation and 
those supporting a united New Sudan. These differing perceptions of the Southern 
cause became the source of a major rift that brought about bitter clashes between 
the Anya- Nya II movement and the newly-formed SPLM/A, which led to the 
defeat of the former, upon which some of its remnants joined the Sudanese 
government and fought alongside the SAF against the SPLA until the signing of 
the CPA, which led to their integration into the SPLA. 
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The most important division was to occur in 1991 when, citing Garang’s 
unilateral decision-making, the lack of Political-Military High Command 
meetings and the failure to hold a SPLM convention355, Machar (a Nuer), Lam 
Akol (a Shilluk) and several other leaders left to form a separate armed group. 
Conflict erupted between the two sides, which “...triggered an intra-SPLA civil 
war and large scale violence along ethnic lines. Machar was prominently 
involved, mobilizing support from his Nuer ethnic group against Garnag’s Dinka. 
In the notorious Bor Massacre in November 1991, it is estimated that at least 
2,000 mainly Dinka died.”356  The failed coup led to bitter conflict amongst 
southern Sudanese in which southerners were predominantly divided along 
ethnic lines. Ultimately, the coup plotters formed a devastating alliance with the 
Government of Sudan, which supplied them with weapons to be used against their 
former comrades. 
 
As noted above, the SPLM/A released its initial manifesto on the 31
st 
of July 
1983. The manifesto spelt out the movement’s political agenda, which was 
essentially the restructuring of social and economic systems throughout Sudan to 
create a secular, non-sectarian, and united socialist country. The manifesto 
stressed that: “aggravated by colonial design and perpetuated by all the minority 
clique governments in Khartoum, the conspicuous difference between the North 
and the South arose from the different levels of socio-economic development, 
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nationality, culture and religion between them.”357  In a diametrically opposed 
stand to Anyanya II’s position, the manifesto affirmed that the SPLM/A aimed at 
engulfing the whole country in a socialist transformation to establish a united 
socialist Sudan, not a separate Southern Sudan.358 While the Manifesto clearly 
articulated the vision of New Sudan, it was still unclear what the true story behind 
the united New Sudan philosophy of the SPLM/A really was, and whether John 
Garang de Mabior was indeed fighting to keep Sudan united under new terms or 
whether the philosophy was a means to fight the war for independence of South 
Sudan – history has taught us, after all, that “...few wars are ever fought in the 
name of their real causes…”359 
 
Following John Garang de Mabior’s death in a helicopter accident in 2005, two of 
those who claim to have been close to him, including his widow, Rabecca   
Nyandeng de Mabior, have offered different explanations as to his intentions, 
clearly indicating that no one knew what he was really thinking. However, a close 
analysis of Garang’s statements makes it difficult to believe that he was a 
separatist. While briefing SPLA recruits in Bonga Military Training Centre, for 
example, he maintained that: “The goal of fighting for secession from the North 
would not resolve fundamental grievances because efforts to obtain legal 
autonomy had been explored and had drastically failed when Numeiri abrogated 
the Addis Ababa Agreement,” and that, “The numerically weaker Southern 
Region, with only a third of the population of the whole country, would not be 
able to wage a prolonged war against the rest of Sudan, especially if the cause of 
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the war would not win sympathy throughout the country as a whole.”360 
 
Since the religious identity of the Sudan had been used by ruling elites as a tool 
for exploitation and suppression of its citizens, the SPLM/A advocated the total 
separation of state and religion. The Sudanese Government’s declaration of an 
Islamic legal system two months after the SPLM/A launched its manifesto was to 
intensify discontent and would have wide ramifications in both the North and the 
South. The new legal system based on Sharia Law forced the SPLM/A to 
magnify the religious dimension of the conflict, refusing to negotiate before the 
change was annulled – an impossibility because, according to the Sudanese 
Government: “Muslims have a religious duty to implement Islamic law.”361 These 
diametrically opposed stands implied that conditions for negotiations were not yet 
ripe and that war would drag on unendingly, making the issue of Islamic law and 
the SPLM’s radical stand on this matter the principal obstacles to a negotiated 
solution. 
 
In order to win sympathy in the North, Garang used ‘Radio SPLA’, which was 
swiftly established and based in Addis Ababa, to make an impassioned plea for 
support, airing messages such as: “The revolution was not for a separate South, 
which would resolve nothing, but a revolution for all the Sudanese to build a New 
Sudan, a federation with a central government committed to fight against racism 
and tribalism.” 362  This marked a fundamental transformation of the original 
North-South division of the country, with ethnicity superseding economic 
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Despite this call, Northern leaders remained skeptical and failed to understand the 
true nature and dimension of the SPLM/A’s war agenda, whilst some appeared 
genuinely baffled by the stated objectives of the movement. Suliman rightly 
observes: “It has always been questionable, however, whether the SPLA would be 
able to maintain this position in the face of large practical and psychological 
obstacles, not least that most of its rank and file were motivated to fight by ethnic 
and religious differences.”363 Such confusion contributed to the longevity of the 
war because Northern leaders found it difficult to conceive of a negotiating 
formula acceptable to the SPLM/A, given that it did not want to represent or 
resolve the grievances of just the South but of all the marginalized masses 
throughout the country. 
 
In addition to attempting to correct the Anyanya’s organisational shortcomings, 
the SPLM/A’s founding leadership drew explicit lessons from Anyanya’s 
experiences and embodied many of those lessons in the 1983 SPLA manifesto.364 
However a group of former Anyanya officers who wanted continuity of 
leadership resisted this diversion away from the Anyanya platform, which led to a 
bloody internal struggle from 1983 to 1988, which the SPLM/A won at a huge 
cost in material and human life. Following his victory over Anyanya II, Colonel 
Garang declared that both the civil and military wings of the new movement 
ought to be led by a single person because the separation of the two wings had 
created an internal conflict in the Anyanya movement before it was restructured 
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under Joseph Lagu in the late 1960s. He also maintained that the goal of fighting 
for secession from the North would not resolve fundamental grievances because 
efforts to obtain legal autonomy had already been explored and had drastically 
failed when Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement. Furthermore, the 
numerically weaker Southern Region, with only a third of the population of the 
whole country, would not be able to wage a prolonged war against the rest of 
Sudan, especially if the cause of the war would not win sympathy throughout the 
country as a whole. It is clear that the experience of the earlier insurgency – the 
Anyanya Movement - shaped the structure and dynamics of the SPLM/A, not 
least because many in the SPLA had also fought in the Anyanya. 
 
The SPLM/A Relations with the Southern Population 
Although the SPLM/A obtained considerable support from the local South 
Sudanese, that support varied greatly from region to region, and from tribe to 
tribe. Often they were welcomed in the Dinka areas where they received local 
support in terms of food supplies and new recruits, perhaps as a result of the 
configuration of the leadership of the SPLM/A. However, in other areas the 
SPLM/A was denounced and betrayed, especially in Nuer, Mundari, Taposa, 
Murle and Fertit areas where the majority of the local leaders such as Clement 
Wani Konga, Paulino Matip Nhial, Tom el-Nur, Ismael Konyi and Gordon Kong 
Chol were recruited by the Government of Sudan to fight against the SPLA. The 
SPLM/A relied on contributions of food, but at some points and in certain places 
it bartered for food items with AK47, G3, SKS rifles and ammunition. The SPLA 
spent its first year waging a bitter struggle against those forces in the South that 
disagreed with its ideology of a united socialist Sudan, securing the long supply 
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lines to bases within Ethiopia and establishing its claim as the irrefutable 
representative of the Southern Region. This was an identity, which the 
Government readily assigned to the SPLM/A, but which the SPLM/A was not 
completely satisfied with, for it wanted to be the voice of all the marginalized 
masses within the country. The fundamental ideological differences between the 
SPLM/A and Anyanya II developed into military confrontation with the SPLM/A 
beginning its attacks against Anyanya II forces in Bilpam, inside Ethiopia in 
August 1983. As the former commander of the SPLA General Headquarters 
(Bilpam) between 1986- 1994 recalls, “Following the disagreement over 
leadership and the strategic direction of the SPLM/A in 1983, we were instructed 
by our Chairman to attack and capture Bilpam.” 365  The SPLM/A’s campaign 
against the Anyanya II forces resulted in the SPLM/A successfully capturing 
Biplam and establishing its headquarters there. Although the Anyanya II had been 
defeated, its remnants returned to their villages in southern Sudan and established 
militias that fought against the SPLM/A with the support of the Government of 
Sudan. 
 
The approach of silencing opposing voices dissatisfied with the vision of New 
Sudan through the use of force created internal divisions and tribal antagonisms, 
which led the ethnic Nuer to support the 1991 split. The SPLM/A breakaway 
group, consisting of three members366 of the Political Military High Command 
(PMHC), accused Garang on August 28, 1991 of running the movement in a 
dictatorial manner.367 Unfortunately this split, which was initially motivated by a 
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power struggle between the SPLM/A elites, quickly turned into a tribal one 
between two major tribes, the Dinka and the Nuer, with the Dinka remaining with 
the main SPLM/A group led by Dr Garang (who was a Dinka) and the Nuer 
supporting the break-away group led by Dr Riek Machar (a Nuer). This latter 
group came to be first known as the SPLM/A Nasir Faction, and later as the South 
Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM). The split supports the argument that:  
“… when Southerners are in conflict with the North, their identity with 
their region and their self-image as black Africans come first, while at a 
local level tribal attachment is predominant.”368 The Dinka and the Nuer 
have  long been in competition for regional supremacy, as Pritchard had 
pointed out nearly eight decades earlier: “… in South Sudan the tribesmen 
have a sense of patriotism…they are proud to be members of their tribe 
and they considered it superior to other tribes.”369 Douglas Johnson also 
acknowledges the existence of historical Dinka-Nuer friction, attributing 
this to the consequences of ecological change and population pressure, 
noting that these were the reasons “...most frequently mentioned by the 
Nuer as the reason for migration.”370 
 
These political divisions reflected profound tribal antagonisms, which remain a 
big problem today and erupted once again into open warfare in 2013. They were 
the result, in large part, of the colonial experience for, following violent military 
expeditions to gain control of the South, the colonial government had imposed a 
different system of administration, known as the “southern policy” on the region. 
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Whilst in the North, control of the economy and the administration was mainly in 
the hands of the state and secular leaders, in the South the colonial government 
created self-contained tribal societies headed by traditional chiefs, thus giving the 
tribes political significance and an administrative role. It was a decision that was 
to replicate itself in the post-Sudanese independence period and, today, inside 
Southern Sudan. 
 
Despite this, the wars fought in the name of New Sudan against Anyanya II were 
of benefit to the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A grew to enjoy the support of a large 
section of the rural poor and dispossessed in the North as well, since it addressed 
the fears of marginalized peoples.”371 The Anyanya guerrillas were bedevilled 
throughout most of their existence by bad organisation, lack of coordination 
between local bands, personal and local rivalries between military and political 
leaders, a chronic shortage of supplies and inadequate training. Lacking a strong 
military or political organisation, which could have enabled them to achieve their 
objectives, they also found that their uncompromising goal of separatism isolated 
them from potential national and regional allies who might otherwise have helped 
them overcome their organisational weaknesses. Garang’s vision of keeping 
Sudan united also rewarded him with Ethiopian government support, even though 
it was battling the separatist Oromo people, the Eritran People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). 
During the early years of the Movement, Ethiopian Government support was 
crucial to the SPLM/A and since Ethiopia had problems with its own 
secessionists in Eritrea and the Oromo region it would have been unwilling to 
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assist in any action likely to lead to a re-drawing of its international borders. 
 
Internal dissent inside the SPLM/A reached crisis point in August 1991, when the 
breakaway group, the Nasir faction, called for the overthrow of Garang and for a 
separate South, thereby abandoning all ambitions for a unified secular state. 
Although they failed to unseat Garang they revived the principle that self-
determination took priority over unity. Eventually, in 1994 Garang and the 
SPLM/A revised the New Sudan vision, refining it to include the right of self-
determination of Southern Sudanese, in order to cater for the strongest 
constituency of the SPLM/A, who believed in breaking the South away from the 
North. In 2002, Riek Machar rejoined SPLM/A after the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement that he had signed with the Khartoum Government was not 
implemented. The Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) had included a referendum 
for South Sudan but without a time line for its implementation. Nonetheless, 
under the vision of a New Sudan, the SPLM/A became a viable negotiating 
partner for the Government of Sudan (GoS) so that the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) could be signed in January 2005, ending one of the longest 
running civil wars of the African continent. Yet, in one sense, the wars were  
primarily a product of tensions within the South for, in part, they reflected 
profound tribal antagonisms and political challenges to the military leadership 
there. In part, too, they were provoked by Northern attempts to disrupt the 
SPLM/A itself. 
 
The SPLM/A Ideology, Organisation and Leadership 
With the end of the Second World War, insurgencies in the name of national 
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liberation became very common, in Third World countries and in Africa in 
particular. Examples include the Mau Mau Revolt in Kenya between 1952 and 
1960, the Algerian War of Independence between 1954 and 1962 and the 
Rhodesian Bush War between 1964 and 1979. They were taken at first as most 
effective way of achieving self-determination from colonial administration, but 
later became another method of changing elitist post-colonial governments in 
Africa. In Sudan, independence in 1956 immediately raised the issue of the 
relationship between the South and the North, with the South seeing the North as 
another colonialist power. The issue was to manifest itself as an armed 
insurgency, with Anyanya, between 1955 and 1972, and then again with the 
SPLM/A between 1983 and 2005. 
 
It is noteworthy that these insurgent movements all owed much to individual 
initiatives on the parts of their leaders, that they were formed in opposition to 
established political structures, and that they allowed their leaders a great deal of 
choice over how they should be organised and how they should operate. This 
meant that the leader and the movement were so closely associated that it was 
difficult to conceive of one without the other.372 It is also difficult to conceive 
that the organisation (SPLM/A) was able to learn independently of its leader. 
With this being the case, one can conceivably argue that learning within the 
SPLM/A was a result of the individual learning of Dr Garang, which was then 
passed on to the movement and its cadres. 
 
Following the 1974 Akobo Rebellion the remnants of Anyanya I together with 
                                                     
372 Clapham, C. African Guerrillas. p.57 
 
206 
these Akobo mutineers adopted Anyanya II as their official name and their 
declared objective became the total independence of the south from the north. The 
Akobo Rebellion, which was led by Lieutenant Benson Kuany Latjor, a member 
of the Nuer ethnic group, resulted in the death of the garrison commanding 
officer, Colonel Abel Chol, who hailed from the Dinka ethnic group. How they 
were to achieve an independent South Sudan was left unexplained, however. The 
original Anyanya I movement had emerged in the early 1960s as a loose alliance 
between army mutineers and politically active Southern Sudanese, united against 
what they perceived as the hegemony of Northern elites in the newly independent 
Sudan. As Yosa Wawa notes: 
“Anya Nya operated exclusively in Equatoria Porvince until 1964, when it 
attacked government posts in Bahr el Ghazal and the Upper Nile 
Provinces. Other names that appeared that had close ties with rebel 
activities included The Land Army (1963), Azania Secret Army and Pan 
African Freedom Fighters.”373 
 
These groups nevertheless operated under decentralised and informal system of 
authority throughout the 1960s so that factional fighting alongside the lack of 
effective military control had been the consequence for the movement. More 
importantly, because of its overtly secessionist agenda, it had failed to cultivate 
robust and stable external alliances, especially among neighbouring African 
countries. In any case, some of these countries, like Ethiopia, were trying to cope 
with their own secessionist movements. As Dowden notes: 
“One reason that the SPLA did not initially demand a separate state was 
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that its fighters were based in and backed by Ethiopia. The government 
there was fighting an Eritrean secessionist movement. It did not want to be 
seen to support any secessionist movements as were in Africa.”374 
 
Intense internal grievances, factional conflict and limited external support thus 
prevented the Anyanya I movement from mobilizing a sufficiently large force to 
mount high-intensity warfare throughout the 1960s. 
 
In the SPLM/A, leadership was closely associated with ideology and organisation, 
which effectively brought Southern fighters under one central command. As I 
illustrated in Chapter 2, the Anyanya was a loose coalition of regional Southern 
forces that were loyal to their regional commanders. Through his reflection as an 
Anyanya fighter, Dr Garang was aware of the shortcomings of a fractured 
leadership and it was for this reason that he wanted SPLM/A cadres to share a 
commitment to common principles and goals, established as a reflection of the 
values of the personalised leadership structures. Formal structures such as the 
Political Military High Command, political and military hierarchies, as well 
military formations, did exist, of course, but their existence and influence 
depended on the whim of the leader. 
 
The SPLM/A’s initial base area of operations, to become known as Bilpam, was 
located immediately to the west of the Gembella region of Ethiopia. After 
clashing with Northern troops in the Southern towns of Bor, Pachalla and Ayod at 
the outbreak of the renewed rebellion in 1983, the mutineers who were to become 
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the SPLM/A headed for Ethiopian border towns, where remnants of the Anyanya 
movement, that were to eventually become part of the Anyanya II movement, 
were operating as bandits, conducting armed raids on their own Southern villages 
and looting cows and goats from poor civilian populations in the name of the 
liberation of South Sudan, in order  to reorganise themselves for revenge attacks 
against President Nimeiri’s forces. “These bandits were predominantly drawn 
from Anyanya I forces that had failed to meet the criteria stipulated in the AAA 
for absorption into the organised Sudanese armed forces.” 375  The rebelling 
Southern officers of Battalions 104 and 105 of the SAF became embroiled in a 
tussle for the leadership of the newly formed SPLM/A with the Anyanya II. 
Anyanya I veterans, who held ministerial positions following the AAA, such as 
Samuel Gai Tut and Akuot Atem were of the view that their age and experiences 
entitled them to lead the SPLM/A. 
 
After obtaining a doctorate in agricultural economics at Iowa State University in 
the USA, Colonel Garang was determined to model his country based on the 
successful management and appreciation of diversity. It can be argued that this 
desire was a result of Garang’s experiences in the United States. Indeed, Garang 
considered that, “…if the USA could fashion a free, secular, democratic, and 
united society from its own ethnically diverse and multi-cultural society 
practicing many religions and living in peace, why not Sudan?”376 He willingly 
admitted the impression his experiences during his schooling in the USA had left 
on him, noting,  “Nations are formed as a result of the historic movement of 
peoples, as in the US, so we aspire to a new Sudanese dispensation in which all 
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are equal, irrespective of these localisms, which we inherit out of no choice of our 
own.”377 Despite Garang’s desire to emulate the US’ successful management of 
diversity, his socialist leanings led to US reservations about the SPLM/A since 
President Reagan’s government was in the midst of the Cold War, which placed 
socialism and capitalism on the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. 
 
Anyanya II’s leadership and competition for control over the SPLM/A presented 
an obstacle to the formation and success of the new movement. Motivated largely 
by personal antipathy, jealousy, and delusions of self-importance, Anyanya II’s 
leaders – Akuot Atem de Mayen, Samuel Gai Tut, and William Abdullah Chuol 
Deng – maintained that the rebellion was not new but merely a continuation of the 
old war and so the original leadership structure of the original Anyanya ought to 
be observed.  The Anyanya remnants therefore proposed that Garang, who was 
only a captain in the Anyanya, be given the post of Deputy Chief of the Army 
while two former Anyanya senior figures and politicians, Samuel Gai and Akuot 
Atem de Mayen, would lead the military and the political wings respectively to 
ensure that the concept of continuity was not interrupted, and so that the objective 
of the war was to remain the same: total independence of the Southern Region. 
The proposed structure is further elaborated in the diagram presented below. 
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Note: This structure remained on paper and was never implemented due to the fact that 
those who were behind it were forced out militarily by the SPLM/A and fled to Khartoum 
where they remained as a government-sponsored militia, fighting SPLA in the South.378 
 
The competition between those aligned with Garang and those aligned to 
Anyanya II leaders led to armed conflict that saw Garang ascend to the leadership 
of the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A was convinced that negotiations would not succeed 
without considerable military leverage. It specifically argued that the movement 
would have to export the war to the North in order to prove its claim to be 
fighting for the whole country, despite the internal threat that it faced from 
Anyanya. In the words of John Garang de Mabior, the SPLA waged a “bitter 
struggle” from June to November 1983 before the “correct direction prevailed” as 
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the SPLA had killed or won over the “separatist reactionaries and 
opportunists.”379 
 
Following the resolution of the leadership issue, the SPLM/A’s first task under 
Garang, was to structure itself into a military organisation as indicated in Figure 
13 below. The defecting Battalions (104 and 105) “became the core of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) under Dr John Garang.380 This ‘militarization’ 
of the movement monopolized the decision-making process and concentrated all 
the power in the hands of Dr John. 
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Figure 13: Leadership Structure of the SPLM/A in 1985 
 
 
Note: The organisational structure in Figure 13 was adopted in 1985 and saw the 
SPLM/A take on a more militarised leadership structure.381 
 
However, the defeat of Anyanya II exposed the SPLM/A to divisions along tribal 
lines. The Sudan government sought to exploit such divisions by providing 
logistical and tactical support to the Anyanya II remnants so that they could fight 
a proxy-war against the SPLM/A. As James Hoth recalls “as we moved from the 
SPLM/A’s headquarters in Bilpam to Sudanese territory, we encountered and 
engaged Anyanya II remnants within the Greater Upper Nile Province.”382 The 
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SPLM/A, having by coincidence installed at its helm a group of Dinka – John 
Garang de Mabior, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Salva Kiir, Arok Thon Arok, Majier 
Gai Ayuel – was quickly branded in the Government media as a Dinka 
movement. Smaller southern tribes distrustful of Dinka hegemony in the SPLM/A 
could then be formed into pro-Government militias. The Mundari, the Toposa, the 
Fertit and the Murle all responded to the government’s call. In 1984 Nimeiri 
ordered the Gaajak Nuer governor of Upper Nile, D.K. Matthews, to provide 
arms, ammunition and uniforms to William Abdullah Chuol – a well-known 
separatist – to establish a rearmed Anyanya II as a Government militia designed 
to cut the SPLA supply lines from Ethiopia and to intercept the steady stream of 
recruits coming from Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile to SPLA training 
camps in Ethiopia. 383  Mohamed Suliman explained that: “Remnants of the 
Anyanya II and the Murle militia operating in Upper Nile and the Fertit make 
up the main pro-Government popular Defence Force.”384 Nimeiri’s backing for 
Anyanya II earned that movement and the Nuer community a bad reputation in 
the South because they were seen to have collaborated with the archenemy of the 
South, thus ensuring that they would be labelled as traitors. 
 
Although Anyanya II’s leaders sought the separation of the South from the North 
whilst the SPLM/A stood for a united socialist Sudan - a position much closer to 
that of the Government in Khartoum - the Central Government backed Anyanya 
II. This clearly shows that the objective of the SPLM/A encoded in the phrase 
‘New Sudan’ – involving the restructuring of social and economic systems of the 
whole country and thereby creating a secular, non-sectarian and united 
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democratic socialist country - threatened the Arab-Islamic establishment in the 
North to such an extent that it preferred the separatist agenda as the lesser of two 
evils. Francis Deng writes: “Since the reform agenda postulated the Arab-Islamic 
distortion of the country’s identity configuration, which was racially, ethnically, 
culturally and religiously pluralistic and more African than Arab, the Arab-
Islamic establishment felt itself threatened.”385 The successive Islamic-oriented 
regimes in Khartoum, after the downfall of the Nimeiri regime, would counter the 
threat posed by the ‘New Sudanese Vision’ by denying the SPLM/A the national 
outlook it professed and rather “…tried to engage the SPLM/A in peace 
negotiations so that the real agenda of the Movement was limited to the South.”386 
The SPLM rejected this limited approach originally embodied in the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, which only addressed Southern grievances and it criticized the 
Government’s proposal to negotiate solely concerning the South. In Garang’s 
words: “We shall never allow ourselves to be reduced to a fossilized regional sub-
species.”387 The SPLM/A’s public insistence on fighting both on the ground and 
at the negotiating table to transform the whole country and the Government’s 
insistence on viewing the movement as only a Southern movement became a 
further impediment to the resolution of the conflict. 
 
Although this perception persisted throughout the history of the SPLM/A as 
evidenced by Dowden, who noted that the SPLM/A “remained a Dinka-led 
southern movement”388, it is important to note that the leadership of the SPLM/A 
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consisted of Nuer’s such as William Nyuon. Furthermore, the early leadership 
contest between the SPLM/A and the Anyanya II was based on ideological 
differences between those that wanted secession and those that desired a united 
Sudan. The fallacy of tribal undertones in the SPLM/A-Anyanya conflict is 
further contradicted by the appointment of a Dinka, Akuot Atem de Mayen, as the 
leader of Anyanya II and the appointment of a Nuer, William Nyuon Bany as a 
member of the SPLM/A Politico-Military High Command and the first SPLA 
Chief of Staff. 
 
The Ideological Dilemma of the New Sudan Vision 
The SPLM/A’s ideological position instantly created a painful stalemate: it won 
sympathy in some quarters in the North (predominantly among communists) but 
alienated armed Southern groups with divergent political views. The consequence 
of such a complication was the alignment of dissatisfied Southern parties with the 
North against the SPLM/A and Northern parties with the SPLM/A against the 
government. This stalemate did not affect the two sides equally because the 
population that supported the Government was numerically stronger than the 
supporters of the SPLM/A in the North, most of whom were just proponents of 
the ‘New Sudanese Vision’ rather than actively organised parties using the force 
of arms to realize such a vision. With the sophisticated armaments secured from 
the Ethiopian Government and, at the time, from Libya, the SPLA had nothing to 
fear with respect to military weakness but it did have to offset the imbalance of 
forces created by the defection to the Government’s side of disgruntled Southern 




In discussing the background to the SPLM/A Yusuf Fadl Hassan has written: 
“Although the Islamic laws were declared three months after the mutiny in Bor 
and were thus not directly connected with incidents, they were instrumental in 
intensifying discontent and arousing wider ramifications both in the North and the 
South.”389 Hassan continues: “it [the SPLM/A] tended to overstate in its leaflets 
and press releases the religious and racial dimensions of the conflict.”390 Contrary 
to Hassan’s suggestions, however, it was the Government that expounded an 
Islamic identity as a defensive mechanism against the threat posed by SPLM/A’s 
vision of the New Sudan. The Government found significant support in the name 
of protecting the faith of the majority, which, it claimed, the SPLM/A sought to 
destroy. In reality, the Government, in collaboration with its sectional militias, 
went on a rampage in the South of the country: razing villages, slaughtering 
civilians and their livestock, and destroying their crops. One notable example is 
the 1986-7 massacres of Dinka civilians in Wau by the Government-backed Fertit 
militia who were known as the Jesh al- Salaam (‘Army of Peace’). As Brenda 
Uekert notes, “the militia received support from the armed forces, and throughout 
1987, hundreds of Dinka and Luo civilians in and around Wau were abducted and 
murdered by Jesh al-Salaam members, sometimes acting with army personnel.”391 
 
In addition, at the time, the SPLM/A’s agenda referred to the whole country 
because regional political realities did not favour the idea of altering colonial 
boundaries, a move that the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) would have 
vehemently opposed because such a precedent would have undermined the 
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greater unity of the continent that the organisation was eager to maintain.392 The 
SPLM/A’s manifesto acknowledged such a challenge: “Africa has been 
sufficiently fragmented by colonialism and neo-colonialism and its further 
fragmentation can only be in the interests of her enemies.”393 Furthermore the 
Ethiopian government, which gave the movement shelter, was waging a war 
against Eritrean separatists and could not support another separatist movement 
without a major contradiction in its own position. The Ethiopian government was 
receptive to Garang’s message of a united Sudan, and backed him and the 
SPLM/A. The SPLM/A’s revolution aimed at changing both the political 
authority and the structure of governance in the country. Its argument was that the 
whole country must be transformed but such a transformation ought to be done by 
those in power, and since those already in power were incapable of reforming the 
defective system governing the country because they themselves were too 
deformed to be reformed, they must be replaced by the SPLM/A. The SPLA 
(army) therefore, was to become the vehicle to take the SPLM (the party) to the 
helm of power where it would implement its program of structural change to 
commence the ‘politics of inclusion’ in a new United Sudan as opposed to the 
‘politics of exclusion’ prevalent in the old Sudan. In the words of John Garang de 
Mabior: “While the SPLA wages armed struggle, the objective is political, to 
achieve freedom and ensure justice and dignity for all, that is to achieve the New 
Sudan.” 394  Through force of arms, the SPLM/A would impose its vision of 
transforming the whole of the country without aiming to break it up; the vision of 
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‘New United Socialist Sudan’ became an ideologically motivating and uniting 
factor amongst its fighters; those leaders who did not support this objective were 
either branded as reactionaries or isolated through revolutionary propaganda. 
 
The SPLA was better equipped and far more organised militarily and politically 
than the Anyanya II, which gave it the upper hand when the Ethiopian and Libyan 
governments – determined to overthrow Nimeiri – had to choose which of the two 
movements to back. Anyanya II had sought the help of the Libyan leader, 
Mu’ammar Qadhafi, who offered to do so but did not take it seriously as a force 
capable of overthrowing the Government of Khartoum because of the staggering 
disorganisation of its forces and their lack of solid leadership. 395  In contrast, 
Colonel Garang’s words left no doubt over the question of which movement was 
the most suitable camp for Libya’s favours: 
“We reached a good understanding with Qadhafi and so he gave us lots of 
arms and ammunition, including anti-aircraft missiles….so, we stockpiled 
a lot of arms and ammunitions. Having received these arms, we became 
very strong and began overrunning enemy camps, making ambushes and 
virtually annihilating military convoys and taking over all of their 
equipment.”396 
 
SPLM/A leaders knew that Libyan support was only a temporary arrangement 
that would end as soon as Nimeiri was toppled. However, the SPLA was not 
waging war against Nimeiri as an individual, but rather against the divisive 
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religious ideology that the successive post-independent governments in the Sudan 
had established. While the SPLM needed to increase the numerical strength of its 
armed wing, the need to secure as much support as it could get led it to graduate 
(pass out) as many battalions as it could in the shortest possible time because each 
time a battalion completed its training, the Libyan office in Addis Ababa provided 
“...aid to the southern-based Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).”397 
 
Internal Crisis Within the SPLM/A 
At the beginning of the 1990s, divisions existed not only between North and 
South, but also within the Southern SPLM/A movement. As the SPLA gained 
victory in the South and liberated key provinces of the southern region, 
accusations of dictatorship and human rights abuses surfaced against the 
leadership of the movement, specifically against Garang.398 These accusations 
may be explained by the dominant role of the Dinka tribe in the South, which has 
historically formed the leadership there. In response, the Nuer and the Shilluk 
tribes led by Riek and Lam respectively, formed their own factions in 1991 and, 
as the SPLM/A prepared to capture the strategic town of Juba, the movement 
split. Commander Riek Machar, with a few supporters at the top of leadership, 
accused Garang and others within the SPLM/A leadership of creating a 
dictatorship, suppressing democracy, and essentially ignoring the political 
platform Garang had established in 1983. 
 
Although the tribal dimension was not the cause of the 1983 conflict between the 
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newly formed SPLM/A and the Anyanya II remnants, opportunistic Southern 
leaders such as Riek Machar and Lam Akol saw an opportunity to utilise ethnic 
tensions in order agitate for leadership change. The ensuing rebellion, which they 
named ‘SPLM/A-Nasir’ after the town of Nasir where it had been launched 
created an internal crisis within the SPLM/A. While the SPLM/A-Nasir’s 
condemnation of Garang’s leadership style as well as the call to fight for the 
recognition of self- determination for the people of South Sudan won the 
sympathy of southern fighters, it did not take long before observers discovered 
that personal ambition stood at the centre of the revolt. Furthermore, the ethnic 
character of the split indicated that the SPLM/A-Nasir was not in fact an inclusive 
Southern movement, but rather a movement that drew its membership from two 
ethnic groups, namely, the Nuer and the Shilluk. As Dowden observes, the Riek’s 
rebellion had an “…ethnic flavour, since most of the commanders of the SPLA 
were Dinka and most of the rebels were Nuer or Shilluk.”399 
 
The SPLM/A-Nasir was to split again in 1994 along ethnic lines with Dr Lam 
Akol forming the SPLM/A-United whose membership was predominantly from 
his Shilluk tribe. Following Lam Akol’s split from Riek Machar’s SPLM/A-Nasir 
Faction, Riek Machar became the chairman and commander-in-chief of the newly 
established South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) whose membership 
was almost exclusively from the Nuer tribe. Ironically, Riek Machar and Lam 
Akol’s newly formed movements turned to the Government of Sudan for support 
despite having called for southern secession from the north. Prior to Lam Akol 
breaking ranks with Riek Machar, “Collaboration between the Nasir faction and 
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Khartoum was publically formalized with the agreement between Lam Akol and 
Ali al-Hajj Muhammed at Frankfurt in January 1992.”400 
 
Riek Machar’s Nasir declaration of August 28, 1991 effectively led to the reversal 
of the SPLA’s victories in its eight years of existence. Indeed, the Government of 
Sudan did not only exploit the split inside the SPLM/A by supporting SPLM/A-
Nasir, but also seized what it saw as a golden opportunity to challenge the 
weakened SPLM/A on the battlefield. Government forces therefore launched an 
offensive in February 1992 and, having been given free passage through areas 
under SPLM/A-Nasir control, it recaptured Pochalla, Pibor, Bor, Kapoeta, and 
Torit, pushing the SPLM/A into Eastern Equatoria along the Sudan, Kenya and 
Uganda border. As a result of these changes in the internal conflict environment, 
the SPLA itself was forced to resort to defensive action rather than taking the 
offensive. The situation for the movement became desperate as the government 
army’s dry season offensives of 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 were particularly 
effective. In response, the SPLM/A re-adopted guerrilla tactics, which it had 
abandoned when it was strong militarily. Prior to this, the SPLM/A was 
establishing administrations in its controlled areas such as Pochalla, Pibor, Bor, 
Kapoeta and Torit among others. As Oyai Deng Ajak notes, “the 1991 split led to 
me having to shift my military strategy from conventional warfare to halting 
advancing government troops.”401 
 
Having failed to defeat the SPLA on the battlefield, the Sudanese government 
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resorted to an alliance with southern factions opposed to the SPLM/A in an 
attempt to achieve the same outcome by political means. On 4 April 1996, all the 
groups opposed to the SPLM/A moved to Khartoum and signed a political charter 
calling for a federal state and a referendum for southerners to “...determine their 
political aspirations” but the time frame for this and the manner by which it would 
be achieved was not specified.402 The political charter was an underhand move by 
the Government of Sudan to derail the gains made by the IGAD mediators. 
Indeed, as Ann Lesch observes “During the hiatus, the government tried to 
bypass IGADD by signing a Political Charter (1996) with Machar, Akol, and 
other southern warlords.”403 In 1997 the SSIM, the EDF, the SPLM Bahr al-
Ghazal, the South Sudan Independence Group, and the Bor Group signed the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) while Lam’s SPLM/A-United signed the 
Fashoda Agreement. 404  In essence, the Khartoum Government succeeded in 
weakening the Southern resistance as Riek Machar, Lam Akol and other defectors 
of the SPLM/A “accepted jobs in Khartoum, and the government gave their 
fighters guns to continue their tribal war against Garang.”405 
 
There were many problems with the agreements signed between the Government 
of Khartoum and the SPLM/A breakaway factions. The lack of any international 
guarantee behind them made them look like a repetition of the Addis Ababa 
Accord of 1972. Furthermore, the factions that signed the agreements had 
diverging interests and this would make it very difficult for them to force any 
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government in Khartoum to address southern grievances holistically. After all, if 
all of these southern groups had had converging goals they would have formed a 
single unified movement with a consolidated leadership structure to give 
themselves greater negotiating power with the Khartoum-based government. In 
reality, however, the sole basis for unity between the groups opposed to John 
Garang de Mabior as leader of the SPLM/A was their individual leadership 
ambitions, not a basis on which to formulate anything that would have constituted 
an ideology. The personal ambition for leadership led to the SPLM-Nasir 
breakaway faction splintering a mere three years after its creation, with Dr Lam 
Akol creating his own SPLM/A-United breakaway movement in 1994. The 
historian Robert Collins noted that personal rivalries, characteristic of the 
southern Sudanese elites, had always been the weakness of the various southern 
movements that had sought redress of the grievances of the southern region 
from Khartoum.406 
 
The KPA brought together the various military groups under the umbrella of the 
South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) and provided for the establishment of a 
political wing, the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). In the same spirit 
of governance created by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA), the KPA 
created a South Sudan Coordinating Council (SSCC) led by Riek to administer 
the areas controlled by the government in the South. The SSDF members believed 
that the KPA was an important step toward the realization of southern self-
determination but what was granted was no different from what had been 
promised in the AAA of 1972. Furthermore, even if Khartoum had, in reality, 
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genuinely granted this major concession of self-determination to the south 
through the KPA in 1997, it is difficult to understand why it would have done so 
through southern groups wielding no significant power after it had declined to do 
so with the SPLM/A, which had exercised real power, three years earlier in the 
IGAD-sponsored talks in Addis Ababa. The alleged concession only makes sense 
if, in reality, it was no concession at all because it would never have been put into 
effect outside the over-arching hegemony of the government in Khartoum. In 
essence, the NIF, which dominated the government in Khartoum, probably 
wanted to reduce any threat posed by these groups to its ultimate control over the 
South by offering concessions. 
 
This was especially important in the context of the Bentiu oilfields 407  where 
Riek’s heavily armed forces could have seriously interfered with their operations. 
The southern groups fell for the illusion of power because, in effect, a meaningful 
concession of self-determination could not be granted. After all, the Sudanese 
government’s increasing reliance on the hydrocarbon resources located in the 
southern part of the country meant the south had to remain an integral part of 
Sudan more than at any other time in the country’s history – a matter of which 
should have made southerners suspicious of the NIF’s backing of the separatist 
movements in the south. Indeed, some Southerners quickly dismissed the KPA as 
a hoax. Elijah Malok noted that any self-determination process that would have 
been supervised by the security organisations controlled by the NIF would 
definitely have been rigged in favor of national unity. Without international 
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guarantees to ensure that self- determination would be a reality, there was 
nothing to celebrate in Riek Machar’s alleged achievement through the KPA, 
for it was little more than a hoax. Fortunately majority opinion in the south had 
not been deceived; the SPLM/A’s critique of the charter found it to be not only a 
challenge to the very concept of self-determination, but also to be a betrayal of 
truth and reality.408 
 
Timothy Tot Chol, who comes from the Nuer tribe, just like Riek Machar, wrote 
to Commander Peter Bol Kong who had joined the SPLA-Nasir but who then 
returned to the SPLA mainstream following the signing of the KPA: 
“I congratulate you and all your officers and men for the patriotic move 
you have taken to disassociate yourselves from the Muslim Fundamentalist 
Regime. It was very clear from the beginning that the whole thing was a 
hoax and that no just and viable peace could be reached with the fascist 
regime of Omer El Beshir. Omer had wanted to use our great Nuer People 
as a proxy force to fight the SPLM/A on their behalf. Never in the history 
of human conflict had an Accord been reached in the home of one of the 
principal parties to the conflict as was the case with the so-called 
Khartoum Agreement. Of course it was a cheap machination to pit our 
people against each other. All of us want the war to end but it must end 
with the achievement of our aspirations including Self-Determination for 
the South, Nuba Mountains and the Ingessena People (Southern Blue 
Nile). Our experience since 1991 is evidence enough that separate co-
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existence is neither workable nor viable.”409 
 
The NIF, in short, had scored another victory, viewing the KPA as a mechanism 
to weaken the SPLM/A as well as a precondition for developing the oil industry 
in Unity State and Upper Nile. It ensured that issues over the implementation of 
the KPA were never broached publicly and the southern groups who now relied 
for their weaponry on Khartoum helplessly watched the NIF undo the agreement 
they had so unwisely signed. Riek, realizing far too late, that he had been tricked, 
ended his alliance with the NIF in December 1999 and moved to Nairobi, where 
he reinvented himself by creating yet another armed group, the Sudan People’s 
Democratic Front (SPDF).  After achieving nothing with this initiative, Riek 
returned to the SPLM/A in 2002. He had little to bring back to it other than, 
perhaps, the reunion of the Nuer and the  Dinka, which John Garang de Mabior 
badly needed to strengthen the SPLM’s negotiation position internationally and in 
Kenya where negotiations would actually take place. Riek’s alliance with the NIF 
had left the Bentiu oilfields securely under its control and southern oil that now 
had arrived in the international markets provided the NIF-dominated government 
with the finance needed for new and sophisticated weapons, which further 
hindered the SPLA’s military potential, so that this became one of the reasons 
which forced it to accept an agreement at Machakos. 
 
The opportunistic defections and re-defections of Riek Machar and Lam Akol 
suggests that their actions were not a result of ideological differences with the 
SPLM/A, but rather a result of leadership aspirations. Indeed, Machar left the 
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SPLM/A, moved to Khartoum and joined the government, defected again from 
the government and formed the Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF) and the 
Sudan People’s Defense Force410 and eventually returned to the SPLM/A in 2002. 
Nevertheless, the SPLM/A’s primary aim was amended to one of self-
determination during the 1994 Chukudum Conference to accommodate the 
opinion of Southern Sudanese that had called for self-determination but had 
remained loyal to the movement. This was a major shift from the original goal 
expressed by the movement during its nascent years of wishing to reformulate the 
political dispensation of Sudan as a unitary state. In the event, however, the SPLA 
experienced little difficulty in marshalling support for its cause, particularly after 
the mid-1990s, when its human rights record improved “as US policy-makers 
indirectly provided promises of material and moral support to the SPLM/A in 
return for a better human rights record.”411 
 
Initially deemed to be too poor to be viable as an independent state, the South was 
now viewed differently by Khartoum following the opening of the oilfields. In 
attempts to control the South’s mineral wealth, “The central government tried to 
redraw boundaries in order to remove resource-rich areas from the South and 
annex them to the North.” 412  Yet another proof of the North’s increasing 
dependence on the South showed up in the talks leading to the CPA where the 
Sudanese government delegation asked for up to ten years as the interim period 
for the sharing of natural resources in the South on a 50-50 basis between the two 
sides. The NIF-dominated government had, by then, realized that it was the 
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SPLM/A that was the sole authority, the valid interlocutor, with which to discuss 
southern grievances. In essence, therefore, the regime, having been seriously 
outclassed on the battlefield, sought negotiations to end the conflict and the 
SPLM/A, having failed to take advantage of earlier opportunities, such as the fall 
of Nimeiri or the period before the fall of Mengistu, vowed not to repeat those 
mistakes and began, therefore, to take negotiations seriously. 
 
The SPLM/A Political and Military High Command – the body responsible for 
war and political strategies – which had consisted originally of five permanent 
members and seven alternative members was expanded to make room for political 
accommodation and was replaced by the Movement’s Leadership Council (LC) as 
the highest body of the movement. With the progression of the Second Civil War, 
the SPLM/A became more militarized and its leadership structure was amended 
in 1985 to no longer include civilian elements, as noted in Figure 13 below. 
Unlike the case of Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA), where members 
of its political wing and its military wing jointly formed the highest executive 
decision-making body, namely the National Resistance Council, the SPLM/A LC 
excluded field commanders. This was because, in principle, the Leadership 
Council was not designed to be responsible for the management of military 
operations, but instead to devise policies in matters of civil structure and 
administration. It was also meant to portray the movement as a democratic 
organisation where decisions were taken collectively, but in actual fact this was 
not the case. This had been the way in which the NRA had become one of the few 
successful rebel movements in Africa and the first to defeat and replace an 
incumbent government. In both cases, the roles of Garang and Museveni had been 
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crucial for both the SPLM/A and NRA/M. However, with the sudden death of 
Garang the SPLM/A’s program was not implemented, unlike the case of the 
NRM/A. While there had been important reforms in key areas such as the 
constitution, the civil service, economic management, the army and local 
government in the case of NRM/A, the SPLM/A vision died with Garang. 
 
Nonetheless, in the SPLM/A, an expansion of the leadership structure was 
affected in 1994 as changes in the external environment favoured a participatory 
approach to governance as opposed to a dictatorial military command approach. 
But placing decisions in the hands of many officers whose loyalties were in 
question (because of their former links to other organisations with different 
ideological perceptions) presented a risk and the top echelon of the movement 
then had to grapple with these new problems. The Chairman, John Garang de 
Mabior, seemed to have allowed the changes in principle but kept the system 
tightly under his personal control. As Young notes: “…on the surface this is not 
surprising, because Garang had been the leader of the SPLM/A since its founding 
in 1983 and for many in Sudan and abroad he virtually personified the struggle of 
the South.”413 
 
Garang’s colleagues resented this although they went along with it for the sake of 
achieving the movement’s original goal. For instance in 2004 in a meeting in 
Rumbek, the SPLM/A’s Number 2, Salva Kiir Mayardit, registered his 
disappointment with the way the Movement was operating: 
“We have no cohesion within our leadership structure because there is no 
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code of conduct to guide the Movement’s structures. When the Chairman 
leaves for abroad, no directives are left and no one is left to act on his 
behalf. I don’t know with whom the Movement is left; or does he carry it 
in his own brief case? The Chairman is everything, from a finance officer 
to one at the lowest level.”414 
 
This was the same complaint to those registered by numerous other commanders 
so that the Rumbek Meeting became another instance where SPLM/A leader 
cadres expressed a desire for change and some explicitly cited what the 
consequences of resisting such changes in the past had been. Yet, despite the 
questionable leadership structure, organisation was the key to the ultimate success 
of the SPLM/A in obtaining independence for the South, especially after losing 
its founding leader John Garang de Mabior on the July 30, 2005 who died in a 
helicopter crash on the way back to Southern Sudan from Uganda, 21 days after 
his appointment as the First Vice President of the Sudan. The SPLM/A was able 
to shift from its original ideological revolutionary position stressing the 
restructuring of power structures at the centre of the Sudanese state to a more 
pragmatic position of fighting for the right to self- determination for the people of 
Southern Sudan. Riek Machar and Lam Akol who led the Nasir415 coup (and 
issued the Nasir Declaration) on August 28, 1991, which aimed to depose Garang 
from the leadership of the movement, had hoped that their unequivocal advocacy 
of secession would isolate Garang and bring other Southerners to their side. As 
Douglas Johnson states: “They calculated that their call for independence would 
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appeal to most Southerners.”416 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
In summary, the organisational evolution, composition and functionality of 
SPLM/A exhibit a pattern of learning. This was manifested in the SPLM/A’s 
refusal to tolerate a repetition of the failures associated with the Anyanya 
movement namely, the civilian leadership of a military movement and a loose 
military alliance of various militia groups. To avoid the mistakes that hindered 
Anyanya’s progress, Dr Garang chose to establish a military leadership at the 
outset. Furthermore, during the establishment of renewed southern resistance in 
the early 1980s, DrGarang attempted to unify his support base with that of the 
former Anyanya veterans. Having failed to convince the Anyanya veterans to 
fight for a unified New Sudan, Dr John turned to military means to ensure the 
existence of only one southern Sudanese rebellion. 
 
The SPLM/A’s organisation and its ‘learning by doing’ demonstrate the 
importance of flexibility to adapt to ensure the survival of an organisation when 
confronted by threatening changes. The SPLA/M’s adaptation capacities and the 
institutionalized flexibility within its organisation, structure and political 
narratives, therefore, reveal that they contributed significantly to the survivability 
and success of the SPLM/A in the midst of all the internal, regional and 
international dynamics. Above all, the SPLM/A’s adaptability and therefore its 
success were equally enhanced by the type of leadership personality that was able 
to read and forecast the ever changing internal and external socio-economic and 
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political events and then define the SPLM/A’s narratives within them.417 
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leadership of Garang the SPLM/A would have not achieved the independence of South Sudan. 
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Chapter 5: The SPLM/A and the Northern Constituency 
 
“Our major problem is that Sudan has been looking for its soul; for its true 
identity”418 
 
Although the issue of a constitution in conformity with Islam had been debated 
since independence, President Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri's Presidential Decree of 
September 1983 imposing Sharia on the country placed the issue squarely on the 
public agenda, leading to increased tensions and eventual conflict between the 
Northern-dominated Government and the South. 419  Eventually the conflict 
resumed in 1983 when the Khartoum Government unilaterally abrogated the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, divided the South into three regions, reduced the 
powers of the regional governments and imposed Sharia Law on the whole 
country, including the non- Muslim South. The rebellion was triggered when the 
Government attempted to transfer Southern battalions to the North, thereby 
removing their capacity to resist. The rebels fled to Ethiopia where they received 
strong support, which helped them organise themselves and equipped them 
militarily, turning them into a strong force against the Government. This time the 
South was better organised than during the Anyanya-led war between 1955 and 
1972, fighting the war under the leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army  (SPLM/A).  
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Although the SPLM/A was composed largely of Southerners under Christian 
leadership, non-Arab ethnic groups from the North and liberal-minded 
Northerners who shared with the movement a vision of a secular, democratic 
Sudan later joined it. 
 
This chapter explains the tactics used by the SPLM/A to deal with Northern 
Sudan. The SPLM/A adopted a strategy of a loose alliance with sympathetic 
groups in the North in the pursuit of a united New Sudan. Without such an 
initiative, dealing with the North and with the changing nature of government 
there, from Jaafar Nimeiri to Sadiq al-Mahdi and then to Omar Hassan Ahmed Al 
Bashir, would have been very difficult. An example of such an alliance with 
northern parties includes the 1986 Koka Dam Declaration, which was an 
agreement between the SPLM/A, the National Alliance for National Salvation 
that represented 14 northern political parties and 22 northern trade unions. A 
further example is the 1989 Charter of the National Democratic Alliance, which 
included the SPLM/A, representatives from nine northern political parties and 51 
trade unions. The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) was an important 
factor in the negotiation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
Hilda F. Johnson who was instrumental in the CPA negotiations and later, 
following the independence of South Sudan, became the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General (SRSG) in South Sudan carefully observed the peace 
talks and has stated: “The SPLM/A ‘s ‘redlines’ in the protracted negotiations 
were largely results of perceived shortcomings of the 1972 arrangements and the 
way in which those had or had not been implemented.”420 
                                                     




A civil war between the North and the South had already begun in 1955, a year 
before independence, continuing until the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 
granted regional autonomy to the South. Yet most Southern Sudanese favoured 
self-determination, which eventually only became a reality on 9 July 2011. Under 
the Addis Ababa Agreement, the integration of the Anyanya forces into Sudan’s 
national armed forces had failed and it was clear during the CPA that security of 
arrangements had to include a provision for Sudan to have two armies during the 
interim period. 
 
As mentioned above, the SPLM/A strategy towards the North had been based on 
loose alliances with sympathisers. Independence from the North dictated a 
changing and flexible method of war and the SPLM/A at some point had to 
accommodate competing opinions - unity for the North and secession for the 
South. The SPLM/A, therefore, had to be able to tailor its objectives to fit realities 
on the ground - the independence of South Sudan on one hand and the unity of 
Sudan on the other. This was to prove to be problematic and there were serious 
differences of opinion on the means by which self-determination should be 
expressed. Some influential Southern political figures, among them Bona Malwal 
and Abel Alier, believed that the South should rally around the right of self-
determination, instead of pursuing the goal of a united, secular, democratic 
Sudan. But self-determination for the South was not only a problem for Sudan 
alone but was seen as a conspiracy to destroy the Sudanese state by the Arab 
World as a whole. For example the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Maher, 
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publicly condemned self-determination for the South on Egyptian television as 
such a conspiracy.421 
 
Dr John Garang was acutely aware of the southern call for cessation, but was also 
aware that such a call would be self-defeating since the Government of Sudan 
would be unwilling to concede any territory unless it was forced to do so. As 
Francis Madinf writes, “In the view of the SPLM/A leadership, Northern leaders 
paid only lip service to self-determination, but would never concede to the South 
the right to secede. Garang argued that only military pressure and self-
preservation would force them to make that concession.” 422  The SPLM/A 
therefore needed alliances with forces from the North to maintain political and 
military pressure against the Government in Khartoum. And this, according to 
Garang, was only possible through the objective of a unified, secular, democratic 
Sudan, rather than by focusing on self-determination for the South, which would 
lead to the SPLM/A losing the support of other marginalised groups in northern 
Sudan namely, Southern Kordofan, Nuba Mountains and Darfur. The SPLM/A 
leadership therefore believed that the best way to achieve self- determination for 
the South was to focus on the alliance with the North. 
 
Learning from the shortcomings of the Anyanya I & II approach of seeking an 
independent Southern Sudan during the first Sudanese civil war, the SPLM/A 
changed the narrative of the war by framing it as a national crisis between the 
center and the peripheries. It did this by first recognizing, in the words of its 
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leader John Garang, that: “Our major problem is that Sudan has been looking for 
its soul; for its true identity.” 423  According to this perspective, the Sudanese 
conflict was a crisis of national self-identification caused by the violent clash of 
two main identities: an Arabic-Islamic identity (associated with the North), 
which was propagated through assimilation of all elements of the state under a 
single identity, and a non-Arab and non-Islamic identity (associated with the 
South and other peripheral regions of the Sudanese State), which adopted 
resistance as its means for survival.424 The political, social, and economic status 
of the various groups which made up the heterogeneous population of the country 
began to be determined by these varied identities, which led to violent conflict 
pitting those seeking the restructuring of a complex national identity to 
accommodate every citizen (what the SPLM/A called the New Sudan) against 
those who wanted to maintain a narrowly defined single national identity.  Thus 
the definition of a holistic approach to the Sudanese problem became an 
advantage in achieving national unity and provided a background of support for 
national liberation among Northerners. The Anyanya, which had called only for 
the liberation of South Sudan, could not win Northern sympathy simply because 
of this factor. The SPLM/A’s holistic approach to the problem of Sudan, on the 
other hand, did win Northern sympathy, and indeed inspired many groups in 
Darfur in the West, in Eastern Sudan, in Southern Kordofan, and in Southern Blue 
Nile to rise up against the Centre, which could be thus portrayed as their 
oppressor and exploiter. As Kama el-Din correctly notes: “This diversity is not 
reflected in the leadership of the Country, as Sudan is characterized by a 
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persistent domination of the Centre over the marginalized peripheries.”425 The 
Centre, of course, was located in the capital, Khartoum, and power was held by 
different elites from the Nile Valley area north of Khartoum. Even though this 
area contains less than 2% of the Sudanese population, the elites from this region 
have always utterly dominated the political and economic life of Sudan. 
 
While learning is an inherent feature of decision-making, it is reflects also how 
people discover the range of values that complement and enhance the decision-
making process. The SPLM/A learned from Anyanya fighters’ mistakes, hence it 
reversed its policy for the struggle by calling for the liberation of the marginalized 
peoples of the Sudan as a whole, rather than just focussing on the South. This new 
call for the liberation of marginalized Arabs and Africans; Muslims and Christian 
therefore shifted the predominant belief which had informed past struggles and 
which Matthew LeRiche had correctly identified - intra-Sudanese conflicts have 
most often been presented as emerging from crude binary tensions; Arabs versus 
Blacks, Muslims against Christians, democracy versus dictatorship, secularism 
versus theocracy and, of course, the North versus the South.426 
 
The SPLM/A’s approach of ‘learning by doing’ involved the process of framing 
issues, and analysing them within the context of social inclusiveness, in contrast 
to the North’s exclusive approach of imposing a single national identity without 
consultation. With independence in 1956, the Northern-dominated government in 
Khartoum had sought to Arabize and Islamize the South. It had two motives for 
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this approach: a belief that homogenizing the country would ensure national unity 
and a desire to spread what it considered to be a superior civilization, Islamic 
Arabism. Some Southerners did convert, whether out of conviction or for other 
reasons, but most resisted. 
 
However, even though it had little difficulty in capturing the loyalties of Southern 
populations, the SPLM/A had to expend more effort to convince the Northern 
constituency of marginalised and alienated groups that it really meant business 
and it was not merely using a slogan or a tool to advance the Southern objective 
of separating Southern Sudan from the rest of the country. SPLM/A also had to 
convince its Southern peers/constituency to support its vision of a united Sudan. 
Thus the SРLМ in effect engaged to continue the armed struggle waged by earlier 
movements in a different manner for it saw the resolution of Sudan's crisis 
differently from the way they had done so in the past. SPLM/A believed that 
Sudan's salvation lay in the solution of both the ‘national groups’ and the 
religious questions within the context of a united, democratic and secular Sudan. 
A South Sudanese political writer, Francis Deng, elaborates: 
“The clash of these two antagonistic cultural outlooks has implications that 
go beyond the borders of Sudan, for the two identity groups have affinities 
within and beyond Africa along both religious and racial lines that could 
potentially widen the circles of conflict. The Arab-Islamic world sees in 
Northern Sudan an identity that must be, and has been, supported. For it, 
the South serves as a dangerous rallying point for Christendom, the West, 
and even Zionism to combat Islam. While this is largely an exaggerated 
conspiratorial construct, it provides a strong basis for Arab-Islamic 
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solidarity with the North. On the other hand, black Africa sees in the plight 
of the South a humiliating racist oppression that must be resisted. While 
the commitment to African unity without racial or cultural distinctions 
inhibits overt support for the South, they have discreetly and clandestinely 
supported the SPLM/SPLA. The potential for an Arab-African clash over 
the Sudan remains real. There is no doubt that Sudan is as much a link as it 
is potentially a point of confrontation among converging diverse 
identities.”427 
 
Thus, although the SPLM/A started by necessity in the South, it essentially aimed 
at spreading its message across Sudan, in order to transform the whole country by 
resolving a general crisis pitting the center against the peripheries of the country. 
It dawned on the SPLM/A leadership that marginalization in all its forms – 
discrimination, injustice and subordination – constituted the root causes of the 
conflict that could not be addressed in a piecemeal fashion by individual 
concessions to disgruntled and rebellious groups, whenever a conflict erupted in a 
particular region as had been tried with Anyanya I. As SPLM/A argued, Sudan 
had problems everywhere: in the West, in the East, in the Center, and even in the 
far North, thereby anticipating the subsequent outbreak of armed conflicts and 
wars in Eastern and Western Sudan. These later eruptions of violence have 
vindicated the accuracy and farsightedness of the SPLM/A’s analysis and vision. 
Defining the problem as the “Southern problem” an attempt by the government to 
marginalize southerners. The SPLM forcefully asserted that it was not the 
‘problem of the South’ as conventionally argued by successive ruling regimes in 
                                                     




Khartoum, but rather the ‘problem of the Sudan’, particularized in the south. 
 
Contrary to previous secessionist movements, the SPLM advocated for the 
liberation of the whole of the Sudan from repressive governance, not only South 
Sudan. This paradigm shift in approach also marked a radical departure from the 
traditional struggle in the South for independence, as had been the case 
continuously since 1955 when the Anyanya war started. The objective had never 
been achieved for it was compromised in 1972 in the Addis Ababa Agreement 
when Southern Sudan was ‘given’ local autonomy. The SPLM, on the other hand, 
moved away from this paradigm of the “Southern problem”, solving the 
‘Southern problem’ and what to ‘give’ to Southerners. The SPLM/A argued that 
when a group is defined as the ‘other’, as something different, as was the case 
with South Sudan because of the constant reference to the ‘Southern problem’, for 
instance, that is in itself a problem. It implies that the people who have a problem 
are the Southerners, but this was not the case for it was the Sudanese State, 
epitomized by the power structure in the Center, which needed to be radically 
restructured in order to accommodate Sudan’s manifold diversity and attend to all 
the forms of exclusion and marginalization of its people, be they in the South or 
in any other marginalized region in the state. Commenting on the SPLM/A’s new 
vision of a united New Sudan, Dr Mansour Khalid428, a Northerner, diplomat and 
writer, stated: 
“…for years, after the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the war 
deflagrated with vengeance; only came a great paradigm shift… under the 
                                                     
428 Dr Mansuor Khalid was Sudan Minister of Affairs in the government of President Nimeiri and was 
a core member of government delegation in the Addis Ababa peace talks with Anyanya. He was also 
among the first northern Sudanese inspired by the SPLM/A vision of New Sudan resulting him to join 
SPLM/A. He remained SPLM/A member till the time South Sudan seceded from Sudan. He authored 
number of books including the one being cited here. 
 
242 
leadership of John Garang de Mabior , the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was launched as a politico-military 
organisation… One ‘S’ of Lagu’s organisation had been dropped… The 
newly formed Southern-based movement dedicated itself to remedying the 
mistakes of the past through the creation of a New Sudan to put an end to 
all historical hegemonies: political, economic and cultural… This is to be 
achieved through going back to the drawing board: convening a national 
constitutional conference that brings together all political, social military 
and regional forces of the country to redraw the political map… The 
SPLM/A, therefore, did not seek to create Sudan through the barrel of a 
gun…on the contrary, it left it to the Sudanese people to decide for 
themselves whether they wanted to have a stable, peaceful, just and united 
Sudan, or wanted their country dismembered... Also, by presenting those 
broad lines for a new political dispensation, the old Southern calls for 
justice, which were in the past ill defined and sometimes inchoate, would 
find in their articulation a united Sudan writ-large… besides, by giving a 
socio-economic dimension to the political aspirations of Southerners, and 
a cultural dimension to the cultural sensitivity, the proposed political 
dispensation has virtually decoded the mute anguish as well as the 
monosyllabic aspirations of the people of the South.”429 
 
From the SPLM/A perspective, the Sudanese state was rotten to the core. Unlike 
the Anyanya movement, the SPLM/A’s inclusive agenda made it into a political 
melting pot for all the variegated marginalized groups outside the central Nile 
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Valley core that made up the Sudanese people. For the first time in its history of 
independence, many different groups including Northerners were able to coalesce 
around a common and shared national objective: the removal of the military 
government. During the early 1990s, northern parties were keen to see the 
governance of Sudan return to civilian hands after the Sudanese coup of 1989, 
which led to the ousting of Sadiq al-Mahdi’s democratically elected Umma Party. 
The groups that formed the anti-government alliance included the SPLM/A in the 
South and prominent northern parties including the Umma Party and the 
Democratic Unionist Party. Perhaps the Northern-Southern political alliance can 
be described as an alliance of convenience that was precarious at best. Indeed, 
before attaining political leadership in 1986, Sadiq al-Mahdi had worked closely 
with the SPLM/A in order to overthrow the Nimeiri regime. The close 
coordination between Sadiq al-Mahdi and the SPLM/A culminated in the March 
1986 Koka Dam Declaration. The follow-up post-Koka Dam Declaration Summit 
that was organised to operationalize the terms of the declaration and attended by 
the then prime minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi and Dr John Garang failed to move the 
Sudan transformation process forward because of disagreements over 
constitutional matters. Whilst in power between 1986 and 1989, Sadiq al-Mahdi 
distanced himself from the SPLM/A until his overthrow in 1989 after which he 
began engaging the SPLM/A once more, which culminated in the Charter of the 
National Democratic Alliance. 
 
Difficulties of Bringing the Northern Constituency On-board 
The SPLM’s grand objective of bringing about radical and fundamental change in 
the Sudan as a whole was regarded an elusive dream both in the North and the 
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South, although Garang considered it an attainable objective, premised on 
victories to be achieved by the whole Sudanese people and on an accurate and 
visionary definition of the central problem of Sudan. Since its inception, the 
SPLM had critically and objectively analysed the Sudanese reality on the ground 
and had concluded that a struggle would have to be waged for a new type of 
Sudan to which all could belong; a united Sudan, albeit defined on new bases; a 
new political dispensation for the country that was anchored in and based on the 
Sudanese reality, on both historical and contemporary diversities.430 This new 
political dispensation would be the New Sudan, as opposed to the current Sudan, 
which had experienced almost three decades of war since independence to the 
formation of the SPLM/A. Garang highlighted the following models for solving 
the conflict in Sudan as illustrated in Figure 14: the establishment of a 
transformed democratic and secular New Sudan, which Garang viewed as the 
preferred option; failing this, Garang viewed an alternative option as the 
establishment of two states within a confederation, a solution popularly referred 
to as one country, two systems; however, the final model that Garang considered 
was the secession of the southern region of Sudan. 
 
However, the Northerners remained sceptical of Garang’s vision of a New Sudan. 
As Mohamed Suleiman clearly states: “It has always been questionable, however, 
whether the SPLM/A would be able to maintain this position in the face of huge 
practical and psychological obstacles, not least that most of its rank and file were 
motivated to fight by ethnic and religious difference.”431 But more importantly 
Southern sceptics, so far as the New Sudan vision is concerned were also present 
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within the ranks of the South. As Francis Deng describes: 
“Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the leadership in favor of a united Sudan, 
most Southern Sudanese favor self-determination and perhaps eventual 
secession...There is, however, a serious difference of opinion on the means 
to self-determination. Some Southern political figures, among them Bona 
Malwal and Abel Alier, believe that the South should rally around the right 
of self-determination, instead of pursuing the goal of a united, secular, 
democratic Sudan.”432 
 
Indeed there had always been internal differences within the SPLM/A over the 
vision of a united New Sudan since its inception and which continued throughout 
the duration of the armed struggle. These disagreements degenerated into violent 
confrontation at various historical junctures in the evolution of the SPLM/A 
between 1983 and 1991, which served as turning points in the history of the 
SPLM/A. In 1983 Anyanya veterans led by Akuot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut 
objected to the notion of a unified New Sudan, preferring Southern secession; a 
position that ultimately led to a violent confrontation. Furthermore, the 1991 split 
within the SPLM/A ranks led by three senior members of the SPLM/A Politico-
Military High Command namely, Riek Machar Teny, Lam Akol Ajawin and 
Gordon Kong Chol once again led to violent confrontation as a result for calls for 
southern self-determination. In short, the vision of the New Sudan, and the 
adoption of the objectives and programs consistent with it, had its share of 
difficulties and troubles throughout the history of the movement. However, the 
seriousness of SPLM/A dissidents’ demands for self-determination can be 
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brought into question, as they ultimately became proxies for the Government of 
Sudan in its fight against the SPLM/A. Perhaps their desire to overthrow Dr John 
Garang was a result of their leadership ambitions rather than because of a 
differing vision of the ultimate objective. 
 
However, history has shown that the phenomenon of divisions and splits is a 
common occurrence within liberation movements in the African continent. 
Divisions are often a result of power struggles underpinned by ethnic factors 
disguised as differences in ideology. This was the case with the SPLM/A when 
Riek Machar split from the mainstream movement citing ideological differences 
with Dr John Garang yet drew the vast majority of his supporters from his Nuer 
tribe. Ironically, Riek Machar began receiving material support from the 
Government of Sudan even though he had split off from Garang’s group because 
of his alleged desire to fight for southern secession from the north. This was a 
phenomenon that clearly validated the argument that few wars are ever fought in 
the name of their real causes, leaving one to conclude that the split within the 
ranks of the SPLM/A was solely due to political rivalries and leadership 
ambitions. Riek Machar’s group later split into Dr Lam Akol’s SPLM- United, 
which drew the majority of its support from his ethnic Shilluk people and 
Theophilus Ochieng’s Equatoria Defence Forces, which drew its support mainly 
from the Madi and Acholi ethnic groups from the Equatoria region. The case of 
the Uganda Bush War, which brought President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni to 
power, also demonstrates how ethnic dimensions give rise to the formation of 
various armed groups despite their unified goal of overthrowing President Milton 
Obote. Indeed, Museveni’s National Resistance Army drew the majority of its 
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support from the Banyakole people of south-western Uganda, whereas the 
Uganda National Liberation Front drew the majority of its support from the Nubi 
people of the Western Nile region and the Uganda National Liberation Army, 
drew the majority of its support from the Acholi people of Northern Uganda. 
 
Furthermore, geopolitical shifts in the early 1990s had an impact on the Second 
Sudanese Civil War. These shifts were to mark a global transition from one 
historical and geopolitical era to a new epoch in world affairs whereby Western 
capitalist ideals were to be promoted in historically communist countries such as 
Ethiopia. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the start of the 1990s, along with the 
ousting of President Mengistu by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front in 1991, meant that in Russia, the SPLM/A lost a key global 
proponent of communist ideology that had provided the ideological framework 
for Dr John Garang’s movement at the same time as it lost its base of operations 
in Ethiopia. The resultant blow of geopolitical and regional realities were further 
compounded by the Government of Sudan’s attempts to destroy the SPLM/A 
through the use of southern militias that had split ranks with Dr Garang’s 
mainstream movement at a time where regional and international shifts dictated 
that internal southern unity was needed more than divisions along ethnic lines. 
The Government of Sudan capitalized on the SPLM/A’s internal troubles to 
undermine the movement and to reverse the political and military gains it had 
made since its inception. The SPLM/A was forced to once again begin cultivating 
regional and international support for its cause, which would mean having to 
depart from its communist leanings through a process of internal restructuring. 
The 1994 Chukudum Conference provided the forum whereby the SPLM/A 
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adopted a more democratic system in which civilian participation was encouraged 
in the leadership of the armed rebellion. 
 
The SPLM/A convened its first National Convention in the period between 2-12 
April 1994 with the objective of debating all issues of concern to the movement 
and to determining its future direction, especially in the aftermath of the 1991 
split. The Convention addressed the issue of self-determination as a popular right 
that did not contradict the SPLM objective of a united democratic New Sudan, but 
on the contrary enhanced it. Indeed, it went on to argue that the New Sudan could 
only be achieved through the mechanism of self-determination as an expression 
of the free will of the Sudanese people. The ensuing debate during the 
Convention, therefore, reaffirmed the argument that the realization of the New 
Sudan vision, brought about either through a combination of armed struggle and 
urban popular uprisings or by a politically negotiated settlement, would be the 
key to the attainment of freedom, equality and justice for the Sudanese people. As 
Garang observed: 
“We can achieve our aim, whether this is the New Sudan, self-
determination, or separation, only if power is radically restructured in the 
center, in Khartoum. It is unthinkable that the regime will voluntarily 
relinquish power or be forced by international pressures to grant separation 
on a silver plate! It was thus decided in unequivocal terms that the 
establishment of the New Sudan and the achievement of the right to, and 
exercise of, self-determination are the two principal objectives of the 
Movement.”433 
                                                     




However, the concept of the New Sudan clearly would have to be the subject of 
more elaborate explanation if Northerners were to be brought on board for there 
were those who were sceptical about the New Sudan vision and they were not 
confined to the SPLM membership. This led Garang to remark: “There are those, 
particularly in Northern Sudan, who condemned outright the vision merely 
because it came from a source unfamiliar to their minds and hearts.”434 
 
It is not surprising that some radical elements in the North would resist change as 
they benefitted from the governance system in Sudan and were therefore keen to 
maintain the status quo. In the minds of the SPLM/A’s top leadership, especially 
its leader, John Garang de Mabior, these forces were therefore bent on 
propagating a distorted image of both the vision and of the SPLM itself in order 
to mislead and frighten away current and prospective SPLM/A supporters. The 
SPLM/A and its vision of New Sudan was painted by its northern neighbours as 
an African, Christian, anti-Arab and anti-Islamic entity, which, in collaboration 
with Zionism, would be intent on doing away with the Arab-Islamic identity of 
the Sudanese. Such unfounded suspicions, fuelled by racism and religious 
bigotry, would not stand the test of time and have been roundly and effectively 
disputed. 435  Contrary to what the Northern critics and sceptics thought and 
claimed, the concept of the New Sudan according to the SPLM/A had no racial, 
ethnic or separatist connotations but rather, it was a national project, for building 
a true and sustainable citizenship-based state, capable of accommodating the 
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multiple diversity of Sudanese society. Indeed, when addressing his supporters 
via Radio SPLM in 1989, Garang noted the importance of a holistic approach 
to solving Sudan’s political problems as opposed to focusing on the southern 
Sudanese region, observing that: 
“Negotiations in the context of the so-called ‘Southern Problem’ is against 
the national interest and a recipe for disaster. Suppose we solve the 
problem of the South, we will soon have to solve the problem of the Jebels 
because the Nuba can also take up arms; after that the problem of the Beja 
and so forth. It is a national problem, not a Southern problem that we must 
address.”436 
 
It was, therefore, vital to note that New Sudan as it was understood at the time, 
was a concept for radically reforming Sudan’s governance system by addressing 
the national identity crisis that had been responsible for the wars, the instability, 
and the failure of the nation-building project that had afflicted the country since 
independence.437 The gist of the crisis was that the dominant Arab group, which is 
in fact an African Arab hybrid and a minority, perceived the country in its own 
image as an Arab-Islamic nation. This inevitably discriminated against the non-
Arab and non- Muslim populations in the South and even against other groups in 
the peripheral regions of the North, who, even though they are predominantly 
Muslim, are not Arab. The South, one third of the country in territorial extent and 
population, had been the first to rebel against this discriminatory framework in 
August 1955, a few months before independence on January 1, 1956. 
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Figure 14: SPLM/A’s Model for Conflict Resolution 
 
 
The Northern Response to the Concept of New Sudan 
The rebellion, which escalated into a 17-year war, was separatist in nature, but 
had been resolved in 1972 by a compromise that granted the South regional 
autonomy. The abrogation of the AAA in 1983 led to the resumption of the 
second rebellion by the SPLM/A that called for the unity of the country in the 
framework of a New Sudan in which there would be full equality of citizenship, 
without any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, culture or gender. 
Over time, this vision began to appeal to the non-Arab northern groups and other 
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liberal minded northerners such as the people of Southern Kordofan (Nuba 
Mountains) and Blue  Nile  (the  Funj  people). This response did not emerge 
from nowhere. Large parts of the rural areas of northern Sudan were also 
marginalized. Sudan historian Douglas Johnson has correctly observed this. He 
argues: “The renewal of civil war in the Sudan in the 1980s came about in part 
because of the failure of the post-Addis Ababa Agreement Southern regional 
governments to meet expectations, but it also happened in the context of the 
further marginalization of large parts of rural areas of Northern Sudan.”438 
 
Thus the vision of New Sudan presented by Garang was received with mixed 
reactions in the North. Northerners of African heritage such as the Nuba and Funj 
people embraced the SPLM/A and joined its ranks in large numbers. Furthermore, 
notable northern Sudanese of Arab origin such as Mansour Khalid who was a 
former cabinet minister in the government of President Nimeiri, Mohammed 
Wardi and Yasir Aman joined the ranks of the SPLM/A. Furthermore, the large 
reception that Dr John Garang received in 2005, estimated in the millions, when 
he arrived in Khartoum to be sworn in as Sudan’s first-vice president 
demonstrated the popularity that he commanded in the whole Sudan. However, 
there were also northerners that viewed the SPLM/A and its New Sudan vision 
with suspicion as an attempt to do away with the Arab-Islamic identity of the 
Sudanese.439 
 
Dealing with Defections whilst Facing the North in the Battlefield 
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As the conflict continued into the 1990s, the unity of the SPLM/A came under 
severe strain over questions of participation in decision-making processes. 
Leading members of the SPLM/A PMHC challenged the leadership style of Dr 
John Garang de Mabior and accused him of absolute power and being 
“...interested in running the movement as his personal property.”440 However, in 
order to weld together men of diverse and often hostile ethnicities into a 
disciplined force capable of scoring military victories against the Government of 
Sudan, Dr John Garang exercised firm control over the SPLM/A. Garang 
tolerated no insubordination; he alone determined SPLA strategy and refused to 
include his field commanders in the decision-making process. As Robert Collins 
observes: 
“Certainly, John Garang’s leadership had been dictatorial, but his 
leadership had achieved a cohesion and coordination that had produced a 
succession of military victories and control of virtually all southern Sudan. 
Dissent was not tolerated, critics were ruthlessly removed or 
imprisoned…”441 
 
The SPLA’s momentum suffered a serious blow as a result of the fall of its ally, 
in the person of Mengistu Haile Meriam, in May 1991. The SPLA’s sole 
decision-maker, John Garang de Mabior, had not read the signs of the inevitable 
demise of Mengistu’s regime; he refused to enter talks with the Ethiopian rebel 
groups who were poised to take power in early 1991. Following the fall of the 
Derg regime, the SPLA was unable to provide for its massive force of over 
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100,000 fighters and this led to a sharp drop in the morale of the SPLA because: 
“...the morale of an army, as Napoleon called it, depends altogether on its material 
condition.”442 The successes achieved on the battlefields were painfully reversed, 
pushing the search for peace out of reach for nearly a decade. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
By calling for a united New Sudan, the SPLM/A had learned from the inability of 
Anyanya to galvanize northern support as a result of its unitary call for secession. 
The SPLM/A changed the narrative of the war by framing it as a national crisis 
between the centre and the peripheries as opposed to it being a war between the 
north and the south, a viewpoint that was promoted by the Government of Sudan. 
During an SPLM/A radio broadcast in 1989 Garang observed that: 
“The Junta considers the problem of war as ‘The Southern Problem’. You 
have heard the Junta repeat this time and again that the problem is the 
problem of the South. Obviously the Junta has a very shallow and distorted 
perception of the nature of the central problem of the Sudan... All past 
peace agreements, as you all know, from Koka Dam to the November 16 
Peace Initiative, affirm that the problem is the problem of the Sudan and 
not the so-called problem of Southern Sudan.”443 
 
The SPLM/A was acutely aware that it needed alliances with northern forces in 
order to maintain political and military pressure against the government in 
Khartoum. The Anyanya, which had called for the liberation of South Sudan on 
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the other hand, did not attract northern sympathies simply because of this factor. 
On the other hand, the SPLM/A’s holistic approach to the problem of Sudan did 
win northern sympathy, and indeed inspired many groups such as Darfur in the 
west, as well as the populations of eastern Sudan, Southern Kordofan, and 
Southern Blue Nile to rise up against the centre, which had been portrayed as an 
exploiter. The key to this more comprehensive approach was the call for the 
liberation of marginalized Arabs and Africans, Muslims and Christians inside the 
Sudanese state, thereby shifting the predominant belief that the Sudan conflict 
was simply presented as growing out of crude binary tensions: Arabs versus 
Blacks, Muslims against Christians, democracy versus dictatorship, secularism 
versus theocracy and of course north versus south. 
 
The SPLM/A engaged its northern constituency through its strategy of a unified 
New Sudan, which appealed to the marginalized people of the Nuba Mountains, 
Southern Blue Nile, Darfur and the Nubians in the far north. Over time, the 
SPLM/A formed alliances with northern political parties on the basis of 
establishing a new political dispensation for the whole Sudan. The SPLM/A’s 
strategy of engaging northern political parties resulted in a number of significant 
agreements such as the Koka Dam Declaration of 1986, which brought together 
14 northern political parties under the banner of the National Alliance for 
National Salvation and the 1989 Charter for the National Democratic Alliance 
comprised of the SPLM/A and nine northern political parties. 
 
The eventual call for southern self-determination resulted in the SPLM/A having 
to adopt a strategy of flexibility whereby it could accommodate competing 
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ambitions: unity with the North and secession for the South. The competing 
ideologies within the SPLM/A proved problematic for the leadership of the 
movement. There now existed a stark difference in opinion on the direction that 
the SPLM/A should take, with its southern constituency calling for the 
prioritisation of southern independence and its northern constituency embracing 
the more unitary approach to resolving Sudan’s political problems. The 
differences in opinion existed at the inception of the SPLM/A in 1983 and led to 
clashes between Dr John’s forces and Akuot Atem and Samuel Gai Tut’s 
Anyanya veterans. Ideological differences with regards to a united Sudan as 
opposed to southern secession resurfaced in 1991 when two senior members of 
the SPLM/A broke ranks on the basis of the need to fight for southern separation 
from the north. Riek Machar and Lam Akol’s 1991 split from the SPLM/A 
resulted in the formation of the SPLM/A-Nasir faction. Although the SPLM/A-
Nasir faction called for secession from the north, both Riek Machar and Lam 
Akol formed an alliance with the Government of Sudan in order to defeat Dr 
John’s movement. The SPLM/A recognised the contradictions inherent in the 
SPLM/A-Nasir faction’s position in its meeting at Beden Falls resolving: 
“In summary, the SPLM/SPLA’s PHMC observed that time has shown 
beyond doubt that the Nasir grouping was not about human rights. It was 
not about democracy and it was not about separation. The Nasir coup 
aided the enemy to recapture liberated towns, caused great damage to the 
SPLM/SPLA, denied the movement capture of Juba, caused incalculable 
loss of lives and properties and caused unprecedented misery to the people 
of Southern Sudan, particularly those of the Upper Nile. History will 





The SPLM/A’s call for a united New Sudan was accompanied by a series of 
difficulties. Indeed, it was this ideological framework that led to conflict between 
John Garang and the Akuot Atem’s Anyanya I veterans at the inception of the 
SPLM/A. Furthermore; the call for a New Sudan provided the justification for 
Riek Machar’s and Lam Akol’s split from the ranks of the SPLM/A in 1991. 
Although it was subsequently clear that the 1991 split resulted from Riek 
Machar’s and Lam Akol’s leadership ambitions, the SPLM/A-Nasir’s call for 
southern secession gave credence to their actions. Ultimately, it was the call for a 
New Sudan, which allowed Dr Garang to galvanize support from northern 
Sudanese and frame the Second Sudanese Civil War as a Sudanese conflict 
irrespective of race, ethnicity and religious orientation. With the support of both 
northern and southern Sudanese, the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan were 
able to negotiate the CPA in 2005, which led to the people of southern Sudan 
being given the choice of staying in one Sudan or establishing a sovereign 
southern state. The resulting referendum in 2011 saw southerners choosing to 
form a sovereign state as opposed to remaining as citizens of the old Sudan.
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Chapter 6: SPLM/A and the External Constituency 
 
One of the shortcomings of the Anyanya movement was its lack of diplomatic 
engagement during the First Sudanese Civil War. The Anyanya leadership had 
ignored the important role that diplomacy plays in mobilising military support as 
well as the role that it can play in peace processes. Although the AAA was 
eventually negotiated in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa only served as a neutral venue for 
the two parties, as opposed to serving as a location where regional and 
international actors could lend support to the peace process. As Sudan’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs noted in 1973: 
“Except for a few insiders, virtually no one was aware of the labyrinthine 
negotiation that went on between representatives of the Government 
and the Southern Sudan in various capitals of Africa and Europe. It was 
only after the news of the agreement resulting from the Addis Ababa talks 
was released that the outside world caught wind of what seemed to be a 
volte-face. The surprise was received with relief and gratification 
throughout the world, especially in Africa and within the group of non-
aligned countries. In certain quarters the news was received with some 
caution, even scepticism, in the first few days. Following the initial shock, 
even the sceptic joined in the rejoicing welcome.”445 
 
In the light of the experiences of Anyanya, Dr John Garang placed significant 
importance on developing diplomatic relationships with both regional countries 
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and countries further afield. Since he launched the SPLM/A from Bilpam in 1983, 
Ethiopia became the first major regional ally for the movement. The SPLM/A 
further strengthened its ties with Ethiopia on ideological grounds through its 
approach to the war with the Government of Sudan. Indeed, Dr Garang framed 
the solution to the Sudanese conflict as one that required a new political 
dispensation for a unified Sudan as opposed to the earlier calls by Anyanya for 
southern secession. With Ethiopia fighting a separatist movement, Dr John’s 
approach to finding a solution that did not require Sudan to amend its colonial 
borders automatically appealed to Ethiopian sentiments. The SPLM/A’s 
relationship with Ethiopia was further buttressed when the movement released its 
initial manifesto in 1983, entitled ‘The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s 
Manifesto’, which manifested communist influences. The SPLM/A was to enjoy a 
strong partnership with the government of Ethiopia between 1983 and 1991, when 
the Derg finally collapsed. 
 
Following the fall of Mengistu’s government in 1991, Kenya became another 
country that held diplomatic interest for the SPLM/A because of the large number 
of southern Sudanese refugees that fled first to Ethiopia and then on to Kenya. 
The fall of Mengistu also meant the loss of the SPLM/A’s base of operations, 
general headquarters and access to military logistics. The post-1991 period led to 
the SPLM/A having to look beyond Ethiopia for external support for the first time 
in its history. Regional realities and global shifts were to come into play after 
1991, and the SPLM/A was eventually able to strike a relationship with a number 
of IGAD member states and key western nations such as the United States. This 
chapter discusses the way in which the SPLM/A approached both regional and 
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international relations in the face of these shifting realities. This discussion will 
also consider the SPLM/A’s relationships with humanitarian organisations. 
 
Relations with the East African Region and the US 
Like other revolutionary movements, the SPLM/A embraced socialism as a 
framework for bringing about a new political dispensation in Sudan. The 
SPLM/A’s leftward leanings attracted the support of the communist government 
under Mengistu Haile Mariam.446 Although the SPLM/A’s first manifesto clearly 
underlined the socialist nature of the movement, the majority of the SPLM/A’s 
rank and file had neither heard of Karl Marx nor of the Communist Manifesto.447 
Although the SPLM/A’s professed aim was to create a socialist state in Sudan, 
little was known of the movement or of its real objectives. Furthermore, other 
than Garang, none of the five permanent members of the Political and Military 
High Command (PMHC), the supposed top decision-making body responsible for 
the military and political strategies of the SPLM/A, were known to be 
communists. Indeed, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, William Nyuon Bany were former 
Anyanya guerrillas and Salva Kiir Mayardit were former Anyanya guerrilla 
fighters with limited basic education, let alone knowledge of the ideological 
theories of socialism and communism. Perhaps therefore, the SPLM/A was only 
communist by circumstance as it saw an ooportunity, through socialism, to gain 
the support of Mengistu’s government. 
 
The significant assistance that the Derg regime offered to the SPLM/A by, 
                                                     
446 Henze, P. B. A (1998) Political Success Story, Journal of Democracy 9(4), p.41 accessible online at 
http://addisvoice.com/Ethiopia%20under%20Meles/A%20political%20sucess%20story%20Paul%20H
enz.pdf 
447 Aleng, E. M. (2009). The Southern Sudan: Struggle for liberty. Nairobi: Kenway Publications. p.7 
 
261 
providing it with logistics and training, helped to shape the movement. However, 
this support had a negative impact on the SPLM/A as it made the movement over-
reliant on Mengistu’s government thus leading to a culture of dependence. The 
over-reliance on Derg, therefore, became a serious problem for the SPLM/A 
when the Mengistu government was overthrown in 1991. When asked in 1991 
whether the developments in Ethiopia and Eritrea, following the fall of Mengistu, 
would make things more or less difficult to move towards peace in Sudan, Bona 
Malwal responded: 
“They will probably make things slightly more difficult than they already 
are. Khartoum is celebrating the fall of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA), and taking the position that it need not negotiate seriously 
to end the civil war.”448 
 
Indeed, the fall of Mengistu resulted in the SPLM/A losing its secure bases, its 
training sites and its supply routes, as well as its administrative headquarters. 
Thus the likelihood of the SPLM/A overthrowing the Government of Sudan 
through military means was now slim. By early 1994, the SPLA had been forced 
back to the borders of Kenya and Uganda and there were even predictions that it 
was on the verge of collapse. Such an outcome, however, was contingent upon the 
Sudanese government’s forces taking Nimule and Kajo-Keji, where it had 
attempted numerous times to break through SPLA defences. The military threat 
was, however, real and the SPLA lost considerable ground in government 
offensives in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, and Bahr el Gazal. 
 
                                                     




During the 1993-1994 dry season offensives, government forces concentrated 
their efforts on the banks of the Aswa River. They intended to recapture Nimule 
in order to control the important Sudan-Uganda border. In April and May of 
1994, an exceptionally intense struggle raged between the SPLA and the SAF, 
which was supported by local militias from the Lotuko, Mundari and Toposa 
regions, as well as by Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels from Uganda. At the 
same time a significant number of SPLA units were engaged fighting forces of 
the breakaway commanders, Riek Machar, William Nyuon and Kerubino 
Kunayin Bol, together with forces commanded by Paulino Matip Nhial. 
Nonetheless, in August 1995 the SPLA began a major offensive against the 
government’s forces and was able to push them back. The new momentum that 
the SPLA had gained on the battlefield was also connected with internal political 
and military reforms which the movement had undertaken, alongside an 
advantageous network of diplomatic alliances, the result in part of Khartoum’s 
alienation of Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Ugandan sympathies because of its support 
for Islamist and other dissident groups in those countries.449 
 
Its success, however, had been a close call for, had the Sudanese government’s 
army overrun the two strategic garrison towns of Nimule and Kajo-Keji, it would 
have succeeded in sealing off the SPLA from vital Uganda border access-points 
through which it received supplies, and the SPLA fighters’ dependents who 
established displaced persons camps on the border would have suffered severely. 
This would, in turn, have demoralized these fighters, who would have had to 
abandon fighting in order to look after their dependents, as had happened when 
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nearly 400,000 refugees450 were forced out of Ethiopia as the government there 
collapsed in 1991. Displaced persons centres were not just important to the 
SPLM/A for access to relief food, as Douglas Johnson suggested in 1998, but also 
mainly because they provided social services such as education and medical 
care.451 Above all, they were safe zones in terms of security for the relatives and 
family members of the SPLM/A volunteers and conscripts – the SPLA used 
conscription on occasion. This policy was applied in Bor, for example, and 
became known locally as as ‘buluk e diak’ which meant ‘each sub-chief with 
three’ (with three recruits).452 
 
For the Sudanese government there would also have been a subsidiary advantage 
in capturing control of Nimule. Such a success would have given it a stronger  
bargaining position at the negotiating table, as the IGAD-initiated negotiations 
were about to take place in Nairobi. Moreover, Khartoum would then have had a 
justification for the ‘waste’ of resources spent on fighting the ‘rebels’ in the south. 
It could proclaim to the citizens that the north had won a great victory, which 
would justify the monetary sacrifices they had had to make for the war. In reality, 
however, the failure of the government to eliminate the southern ‘rebels’ had the 
effect of making the Sudanese population lose faith in a military solution, the sole 
tool the government in Khartoum had at its disposal to resolve its crisis in the 
south. 
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The Sudanese government’s diplomatic errors compounded its problems, for its 
alienation, for example, of Uganda ensured Ugandan support for the SPLM/A 
whilst American suspicions of its intentions ensured its marginalization inside 
East Africa. The Ugandan government was fighting its own war with the Lords 
Resistance Army (LRA) rebels and feared that the elimination of the SPLA would 
strengthen the LRA, which was receiving support from the north in Sudan. The 
LRA, under Joseph Kony, had cemented relations with the Sudanese government 
after 1990 and it had provided the LRA with weapons and transport in retaliation 
for the support that the Ugandan government gave the SPLA. 453  So Uganda 
remained supportive of the SPLA in terms of facilitating replenishment of the 
SPLA’s military resources. But more important for the SPLA’s success was the 
USA’s opposition to terrorist expansion originating from Khartoum. To 
effectively isolate Sudan from other states in the region the USA encouraged 
alliances between Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea under an umbrella known as the 
‘African New Blood Leadership’. US funds were poured into these countries, 
provided that they supported the SPLA. In 1995, combined operations involving 
Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the SPLA were launched. This, in turn, contributed 
towards the SPLA’s success in 1995 in slowing down the Sudanese government’s 
offensive.  As Richard Dowden of the Independent confirmed: 
“Six weeks ago when the offensive against the SPLA began, morale 
among the SPLA fighters was low and ammunition in short supply. The 
Khartoum troops pushing southwards towards the Uganda and Kenya 
borders with Sudan seemed unstoppable. However, in recent days the 
SPLA has halted the attack and is reported to have reversed it in some 
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areas, attacking Torit and holding the line at Kit River.”454 
 
Kuol Manyang, who was the SPLA’s acting military commander for the area, 
with his command post a few miles east of Nimule, claimed that in fighting on 
April 23-24 and again on May 4 1994 the SPLA had inflicted heavy casualties on 
government forces north of Nimule and halted their advance. 
 
Many factors explain this recovery, amongst them the fact that, within the 
movement, political and military tactics had been subjected to significant re-
evaluation and adaption over the years, particularly after the collapse of the 
Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. When the war had started in 1983, the SPLA had 
grown swiftly until it outnumbered the government forces, which was unusual for 
a guerrilla movement. Whether because of this sheer abundance of fighters 
(which it was graduating in large numbers from its Ethiopian training bases) or 
whether because of its lack of experience in military tactics, the SPLA started by 
waging mass warfare, pushing fighters forward towards the enemy lines in mass 
waves as it attacked small garrison towns using more than a thousand fighters a 
time. Some soldiers claimed that they had originally been told that the ratio of 
SPLA forces to the Sudanese armed forces was going to be three to one in their 
favour.455 But in 1991, after the fall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, the SPLA lost 
its training bases and, due to the split within the movement in the same year, the 
SPLM/A’s ability to recruit was inhibited. The SPLM/A’s reaction to these 
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changes was to use different tactics based on a taskforce [three hundred fighters] 
instead of a battalion [one thousand fighters] to mount an attack. This change 
proved effective raising the question as to why the SPLA had not adopted this 
minimalist approach instead of wasting human resources on mass warfare 
initially. 
 
Part of the explanation lies in the experiences of the officers who were in 
command during each of the periods before and after 1991. Initially, commanders 
were often either illiterate or semi-illiterate with no professional knowledge of 
military tactics. Furthermore, they lacked heavy armour, so that military action 
depended entirely on infantry, as there were no tanks. By 1991 there was a change 
in the nature and experience of command since the most effective use of human 
resources had become of paramount importance and senior commanders were 
educated officers, who could read about military tactics. In 1997 three 
commanders, Oyai Deng, Pieng Deng, and Gier Chuang attacked and overran 
Amadi town in Yei county with a unit only sixty- four fighters-strong. This was 
something that would have been unheard of in the 1980s.456 These improvements 
in military tactics helped the SPLA to survive government offensives, whilst the 
logistical shortcomings of the northern forces contributed to their inability to 
control the country’s strategic borders with Uganda and Kenya. This was noted 
by Commander Manyang, who also pointed out that the ability of the northern 
Sudanese forces to advance in this sector had depended on their use of Antonov 
aircraft, which located troop dispositions. Furthermore, smoke from bomb 
explosions were used as guides for government artillery batteries, which rained 
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shells on the SPLA to force their withdrawal.457 Territory cannot be effectively 
occupied without ground forces, however, and the Aswa River was a useful 
obstacle to any attempt by government forces to advance into Nimule. They were 
unable to occupy positions near the north bank of the Aswa River because the 
terrain on that side is considerably lower than the bluffs along the south bank, and 
so the government forces would be dangerously exposed to SPLA fire. 
 
The combined result of all these factors was that, between 1994 and 1995, the 
struggle between the SPLA and southern factions allied to the government, which  
took place mainly around Panyagor, Ayod, and Waat, tilted in favor of the SPLA. 
In October 1995, the SPLA recaptured Parajok and Owiny-ki-Bul, and other 
victories followed swiftly. In November 1995 the SPLA retook Obbo, Panyiwara, 
Ame, Moli, Pageri, Loa, and Kit. By early 1996 the SPLA offensive appeared 
unstoppable. The SPLA took Aswa on 8 January 1996 and followed with 
Khor Yabus and Chali in Southern Blue Nile. Pochalla was recaptured in March 
and a whole Sudanese battalion took to their heels in an embarrassing gesture of 
surrender at Yirol, southeast of Rumbek. 
 
Dr Garang had attempted to save face amidst the chaos created by the fall of the 
Mengistu regime and, to deflect the government’s accompanying offensive, had 
ordered a full-scale attack on Juba in July 1992, but the SPLA forces had been 
forced to withdraw, with heavy losses, back to the bush. The close relationship 
between Mengistu and the SPLM/A’s commander-in-chief, John Garang de 
Mabior, was also blamed for the prolongation of the conflict, because of 
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Mengistu’s commitment to provide unlimited military facilities and supplies to 
the SPLA. This, in turn, had hardened opinion within the SPLA to only believe in 
a military solution and had persuaded it to disregard chances of peace 
negotiations, which could have halted the war much earlier. 
 
The SPLM/A’s goal and the Marxist language used in its manifesto did not cause 
the US to take any serious action indirectly or directly against the movement, 
although this was the ostensible reason why it became difficult to defend the 
SPLA in the West, where it was attacked in major newspapers for its reportedly 
poor human rights record. However, other changes in the international scene 
made it possible for the SPLM/A to be acceptable to Western eyes in the early 
1990s.  Following the fall of the Soviet Union and its allies, terrorism became the 
major global security concern in the 1990s as a result of the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing and the 1998 bombings of the Unted States Embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Having been placed on the US State Department state sponsors of 
terrorism list in 1993, it was clear that Sudan was on America’s radar. The 
aggressive US stance towards Sudan was confirmed in 1998 with the Clinton 
administration choosing to bomb the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in 
Khartoum. These changes in the conflict environment and in the reactions of 
leading international actors to them caused a shift in USA attitudes towards 
Sudan, seeing it now as a supporter of terrorism. President Clinton’s 
administration responded aggressively to Khartoum’s hosting of Osama bin 
Laden, for example. The SPLM/A’s calls for secular democracy increasingly 
resonated with Washington, although the American government remained critical 




With the attacks in the 1990s and the US view that Sudan was supporting 
terrorists Sudan’s internal conflict became an issue of concern for the Bush 
administration. The new administration appointed Senator John Danforth, as a 
special envoy for peace in Sudan in September 2011. The level of importance that 
the Bush administration placed on resolving the Sudanese conflict is well 
illustrated in President Bush’s remarks on the appointment of Senator Danforth 
when he stated: 
“For nearly two decades, the government of Sudan has waged a brutal and 
shameful war against its own people. And this isn’t right, and this must 
stop. The government has targeted civilians for violence and terror. It 
permits and encourages slavery. And the responsibility to end the war is on 
their shoulders. They must now seek the peace, and we want to help.”458 
 
Throughout the 1990s and up to the signing of the CPA in 2005, the US 
government remained an active player in the Sudanese peace process. 
 
The SPLM/A and Humanitarian Organisations 
From 1983, when the SPLM/A was founded, until shortly after it split in 1991, 
the movement fought to restructure the power structure at the center of the 
Sudanese state through a purely military strategy, giving little or no room to 
political action instead. The SPLM – the political wing of the movement – had 
designated itself as the political voice of the marginalized masses of the Sudan 
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but with a non-combatant membership that played little political role initially 
because the movement did not involve it in decisions that could affect its 
members’ lives. Instead, their role of contributing to the SPLM/A through 
revolutionary taxes that had levied on the civil population in SPLM/A-
administered areas and providing new recruits was seen as their positive 
contribution to the struggle. Even by the end of this first period, little thought had 
been given to involving them in decision-making or administration or even to 
protecting their essential rights. 
 
Indeed, as a result of this neglect, a number of observers complained about human 
rights issues within the movement and about its relations with local communities. 
Even some insiders subsequently admitted that they had witnessed abuses as a 
consequence of a lack of interest in such issues within the movement. After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US 
government turned its attention to terrorism and this made the SPLM preferable to 
the Islamists to the north. Given the advent of the diplomatic environment that 
was to lead to the war on terror, it was crucial for a movement like the SPLM to 
be on the safe side, in its relations with the world’s superpower so it began the 
process of normalising its relations with the United States with some trepidation 
as it tried to reformulate its internal policies to attract American sympathy. 
 
In reaction to these normative internal and external pressures, the SPLA adopted a 
new approach towards the populations that it claimed to represent, the 
development of democratization in the SPLA-liberated areas from 1994 onwards;, 
as noted by Elijah Malok when he remarked that: “...the structures of the SPLM/A 
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witnessed the advent of the SPLM National Convention in 1994. The revised 
SPLM Vision, Program and Constitution, declared that: 
“The SPLM shall set up and establish good governance, where the 
exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the 
management of the country’s affairs at all levels shall be people-based, so 
that individuals and groups have an effective say in the allocation and 
management of resources and in decisions that affect their lives.”459 
 
This dramatic move towards democratic governance stands as a example of an 
insurgency responding to changes in the conflict environment and the normative 
pressures on it to democratize, as well as signalling its acceptance of a greater 
reciprocity and mutual reflexivity in social relations amongst its members within 
the insurgency.460 Indeed, the SPLM/A was to significantly transform its strategy 
toward the civil population as a result. It separated military administration from 
civil administration and established structures of participatory governance, 
including a legislative, an executive and a judiciary in SPLM/A controlled areas. 
The restructuring broadened the decision-making body by dissolving the PMHC 
and creating in its place the General Field Staff Command Council, which 
comprised all the SPLM/A’s field commanders including young officers who 
came with fresh ideas and were better educated than their older colleagues. 
 
After securing its legitimacy through the Chukudum Convention, where all the 
movement’s traditional leaders had confirmed the SPLM/A as the valid 
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representative of the new Southern Sudan (which included the traditional 
Southern Sudan, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and the Abyei District), 
and had re-elected John Garang de Mabior as the movement’s chairman and Salva 
Kiir as his deputy, the SPLM/A treated the liberated zones as if they were a mini-
state within the larger Sudan, instituting governing councils, courts, tax bureaus, 
and diplomatic offices to deal with foreign NGOs and journalists. One implication 
of establishing a mini-state within another, wider state was the appearance of 
giving up the original goal of fighting to restructure the power structure at the 
centre. The movement acknowledged that the liberation of the whole of Sudan 
through military means was an unattainable goal, so that the SPLM/A now 
refined and limited its objectives to the attainment of self-determination for the 
new Southern Sudan, to appeal to the populations that would be affected by this 
initiative. We note that ideology played an important role at the inception of this 
process because it became the optimal way to mobilize and organise people and 
resources to wage the war. Since only the traditional Southern Sudan, Southern 
Kordofan, and Southern Blue Nile had responded positively to the original 
initiative – the SPLM/A’s appeal for a struggle to restructure the governance 
system for the entire country – in terms of contributing fighters, so the SPLM 
finally reduced its field of activity to these regions alone. 
 
There was, moreover, a further consideration behind this change of focus. The 
new, more restricted arena adopted after the Chukudum meeting was also 
motivated by an increased awareness among the leaders of the movement, amidst 
the chaos of the split, of the vital role traditional civilian leaders could play. They, 
after all, had been the backbone of the system that provided the SPLM/A with its 
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vital supplies of men and food. Yet, many policymakers and scholars have argued 
that this rather dramatic transformation in its relationship to the civilians it 
controlled was really motivated by a desire to cultivate positive relations with 
NGOs, in order to optimize badly needed relief aid.461 But in what seems to have 
been in contradiction with this approach, the SPLM did not view relief assistance 
as a long-term solution but as a consequence of government policy, as noted in an 
SPLM/A booklet: 
“Since the beginning of Sudan’s second civil war in 1983, large numbers 
of people in the war zones of Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and 
Southern Blue Nile have been forced to live on handouts from 
humanitarian organisations, notably the United Nations Operation Lifeline 
Sudan. However, relief assistance, though appreciated, easily creates 
dependence and stifles local initiatives in the fields of food production and 
self-reliance.”462 
 
This seems to have been the origin of the reasons why so many civilians came to 
depend on relief assistance. In an attempt to halt SPLM/A military advances on 
the battlefields between 1985 and 1990, the government and its allied militias 
destroyed livestock and crops across Southern Sudan in a deliberate effort to deny 
the SPLM/A access to food from its support base, where it depended on the 
revolutionary taxes that local chiefs collected in the form of cattle and other food 
items from their subjects. The author personally experienced this move by the 
government in the towns of Mundri, Maridi, Ame and Ashwa. The system of tax 
collection was well organised so that villagers took turns in contributing what 
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they called ‘awata’ (revolutionary taxes). The local communities also provided 
the SPLA with new volunteers, although the youth who stormed into the training 
camps had other primary motives for their decisions, such as the defence of their 
local communities against their rivals. The Al- Bashir government realized the 
necessity of destroying the SPLA’s source of food supply and new recruits – local 
communities in Southern Sudan – alongside its sources of weapons and 
ammunitions – the communist regime in Ethiopia. Khartoum destroyed livestock, 
crops, and razed villages using irregular forces and, by lending support to 
Ethiopian rebels, it would later contribute to the downfall of the Derg. 
 
The destruction in Southern Sudan led to massive displacement and starvation. In 
1988 alone, an estimated 250,000 Sudanese died as a result of war and famine and 
over a further 100,000 were estimated to be facing starvation by the end of 
1989.463 Attempts by the ICRC and other organisations to deliver humanitarian 
aid were hampered by Khartoum, which wanted no Western humanitarian 
workers in the conflict zone. After concerted efforts from international actors, 
however, an understanding was reached to allow for delivery of humanitarian aid 
to war zones. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which “involved more than forty 
NGOs organised under the umbrella of the U.N.”464, was to become one of the 
first major coordinated humanitarian efforts to deliver relief aid to internally 
displaced persons inside Sudan. 
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Khartoum’s View of the OLS 
While the government of Sudan had accepted, in theory, the delivery of relief aid 
to war zones, it had reservations on two grounds. Firstly, the best time to deliver 
relief aid was also the best time for the government to launch offensives and, 
secondly, it was afraid to allow the NGOs to feed its enemies, for this would 
contradict Khartoum’s strategy of using denial of access to food as a weapon 
against them. Nonetheless, it could not overtly resist international pressure, so the 
OLS went into operation. 
 
The initial OLS plan had consisted of delivering 120,000 metric tons of food and 
emergency supplies to specific locations in the Southern region within a six-week 
period. 465  The timeframe was short because supplies needed to be delivered 
during the dry season when roads and landing strips would make certain areas 
inaccessible. Yet, of course, while the dry season was the best time of the year to 
deliver relief aid to Southern Sudan, it was equally the best season for the 
government’s army to carry out its offensives, because it was then that heavy 
armour and machinery could be easily moved. For this reason, the government 
often denied aid flights for strategic military reasons, although its approach to the 
OLS exhibited a striking pattern that became useful for the SPLA’s counter-
offensive strategies. 
 
As an aid worker noted, “every single time Khartoum tells us not to fly to a 
specific location, it is always an indication that they will attack that place or some 




other place in the vicinity.”466 The aid workers had among them former SPLA 
fighters and such information allowed the SPLA to concentrate its effort on these 
threatened areas. The government’s strategy in dealing with the NGOs operating 
within the OLS context was simple; it bombed SPLA-held territory and then 
denied humanitarian access on the grounds of the resultant insecurity. In 1989, 
however, the Umma Party was overthrown by Omer Hassan el-Bashir. The first 
order of business for the Bashir government was to suspend all OLS flights 
delivering relief to Southern Sudan since there was a distinct possibility that food 
relief entering the south would end up in the SPLM/A’s hands. 
 
SPLM-OLS Relations 
Initially, in the late 1980s, the relief agencies that operated in the Ethiopian 
refugee camps that hosted Southern Sudanese refugees had no direct link to the 
SPLM/A since they were operating in Ethiopia where the SPLM/A had no 
administrative authority. Instead the relief agencies worked directly with the 
Ethiopian authorities. It was not until the establishment of the OLS in 1989 that 
the SPLM/A began to have direct contact with humanitarian agencies, which 
culminated the signing of the SPLM/A-OLS Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) in 1995.467 The OLS had begun as a small UN agency but it quickly grew 
to assume a greater role within the Sudanese operational environment. During the 
era of the split inside the movement’s leadership, the SPLM/A’s principal 
complaint about it was that it had interfered in the internal politics of the 
movement. From 1991 to the end of 1994, the SPLM viewed the OLS agency as 
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its enemy, accusing it of having allowed itself to be used as a tool by Western 
governments and intelligence services. Perhaps the SPLM/A’s concerns were 
connected with one of the OLS staff members, Emma McCune. She was married 
to Riek Machar who had split from the SPLM/A in 1991. The SPLM/A’s 
leadership went further in blaming the split in the movement on the OLS, 
justifying its claims on the grounds that the American deputy chief-of-mission at 
the United States Embassy in Nairobi had used an OLS aircraft to fly US 
Senators to Nasir onAugust 28, 1991, to receive the news of the coup against 
John Garang de Mabior. In another instance the OLS refused to deliver relief in 
the SPLA-held areas unless Khartoum first sanctioned such an action. This 
amounted to refusal to provide relief services because Khartoum would often 
refuse to allow its enemies to be fed. In other instances, the OLS was seen to 
cooperate with Riek Machar’s faction; for example, “when Akobo was captured 
by forces loyal to the SPLM, the OLS cut off supplies until it was recaptured by 
the forces of Riek Machar.”468 
 
There were, indeed, grounds for this distrust and suspicions existed on both sides. 
On the one hand, duped by the rhetoric of human rights concerns and democratic 
ideals preached by the leaders of the factions that had split off from the SPLM/A 
in 1991, the NGO community initially sympathized with their leaders. On the 
other, the SPLM/A installed itself as the gatekeeper over external resources by 
controlling regional borders and denying all other Southern political or armed 
groups such access. It did not like to see other groups coming into the operational 
environment as potential competitors for local and regional influence. This was 
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particularly true whilst the Derg controlled Ethiopia, for then the SPLA enjoyed 
exclusive support from the major power in the region willing to aid an insurgency 
in Sudan.  This meant, at the local level, that the SPLA would then be the only 
option for those fighting against Khartoum. The early strategy of the SPLM/A 
was to further this tactic by fragmenting the South’s economy, thus strangling 
alternatives. This involved fostering battles in key border areas to cut off trade, 
excluding agricultural production and controlling the regional cattle market.469 
 
The presence of international humanitarian organisations in Southern Sudan also 
played into the politics of the 1991 split within the SPLM leadership for senior 
UN and NGO staff were present in Nasir when the coup attempt was announced. 
As Lieutenant General Bior Ajang narrates: 
“Riek Machar and Lam Akol had been courting the humanitarian agencies 
by expressing a willingness to improve humanitarian access in the South 
and they apparently believed that if some sort of international recognition 
could be achieved, thereby securing them a degree of legitimacy, the effort 
to topple Garang would receive significant support.”470 
 
The OLS’s decision to continue to work in the SPLM-Nasir controlled areas led 
to suggestions that aid organisations were collaborating against Garang. However 
these NGOs were later disappointed when soldiers under the command of Riek 
Machar committed the massacre in Bor, an act that instantly negated every 
positive claim that the SPLA-Nasir leadership had made in their 1991 Nasir 
declaration. Indeed, 1991 saw high levels of atrocities whereby “Nasir forces 
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(mostly Nuer) massacred many Dinka civilians in an effort to capture Garang’s 
home territory of Bor.”471 In the end, the behaviour of the splinter group, which 
comprised the SPLA-Nasir, coupled with the changes instituted by the SPLM/A 
mainstream in 1994, left the NGOs with no choice but to seek cooperation with 
the latter as the sole and legitimate representative of the Southern Sudan region. 
Furthermore, the groups associated with the original leadership split joined the 
North for their own survival and this rendered them useless from the point of 
view of a common Southern Sudanese relief initiative. 
 
At the same time, the SPLM/A mainstream leadership had to find some 
accommodation with the OLS initiative because of the problems it faced when the 
Derg regime in Ethiopia collapsed in 1991. The expulsion of Southern Sudanese 
refugees from the Ethiopian refugee camps created an alarming humanitarian 
crisis which would eventually force the SPLA to cooperate with the OLS, 
although formal cooperation only began after the Chukudum Convention in 1994. 
In a meeting held between the SPA General Military Council and the OLS in 
September 1994, the OLS faced a simple choice; to cooperate with the SPLM/A 
or leave Southern Sudan. The OLS chose to stay and work with the relief wing of 
the SPLM/A, known as the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). 
The meeting culminated in the signing of an Agreement that came to be known as 
the ‘Ground Rules.’ While due to its sovereignty claim as a member of the UN, 
Khartoum retained significant control over when aid was delivered and where 
access would be granted, the ‘Ground Rules’ allowed the SPLA to retain 
significant leverage over how the aid that reached the areas under their control 
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The atmosphere created by the ‘Ground Rules’ allowed for a greater 
cooperation between the SPLA and the OLS and even some degree of SPLA 
control over the relief efforts, as many NGOs under the OLS rubric came to be 
led by SPLA-educated officers working for the Sudan Relief and Rehibilitation 
Association (SRRA). Consequently, according to Holly Philpot, the SPLA was 
able, with the full knowledge and cooperation of the OLS, to divert relief supplies 
for military purposes (feeding its fighters and to levy taxes on relief workers who 
arrived via the OLS).473 For his part, William Reno admits that foreign guests had 
to pay various fees and taxes to the SPLA for permission to enter, work, and live 
in SPLA-held territories, much as a sovereign government would demand.474 
Reno continues, arguing “Such regulations allowed the SPLA to control people in 
its territory and to assert its political dominance as a gatekeeper for external 
resources.” 475  When I talked to the SPLM/A staff of the Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Association (SSRA) to check whether the argument presented by 
Reno and Philipot on the diversion of relief food for military use was correct the 
answer was obviously a denial of their arguments. 476  However, it cannot be 
disputed that the SPLM/A had diverted relief food at some point during Second 
Sudanese Civil War. As Peter Adwok Nyaba observes, “...with the Anyanya there 
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was no relief. But with SPLA there was a systematic use of relief. The SPLA 
engineered displacements, for example moving people to Ethiopia…It used the 
humanitarian situation to feed the army.”477 
 
While it is undeniable that the SPLM/A may have diverted relief food for its 
members’ use, the movement of people to take refuge in Ethiopia and other 
neighbouring countries was never of the SPLM/A’s making. Thus Peter Adwok’s 
observation was inaccurate. Other factors, such as government directed attacks by 
air, land or by its militia forces on the Southern villages were a major cause of the 
exodus. Apart from that, because there were seasons where heavy rain prevented 
accessibility to the areas under SPLA control; even air movements could be 
inhibited. Because an aircraft could be grounded in an area, which the UN might 
have classified as ‘dangerous’, the SPLA had to store food for such periods when 
access might be difficult or impossible. As a result, the numbers of persons that 
were usually reported in a given camp were often exaggerated so that enough 
relief aid would be secured for emergency use as well. In this way, there would be 
sufficient food for the displaced civil population, the intended recipients, as well 
as for the use of SPLA fighter if stranded there. This collaboration between the 
SPLA and relief agencies, regardless of the intentions of specific actors, was a 
significant shift from past practice among relief agencies, which had been based 
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Internal Adjustments to Improve the SPLM/A’s International Image 
As Sacks notes, one of the principal factors affecting policy at a given time is 
policy itself.
478 Current policy, in short, responds to provisions of past policy. 
Weir and Skocpol explains: “the interest and ideals that policymakers pursue at 
any moment in time are shaped by policy legacies or ‘meaningful’ reactions to 
previous   policies.”479 Indeed the SPLM/A, in responding to the consequences of 
past policy, had to introduce internal adjustments to improve its international 
image. The painful crises such as the massive destruction of civilian ways of life, 
loss of support lines in Ethiopia, internal wrangling, and the collapse of the 
communist bloc forced the SPLA to change its mental model of NGOs and its 
relationships with them as they were the only ones to turn to in those perilous 
times. Following the fall of Mengistu in 1991, Dr John Garang de Mabior, visited 
Washington and, upon his return, cooperation between the SPLA and the NGOs 
improved. William Reno noted that a few NGOs operating under the OLS rubric 
now actively collaborated with the SPLA. An investigation of Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) showed that it: “…had for several years organised an air-
bridge for the supply of weapons to battle zones within Sudan under the 
supervision of its Nairobi office.” 480  One of the NPA pilots involved in the 
gunrunning stated that his plane had landed at SPLM/A bases with some 2.5 tons 
of weapons.481 Such claims are hard to substantiate but what they all point to is 
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the deeper level of cooperation that developed between two sides who had not 
viewed each other favourably before. This modification of positions based on 
changes in the conflict environment came about as a result of a learning process. 
The NGOs learned that they needed the SPLA on their side in order to accomplish 
their goal of helping to reduce the suffering of the Southern Sudanese civil 
population, and the SPLA wanted to use the relief aid to consolidate its authority 
over the civil population, and so cooperation with the NGOs was necessary. 
 
Given its absolute control of the operational environment as the sole gatekeeper to 
Southern Sudan, the SPLA had tried to manipulate the interests and agendas of 
outsiders, despite its position as a non-sovereign authority, and tried to use them 
to fit its own economic design. It is to be noted that Operation Lifeline Sudan and 
international humanitarian organisations had spent about $2 billion on relief 
supplies during its years of operations in the SPLM/A controlled areas. This 
amount would have had significant developmental impact on the livelihood of 
civil society if it had been utilized in the development of the economy. 
 
Now, however, the SPLM/A had to move towards a more collaborative agenda in 
which it saw the NGOs in OLS as partners rather than as clients. Yet it also had to 
do this in a manner, which did not negate its previous policies. It did this by 
recognising the utility of a civilian administration as an autonomous part of its 
overall control of the new South Sudan and engaging it in the decision-making 
process alongside the military administration of the on-going war. It also accepted 
the role of NGOs as valid participants in the process of countering the 
marginalization and victimization of the civilian population living inside the 
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regions under its control hence Garang’s willingness to sign the SPLM/A-OLS 
MOU in 1993. 
 
Regional Developments 
These developments, of course, took place in a regional context where pressures 
for a resolution of the conflict in Southern Sudan were beginning to accumulate 
and had culminated in the initiative mounted by the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) in 1994. With conflict prevention, management and 
resolution as a major part of its agenda, IGAD had been formed in 1986 by the 
governments of Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. 
At the instigation of the Kenyan president, Daniel arap Moi, IGAD facilitated 
negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A in 1994. 
Although these floundered over Khartoum’s refusal to accept the Declaration of 
Principles (DoP), they encouraged IGAD to adopt a revised strategy; including 
extending its mandate to include broader matters of political and economic 
cooperation, and by 1997 the Sudanese government had accepted the DoP. 
 
From their experience during the first civil war (1955-1972), the SPLM/A leaders 
had realised that diplomatic strategies were as essential as military strategies in 
achieving success, and that the successes of such strategies depended on 
exploiting changes in the external environment. In order to garner regional and 
global political and financial support for the insurgency, the SPLM/A set out to 
make its version of its case heard through its Radio SPLM/A in Ethiopia, as well 
as through Colonel John Garang de Mabior’s letters which were hand-delivered 
by SPLM/A’s leaders to regional and international leaders. In a letter dated 14 
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October 1994 Colonel Garang urged President Mobuto Sese Seko to support the 
SPLM/A’s peace position: self- determination for Southern Sudan, South 
Kordofan, and South Blue Nile, and separation between state and religion. In a 
letter to Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon dated 30 May 1996, 
Colonel Garang admonished: “May I state again that the war in Sudan is an 
African Wr and therefore, I appeal to you so that you use your influence and 
support the IGAD peace initiative.”482 Colonel Garang maintained that to have the 
same message for everyone would be a recipe for failure and, guided by this 
principle, he tailored his message to address his audience’s concerns. When 
addressing Arabs and socialists, he would maintain that the war was about 
correcting injustices left behind by Western colonialism; when addressing 
Africans on the other hand, he would state that the war was against Arab 
hegemony; and when engaging the west, he would claim that the war was a war 
for the human rights of all the marginalized masses of Sudan threatened, as they 
were, by Islamic extremists. 
 
When Khartoum resisted attempts by the IGAD countries to negotiate an end to 
the North-South conflict between 1994 and 1996, the SPLM/A increased its 
military offensives on the battlefield. Colonel Garang switched gear in his letter 
writing; instead of asking for political support from regional actors, he now 
requested military support. In a letter addressed to President Laurent Kabila dated 
June 25 1997, he wrote: 
“Our military situation is very good following the recent offensive and 
victories in Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal. The situation is now ripe for the 
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SPLA to capture Juba and subsequently advance to Khartoum with our 
allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). We are therefore in 
urgent need of military and other assistance for Juba.”483 
 
Indeed, the SPLM/A’s military gains as well as regional and international 
pressure drove the Khartoum government back to the negotiating table. As 
Boshoff notes, “the military setbacks and and intense international pressure 
forced the government back to the negotiating table in Nairobi in 1999.”484 
 
Operational Environment and Controlling Borders 
In the early 1960s various Southern political leaders had dealt with neighbouring 
countries independently without a centralized institutional structure, until the 
Anya- Nya leader, Joseph Lagu, finally succeeded in controlling the operational 
environment with the help of the Israelis. Having subsequently learned the 
importance of achieving such control from Lagu, whose successes in the late 
sixties were due mainly to his firm control of the flow of weapons into rebel-held 
bases, the SPLM/A sought to control resource flows along South Sudan’s borders 
(with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the DRC, and the CAR). The implication of this 
strategy was such that, whenever the SPLA failed to overrun a government 
garrison town, the SPLM/A’s control over the operational environment allowed it 
to cut off supplies to such a town and besiege it, causing the enemy to starve, as 
happened in Torit and Bor in the late 1980s. 
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Control over the operational environment also served as a means of coercion 
against members who chose to play a ‘renegade game’ (as Riek Machar and Lam 
Akol had done in 1991 by splitting with the mainstream SPLM/A). By controlling 
the operational environment, the SPLM/A held control of the only significant 
flow of consistent and reliable external resources entering the region, and the flow 
of information into and out of the region could also be firmly controlled. Those 
who chose to renege on their implicit contract of support for the SPLM/A had few 
other options available to them, for they would be forced to turn to Khartoum as 
the only source of military and financial support or perish. Yet, while receiving 
military and financial support from Khartoum was the only alternative available 
to any splinter group from the SPLM/A, it evoked a strong and adverse societal 
sanction in the South because such a support was contingent upon how much 
damage such a group could inflict upon their former comrades (fellow South 
Sudanese). On the other hand, halting the internal conflict would cause 
difficulties for the renegades with Khartoum, which could then stop military 
logistical support or turn on the renegades, some of whom would have already 
relocated to Khartoum. 
 
Indeed, the SPLM/A’s control of access to regional borders rendered Riek 
Machar’s SSIM impotent, and this, together with strong criticisms from Southern 
citizens of its alliance with Khartoum, forced it into obscurity. The SPLM/A’s 
number two, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, also became estranged from Colonel Garang 
who decided to send a force to arrest him. This could have had a bloody outcome 
but the Ethiopian Government intervened, tricking Kerubino into going to Addis 
Ababa on the promise that Ethiopia would help prepare him to takeover the 
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leadership of the SPLM/A from Garang. As Christopher Clapham notes, 
“Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Garang’s chief of staff, attempted to overthrow Garang, 
he did so by appealing to Mengistu to remove Garang from power. Mengistu 
responded by arresting Kerubino and handing him over to Garang.”485 
 
In order to control the operational environment the movement aligned its 
objectives with those of regional actors. The external environment at the time did 
not favor the idea of breaking up a country, which would have implied that the 
boundaries set by colonial governments ought to have been redrawn, a move that 
the then Organisation for African Unity (OAU) would have vehemently opposed 
because such a precedent would have undermined the greater unity of the 
continent that the organisation was struggling to achieve. The forward-looking 
SPLM/A’s manifesto acknowledges such a challenge: “Africa,” it said, “has been 
fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neo-colonialism and its 
further fragmentation can only be in the interests of its enemies.”486 
 
Moreover, the Ethiopian Government (the primary ally of the movement) was 
waging a war against Eritrean separatists and it could not support another 
separatist movement without contradicting itself. The shifting of war objectives 
by the SPLM/A from a regional protest to an ideological challenge made the 
conflict more complex for the central government in Khartoum to deal with. In 
the words of South Sudanese writer, Francis M. Deng, the SPLM/A, with its new 
ideology: “…has disarmed the central government of its only powerful accusation 
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against Southerners, that they are separatists.”487 In the eyes of outsiders, the 
SPLM/A had transformed a people who were once considered “rebels” and 
“separatists” into a people seeking unity and fighting to restructure their country. 
This surprised many Northern leaders who had never expected that a Southern 
Sudanese-led movement would ever champion the cause of all the marginalized 
masses throughout the country.488 
 
The SPLM/A’s ideology of the New Sudan in which the Sudanese people would 
purportedly enjoy absolute freedom forced the central government to seek refuge 
in religious rhetoric in an attempt to secure national support on the basis of 
Islamic solidarity. The north-south conflict crystallized into a visionary 
confrontation pitting the New Sudan Vision against the vision of an Islamic-Arab 
Sudan. In response to the SPLM/A’s calls for a secular New Sudan, the 
government enacted the September Laws, which instituted Sharia Law. Professor 
Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, writing in 1987, correctly stated that the lessons learned 
from the experiment with autonomy as guaranteed by the AAA had clearly 
demonstrated that political devolution without the power to make economic 
decisions and planning at the regional level, in conjunction with the overall 
national goals, was not adequate.489 There was nothing wrong with regionalism 
per se since the SPLM kept and used the regional administrative system of 
management in the areas it liberated from the government. The problem with the 
regionalism concept derived from the limited decision-making power it offered to 
Southern political leaders as demonstrated by the post-AAA period. The 
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limitations of ‘self-government’ led the SPLM/A to demand ‘self-determination’ 
for southern Sudan as an alternative to achieving a unified New Sudan. Self-
determination would ultimately lead to northern- southern border disputes, 
particularly with regards to Southern Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile and the Abyei 
region, which led to a separate protocol being adopted in the CPA for them. 
Historically, the government of Sudan had always sought to frame conflict in 
Sudan as a ‘southern problem’ instead of addressing the conflict in an all- 
encompassing manner. For instance during the first civil war between 1955 and 
1972, the conflict was seen as the rebellious areas – the Bahr el-Ghazal, 
Equatoria, and Upper Nile – versus the north of the country. Consequently when 
negotiations were conducted in 1972 the AAA granted self-government (regional 
autonomy) to these areas alone, excluding all other related regions. Thus, the 
post-AAA governments in Khartoum continued to purchase the rights of the elites 
at the center of the state at the expense of those on the peripheries (especially 
those from Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Abyei District and Darfur) 
who had not formed part of the original rebellion, although they were 
geographically and by temperament intrinsically part of it. 
 
Having seen the compromises promised to Southern Sudan through the AAA of 
1972, those on the peripheries learned that it paid to rebel, so they waited for an 
opportunity to pick up their guns. This opportunity presented itself when the war 
resumed in 1983. These groups rebelled against the rulers and joined their kin in 
South Sudan in the armed struggle against Arab hegemony. As the AAA of 1972 
had granted self- government to the fighting portion of Sudan, the CPA was 
expected to grant self- determination to the ‘new fighting Sudanese region.’ When 
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the CPA failed to do this, the conflict flared up in the Nuba Mountains and 
Southern Blue Nile provinces of Sudan after the South had opted out of the union. 
Colonel Garang’s words could not be more prophetic: 
“Negotiations in the context of the so-called ‘Southern Problem’ are 
against the national interest and a recipe for disaster. Suppose we solve the 
problem of the South, we will soon have to solve the problem of the Nuba 
Mountains because the Nuba can also take up arms; after that the problem 
of the Beja, and so forth. It is a national problem, not a Southern problem 
that we must address.”490 
 
A former minister of foreign affairs in Sudan and a prominent northern scholar, 
Dr Mansour Khalid, who joined the SPLM/A, once aptly noted that the failure of 
post- independence governments in Sudan to manage crises involving political 
and economic structure is a problem of lack of leadership endowed with a sense 
of history, intellectual integrity, and a spirit of toleration.491 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the way in which the SPLM/A learned to deal with the 
regional and international environment in light of changing realities. The 
SPLM/A was keen to develop strong regional and international partnerships, 
having witnessed the shortcomings of Anyanya’s diplomacy. Ethiopia initially 
served as the SPLM/A’s key ally between from 1983 until the fall of Mengistu in 
1991. The decline of socialism also meant that the SPLM/A would have to adjust 
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its internal policies to attract Western nations instead. The 1994 Chukudum 
Convention served as the forum whereby the SPLM/A could adopt policies that 
appealed to Western sentiments. 
 
The 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, as well as the 1998 
bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led to the global 
fight against terrorism taking centre stage. The Government of Sudan 
automatically became a target of US international policy as a result of its 
inclusion on the State Department’s 1993 list of state sponsors of terrorism and its 
policy of harbouring known terrorists such as Carlos the Jackal and Osama Bin 
Laden. The SPLM/A recognised an opportunity to develop ties with US, which it 
exploited at the expense of the Government of Sudan. Ultimately, it was the 
involvement of the US, in partnership with the IGAD sub-regional body, which 
brought an end to the Second Sudanese Civil War. 
 
The painful realities of the Second Civil War such as the massive displacement of 
civilians led to the SPLM/A having to improve its relations with international 
humanitarian organisations in order to administer support in its areas of control. 
The SPLM/A’s strengthened partnership with humanitarian agencies was well 
demonstrated in the movement’s agreement on operational ground rules with the 
OLS in 1995. 
 
The post-Mengistu era led to the SPLM/A to seek new regional and international 
alliances. This period coincided with the tougher US stance on Sudan’s links to 
terrorists. Aware that the SPLM/A needed to improve its image, Dr Garang 
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sought to reorganise the movement to better align with democratic ideals. As a 
result, the SPLM/A significantly transformed its strategy towards civil 
administration. It separated military administration from its civil administration 
and established structures of governance, including a legislative, and executive, 
and a judiciary. The re-structuring broadened the decision-making body by 
dissolving the Politico-Military High Command (PMHC) and creating in its place 
the General Field Staff Command Council, which comprised of all the SPLA 
commanders including young commanders who came with fresh ideas and better 
educated than their older colleagues. The new body proceeded to form various ad 
hoc specialized committees and instructed them to draw up recommendations for 
the restructuring of the movement. Ultimately, the restructuring of the movement 
encouraged humanitarian workers to begin operating in SPLM/A controlled areas. 
 
Nevertheless, attempts by the ICRC and other organisations to deliver 
humanitarian aid were hampered by Khartoum, which did not want western 
humanitarian workers in the conflict zone, viewing their assistance as a source of 
food supply for the SPLM/A. After concerted efforts from international actors 
some understanding was to allow for delivery of humanitarian aid to war zones. 
The Operation Lifeline Sudan [OLS] marked one of the first major coordinated 
humanitarian efforts to deliver relief aid to internally displaced persons inside 
Sudan. The OLS involved more than forty NGOs organised under the banner of 
the United Nations. 
 
The atmosphere created by the ‘Ground Rules’ allowed for a greater 
cooperation between the SPLA and the OLS and even to some degree the SPLA 
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could manipulate the relief efforts as many NGOs under the rubric of the OLS 
came to be led by SPLA educated officers working for the SRRA. Consequently, 
with full knowledge and cooperation of OLS, the SPLA was able to divert relief 
supplies for military purposes (feeding of the fighters) and to levy taxes from 
relief workers who arrived via OLS. The foreign guests had to pay various fees 
and taxes to the SPLA, including for permission to enter, work, and live in the 
SPLA-held territory, much as a sovereign government would demand. Such 
regulations allowed the SPLA to control people in its territory and assert its 
political dominance as a gatekeeper to external resources. 
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Chapter 7: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 
On 20 July 2002, after a month of consultations under the auspices of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the SPLM/A and the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) signed the Machakos Protocol. The protocol had 
been supported by the US, UK and Norway, and later by Italy - all of whom were 
to become to be known as the ‘Troika Plus’ – and also by the IGAD Partners’ 
Forum (IPF) initiative.492 War fatigue in Sudan and the post-September 11, 2001 
geopolitical environment had created an auspicious atmosphere for talks and there 
had been significant pressure from the Bush Administration such that a negotiated 
political settlement had become more relevant than it would have been before. 
The strong commitment of the Kenyan government towards negotiations was 
pivotal for ensuring that the talks should continue, not least because of President 
Moi’s decision to appoint General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as a mediator. The 
Machakos Protocol defined the framework for future negotiations over a peace 
agreement for a New Sudan. At Machakos the parties to the talks reaffirmed the 
principle of self-determination for the Southern Sudanese but abandoned the 
principle of secularism, which had been recognized in the IGAD Declaration of 
Principles in 1994 and promoted by the SPLM/A during the armed struggle up to 
a few months before the talks began. The Machakos Protocol is considered to 
have been the cornerstone of the CPA. It is therefore important to examine the 
implications of this very carefully by first asking why was there a deal at the 
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Kenyan town of Machakos in the first place. 
 
What Factors Made the CPA Possible? 
Despite the agreement at Machakos, negotiations, especially in the early stages, 
were to prove arduous and often unfruitful. By 2003 there were several 
negotiation attempts including the 23
rd 
January meeting in Karen (Kenya), where 
members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) sat in as observers. This 
was followed by a meeting held in Nairobi for the specialised committee tasked to 
follow up the Memorandum of Understanding between the SPLM/A and the 
government on the cessation of hostilities. The Karen meeting called for 
discussion of power sharing, wealth distribution, and of the issues connected to 
the contested three areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) and 
Southern Blue Nile (the Angessina Hills). All ended with no progress because the 
government delegation declined to negotiate formally. 493  Amongst the 
contentious issues on the table was a confederal structure for Sudan with a 
separate secular constitution for the South and an interim period of two years 
before a final arrangement. Other important issues included a rotating presidency, 
the first vice-presidency being reserved for the South, the status of the national 
capital in Khartoum, a referendum for Abyei, and the establishment of two armies 
(the SPLA and the Sudanese Armed Forces). Eventually, however, these matters 
were resolved through compromise and the key to understanding how this was 
possible, given the early difficulties, is to understand the ways in which the 
delegations concerned actually approached the negotiating process. 
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The Rationalist Approach 
Conflict resolution theory has long held the rationalist viewpoint that the ‘ripest’ 
moment for negotiation would involve a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, defined as 
mutually blocking vetoes over outcomes from which escalation of the conflict 
provided no prospect of escape and the parties were thus open to the 
consideration of other options. 494  Defining such a situation can be difficult 
because no two cases are ever the same. It would be unreasonable, for instance, to 
expect that the experiences of one country in a specific dispute could be directly 
applied to another dispute, given the circumstantial, historical and national 
differences between such cases, and there were certainly no parallels to the 
experiences of the combatants in Sudan. Furthermore, it was also the case that the 
two sides in the Sudanese conflict initially defended their interests so vigorously 
during the peace talks that began in the late 1980s that several commentators 
doubted if they could ever agree on a compromise. John Young for instance, 
pointed out that negotiators on both sides were playing a complicated game of 
positioning themselves, each expecting the worst of the other.495 However, in 
2002, to the surprise of many in Machakos, the disputants began to accept 
solutions proposed by IGAD. 
 
This apparently rational acceptance of solutions proposed by agents not directly 
party to the dispute could also be explained in terms of coercion and sanctions 
(exerted on the bargaining agents by regional and international organisations).496 
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Brosché also adds that the experience of the CPA process suggested that 
involving both regional actors and the broader international community seems to 
have been a fruitful approach, which facilitated the ultimate agreement. 497 
Pressure from the United States resulted in the United Nations Security Council 
holding a meeting to discuss Sudan’s Second Civil War. The UN Security 
Council in its 5,080
th 
Meeting, held in Nairobi between 18-19 of November 2004, 
listened to reports on the situation in Sudan. This was only the eleventh time that 
the Council had met away from its headquarters in New York, and the first time 
that it had met in Nairobi. Indeed, the role of international actors appears to have 
been crucial, as Einas Ahmed has affirmed by arguing that regional and 
international actors pressured Sudan’s adversaries into joining the dialogue for a 
peace agreement by helping to resolve what had become a mutually hurting 
stalemate through their intervention.498 In light of this experience, it appears that, 
in such circumstances, peace agreements will depend on the nature of the third 
party involved and level of respect for it felt by the protagonists; in other words  
on  how  powerful the third party can be in the negotiating process, as 
exemplified in the CPA by the role of the United States. 
 
Other factors have been suggested by observers of the CPA negotiations; one 
being the skill of the mediators involved. The chief mediator of the CPA, General 
Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya, states in his book that the outcome was a result of 
skilful mediation. 499  Others, such as Marina Ottaway have noted that, “The 
signing of the agreement was due to skilful international mediation and 
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diplomacy, rather than to a sincere change in the position of the two sides.”500 
However, she goes on to argue that: 
“While indeed skill is an important element in mediation it is not a 
decisive factor in achieving agreement(s). What leads to reaching a deal 
are benefit or gain associated with it. The other deciding factor is immense 
pressure both internally or externally. In the case of Sudan military power 
balance and the role of US and Troika countries are two factors in the 
CPA. For the south, the six-year interval mandated by the agreement 
before the holding of the referendum was simply a waiting period before 
the goal of independence could be achieved. And the northern government 
gave no indication that it was willing to try democracy and power sharing 
as a solution. It remained authoritarian in the north, dealing harshly with 
the opposition, and more determined than ever to crush resistance in 
Darfur with force.”501 
 
In other words, she recognized the decisive role of coercion and pressure in the 
search for a peaceful solution to the Sudanese conflict. 
 
A further factor often cited by commentators involves the personalities of the 
negotiators. Thus Einas Ahmed points out that, “Apart from international 
pressure, the CPA would probably not have been concluded successfully if it had 
not been for the personal ambitions of the main two negotiators, the late Garang 
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and the current Vice President Taha.”502 Mike Jobbins agrees that: “Though a 
success for the international community, the CPA was nonetheless a Sudanese 
agreement, and appeared to be a major step forward by the leadership both of the 
rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National 
Congress Party (NCP)-led government.”503 However, as this chapter will show, 
despite the role of leadership in bringing about the conclusion of the peace 
agreements, multiple factors, as suggested above, really account for the success of 
agreements. 
 
An additional factor was that, although the negotiation process was subject to 
various setbacks, resulting in the intensification of war in the years between 1998 
and 2002, the prospects for decisive military or political victory by one side over 
the other diminished over time, something which came to be better understood by 
both the NCP government in the north of the country, as well as by SPLM/A in 
the south.  This, in itself, facilitated an atmosphere of commitment to the peace 
deal. Achim Wennman argues, however, that it was really a strategy to gain at the 
negotiating table what could no longer be won on the battlefield.504  In other 
words, the move from violence to the negotiating table represented a deliberate 
strategic option chosen by the two parties, both of whom were to make 
concessions designed to enable them to maintain political power in their 
respective sub-national domains by sharing power between them at the national 
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level. Indeed, although the CPA catered for the continued political dominance of 
the NCP in the North, it also provided for a significant opening of political space 
at the national level, and the sharing of state power and wealth previously 
controlled by the NCP with the SPLM/A. The hegemonic military and political 
positions that the CPA granted to the SPLM/A in the South, however, amounted 
to sowing seeds for future wars, for the agreement glossed over many inter-
southern sources of conflict because both the NCP and the SPLM/A were 
predominantly concerned with optimal gains for themselves in their own 
individual spheres of hegemonic dominance. As Edward Thomas points out:  
“During the 2010 general elections, the NCP and SPLM agreed not to 
contest the elections in each other’s sphere of influence. Consequently, the 
NCP withdrew its candidates in the south, and the SPLM withdrew its 
presidential candidate, and withdrew from contests for northern 
parliamentary seats, governorships, and the national presidency.”505 
 
A similar interpretation applies to the issues of oil revenues and the outbreak of 
war in the Western Sudan (Darfur) and Eastern Sudan (Beja) as well. The 
availability of oil to the NCP (the wells at Unity Field were by then producing at 
a rate of 160,000 bpd) made it easier for it to obtain sophisticated weaponry, 
which the SPLM/A could not match.506 In an SPLM/A meeting at the level of the 
National Convention in Rumbek in 2004, a top SPLA commander, Salva Kiir, 
disclosed that, given the paucity of resources, he effectively no longer had an 
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army under his command.507 Such logistical weaknesses were going to hurt the 
SPLM/A if it insisted on continuing to fight. At the same time, despite its access 
to oil revenues, the NCP could not afford to simultaneously maintain wars in the 
East, West, and South of Sudan. This meant that it was in the NCP’s best interests 
to end the war in the South so that it could focus on threats closer to home – in 
short to Khartoum, the seat of government. The issue was, however, how would 
both sides individually react to these realities; would they have been prepared to 
draw the obvious conclusions from them and be prepared to compromise or 
would either of them have sought to pursue their original objectives of outright 
victory? Given the SPLM/A’s weakness, this concern was of particular relevance. 
That question, in turn therefore, provokes a further query with respect to the 
SPLM/A. Would the SPLM/A have appreciated the implications of such 
circumstances – its own weakness combined with the limits to the NCP 
government’s own resources – unless some form of learning had taken place in 
the conflict environment over the years? Francis Deng, for example, concludes 
that the SPLM/A did have a learning culture: 
“In the first years of its struggle, the SPLM/A set out an analysis of 
Sudan’s problems as a conflict between the center and periphery that drew 
on the neo- Marxist dependency theories of the day. After the cold war, 
however, the SPLM relinquished Marxism and turned instead to African 
tradition, emphasizing the cultural rather than the economic difference 
between the center of Sudan and the south.”508 
 
                                                     
507 There were many interpretations of this statement and it was never clear why Salva Kiir, then Chief 
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303 
Paula Roque voiced similar sentiments: “The SPLM has shown that it can be 
pragmatic and is able to adapt its institutional framework and rhetoric when 
confronted with moments of internal crisis, as was the case after the 1991 split 
and the 2004 leadership crisis in Rumbek.”509 She concluded that the strategy 
adopted had therefore usually been one of political accommodation. However, 
this had led to an amalgamation of different political forces and interest groups 
into an over-inflated structure, something that could have threatened the future 
cohesion and ideology of the SPLM.510 
 
However, none of the explanations in the existing literature gives a complete 
answer to the way in which the CPA came about. In discussing this literature gap, 
Matthew LeRiche noted that Oystein and others identify the willingness to 
compromise shown by the parties to the negotiating process as a continuing realm 
of interpretative confusion. LeRiche adds that it is still not clear what changed to 
make concessions over self-determination feasible for NCP and rendering shar’ia 
law tolerable to the SPLM/A.511 Indeed the initial position of the SPLM/A could 
not have been captured better than the comment made in a public letter from John 
Garang de Mabior in 1998: “We in the SPLA are not interested in half solutions, 
for history taught us: either a just and final peace or no peace at all.”512 Yet, as 
will be shown, the SPLA was not only learning from past history as Garang 
suggested, but was also learning through interacting with its opponent at the 
negotiating table. Otherwise, there is no other way, in terms of a rationalist 
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approach, of explaining why the SPLA finally accepted the half-solutions that 
Garang had rejected, such as allowing shar’ia to remain in force. 
 
The Constructivist Approach 
The broader constructivist literature suggests that different compliance dynamics 
are a result of social learning.513 Here, learning and social interaction, rather than 
political pressure and individual choice, lead to agent compliance with normative 
prescriptions.514 As described in an Chapter 2, the processes involved are based 
on notions of complex or double-loop learning drawn from cognitive and social 
psychology.515 Learning leads the parties to embark on an iterative process of 
calculating future potentialities based on current benefits, for the parties will 
agree to settle only when, according to their calculations, a peace settlement 
would offer a potentially better alternative than the continuation of conflict. Both 
the SPLM/A’s negotiators and the Sudanese government had to learn how to 
construct a viable agreement to end the war, not just in terms of rational decision-
making, but also in the context of the socio-political environment in which they 
operated. 
 
To appreciate what this has meant, attention needs to be paid to the actual 
evolution of the conflict and to the way that those involved in its resolution 
learned from experience how that could be achieved. The beginning of new 
negotiations in early 2002, which were eventually to lead to the CPA, were 
marked by a phase in the negotiating process when both parties, because of firm 
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international and regional pressure, had to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards 
each other and had to accept concessions. In this respect, the experiences of the 
SPLM/A during the CPA negotiation process were quite different to those of the 
Anyanya during the AAA process in which Southerners had to concede to the 
intransigence of Northern negotiators. Essentially, the AAA experience was one 
of profound power asymmetries. 
 
This study has sought to establish that the SPLM/A’s delegates to the peace talks 
had learned that what mattered was not simply the process of reaching an 
agreement but how it was reached in terms of the identities and interests of the 
parties involved in the negotiating process, the sequencing of issues at the 
negotiating table and the successful negotiation of implementation modalities. In 
other words, for the SPLM/A, at least, negotiating techniques as applied in the 
construction of the CPA were the consequence of a learning process that had been 
defined by past failure as well as by learning at the negotiating table from the 
enemy and third party participants. 
 
The SPLM/A’s reversal of the Anyanya’s liberation goal of seceding from Sudan 
into fighting to structure the governance of a united Sudan between 1983 and 
1994; its ultimate openness to pursuing the goal of fighting for the right to self- 
determination for the Southern region after it faced a split within its ranks in 1991 
over the issues of leadership and of liberation as an objective; its transformation 
from being a predominantly military movement into one committed to 
governance as well; and its ultimate realisation that compromise at the negotiating 
table would have to replace confrontation on the battlefield were important 
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learning processes. These transformations were associated with and were the 
product of the flawed way in which the AAA had been achieved and applied. 
They, in turn, influenced the way in which the SPLM/A was to re-interpret its 
conflictual relations with Khartoum throughout the second civil war. Nor was this 
a simple matter of individualistic rational choice on the part of the leadership 
when confronted with a coercive environment. It was, instead, the consequence of 
a learning process throughout the movement in which a normative principle 
eventually determined acceptable outcomes, in that negotiated compromise was to 
be preferred over violent confrontation. 
 
The learning process related to three different dimensions of the SPLM/A’s 
actions. Firstly, it had to develop tools through which to engage the Government 
of Sudan. Then it had to persuade its internal constituency of the viability of its 
approach. Finally, it had to co-opt support from the international community in 
the process of achieving a viable and permanent solution to the conflict in which 
it was engaged. All of these processes were not merely the result of the rational 
choices that the movement made. More importantly, they reflected the way in 
which the SPLM/A’s own approach was grounded in its ability to learn through a 
process of interaction with its social and political environment 516  and of the 
internalization of the normative principles that informed it. 
 
There was an additional factor, too, which conditioned the social environment in 
which the parties to the conflict eventually accepted that negotiation would serve 
their interests better than continued conflict. Natural climate cycles seem to have 
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had a striking influence on the conflict between North and South in Sudan and on 
the eventual peace initiatives. One of the primary determining factors in the 
parties’ change of attitude towards conflict was weather-induced stalemate. The 
military balance tended to tilt in favour of the government forces during the dry 
season (December through April) because the government was able to move its 
mechanized forces with relative ease. However, the rainy season, during which all 
the roads in Southern Region turned into rivers, was favourable for the SPLM/A 
because government forces would then be confined to fortified towns, which they 
were determined to hold. The outcomes were not as promising as this brief 
analysis might suggest, however, as many of the major towns (Torit, Bor, 
Kurmuk, for example) changed hands at least three times. Thus both sides 
realized that they had, as a result of the climate, reached a parity of the kind that 
John Howell emphasized in the following comment: 
“In guerrilla war, parity is reached not necessarily by equality of armed 
strength, but at a point where the superior conventional force of the 
counter- insurgent is unable either to eradicate the insurgent, or prevent his 
continued recruitment of men and continued access to weaponry; and the 
insurgent is unable to wrest control in areas which the counter-insurgent 
is determined to hold and is unable to destroy the political will of the 
counter-insurgent to defend…”517 
 
After two decades of playing this game, both sides lost faith in their chances of 
winning outright militarily and began to see an opportunity for cutting losses and 
achieving satisfaction through accommodation. Such a loss of faith forced both to 
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also give more weight to the need to redress the grievances of their followers, 
who grew increasingly weary of war, than their initial commitment to the cause 
would have originally implied, making negotiations possible. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, William Zartman sums this up nicely: “in a situation of continuing 
uncertainties, parties negotiate when they change their estimates of future 
potentialities.”518 In short, by this time, both parties had an enhanced interest in 
gaining access to the economic and social benefits arising from the exploitation of 
oil, land, and water, resources, which could not be fully exploited in an 
environment of war. 
 
The Significance of the Past in the CPA 
It is not easy to establish an agreement based on a past history, especially when 
such a past is a story of deep seated mistrust between the actors involved in a 
conflict, unless the actors themselves realize that they will be worse off in the 
foreseeable future than if they settle in the present. However, such a realization 
requires that at least one party in the conflict learns and adapts to the dynamic 
conflict environment in which he or she finds themself. Whether a country 
continues to experience a protracted internal conflict or manages to contain or 
stop it seems to have much less to do with the system of governance it practices 
than with the rate and scope of learning amongst its political elites (both those in 
the governing class and those battling their way to the top). The problem in Sudan 
has not been the failure of the civil population to replace a bad government but 
what to replace it with. For instance, popular uprisings overthrew governments in 
1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989 but each of the newly installed governments turned 
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out to be much worse than its predecessor in terms of managing political and 
economic crises, chiefly because the ruling elites, lacking a sense of history, 
failed to learn from the past. 
 
The lessons learned or ignored from previous negotiation engagements can, as a 
result, lead the parties involved to achieve a correspondingly better or worse 
peace settlement in subsequent negotiations. More importantly, knowing what 
works and what doesn’t work requires learning and adaptation. Having 
undoubtedly learned from the past failures, the SPLM/A was determined to not 
repeat them; it did not want to end up with another flawed peace settlement as 
such an outcome would amount to nothing more than pausing the conflict for it to 
be resumed at a later date – whenever either party found it in its best interests to 
do so. The SPLM/A’s reorganisation of its leadership structure, its transformation 
of its violent regional protest into an ideological protest, its provision of more 
than a year for the negotiation of implementation modalities, and its insistence on 
a particular sequencing of disputed issues at the negotiating table, can best be 
identified as variables of this learning process. In short, unlike the AAA in 1972, 
the negotiation process leading to the signing of the CPA was better structured in 
the sense that the parties had clear agendas, which they fed into the compromises 
that led to the final agreement.519 As Manshour Khalid has noted this procedure 
had to do with a learning approach.520 
 
The intellectual concepts that John Garang de Mabior provided during the talks 
which led, first to the Machakos Protocol and finally to the CPA, were not new 
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because he had raised them with General Lagu during the AAA negotiation 
process. Dr Garang had asked Lagu why he had adopted a specific approach in 
drawing up the agreement, suggesting that, instead, any ultimate decision would 
have to have had popular sanction and that this would have required an interim 
trial period after which the population in the South would have to be consulted 
about the decisions that had been made. In addition, Dr Garang did not believe in 
an integrated unitary army for Sudan; he wanted two separate military forces with 
an umbrella command structure. His concerns about the viability of the decision-
making process actually adopted were probably correct in view of the failure of 
the AAA. Furthermore, Garang had never envisioned two Sudans as separate 
sovereign states, preferring a federal solution instead. His decision to consider 
separation was due to the governmen’st insistance on Sharia Law and the demand 
from southerners for self-determination. Indeed, if John Garang de Mabior had 
been a separatist, it would not have taken another two years to negotiate the CPA 
after the Machakos Protocol had been signed because the issues discussed did not 
only relate to the South alone.521 In the CPA negotiations, the Government of 
Sudan had two objectives: to stop the war and to extricate itself from the 
accusation that it was a sponsor of terrorism, mainly in order to appease the 
United States whose anger over Khartoum’s hosting of Osama Bin Laden had 
been aggravated by the September 11th 2001 attacks on New York and 
Arlington.522 By this time, the War on Terror had effectively picked up where the 
Cold War left off with the consequence of a sharp division of the non-western 
world into “those who are with us and those who are with terrorists.”523 The GoS’ 
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position on the IGAD peace effort as far as the war was concerned was clear in 
the following excerpt from Don Petterson’s interview with a leading NIF leader, 
Abu Salih: 
“Abu Salih and I had been talking about the IGAD peace effort. He 
indicated he had been fully briefed on [these] meetings. He went on to say 
his government wanted the IGAD mediation to succeed in ending the war. 
He expected to meet with [Kenyan] President Moi on March 16th, and a 
GoS delegation would go to Nairobi for talks with the SPLA beginning on 
the 17th. He said Sudan was suffering enormously because of the war, 
which in his view was the cause of most of its problems with the West. 
However, some outside forces were bent on keeping the war going so that 
his government would be weakened and toppled.”524 
 
As this shows, the government in Khartoum felt acutely vulnerable, for other 
actors in Khartoum had begun to consider themselves better alternatives to the 
NIF as the government; even the former NIF ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi, had 
been able to convince a considerable number of people that he was more 
democratic in outlook than the regime of Omar al-Bashir, which he had himself 
originally catapulted into power.525 Therefore, from its point of view, anything 
that would guarantee securing its hold on the system and hence its remaining in 
power, at least in the North, was open for discussion as far as the GoS was 
concerned, including cutting a deal with a powerful southern movement, the 
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State, Religion and Confederation 
It is clear that the government’s peace agenda was intended to end suffering 
induced by the war. However, it was not the suffering of the civilian population 
that it was concerned about but rather the suffering inflicted on the regime by 
American sanctions in 1997, issued under Executive Order 13067, which imposed 
a comprehensive trade embargo on Sudan and blocked government assets.526 It is 
likely that these sanctions, more than anything else, were the major driving force 
for Sudan to take its place at the negotiating table. Furthermore, the SPLM/A had 
clearly defeated the Government of Sudan on the diplomatic front because its 
leader, John Garang de Mabior, had made sure to publicise the movement’s 
position everywhere, wherever he found an opportunity to do so. In a letter dated 
14
th 
of October 1994, for instance, John Garang de Mabior wrote to Mobutu Sese 
Seko the Zairian president: “The SPLM/A wants a negotiated settlement on the 
following two issues: self- determination for Southern Sudan including Abyei, 
South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile; separation between state and 
religion.”527 
 
In all of the Sudanese negotiations prior to the signing of the Machakos Protocol 
in July 2002, the issue of what the relationship between state and religion should 
be had dashed any hope for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The SPLM had 
always wanted there to be no relationship between state and religion and had 
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demanded that matters of faith be left between an individual and her/his creator, a 
position popularized by the leader of the SPLM through his speeches over Radio 
SPLA and other SPLM/A media. The government of Sudan, especially as 
represented by the NIF, which had originally been responsible for its extremist 
stand on questions of faith, maintained that the state and religion were 
inseparable. Sudan is a heterogeneous society, and in the past, the politicization of 
religion has been a factor in dividing Sudanese and producing a fragmented 
Sudanese society. Sudan is divided between various denominations of 
Christianity and Islam mainly Sunni Islam. Muslims have had greater access to 
education and modern economic employment. Indeed, the Muslim north “...had 
opportunities to advance and develop economically and educationally.”528 Unlike 
the case of Eritrea where nationalities rather than religious communities were 
stressed as the major factor in nation building, Sudan nationalism was based on 
religion and ethnicity. 
 
Given the negotiating conditions in which the CPA was to evolve, only two routes 
were open for the SPLM/A: either to insist on the separation of religion and state 
throughout Sudan, which would have led to a stalemate and the eventual 
breakdown of the talks, or to seek workable solutions that would end the war 
without compromising the citizenship rights of non-Muslims in the South. In 
these circumstances, too, it was made clear to the GoS that either the NIF make 
the prospect of unity attractive to the South or there would be a cost, namely, the 
separation of the country into two after a referendum for self-determination in the 
South. The IGAD mediating team realized that, in order for the talks to move 
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forward, the question of state and religion would have to be given the attention it 
required. In consequence, the mediators asked the disputants to put their initial 
positions on the issue in writing so that they could try to construct a mutually 
acceptable position out of them. This exercise took up to between ten and twenty 
drafts, each of which was then tabled for debate. The second draft provides an 
example of the intensity of the debate for when it was presented to the SPLM/A, 
it was rejected outright. As the SPLM/A delegation pointed out: 
“Separation of religion and state as referred to in the IGAD declaration of 
principles (DOP) has been redefined as ‘religious accommodation,’ 
presumably in support of the idea of a ‘two systems – one state’ approach, 
and possibly because Khartoum is presumed not to be prepared to accept 
separation of religion and state.”529 
 
The issue of the relation between the state and religion was critical because the 
question of what the governance system for Sudan would be would depend on it. 
For instance, the NIF demanded that a united Sudan should be ruled as a federal 
state while the SPLM demanded that the united Sudan should become a 
confederation530 for an interim period, the length of which would have to be 
subject to further discussion. It should be recalled that federalism was the system 
that Southern political leaders had originally demanded in exchange for their 
support for Sudan’s independence from Britain in 1956 and which had been 
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promised to them by the Khartoum-based elites but which was later denied after 
Independence. 
 
This initial betrayal of Southern aspirations and the SPLM/A’s later rejection of 
federalism seem to be in contradiction with each other and raise the question as to 
why the SPLM/A, which had portrayed itself as the sole representative of 
Southern Sudan, the region that had originally called for federal status, would 
now reject the NIF’s offer of a federal system. The answer was simple: 1) the 
federal system could not guarantee that state and religion would remain separate 
and 2) the federal system did not guarantee equitable representation in all the 
institutions that would have comprised the federal union. The lesson had been 
well-learned; in a letter dated 10 October 1989 to John Garang de Mabior, James 
Wani Igga, a military commander, wrote: “the federalism now proposed does not 
differ in substance from the regionalism now in effect. In fact, it is feebler as it is 
like replacing a broken pot with a worn-out saucepan.”531 In fact, the 1972 AAA 
had implied regionalism and regionalism did indeed result from its failure. In both 
cases, therefore, historical experience meant that regionalism was a system that 
did not enjoy wide support in the South; even SPLA soldiers derided it in their 
songs: “Regionalism, we do not want anymore; small government we do not want 
anymore.” The SPLM/A, therefore, offered confederation as an alternative, which 
would solve the problem of religion and state. The Southern region, including 
Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Southern Blue Nile would not be required to 
accept any form of shar’ia law or indeed an ‘exemption from Sharia’ or a 
‘Special Status’ within the Sudanese state. Instead, as a confederal state, it could 
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be secular, alongside a shar’ia-based state in the North, the two states together 
making a confederation that would be the future Sudan.532 
 
The issue of shar’ia law, however, was only one of the two key issues that had to 
be resolved in the CPA. The other was the ultimate status of Southern Sudan, for 
it will be recalled that John Garang de Mabior had demanded that, whatever 
conclusions were reached in the IGAD-mediated negotiations, the population of 
the South should eventually be consulted about their willingness to accept them. 
In Geneva on March 24
th
 1999, John Garang de Mabior, identified himself as the 
spokesperson for the marginalized and persecuted people of Sudan in addressing 
what he called ‘the forum for the human rights of all peoples,’ – the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission – in the following terms: “The SPLM/A 
conceives of self-determination as a democratic, human and popular right.”533 The 
SPLM/A also made clear what it considered were the appropriate entities to 
which self-determination should apply and under what conditions the process 
should be carried out. Those concerned would comprise the populations of the 
territories within the Southern Sudan border as defined by the January 1, 1956 
Sudan map including the District of Abyei, whose population was Dinka, 
Southern Kordofan (the Nuba Mountains), and the Funj people of Southern Blue 
Nile. Writing in 1963, Oduho and Deng note: 
“At present the part of the country known as the ‘North’ extends from 12° 
to 22° latitude north; it is mainly Muslim with a large Arab group and is 
administratively divided into six Provinces: Northern, Kassala,  Khartoum, 
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Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur. From 4° to 12° latitude north is known as 
the South…”534 
 
The movement also proposed that separate referenda should be carried out in each 
of the three areas mentioned above and that they should be conducted under 
international supervision. 
 
The insistence on referenda also reflected the learning process that the SPLM/A 
had undergone for it was not the first time that a negotiated settlement in Sudan 
had promised a referendum for populations which had felt excluded from the 
Sudanese state. The 1972 Addis Ababa Accord had promised that the District of 
Abyei would be able to decide its own future through a referendum, but this had 
never taken place because of the absence of international supervision. As a result, 
the failure to hold a referendum in Abyei led the population there to take up arms 
against the Sudanese state at the start of the 1980s - the Abyei Liberation Front 
was founded between 1982 and 1983 and joined the SPLM/A’s insurrection in 
1983. 
 
Past history alone, however, was not the only reason for the SPLM/A’s insistence 
that any agreement be confirmed by popular referendum. Firstly, the Movement 
was determined, in constructing the CPA, to avoid a recurrence of the conflict 
created by the inequalities inherent in the settlement negotiated in Addis Ababa in 
1972. Secondly, it was insistent that lasting peace could only be achieved if the 
negotiating process took as its starting point the factors that had then led to the 
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resumption of the civil war.535 The reasons for its insistence on this position was, 
again, born out of historical experience, for previous agreements had tended to be 
‘quick fixes’ for specific problems rather than seeking to fundamentally redress 
grievances. Thirdly, although the SPLM/A had declared itself to be the 
spokesperson for all the marginalized masses in the country, it insisted that only 
those that had taken up arms against the government should have the final say in 
any negotiated outcome. In the end a popular consultation was agreed, in a 
separate protocol, for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, while Abyei was given a 
referendum that was to take place at the same time as the southern referendum. 
 
The SPLM/A, by the time of the CPA negotiations, had embarked on programmes 
to empower the populations it controlled and to involve them in decision-making 
processes, including their economic future and their social situation. Indeed, 
involving the population in making decisions that affected their lives became a 
dominant strategic theme for the SPLM/A at the negotiation table as well.536 
 
This position made the negotiations leading to the CPA unique in the sense that 
no former peace settlement between the South and the North of Sudan had ever 
been structured with the civilian populations affected by the war in mind. One 
reason for this was again connected to the learning process that the SPLM/A had 
undergone in the aftermath of the Addis Ababa Agreement. It had concluded that 
that agreement had effectively failed because of the perception that it had really 
been no more than a ‘gentleman’s understanding’ between Sudan’s President 
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Nimeiri and Anyanya’s Joseph Lagu. Thus, since the understanding was merely 
between two individuals, it proved to be easy to abrogate it, once one of the 
partners decided that the other was acting in bad faith.537 
 
The SPLM/A’s demand for a participatory peace settlement in the CPA, where 
the affected civilian population would eventually decide on its future through a 
referendum challenged this apparent lack of participatory governance in Sudan, 
which it saw as the sole obstacle to stability in the country. From its perspective, 
as early as 1994, a peaceful resolution of the Sudanese conflict could only be 
achieved through a comprehensive development strategy that depended on a 
sustainable system of participatory democracy and good governance. This was a 
radical shift for the movement from the days of the AAA in 1972 and showed 
how it had learned from its own mistakes, both in shaping the armed struggle and 
in formulating its peace agenda. In this process of learning, 1994 is a key date for, 
from the onset of the liberation struggle in 1983 until the First National 
Convention in 1994, the efforts of the movement had been directed mainly to the 
prosecution of the armed struggle such that its military aspect was paramount and 
was more emphasized than the question of civil authority. In 1994, however, the 
imperatives of the liberation struggle – namely, its responsibilities in 
administrating the areas it controlled – led it to change course, building up 
appropriate administrative structures and promoting participatory democracy. By 
the time of the CPA, the SPLM/A had learned from the mistakes made in the 
AAA, not least the lack of international guarantees and implementation 
modalities for the performance of the agreement. With the CPA, however, the 
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SPLM/A proposed an Assessment and Evaluation Commission, made up of 
international representatives, to monitor the agreement and to help ensure its 
implementation. 
 
Sequencing in Negotiations 
Mediation efforts undertaken from the start of the war by various interested 
groups - the African leaders, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Arab 
leaders – had failed to find a negotiated resolution to the conflict. The government 
and the SPLM/A continued to pursue a military resolution to the conflict, with oil 
wells and other development projects such as the Jonglei Canal in the South as the 
government’s main project for the sources of revenue, as the main prize. In 
February 1984, former Anya- Nya I veterans, who had been incorporated into the 
SPLM/A, “...attacked a Chevron facility in Block 1… This led Chevron to 
suspend operations in the south.”538 While the government in Khartoum refused 
to accept the SPLM/A as the representative negotiator of the marginalised people 
of the Sudan, and made its commitment to a ceasefire deal conditional on the 
immediate withdrawal of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan, the SPLM/A 
conditioned its commitment to negotiations on the removal of shar’ia laws 
introduced by Nimeiri. Under pressure from international actors and faced with a 
growing military stalemate, the belligerents half-heartedly engaged in the 
Machakos peace process which resulted in the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles (DoP) in 2000, the Machokos Protocol in 2002 and the eventual 
signing of the CPA in 2005. 
 
                                                     




Normally negotiators seek a general definition of the items under discussion, 
conceived and grouped in such a way as to be susceptible of joint agreement 
under a common notion of justice. This process is what is referred to here as ‘the 
sequencing of issues,’ for the order in which issues are discussed determines the 
ultimate character of the negotiated outcomes. Nicholas Haysom highlighted this 
aspect of the process that was to lead to the CPA when he commented on the 
negotiation process, which produced the 1994 Machakos Protocol: “The 
Machakos Protocol was indeed a breakthrough. It not only generated a basis 
for a common text but it also saw the parties agree on both principles and 
details on issues that had previously seemed intractable.”539 
 
It is clear from this that, for the SPLM/A, the history and the failures of AAA 
acted as a reference point against which any outcome of future peace negotiations 
would have to be compared. It saw the implications of that experience as the need 
to protect its delegates from accepting unfavourable agreements in the future. It 
also appreciated the need for properly structuring the negotiation process, such 
that its insistence on a particular sequencing of the issues in dispute was also 
intended to produce a positive outcome, which the AAA, because of the 
unstructured nature of the negotiations in 1972, failed to produce. Thus, the 
SPLM/A’s red lines in the protracted negotiations, which gave birth to the CPA, 
were largely the consequences of its perceptions of the shortcomings of the AAA. 
That failure had been rooted in four issues: a lack of security guarantees for 
former rebel fighters, an absence of mechanisms for ensuring the political 
inclusion of Southern elites in the future governance of the country, an absence of 
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international guarantees, and an absence of implementation modalities or 
mechanisms for monitoring.  The SPLM/A therefore approached these issues with 
cautious deliberation, putting aside a period from July to December 2004 to 
address them. 
 
In the 1972 AAA, the most contentious issues, which involved security 
arrangements, were pushed to the bottom of the list of items to be discussed. The 
result was that when one party to the negotiations felt unfairly treated, too much 
commitment had already been invested in the negotiating process and it was far 
too late for that party to exit it. In other words, the ‘sunk cost effect’ ensured that 
the negotiating process would continue despite the perceptions of disadvantage 
experienced by one of the parties to it.540 By the time of the CPA negotiations, 
however, the SPLM/A’s negotiators had learned that the poverty of the content of 
the AAA arose in large part from the order in which the issues it dealt with had 
been negotiated. As a result, when they, in turn, negotiated with the Government 
of Sudan, the issue of sequencing became a decisive concern. 
 
As early as the negotiations of the Machakos Protocol in 1994, the SPLM/A 
insisted that it would only negotiate if the first item on the agenda was to be the 
security issue. This was important, even more than the issue of oil, which had not 
even been mentioned in the AAA, because the guiding principle that the SPLM/A 
wished to institute for the country overall was what it called, perhaps in conscious 
imitation of the Republic of China’s arrangements for re-integrating Hong Kong 
in 1997, ‘one country, two systems’. This would entail, among other 
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considerations, two separate armies, one of which would serve as a deterrent in 
case the Government of Sudan reneged on its promise to allow the South to 
decide whether it would opt for independence or remain as an integral part of the 
Sudan as the result of a referendum. The AAA had fallen short of securing 
independence or even effective autonomy for the Southern region because there 
had been no independent army for the South. Its lack was the reason why regional 
autonomy, which the agreement had guaranteed, could be so easily undermined 
by President Nimeiri, as the author of the accord, by meddling with the internal 
politics of the Southern region. 
 
Similar concerns applied to the question of the relationship between state and 
religion. All the previous Sudanese negotiating initiatives had collapsed because 
both sides failed to agree on how to handle the issue. Eventually, the SPLM/A 
appreciated that the only effective sequencing of such a substantive issue would 
be to place it, alongside the security issue, at the head of the list of issues to be 
discussed. Indeed, even the mediating team at the Machakos talks realized this as 
Nicholas Haysom recalls: “It had been suggested that if this issue could be 
resolved other issues would fall into place.”541 
 
In passing, it is worth noting that the sequencing of issues still seems to continue 
to deadlock negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLM (now the government 
in Juba) even after the CPA. In recent talks, the two issues on the table that had to 
be sequenced before effective negotiations could begin were the demilitarization 
of border zone and the flow of oil from the South through the North to world 
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markets, which had been shut down after the crisis at Heglig.542 Khartoum had 
been insisting that before oil could flow, the demilitarized border zone had to be 
agreed. The breakthrough in the stalled peace deal came in January 2013 when 
Khartoum agreed to negotiate both issues simultaneously. However, without the 
implementation of the Abyei Protocol, this deal on Heglig will not occur. 
 
Mutual Trust and Popular Reaction 
Unlike the case of the Congo, where negotiators struggled to reach an agreement 
on two fundamental aspects of peace deal: power sharing and the restructuring of 
the national army without sequencing during their inter-Congolese Dialogue, the  
SPLM/A and the GoS focused on the identification and sequencing of hard issues. 
Despite the SPLM/A’s identification of key issues and its understanding of the 
importance of appropriate sequencing of issues in negotiations, perhaps two of the 
most important lessons it learned was that a negotiating process can only succeed 
if there is eventually a degree of confidence in the equitability of the process on 
both sides and if the constituencies that each party represent also feel engaged in 
it. The basic lesson learned in the Sudanese negotiations was that a party will 
accept to negotiate if the minimum payoff will not place it in a worse position 
than it had enjoyed prior to the negotiations and, furthermore, that the calculation 
of such a minimum payoff requires tactical learning. A miscalculation on these 
issues can be dangerous and result in outcomes similar to those that developed in 
1972. Making peace with the South in order to expand his national power-base 
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had been Sudanese President Nimeiri’s strategy in negotiating the AAA in that 
year. In 2005, in negotiating the CPA, the National Congress Party (NCP) that 
then dominated the Government of Sudan calculated that negotiations would 
allow it to secure its political system, ensure stability and remain in power at 
least in the North – an important motivation for it having been prepared to 
accept to negotiate. Whether the NCP miscalculated is yet to be seen, however. 
 
Popular engagement in the outcome of a negotiating process was key to Southern 
success. During the exercise of its right to self-determination through referendum, 
an element of the learning process was evident amongst the population in the 
South. The BBC’s Peter Martell watched Southerners who “…gathered to watch 
the results of their historic independence referendum, [for them] only one 
message mattered: the confirmation that the South will become a nation of its 
own.” 543  The results, when they came, demonstrated the accuracy of his 
observation, for 98.83% of voters had backed independence. This result was 
certainly a revenge against historic injustice and demonstrated the wisdom of the 
SPLM/A in including the possibility within its negotiating objectives. Indeed, as 
Kofi Annan agreed “…people [in South Sudan] have had enough of war. They 
want to avoid conflict.”544 It would have been hard to reach such a conclusion if 
learning had not taken place and popular capacity to learn and remember should 
never be underestimated. 
 
The SPLM/A had, in short, learned from the mistakes of its predecessors and 
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vowed not to repeat them as far as dealing with Khartoum was concerned. 
Another element of learning process showed up when the SPLM/A and the GoS 
discussed terms of cease-fire. The SPLM/A argued in essence that: 
“A comprehensive cease-fire without the necessary political framework 
would only postpone the war and prolong the suffering of the Sudanese 
people. This was borne out of historical experience. In the past, subsequent 
governments of Sudan have called for cease-fires when weak (or under 
pressure) as a matter of strategy and violated them when in a position of 
strength. Well-known examples of this phenomenon are the 1972 Addis 
Ababa Agreement, the 1993 Abuja-brokered cease-fire, the 1998 
Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement, and the now defunct 1997 Khartoum 
Peace Agreement.”545 
 
When the preliminary agreement proposed by the mediators was presented to the 
SPLM/A, as mentioned above, it objected to the definition of ‘self-determination’ 
used in the document. The SPLM/A’s criticism was that the document redefined 
self- determination as a process designed to lead to self-administration or local 
autonomy, thus excluding the option of independence. For the SPLM/A this 
approach  had failed twice before, in 1972 (Addis Ababa Agreement) and recently 
in 1997 (Khartoum Peace Agreement). The preliminary agreement had recognised 
that the people of Sudan are diverse and belong to the different ethnic, religious, 
and cultural affiliates but desire to remain united as a nation and to co-exist within 
that diversity. However, the SPLM/A was of the view that thirty-six years of war 
out of forty-six years of independence is not an indication of desire to remain 




united as one nation. 
 
The other serious problem with all the pre-CPA agreements between the South 
and the North had been the non-involvement of Southern citizens in the process. 
They had all been agreements between southern elites (with little or no mandate 
from the tribal majority of the population) and northern political leaders. 
Determined not to repeat the mistakes of the previous generation, the SPLM/A 
recognized the importance of the southern citizenry’s participation in deciding its 
own future. As a result, the issue of the right to self-determination through a 
referendum for the Southern Sudanese became the most emotive issue for the 
SPLM leadership. The deputy Commander-in- Chief of the SPLA, Salva Kiir 
Mayardit, who headed the SPLM/A’s delegation to Machakos warned the chief 
mediator, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, that: “if self- determination is not 
included in the document, we will not sign this agreement.”546 As soon as self-
determination had been agreed, Commander Salva Kiir went back to   the bush, 
leaving the remaining items to be negotiated by his juniors. 
 
However, the issue was not fully resolved by a basic agreement about self- 
determination, for there was still no agreed mechanism by which it could 
discharged. A statement by Sudanese Church leaders on 20th July 2002 about the 
Machakos Protocol, released from Entebbe (Uganda) on 29th July read: 
“We are concerned about the lack of international guarantees that the 
provisions of the Protocol will be carried out. The procedures for carrying 
out the referendum are not provided in the Protocol. We recommend that 
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these guarantees and procedures should be discussed and agreed upon 
during the August 2002 talks.”547 
 
As can be seen from this statement by Sudanese church leaders, civil society 
within the southern population had certainly learned from the failure of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. Since the SPLM/A had promised to make the peace settlement 
a participatory project in which it would represent the civilian population in the 
Southern Region, it did not ignore such concerns amongst popular representatives 
from the wider community, which feared a repetition of previous failures. Indeed, 
in negotiating the CPA, the SPLM/A spent half of the three-year-long process on 
negotiating the implementation matrix 548  as a consequence of its historical 
experiences. As a result, it continued to gain support from the civil population 
over this specific aspect of the negotiations. For instance, Chief Kanuto Ekebek 
Aham in a letter dated May 30th 2004, wrote to John Garang de Mabior: “may the 
Almighty God give you extra courage to follow the implementation process till 
the least of our objectives is achieved.”549 Besides the letters that the SPLM/A 
leadership received from individuals, civil society organisations, and church 
leaders, another very important source of individual and collective expression of 
awareness of these issues came from songs composed during the war and which 
kept reminding Southerners ‘ke waar ci rot ber nyok’, (yesterday’s event must not 
repeat itself) – a coded reference to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. 
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The NCP had also had its own failures in respect of popular representation; it had 
tried to make an alternative peace with non-SPLM/A political groups through the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, but that had failed because such parties 
were not widely accepted to be representative of the Southerners. This was a 
failure which, in turn, boosted the identity of the SPLM as the sole representative 
of South Sudan and this left the NCP with no alternative but to accept to negotiate 
with the SPLM/A. Also, the GoS was internationally isolated, largely due to its 
sponsorship of international Islamist terrorism. While Khartoum was challenging 
the SPLA’s earlier victories between 1991 to 1994, it also sheltered Osama bin 
Laden and al-Qa’ida, an action, which gave rise to fears of American retaliation 
after the September 11th 2001, attacks on New York and Washington. 
 
The CPA Itself 
Asked to explain why it took so long to sign the CPA, Nicholas Haysom who was 
in the mediating team, pointed out that: “Negotiating the implementation details 
took longer than many observers wanted, but for us it was an essential element. 
The SPLM, as the non-state party, was understandably keener than the 
government.”550  The SPLM/A certainly insisted on negotiating issues and the 
details of the consequent implementation procedures, but this caution actually 
had little to do with the status of the SPLM/A as a non-state party. Instead, it had 
everything to do with the lessons it had learned from previous failures of 
negotiated settlements, notably the Addis Ababa Agreement. It was also the case 
that identity issues have always been at the centre of the Sudanese conflict but in 
the 1972 Addis Ababa negotiations, the entire enterprise took less than two weeks 
                                                     




to conclude, hardly time for such delicate and complex matters to be addressed. 
When compared with the protracted negotiations, which cumulated in the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, it is not too difficult to 
understand that a different explanation than one based on non-state status is 
necessary. In fact, it must have had to do with the actual scope of the conflict and 
the objectives for its resolution entertained by both sides. The scope of a conflict 
for these purposes can be defined in terms of the purposes for which it is waged. 
A primary distinction could be between wars of secession and wars of revolution, 
in that insurgents seek to change either a government or society or to reform both. 
Such a distinction is important because it helps the disputants to devise 
appropriate strategies. Richard Bensel argues that secessionist conflicts are best 
resolved by devolution of power, while a revolution is best contained by 
centralization of power and defeating the rebels.551 The question of power is 
central to the analysis of discourse and, by extension, to the critical constructivist 
approach adopted here. 552  First and foremost, this means that discourses are 
embedded in, carried forward by, and bound up with institutions of authority. The 
state and its representatives do not monopolize such authority. Rather, it is widely 
but unevenly distributed through society. Discourses are bound up with power, 
secondly, in that they produce knowledge and truth on which human action is 
based. Discourses are powerful because they open up and foreclose possibilities 
of speaking and acting on the subjects, which they form. However, the warring 
parties in the Sudanese conflict that began in 1983 have never been able to agree 
on the definition of the scope of the conflict in which they were engaged. 
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The SPLM/A, largely based in the Southern Region, believed it was waging a 
revolutionary conflict to transform the whole of the country and its governing 
system, while various regimes in Khartoum that had to deal with the movement 
viewed the conflict as secessionist. The confusion that arose from this 
disagreement stalled many peace initiatives between the disputants. The 
SPLM/A’s declared objective was to restructure both the system of national 
governance and to change the leadership in Khartoum. In April 1985, “...the 
blows dealt to the regime by the SPLA and the popular uprising in the cities of the 
North overthrew Nimeiri.”553 This only achieved one of the SPLM/A’s objectives, 
so it continued to fight. In the words of Colonel Garang: 
“Dictator Nimeiri has gone but his policies, laws, and institution are still in 
force. The September Sharia Laws of 1983 have not yet been repealed. 
The government is working out alternative Islamic Laws. Since there is no 
change in policies and system of rule, and since the present ruling class 
does not want peaceful solution to our national problems the SPLA has no 
choice, but to fight to bring about lasting peace and equality among all the 
nationalities of our country and for democracy and unity.”554 
 
The SPLM after failing to restructure the country, opted instead for the creation of 
a new state in the South but this, a major achievement in itself in creating a state 
at the negotiating table, could not have been achieved without learning from past 
negotiating failures. 
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As the case of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue between the warring parties in 
Congo show, technical competence plays a significant role in reaching an end to 
conflict. In the case of the Inter-Conglese Dialogue, the meeting was organised in 
five technical commissions: a political and legal commission, a defence and 
security commission, an economic and financial commission, a humanitarian, 
social and cultural commission, and a peace and reconciliation commission. In the 
case of the Sudanese negotiations, John Garang de Mabior and Ali Taha led the 
delegations to the Naivasha negotiations of the SPLM and the GoS respectively, 
where the CPA was finally signed in 2005. The Naivasha talks made use of the 
experience acquired from the shortcomings of the negotiations that had taken 
place in Addis Ababa thirty-three years earlier, not least the need for technical 
and professional competence. Throughout the negotiation process at Naivasha, 
the SPLM’s delegation was divided into specialized teams each responsible for a 
different area of competence. As a result, the main negotiating team was flanked 
by a team on wealth sharing, a legal team, and a political committee, each of 
which dealt with issues pertaining to its sphere of operations. As Gabriel Alaak 
Garang explains: 
“I was reminded that when we had been in Machakos, there had been a 
debate about whether one person or two people should hold the positions 
of the first vice-president of the Republic of Sudan and that of the 
president of the autonomous government of Southern Sudan, an issue that 
required some expertise to resolve. The argument that won was that the 
same person could hold both positions because experience from the Addis 
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Ababa arrangements showed that Khartoum would try to engineer an 
internal rift of the kind which had aided President Nimeiri in ultimately 
abrogating that agreement.”555 
 
As mentioned above, the CPA was signed under tremendous international 
pressure, especially for the Government of Sudan, which accepted Southern 
demands which it had resisted for decades – such as the existence of two separate 
armies in the same country and an exercise of self-determination through 
referendum. It hoped, however, to recover what it had conceded during the 
implementation phase, as had been its practice previously. The structure of 
negotiating teams, according to Brigadier General Alaak Garang- a resource 
specialist in the SPLM/A negotiation team, which had culminated in the creation 
of ‘specialized committees’ as described above – set the CPA discussions poles 
apart from the Addis Ababa negotiations, for those discussions had lacked any 
basic organisation simply because the Southern rebels did not have a clear agenda 
for the talks whereas the SPLM had learned to prepare a proper agenda that it 
intended to achieve and clearly defined redlines which it would not cross. 
 
Commander Gier Chuang’s account of the CPA negotiations showed that much 
had been learned from the AAA experience, as well as from other agreements that 
had been negotiated over the years, particularly negotiations held by factions 
which split from the mainstream SPLM/A in 1991.556 In addition, the leader of 
the SPLM/A, John Garang de Mabior, had been one of the Anyanya officers who 
had experienced the AAA negotiations and had had reservations over their 
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conduct, which he had communicated in writing to the leader of the Anyanya 
delegation, Joseph Lagu. He therefore could comment on the CPA negotiations 
with personal knowledge. His original written comments to Joseph Lagu had been 
ignored at the time and the rebel authorities decided to keep him isolated by 
sending him to the USA for further  studies. The education he obtained there only 
made his resolve to fight, rather than to accept a bad peace agreement, more 
intense. The result was that, when the war resumed in 1983, Dr Garang had an 
insight into past negotiating failures as a participant in the Anyanya experience as 
well as from other leading actors who had written about what had happened, such 
as Abel Alier. Dr Garang and the SPLM/A resolved to make sure that such 
failures would ultimately be either reversed or, at least, not repeated. Every 
SPLM/A delegation that thereafter negotiated with representatives from the 
North, sought to ensure that every negotiated outcome would have to at least 
correct the errors of past agreements and ensure that priorities were properly 
addressed. 
 
Thus the strength of the CPA lay in the priority the SPLM/A addressed towards 
security arrangements because these would protect the entire agreement, had the 
North reneged on its terms in the implementation phase as it had on numerous 
occasions in the past – after all, Jaafar Nimeiri had said of the AAA that it was 
neither Koran nor Bible whilst Omar al-Bashir had said of another agreement that 
he would soak it, dilute it and then drink it down! This was the SPLM/A’s 
greatest victory; for Khartoum to have accepted the concept of ‘two systems in 
one country’, allowing the SPLM to keep its armed wing alongside the national 
army was a terrible error unless Khartoum actually wanted the South to secede. 
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The SPLM had calculated that this would be the way to ensure the separation of 
the South from the North, whether through confederation or independence, given 
its past experience of Northern tactics and its responses to the past errors of 
Southern representatives. The other crucial lesson that the SPLM had learned lay 
in the area of the importance of the technical competence of the negotiating team. 
This conclusion one member of the SPLM delegation to the CPA, Elijah Malok, 
attributed to the previous failings of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace talks and of the 
Juba Conference in 1947, at which Britain had first proposed to weld North and 
South Sudan into a single political entity. 
 
In one important way, the Addis Ababa negotiations were a case of history 
repeating itself with regard to the Juba Conference of 1947, for, as had been the 
case then, the Southern delegates to the Addis Ababa talks found themselves no 
match for their Northern counterparts. They had had no constitutional lawyer in 
their delegation, nor did they have seasoned diplomats in their ranks.557 Elijah 
Malok Aleng, who was intimately connected with the South Sudanese from the 
end of 1983 onwards, has concluded that the failure of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement to provide a permanent institutional presence in the national army for 
the former Anyanya arose from the fact that the Southern delegates were not 
technically competent over constitutional issues. Instead of allowing themselves 
to be cajoled into dropping their demand for a permanent Anyanya presence in 
the all-Sudanese army, they could have claimed that Southerners should provide a 
third of the officer corps since the Southern Region constituted a third of the 
country’s population. As noted by General Alaak Garang, in the CPA 
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negotiations in consequence, the SPLM leadership stressed technical competence 
in selecting the delegates to the talks in Kenya. It did this by gathering 
intellectuals together and organizing them into technical teams. The drafting of 
the disputed issues, for example, was left to lawyers, among whom were very 
senior SPLM leaders including Michael Makuei Lueth, John Luk Jok, and 
Mayom Akech, all now ministers in the current government of the Republic of 
South Sudan. This approach made for a far better settlement between the North 
and the South. 
 
The agreement that had ended Sudan’s conflict in 1972 was particularly 
interesting in the sense that it was not only an agreement that was reached as a 
result of informal and secret discussions between representatives of the 
SSLM/Anyanya and the Sudanese Government but was also an agreement that a 
mediator formalized without making a significant effort to persuade the principal 
parties to assent to a compromise agreement. On Anyanya’s part, the fear of an 
uncertain future if it did not settle forced it to agree to negotiations even though it 
knew it would not gain much advantage through them. Part of this fear was rooted 
in the anticipated changes in the external environment, which could have 
adversely affected Anyanya as Abel Alier noted. He had participated in the talks 
on behalf of the Sudanese Government although he came from the South. He 
commented that: 
“The neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zaire, which were 
friendly to the Southern Movement, might suddenly face internal changes 
of leadership…. One southern Sudanese refuge leader recognized this 
dangerous possibility well when he said to me in Addis Ababa on evening 
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of 10th November 1971 that: Our friends are Emperor Haile Sellassie, 
General Amin and General Mobutu. I think these people could change any 
time and become friends with the Sudan…. But if even they do not 
change, their people may change them or death may take them…. In any 
case whatever military support we can get in these countries or through 
them, cannot match the military power of Sudan government.”558 
 
The government had had to assure the rebels that all would be well as a result of 
the agreement, so it is possible that the government’s choice of Southern 
Sudanese leaders such as Joseph Garang and Abel Alier to represent it in the talks 
was meant to allay rebel fears. The Anyanya movement and, to some degree, the 
entire South Sudanese elite had a very negative view of the government in 
Khartoum and thus needed some reassurance if it were to participate in the 
negotiating process. Furthermore, the biggest problem for the Anyanya leadership 
was the fact that its members did not know or really understand the Khartoum 
elite as most of them had not grown up in the nation’s capital. In addition, a 
pattern of dishonoured peace accords between the North [the government] and the 
South had already emerged during the period after the Juba Conference in 1947 
and Independence in 1956, thus adding to their distrust. While the Anyanya 
movement viewed Abel with suspicion as an agent of the government, he knew 
what would satisfy both the government and Anyanya so his approach was to 
reconcile the government’s position and that of Anyanya, as he noted: 
“The government should re-examine its stand on the question of dialogue 
with the rebels. Our purposed solution of regional autonomy is well 
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known. Rebel leaders continue with rebellion. These leaders are known. 
We do not lose anything by probing into the rebels’ attitudes to our 
proposed solution… Those responsible for rebellion may wish to have 
regional autonomy specified in terms of powers, institutions and values, 
and spelt out clearly or even generally. There should not be any difficulty 
in working out this, even by encouraging the rebels to offer their 
suggestions within the framework already laid down.”559 
 
Alier proposed regional autonomy because the concept was already widely known 
throughout Sudan, having been popularized by the Sudanese Communist Party 
which had referred to the model of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in proposing 
regional autonomy for the South within a united Sudan many years before. In 
essence, however, Anyanya accepted the autonomy proposal because it lacked the 
power and authority to insist on a more equal arrangement with the Sudanese 
government at the time. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter examined the Rationalist and Constructivist approaches to conflict 
resolution that highlight the importance of stalemate and external pressure and 
their applicability to the Second Sudanese Civil War and the CPA negotiation 
process. This Chapter argues that the Rationalist and Constructivist approaches 
fail to satisfactorily explain the resolution of the Second Sudanese Civil War. 
Indeed, external Western pressure on the warring parties to find a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict emerged in the 1990s as a result of Western desires to 
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tackle international terrorism and alleged state sponsors of terror. The same 
decade ushered in a stalemate in the civil war as a result of the SAF being unable 
to defeat the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A being unable to overthrow the 
Government of Sudan. Although the external pressure and stalemate of the 1990s 
would suggest a ripe period for a negotiated settlement to the Second 
Sudanese Civil War, the government and the SPLM/A were unable to reach a 
peaceful compromise until 2005. The two approaches therefore fail to fully 
explain the success of the CPA peace process. Without the SPLM/A having 
successfully shifted its position in light of its experiences during the civil war and 
the experiences of the Anyanya movement, the CPA would have been unlikely. It 
was therefore the social dynamic learning of the SPLM/A that made a peaceful 
settlement a reality. In order to understand the Sudanese peace process therefore, 
social learning must be incorporated to existing Rationalist and Constructivist 
approaches to explaining the Second Sudanese Civil War. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Although IGAD has been criticized for not having been able to prevent or manage 
inter-state as well as intra-state conflict, its intervention in the Sudanese conflict 
between the SPLM/A and the GoS led to the signing of the CPA in 2005. IGAD, 
with its headquarters in Djibouti, was initiated in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Somalia and Uganda, with Eritrea becoming a member following its 
independence from Ethiopia in 1993. It was originally conceived by its drought-
prone member states as a mechanism for coordinating measures to manage the 
effects of drought and desertification. It recognizes the sovereignty of all of its 
member states and non- interference in their internal affairs, as indicated in its 
Founding Act. But, nonetheless, a lack of trust between IGAD member states has 
stalled its progress in finding peaceful solutions to conflicts within the sub-region. 
One case in point is the tension between Sudan and Uganda as a result of 
accusations and counter-accusations over support to one another’s dissidents, 
namely the LRA and the SPLM/A respectively. Another example of unresolved 
sub-regional tensions has been the case of border conflicts between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. It was to prove to be, however, a very useful vehicle through which the 
two sides to the dispute in Sudan were brought together in order to negotiate a 
peaceful solution to their differences. With IGAD’s support, the dissidents in the 
conflict in Sudan were able to sign the CPA in 2005, which ultimately resulted in 
the 2011 independence of the Republic of South Sudan. 
 
Conflict resolution theorists that adhere to ripeness theory, such as William 
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Zartman, would suggest that the CPA, however, came about in 2005 because 
there was a military and diplomatic balance-of-power between the SPLM/A and 
the Government of Sudan that had created a stalemate between them. However, as 
this study has sought to reveal, it was the back-and-forth dynamic of ‘learning-by-
doing’ through the negotiating process that was as important as any rationally 
based process of a deal reflecting costs and benefits. Through these complex 
negotiating sessions, the delegations of the warring parties were able to build 
confidence and trust among themselves and were able to reciprocate and adjust 
their positions. This was a clear indication that the two parties to the dispute were 
increasingly able to revise and compromise their positions, a feature of the 
process that had been lacking when it began. Continuous interaction between the 
two parties, therefore, is a vital element in conflict resolution. During this 
negotiation dynamic and through the continuous interaction between the parties, 
Vice President Ali Osman Taha and Dr Garang, as the leaders of the two 
delegations, developed a personal relationship to the extent that they were 
eventually able to learn to trust each other, as well as a mediator that both could 
respect. As Ali Osman himself has clearly pointed out: 
“After a while we felt uneasy about the Secretariat and the presence of a 
third…The discussions we had were like a family affair or a family 
dispute…We felt uneasy about having someone else present… These were 
things we needed to sort out ourselves, within the family, so to speak. We 
realized that the presence of Secretariat could complicate matters more 
than helping us. That was why we ended up negotiating on our own, 
without any one else in the room.”560 
                                                     




Ripeness theorists suggest that armed conflicts are ended when the warring 
parties are on a basis of equality of power and when timely third party mediation 
becomes actively involved in attempts to resolve the conflict. However, through 
examining the Sudanese experience of the CPA, it is difficult to accept the 
argument that stalemate and ripe intervention amount to conflict resolution. As 
this dissertation has sought to demonstrate, the SPLM/A’s and the Government of 
Sudan’s decision to discuss a peace process at the negotiating table never resulted 
from a stalemate on the battlefield, as much as ripeness theorists would suggest. 
A true peace agreement however, is possible when the parties to it build sufficient 
confidence between themselves through interactions at the negotiating table, 
when there is powerful internal and external pressures for the conflict to be 
resolved and when the parties involved begin to ‘own’ the process. Thus the 
peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A occurred 
when Washington, London and Oslo took a decision to engage in the negotiations 
using a technique that Hilde has referred to as “the Americans Wave Sticks”561 
and perhaps more commonly known as the ‘carrot and the stick’ process. In 2001, 
in a letter to President Bush, Congressmen Donald Payne and Thomas Tancredo, 
had requested, alongside an investigation into slavery in Sudan, an investigation 
of twelve Sudanese officials allegedly involved in supporting terrorism including 
an attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 
1995. It was the threat of such an investigation that helped to encourage the 
Sudanese government to seek to placate the United States by starting the 
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negotiation process.562 They had also called, at the same time, for the Sudanese 
government to enter into negotiations with the SPLM/A. It was their initiative that 
focused American interest on the IGAD mechanism as the vehicle through those 
negotiations could occur.563 
 
Within an interactive problem-solving framework, the ultimate goal of 
negotiation is to transform the relationship between the parties. Negotiations are 
designed not merely to produce a minimally acceptable political agreement but to 
provide the basis for peace, stability and a mutually enhancing relationship that 
would contribute to the welfare of both parties. As is well known, conflict is 
caused by and escalates to a considerable degree through unsatisfied needs, not 
only material needs but also socio-psychological concerns, such as security, 
identity, recognition, autonomy and justice. Parties in pursuance of their own 
security, identity or related needs and interests can undermine or threaten the 
security and identity of the ‘other’.564 Thus to resolve conflict and begin to build a 
new relationship requires an agreement that satisfies the fundamental points of 
disagreement of both parties and reassures them that their fundamental fears are 
no longer warranted. 
 
The central strength of the CPA and the primary reason why it achieved its 
goal of ending the war lay in the fact that it could maintain the balance-of-power 
between the two parties because it had instituted two distinct armies for the two 
regions of the country and provided for popular choice as the ultimate factor 
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deciding the future structures of Sudan. This reflects the political opportunity 
model of conflict resolution that places state capacity at the heart of the resolution 
process. It suggests that any decision to rebel must take into account the 
government’s capacity for repression and accommodation, such that, if the state is 
capable of repression, then the likelihood of failure will be higher and rebellion 
will be less likely, whereas if the state is capable of accommodating grievances 
via institutionalized channels providing for facilities such as the redistribution of 
wealth, the granting of rights of autonomy or the incorporation of dissident 
movements. When such a situation occurs, the motivation for violent rebellion 
will be lessened and conflict will be less likely.565 
 
Looking at the CPA, a number of lessons can be learned that can assist future 
peace processes, including: 
1) Providing warring parties with ample time to find a negotiated settlement; 
2) Ensuring continuous engagement to allow the parties to address issues 
systematically; 
3) Establishing a mechanism for international pressure from ‘respected 
countries’ that have an ability to influence proceedings; 
4) Involving respected countries in the implementation of agreements 
reached;  
5) Creating a forum for decision-makers to engage in direct negotiations; and  
6) Mobilising resources to assist the peace process. 
 
The CPA process enjoyed major international diplomatic support – something 
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that had been absent during the AAA in 1972. International diplomatic support 
emphasized the principle of a win-win situation for both parties. In order to 
achieve this end state, state and non-state actors transformed the dispute by 
communicating information, proposing new solutions, and directly influencing 
the crisis using an incentivized approach that helped to generate movement 
towards potentially overlapping bargaining positions.566 Critically, this support 
originated from ‘respected countries’, that were able to exert considerable 
international pressure, be it diplomatic, economic or political, when necessary, in 
order to persuade the warring parties to find a peaceful solution to the Second 
Sudanese Civil War. It was these countries that often bankrolled the various 
engagements and negotiations between the warring parties. 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the failure of the 1972 AAA was an important 
factor in the negotiation of the CPA in 2005 for, as one of the key players in the 
CPA, Hilda Johnson, put it, “the SPLM/A’s redlines in the protracted negotiations 
were largely results of perceived shortcomings of the 1972 Addis Ababa 
arrangements and the way in which those had not been implemented.”567 The 
AAA did achieve a state of regional autonomy that lasted from 1972 to 1983 for 
South Sudan within a united country. However, it was ultimately violated because 
of the powerlessness of the south in the areas of security, diplomatic relations, 
central decision-making and economic wealth control. Despite the fact that the 
AAA granted the southern region semi-autonomy, the central government 
interfered in its internal political affairs, and ultimately abrogated the terms of the 
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There were potential problems with the implementation of the CPA, although it 
was a far better structured agreement than the AAA. One of these emerged with 
the unexpected death of the South Sudanese leader, John Garang de Mabior, for, 
as Alaak Garang, who was a part of the negotiating team noted: “the CPA was 
designed as if it were going to be personally implemented by Dr John Garang.”568 
As a result, with his demise, the CPA could very easily have collapsed. The fact 
that it did not was a testament to the complexity of its implantation matrix, a 
feature that the AAA had lacked.569 The significance that the SPLM/A placed on 
the implementation matrix led to the movement spending nearly a year 
negotiating the implementation matrix alone. 570  Furthermore, one cannot 
downplay the significance of the post-CPA support that the Transitional 
Government of National Unity received from the international community, which 
helped to guide both parties between 2005 and the declaration of South Sudanese 
independence in 2011. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in the 
Sudan (UNMIS) by the UN Security Council under Resolution Number 1590 on 
the 24th of March 2005 was in direct response to the signing of the CPA on the 9th 
of January that same year. Ultimately UNMIS was to play an important role in 
helping the Transitional Government of National Unity implement the 2005 peace 
agreement. 
 
The SPLM/A also showed a degree of flexibility in adjusting its objectives to 
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realistic and realizable outcomes, in ways that Anyanya had been unable to do. 
While it had fought the war under the banner of liberating the whole of the Sudan, 
it did not maintain this agenda at the negotiating table for the good reason that the 
government in Khartoum had never acknowledged it as a national movement.  
Instead it treated the SPLM/A as a regional movement fighting for the interests of 
the South alone. The SPLM/A then tried to negotiate on behalf of all the regions 
of Sudan in rebellion against the central government – Southern Sudan, Southern 
Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile, and the District of Abyei – but once it realized that 
this objective was also unobtainable, it further refined its strategy to obtain the 
right to self-determination for Southern Sudan and the District of Abyei. For the 
other two regions, the SPLM/A was able to negotiate an outcome, which it called 
‘Popular Consultation’, which was included in the CPA. This provided for a civic 
education programme in the two regions before public opinion was sampled to 
inform negotiators from each region what their negotiating positions with the 
Sudanese government should be.571 The flexibility that the SPLM/A demonstrated 
is well captured by Michael Makuei, who remarked: 
“The CPA negotiating process demonstrated the SPLM/A’s flexibility as it 
adjusted its claims to represent all of Sudan down to a differentiated 
approach in which self-determination was established for South Sudan and 
for Abyei, to be determined by referendum after a six-year interim period, 
alongside the issue of ‘Popular Consultation’ for Southern Kordofan and 
Southern Blue Nile.”572 
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Negotiating a peaceful settlement to the Second Sudanese Civil War spanned 
almost two decades, with the first meaningful engagement between the 
Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A leading to the Koka Dam Declaration of 
1986. The various engagements during this two-decade period helped to build 
confidence between the warring parties. The level of confidence that both parties 
built was bolstered in the latter period of the CPA negotiation-process, during 
which the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A interacted at the level of its 
decision-makers. The high-level interaction between the Government of Sudan 
and the SPLM/A negated delays caused by the back and forth evident in previous 
negotiations between the two parties. 
 
The issue of a referendum for Abyei almost caused the talks to collapse, 
necessitating an American intervention to save them. The SPLM/A’s maturity and 
professionalism in the negotiating process was evident in its success, despite 
American fears, in the security arrangements that were adopted, with Khartoum 
conceding the ‘two army’ approach – in reality three separate forces, for there 
was to be a federal force with equal North-South representation as well as the two 
regional entities. In recent history, the Khartoum government has, however, not 
been prepared to repeat the concessions it made in the CPA, as the Darfurians, 
who have sought a similar agreement, have discovered – a further testament to the 
SPLM/A’s success. 
 
The basic reasons for the SPLM/A’s success were not only its clear objectives 
and flexibility but also its technical competence. Three components, which were 
lacking in the AAA and which were successfully addressed in the CPA, 
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comprised knowledge of the opposing camp, expertise over disputed issues and 
clarity in the viability of the objectives sought. By comparison, in the AAA 
negotiations, no professional expertise, not even legal advice, was available to the 
Southern delegation whilst Southerners were represented on both sides of the 
negotiating table, thus obscuring the process itself as the objectives of both sides 
were never clearly demarcated. Furthermore, the Anyanya representatives did not 
have personal knowledge of their counterparts representing the Sudanese 
government. And, perhaps worst of all, the negotiating process was rushed and no 
meaningful internal or external pressure was applied to ensure the desired 
outcome. As Hilde Johnson noted, pressure on Dr Garang from key members of 
his delegation was significant.573 These were all factors that were present in the 
CPA. 
 
On the whole, the CPA had a different intellectual and political approach from 
previous negotiating efforts undertaken by Southern opponents of the Sudanese 
government over the years after Independence. The Agreement revolved around 
the New Sudan vision of the SPLM/A, which aimed at transforming the centre of 
the state to solve the fundamental problem of Sudan as a complex, heterogeneous 
state entity. The CPA turned out to be a highly detailed and complex agreement, 
involving both power sharing and a territorial solution based on a tight 
implementation matrix and on the Western liberal peace-building model, seeking 
peace through democratic governance, the dominant approach after the end of the 
Cold War. Nonetheless it was ultimately a Sudanese agreement, reflecting the 
positions and expectations of the parties to it and control of its implementation 
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has, therefore, remained with them.574 
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  This is the full text of the proposal entitled “Principles of Agreement on Abyei,” presented 
by US 


























and SPLM/A Chairman Dr. John Garang on the 19
th 
March, 2004. The Parties hereby 




Abyei is a bridge between the north and the south, linking the 
people of Sudan; 
The territory is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka 
chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905; 
The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their 





Upon signing the peace agreement, Abyei will be accorded 
special administrative status, in which: 
 
Residents of Abyei will be citizens of both Western Kordofan 
and Bahr el Ghazal, with representation in the legislatures of both 
states; 
Abyei will be administered by a local Executive Council, 
elected by the residents of Abyei. Pending the election of the 
Executive Council, its initial members will be appointed by the 
Presidency; 
Net oil revenues from Abyei will be divided six ways during the 
Interim Period: the National Government (50 percent); the 
Government of Southern Sudan (42 percent); Bahr el 
Ghazal region (2 percent); Western Kordofan (2 percent); 
locally with the Ngok Dinka (2 percent); and locally with the 
Misseriya people (2 percent); 
The National Government will provide Abyei with assistance 
to improve the lives of the peoples of Abyei, including 
urbanization and development projects; 
International monitors will be deployed to Abyei to ensure full 
implementation of these agreements. 
 
End of Interim Period: 
 
Simultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the 
residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot. The 
proposition 
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voted on in the separate ballot will present the residents of 
Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of the results of 
the southern referendum: 
 
That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north; 
That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal. 
 
The January 1, 1956 line between north and south will be 




Upon signing the Peace Agreement, Abyei Area shall be 
accorded special administrative status under the institution of 
the Presidency. 
 
Abyei area shall be administered by a local Executive Council, 
elected by the residents of Abyei. Pending the election of the 
Executive Council, its initial members shall be appointed by the 
Presidency. 
 
The administration of the Abyei Area shall be representative 
and inclusive of all the residents of the area. 
 
The Executive Council shall be composed of the Chief 
Administrator, his/her Deputy and not more than five heads of 
departments. Prior to elections, the Chief Administrator and 
his/her Deputy shall be appointed by the Presidency. The Chief 
Administrator shall make recommendations to the Presidency 
regarding the appointments of the heads of departments. 
 
The Executive Council, in exercise of its executive powers, 
shall: 
 
render necessary services; 
supervise and promote security and stability in the area; 
 Propose development and urbanization projects for the area to 
both the Abyei Area Council and to the Presidency; 
Present to the National Government proposals regarding 
the provision of assistance to improve the lives of the 
peoples of Abyei, including urbanization and development; 
 
The Presidency, upon the recommendation of the Executive 
Council, shall determine the executive, legislative and 
financial powers and competencies of the special status of 
Abyei Area, having regard to this protocol, other protocols, 
agreements, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
 
In view of the special status of Abyei Area, the Presidency 





Without prejudice to the provisions of the Wealth Sharing 
Agreement, the net-oil revenue from the oil produced in Abyei 
Area shall be shared during the Interim Period as follows: 
 
Fifty Percent (50%) to the National Government; 
Forty Two Percent (42%) to the Government of Southern 
Sudan; 
Two Percent (2%) to Bahr el Ghazal Region; 
Two Percent (2%) to Western Kordofan; 
Two Percent (2%) locally with the Ngok Dinka; 
Two Percent (2%) locally with the Misseriya people. 
 
In addition to the above financial, resources , Abyei Area shall 
be entitled to: 
 
The area share of the national revenue as per the Wealth 
Sharing Agreement; 
The revenues raised in the Abyei Area from Income Tax and 
other taxes and levies; 
The share of the Area in the National Reconstruction and 
Development Fund; 
An equitable share of Southern Sudan Development and 
Reconstruction Fund; 
 Allocations from the National Government to cover the cost of 
establishment of the new administration, its running and 
provision of services; 
Donations and grants. 
 
There shall be established, under the Executive Council, 
Abyei Resettlement, Construction and Development Fund to 
handle relief, repatriation, resettlement, reintegration, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in the Area. 
The Fund may establish specialized agencies. 
 
The National Government shall appeal to the international 
and donor community to facilitate the return and resettlement of 
the residents of Abyei Area. 
 
The financial resources due to Abyei Area as provided in 
section 3 herein shall be deposited in special accounts, 
acceptable to the Presidency, from which the administration of 




There shall be established Abyei Area Council comprised of not 
more than twenty members. 
 
Prior to elections, the Presidency shall appoint the members of 
the Abyei Area Council. 
 
The Abyei Area Council shall: 
 
Issue local enactments within the powers of local 
government and on customary matters; 
Approve the budget of the Area; 
Adopt reconstruction, development and urbanization plans for the 
Area; 
If necessary, recommend to the Presidency the relief of the 
Chief Administrator or his/her Deputy; 
Participate in the promotion of reconciliation efforts in the Area. 
 
DETERMINATION OF GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES: 
 
 There shall be established by the Presidency, Abyei 
Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the 
area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan 
in 1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area. 
 
The composition and timeframe of the Abyei Boundaries 
Commission (ABC) shall be determined by the Presidency. 
However, the Commission shall include, inter alia, experts, 
representatives of the local communities and the local 
administration. The Commission shall finish its work within the 
first two years of the Interim Period. 
 
The Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) shall present its final 
report to the Presidency as soon as it is ready. Upon 
presentation of the final report, the Presidency shall take 
necessary action to put the special administrative status of 
Abyei Area into immediate effect. 
 
RESIDENTS OF THE AREA: 
 
The residents of Abyei Area shall be: 
 
The Members of Ngok Dinka community and other 
Sudanese residing in the area; 
The criteria of residence shall be worked out by the Abyei 
Referendum  Commission. 
 
 
Residents of Abyei shall be citizens of both Western Kordofan 
and Bahr el Ghazal with representation in the legislatures of 
both States as determined by the National Electoral 
Commission. However, prior to elections, the Presidency shall 




There shall be established Abyei Area Security Committee, 
chaired by the Chief Administrator, and shall comprise of the 
Deputy Chief Administrator, the Army Commander, the Police 
Chief, and the representative of the Security Organ. 
 
Without prejudice to the Agreement on Security Arrangements, 
 the two Parties shall, through the Interim Period form and 
deploy one joint battalion in the Area. 
 
International monitors, as shall be agreed in the comprehensive 
Cease-fire Agreement shall also be deployed in the Area 
through the Interim Period. 
 
International monitors shall be deployed to Abyei to ensure full 
implementation of these Agreements. 
 
ABYEI REFERENDUM COMMISSION 
 
There shall be established by the Presidency an Abyei 
Referendum Commission to conduct Abyei referendum 
simultaneously with the referendum of Southern Sudan. The 
composition of the Commission shall be determined by the 
Presidency. 
 
The residents of Abyei shall cast a separate ballot. The 
proposition voted on in the separate ballot shall present 
residents of Abyei with the following choices; irrespective of the 
results of the Southern referendum: 
 
That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north; 
That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal. 
 
The January 1, 1956 line between north and south shall be 
inviolate, except as agreed above. 
RECONCILIATION PROCESS 
 
Upon signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the 
Presidency shall, as a matter of urgency, start peace and 
reconciliation process for Abyei that shall work for harmony and 
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 Annex 2: Addis Ababa Agreement 
 
 THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH SUDAN 
 
Draft Organic Law to organise Regional Self-Government in the Southern 
provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan 
 
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic 
of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of 
June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-
Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the 
principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively 





This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Government in the Southern 
Provinces. It shall come into force and a date within a period not exceeding thirty 




This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a 
three- quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and confirmed by 




CHAPTER I: DEFINITIONS 
 ‘Constitution’ refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any other basic law 
replacing or amending it. 
‘President’ means the president of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. 
‘Southern Provinces of the Sudan’ means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, 
Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood 
January 1, 1956, and other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of 
the Southern Complex as may be decided by a referendum. 
 
‘People’s Regional Assembly" refers to the legislative body for the Southern 
Region of the Sudan. 
 
‘High Executive Council’ refers to t he Executive council appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council 
and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the 
Southern Region of the Sudan. 
 
‘President of the High Executive Council’ refers the person appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly to lead and 
supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern 
Provinces. 
  
‘People’s National Assembly’ refer to the National Legislative Assembly 
representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution. 
 
‘Sudanese’ refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the Sudanese 




Article 4. The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as 
defined in Article 3. (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan and be known as the Southern Region. 
 
Article 5. The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive  organs, the 
functions and power of which are defined by this law. 
 
Article 6. Arabic shall be official language for the Sudan and English the 
principle language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any 
language or languages, which may serve a practical necessity for the efficient 




Article 7. Neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the High Executive 
Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature which 
are: 
National Defense External Affairs Currency and Coinage 
Air and Inter-Regional Transport Communications and Telecommunications 
Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities, 
which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central 
Government. 







Article 8. Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a 
People’s Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the 
Southern Region. The constitution and condition of membership of the Assembly 
shall be determined by law. 




For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the 
People’s Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive 
 to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed 
members shall not exceed one-quarter of the Assembly. 
 
The People’s Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in 
accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during 
it first sitting. 
 
The People’s Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, 
provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the 
High Executive Council. 
 
Article 11. The People’s Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of 
public order, interim security, efficient administration and the development of 
the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the 
following: 
Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development 
and administration of the Southern Region. 
 
Organisation of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration. 
Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National 
Law. 
 
Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory 
institutions. 
 
Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in 
accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social 
development. 
 
Promotion of local languages and cultures. Town and village planning and the 
construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programs 
 
Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of 
traders’ licenses and formation of co-operation societies. 
 
Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals. 
 
Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child 
welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical 
assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centers, dispensaries and 
dressing stations. 
 
Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal 
production and trade. 
 
Promotion of tourism. 
 
Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organisations of trade and 
 cultural exhibitions. 
 
Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central 
Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals. 
 
Recruitment for, organisation and administration of Police and Prison services in 
accordance with the national policy and standards. 
 
Land use in accordance with national laws. 
 
Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases. 
 
Development, utilization, and protection of forests crops and pastures in 
accordance with national laws. 
 
Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes. 
 
All other matters delegated by the President or the People’s National Assembly 
for legislation. 
 
Article 12. The People’s National Assembly may call for facts and information 
concerning the conduct of administration in the Southern Region. 
 
Article 13. 
The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for 
specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President of relieve the 
President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The 
President shall accede to such request. In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of 
the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered 
as having automatically resigned. 
 
Article 14. 
The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the 
President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the 
members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the 




The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the 
President to withdraw any Bill presented to the People’s National Assembly 
which in their view affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens 
in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the People’s 
Regional Assembly. If the President accedes to such request, the People’s Regional 
Assembly shall present its views within 15 days from the date accession to the 
request. The President accedes to such request, The People’s Regional Assembly 
together with his own observation if he deems necessary. 
 
Article 16. 
The People’s National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts of the 
People’s Regional Assembly for their information. The People’s Regional 
Assembly shall act similarly. 
 
CHAPTER V: THE EXECUTIVE 
 
Article 17. 
The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which 
acts on behalf of the President. 
 
Article 18. 
The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in 
the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government 
Agencies it shall act with approval of the President. 
 
Article 19. 
The President of the High Executive council shall be appointed and relieved of office 
by the President on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly. 
 
Article 20. 
The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved 




The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the 
President and to the People’s Regional Assembly for efficient administration in the 
Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President. 
 
Article 22. 
The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings 
of the People’s Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the 








The president shall form time to time regulate the relationship between the high 
Executive Council and the central ministries. 
 
Article 24. 
The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public 
Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the 
Regional Public Service. 
 
CHAPTER VII: FINANCE 
 
Article 25. 
The People’s Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition 
to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislation and orders to 
guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels. (One) The source of 
revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:- 
Direct and indirect regional taxes. 
Contribution from People’s Local Government Councils 
Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in 
accordance with the National Plan. 
Funds from the National Treasury for established services. 
Funds voted by the people’s National Assembly in accordance with the requirements 
of the Region. 
The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the People’s Regional 
Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the 
Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of June 9, 1968. 
 
CHAPTER VIII: OTHER PROVISIONS 
 
Article 26. 
Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People’s 
Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the 
region. The use of the People’s Armed Forces within the Region and outside the 
framework of national defense shall be controlled by the President of the advice of the 
President of the High Executive Council 
Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People’s Armed Forces 
in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements. 
 
Article 27. 
The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the 
National Constitution provided the People’s Regional Assembly, after receiving the 
President’s views, may reintroduce the Bill. 
 
Article 28. 
The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the 
People’s Regional Assembly. 
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Article 29. 
Any member of the People’s Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided 
that financial Bills shall not be presented without sufficient notice tot he President 
of the High Executive Council. 
 
Article 30. 
The People’s Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan 
and respect the spirit of the National Constitution. 
 
Article 31. 
All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, 
provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named 
citizen solely on grounds of public health and order. 
 
Article 32. 
a) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of 
education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession. No law adversely 
affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal 
origin, religion, place of birth, or sex. 
 
Article 33. 
Juba shall be the Capital of the Southern Region and the seat of the Regional 
Executive and Legislature. 
 
APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
 
The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic 
of the Sudan. 
 
A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship Equality of citizens. 
All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sec, 
economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law. All 
persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the rights to 
institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in 
an open court without delay prejudicing their interest. Personal liberty. 
 
b) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be 
prohibited. The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty. 
Retrospective penal legislation and punishment should be prohibited. The right of the 
accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed. No 
person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the due 
process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than 
twenty-four hours without judicial order. No accused person should be subjected to 
inducement, intimidation of torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in 
his favor or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment 
should be inflicted on any convicted person. 
 
Freedom of Religion and Conscience. Every person should enjoy freedom of religious 
opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and 
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to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favor of morality, 
health or public order as prescribed by law. Parents and Guardians should be 
guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance 
with the relation of their choice. 
 
Protection of Labor. 
Forced and compulsory labor of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered 
for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law. 
The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed. 
Freedom of minority to use their languages and develop their culture should be 
guaranteed. 
 
APPENDIX B: DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OR REVENUE AND GRANTS- IN-
AID FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION 
 
Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the 
Southern Region. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the 
Central list of the Ministry of Treasury. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits 
consumed in the Southern Region. Profits on sugar consumed in Southern Region. 
Royalties of forest products of the Southern Region. Royalties on leaf Tobacco and 
Cigarettes. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance. 
Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects (5 percent of net profits 
of factories, co-operative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas). Revenue 
accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the 
Region shall bear maintenance expenses e.g., Post Office revenue, land sales, sale 
of forms and documents, stamp duties and any other item to e specified from time to 
time. Licenses other than those provided for in the People’s Local Government Act, 1971.  
Special Development Tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region the rate of 
which should be decided by the People’s Regional Assembly. Income Tax collected from 
officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and 
national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and 
Political Establishment. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project 
established in the Region but not run by the Regional Government (5 percent of the 
initial cost). Contribution from the Central Government for the encouragement of 
construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and 
trading enterprise (20 percent of the initial cost as assessed by the Central 
Government). New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any 
of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants 
from the National Treasury in the following manner: Education institution, 20 percent 
of expenses. Trunk and through Roads and Bridges, 25 per cent of expenses. Relief and 
Social amenities, 15 percent of expenses. Tourist attraction projects 25 percent of 
expenses. Security, 15 percent of expenses. Grants for Post Secondary and University 
education within the Sudan, 20 percent of grants, outside the Sudan 30 percent of 
grants. Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural Activities, 
25 percent of expenses. 
 
AGREEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION 
 
Article 1. This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for 
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the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
 
Article 2. There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed actions in 
the Southern Region from the time of cease-fire. 
 
Article 3. All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of 
the cease-fire. 
 
Article 4. Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence. 
Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease. 
 
Article 5. Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the 
areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and 
authorized by their respective authorities. The plans for stationing troops from the 
National Army shall be such as to avoid any contact between them and the 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement combat forces. 
 
Article 6. A joint Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all 
questions related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint 
Commission shall include members from all the countries bordering on the 
Southern Region as well as representatives of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, World Council of Churches, all Africa Conference of Churches and 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges. 
 
Article 7. The joint Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by 
both parties in dealing with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot. 
 
Article 8. Each party shall be represented on the Joint Commission by one senior 
military officer and maximum of five other members. 
 
Article 9. The headquarters of the Joint Commission shall be located in Juba with 
provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau. 
 
Article 10. The Joint Commission shall appoint local commission in various 
centers of the Southern Region composed of two members from each party. 
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PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS CHAPTER 1: INTERIM 
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
(Political, Local Government and Civil Service) 
 
Article 1. The President of the Democratic Republic of Sudan shall, in consultation 
with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (S.S.L.M) and branches of the Sudanese 
Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the president and members of an 
Interim High Executive Council. 
 
Article 2. The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and 
other members with portfolios in: 
 
1 Finance and Economic Planning. 2 Education 
3 Information, Culture and Tourism 4 Communication and Transport 
5 Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries. 6 Public Health. 
7 Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons). 8 
Housing, Public Works and Utilities 
Natural Resources and Rural Development (Land Use, Rural Water Supply, 
Forestry and Cooperatives). 
Public Service and Labor 
Minerals and Industry, Trade and Supply. 
 
Article 3. The interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national 
laws, establish a Regional Civil Service subject to ratification by the People’s 
Regional Assembly. 
 
Article 4. The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive 
Council determine the date for the election to the People’s Regional Assembly, 
and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of 
this Assembly. 
 
Article 5. In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and 
regional institutions, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and 
communicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside of the Sudan in 
accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of Public Service and 
Administrative Reform. 
 
Article 6. The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and 
Administrative Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations 
with effect from the 192\72-73 Budget for such placements and appointments. 
 
Article 7. The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a 
period of 18 months. 
 
CHAPTER II: TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF 
UNITS OF THE PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION. 
 
  
Article 1. These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years 
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subject to revision by the President of the request of the President of the High 
Executive Council acting with the consent of the People’s Regional Assembly. 
 
Article 2. The People’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a 
national force called the Southern Command composed of 12,000 officers and 
men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from the Region and the other 6,000 from 
outside the Region. 
 
Article 3. The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region 
within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military 
Commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops 
with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The commission 
shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and 
confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region. 
 
Article 4. The joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior 
military officers from each side. Decision of the Joint Military Commission shall 




CHAPTER III: AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Article 1. No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil or criminal, 
shall be instituted against any person in any court of law for or on account of any 
act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from 
the 18
th 
day of August 1995, if such act or matter was done in connection 
with mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region. 
 
Article 2. If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article 1 
is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void. 
 
Article 3. All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in 
respect of offences herein before specified in Article 1 shall be discharged of 
released within 15 days for the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. 
 
Article 4. The joint Cease-fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian 
returnees, which register shall serve to certify that the person therein named 
are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement provided 
that the commission may delegate such power to the Sudan in the case of citizens 
from the Southern Region living abroad and to whom the provisions of this 
Agreement apply. 
 
Article 5. In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces 
the Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons who 
shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article 4. 
 
Article 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 above a Special 
Tribunal with ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and 
decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not meet the 
conditions for amnesty specified in Article 1 of this Agreement. The Special 
Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the President of the 
Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease-fire Commission. 
 
Article 7. Cases referred to in Article 6 shall be brought to the attention of the 
Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice. 
 
Article 8. The Amnesty Provision contained in this Agreement as well as the 
powers of Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President 
after consultation with the commissions referred to in this 
 
Article 9. Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced 
persons is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government the 
present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole 
nation of the Sudan and International organisations should be pooled to help and 
rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlement 





Article 10. The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within 
the Sudan in the following order: 
Persons presently residing in overcrowded centers in the Southern Region, and 
persons desirous to return to their original areas and homes; 
Persons returning from the bush including Anayanya Supporters; 3 Handicapped 
persons and orphans 
 
Article 11. The second priority shall be given to returnees from the 
neighboring and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall 
provide for: 
Adequate reception centers with facilities for shelter, food supplies, medicine and 
medicaments; 
Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin. 3 Materials and 
equipment. 
 
Article 12. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall: 
Appeal to international organisations and voluntary agencies to continue 
assistance for students already under their support particularly for students in 
secondary schools and higher institutions until appropriate arrangements are 
made for their repartition; 
Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial 
support from the Sudan Government. 
 
Article 13. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the 
education of all returnees who were attending primary schools. This agreement is 
hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in the year 
one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D, in this city Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on 
the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on the other. It shall 
come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Leader of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement. It shall be ratified by the said by two Leaders in person 
or through their respective authorized Representatives, in this city, Addis 
Ababa Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of 
March, in the year on thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D. In witness 
whereof, we the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence of the 
Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and the 
Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of 
Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches. 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE 
SUDAN 
 
Abel Alier-Wal Kuai, Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs. Dr. 
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Mansour Khalid, Minister for foreign Affairs. 
Dr. Gaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit, Minister for Local Government Major-General 
Mohammed Al Baghir Ahmed, Minister of Interior. 
Abel Rahman Abdalla, Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform. 
Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman 
Colonel Kamal Abashar. 
 
FOR THE SOUTHERN SUDAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT 
 
Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza, Leader of the Delegation. 
Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, Secretary of the Delegation. Mading deGarang, 
Spokesman of the Delegation. 
Colonel Frederick Brian Maggot, Special Military Representative. Oliver Batali 
Albino, Member. 
Anelo Voga Morjan, Member. Rev. Paul Puot, Member. 




Nabiyelul Kifle, Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia. 
Leopolda J. Niilus, Representative of the World Council of Churches. 
Kodwo E. Akrah, Representative of the World Council of Churches. Burgess Carr, 
General Secretary All Africa Council of Churches. 
















RECOGNIZING that the conclusion of the comprehensive peace 
settlement that the Sudanese people are longing for requires solving the 

















THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN 










and Blue Nile States as a model for solving 
problems throughout the country; and 
 
REAFFIRMING that citizenship shall be the basis for equal rights and 
duties for all Sudanese citizens regardless of their ethnicity or religion; and 
 
UNDERLINING the importance of recognizing the cultural and social 
diversity of the Sudan as a source of strength and unity; and 
 
EMPHASIZING equality, fairness, economic development, social 
welfare and stability as overarching goals of the Sudanese people in 
general and the population of the conflict affected areas in particular; 
 






The Parties agree on the following, as the basis for political, administrative, 
economic and social solution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile: 
 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed to all 
individuals in the State as prescribed in the Interim National 
Constitution; 
 
The diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population of the 
State shall be developed and protected; 
 
Development of human resources and infrastructure shall be the main 
goal of the State. It shall be conducted to meet human needs    in 
 
1 
The name of the State shall be settled before the conclusion of the Peace Agreement by a 
committee representing the State formed by the two Parties. 
accordance with the best-known practices of sustainable development within a 
transparent and accountable framework. 
 
Definition of the Two Areas: 
 
 
The boundaries of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State shall be the 
same boundaries of former Southern Kordofan Province when Greater 
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Kordofan was sub-divided into two provinces. 
 
For the purpose of this Protocol, Blue Nile State shall be understood as 





The Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (the Parties), committed to reaching a just, fair and 
comprehensive peace agreement to end the war in Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, agree on the following:- 
 
Popular consultation is a democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the 
views of the people of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue 
Nile States on the comprehensive agreement reached by the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. 
 
That this comprehensive agreement shall be subjected to the will of the 
people of the two States through their respective democratically 
elected legislatures. 
 
That the legislatures of the two States shall each establish a 
Parliamentary Assessment and Evaluation Commission to assess and 
evaluate the implementation of the agreement in each State. The two 
Commissions shall submit their reports to the legislatures of the two 
States by the fourth year of the signing of the comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. 
 
An independent Commission shall be established by the Presidency to 
assess and evaluate the implementation of the comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in each of the two States. The Commission shall submit its 
reports to the National Government and the Governments of the two 
States who shall use the reports to rectify any procedure that needs to be 
rectified to ensure faithful implementation of the Agreement. 
 
Once this agreement is endorsed by the people through the legislature of 
any of the two States as meeting their aspirations, then the 
agreement becomes the final settlement of the political conflict in that 
State. 
Should any of the legislatures of the two States, after reviewing the 
Agreement, decide to rectify, within the framework of the Agreement, any 
shortcomings in the constitutional, political and administrative 
arrangements of the Agreement, then such legislature shall engage in 
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negotiations with the National Government with the view of rectifying 
these shortcomings. 
 
Structure of the State Government: 
 
 
The State shall have the following structure:- 
 
 
The State Executive, which shall comprise of:- 
The State Governor; 




The State Legislature (SL). 
The State Judiciary. 
 
 
The State Executive: 
 
 
The Governor of the State shall be directly elected by the registered voters 
of the State in a public adult suffrage. 
 
The Governor shall appoint the ministers and the commissioners of the 
state in accordance with the State Interim Constitution. The State Council 
of Ministers shall be representative. 
 
The Governor shall, together with the State Council of Ministers, exercise 
the Executive Powers of the State which shall be in respect of the 
functional areas listed in Schedules A and B, read together with Schedule 
C, attached hereto, and in accordance with the State Interim Constitution. 
 
The State Council of Ministers shall be accountable to the Governor and 
the State Legislature in the performance of their duties. 
 
The State shall have commissioners and elected local councils. The 
organisation and proper functioning of the Local Governments shall be the 
responsibility of the Government of the State. 
 
There shall be State Security Committee to be chaired by the Governor of 
the State. The Committee shall include, among others, the Military 
Commander of the area, his Deputy, the Director of the State Police and 
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Director of the State National Security Branch. 
 
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 5.6 above, the Governor 
of the State may demand the transfer of the Director of the National 
Security Branch from the State. 
 
The State Police Service shall adhere to the National standards and 
regulations as set forth by National Police Service. 
 
Police, Prisons, Wildlife and Fire Brigade Officers shall be recruited by the 
State Service according to the National standards, trained and 
commissioned nationally and returned to the State for service. The other 
ranks shall be locally recruited to serve within the State. Recruitment and 
training regulations shall be designed and standardized by the National 
Police Service. 
 
Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 5.9 above, the National 
Authority may agree with the State Authority to transfer any number of 
police officers from the State police to the National Police Service 
whenever necessary. 
 
The State Authority may request the National Authority to transfer to the 
State any number of police officers to fill any vacancies in the State. 
 
The State Legislature: 
 
 
Members of the State Legislature (SL) shall be elected by the registered 
voters of the State in accordance with the State Law and in conformity 
with the general guidelines as set forth by electoral provisions as set forth 
by the National Electoral Commission. 
 
The State Legislature shall prepare and adopt the State Constitution, 
provided that it shall conform to the Interim National Constitution. 
 
The Governor of the State shall sign any law duly approved by the State 
Legislature, failing which, after thirty (30) days it shall be deemed to have 
been signed into law, unless the Governor has submitted the law to the 
Constitutional Court for a ruling on its constitutionality. If the Constitutional 
Court finds the law constitutional, the Governor shall immediately sign 
such law. 
 
The State Legislature shall legislate for the state within its legislative 




State laws currently applicable in the State shall continue until new 
legislation is duly enacted by the SL within its competence. 
 
The State Legislature shall decide its own rules, procedures, and 
committees, and elect its Speaker and other officers. 
 
The State Legislature may relieve the Governor of the State of his/her 
functions by a motion supported by two-thirds of its membership. 
 
Members of the State Legislature and the State Executive shall have such 
immunities as are provided by law. 
 
The State Courts: 
 
 
The structures and powers of the courts of the States shall be subject to the 
Interim National Constitution. 
 
The State Constitution shall provide for the establishment of such state courts 
as are necessary. 
 
The State Legislature shall provide for the appointment and dismissal of 
state appointed judges, subject to the State Constitution and the approval 
of the National Judicial Service Commission. 
 
The State legislations shall provide for guarantees for the independence 
and impartiality of the State judiciary and ensures that state judges shall 
not be subject to political or other interference. 
 
The state courts shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction in respect of State 
and National Laws, save that a right of appeal shall lie to the National 
Courts in respect of matters brought before or heard under National laws. 
 
The National Legislature shall determine the civil and criminal procedures to be 
followed in respect of litigation or prosecution under National laws in 
accordance with the Interim National Constitution. 
 
The State Share in the National Wealth: 
 
 
The National wealth shall be shared equitably between different levels of 
Government so as to allow enough resources for each level of 
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Government to exercise its constitutional competencies. 
 
The States shall raise and collect taxes and revenues as listed in 
Schedule (D), annexed herewith. 
 
Oil producing state is entitled to two percent (2%) of the oil produced in 
that state, as specified in the Wealth Sharing Agreement. 
 
The state shall be represented in the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and 
Monitoring Commission, which shall ensure transparency and fairness in 
regard to allocation of the share due to the state from the Nationally 
collected revenues and ensure that allocations due to the state are not 
withheld. 
 
The general objective of the National Reconstruction and Development 
Fund (NRDF) is to develop the war affected areas and least developed 
areas in the Sudan with the aim of bringing these areas to the national 
average standards and level of development. 
 
In allocating the funds to the war-affected areas and least developed 
areas, NRDF shall use the effects of war and level of development as the 
main criteria. The Parties agree to allocate seventy-five percent (75%) of 
the total fund to the war-affected areas, particularly to Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, while the remaining 
balance shall be earmarked to the least developed areas. 
 
The allocation of funds among the areas affected shall be determined 
during the Pre-Interim Period by the Joint National Transition Team 
(JNTT) that shall be established as agreed to in the Wealth Sharing 
Agreement, within the agreed percentages as in the above paragraph, 
taking into consideration the actual needs based on the results of Joint 
Assessment Mission. 
 
The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC), as 
agreed to in the Wealth Sharing Agreement, shall allocate current 
transfers to Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and other war- 




Minimum expenditure responsibilities; 
Human Development Index / Social Indicators (social development 
factor); 
Geographical area (cost disability factor); 
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Fiscal effort (internal revenue effort); and 
The effect of war factor. 
 
 
In addition to the budgetary allocations and the two states’ share in the 
NRDF, the President shall allocate an amount of money to each of the two 
states. 
 
8.10 The Parties agree to appeal to the donor community to provide 
technical assistance to the FFAMC to develop comprehensive equalization 
criteria. 
 
The states shall hold all income and revenue received in audited public 
accounts and shall comply with the regulations and auditing standards set 
by the Chamber of the Auditor General, who may audit the state’s 
accounts. 
 
There shall be no impediment to interstate commerce or the flow of goods 
and services, capital, or labour to and from the state. 
 
Any debts/liabilities incurred by any level of government shall be the 
responsibility of that level of government. 
 
There shall be a fair and equitable division of government assets. An 
asset shall in the first instance be allocated to the level of government 
responsible for the function in respect of which the asset is related (e.g., 
school buildings to the level of government responsible for education). In 
the event of a dispute, the Parties agree that such dispute shall be 
referred to a committee comprising a representative of each of the Parties 
involved in the dispute and a mutually agreed expert. 
 
There shall be at the State’s level accounting standards, procedures and 
fiscal accountability institutions operating in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting standards and procedures to ensure that funds are 
distributed according to the agreed Government budget and properly 
expended having regard to value for money. 
 
State Land Commission: 
 
 
The regulation of the land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land 





Rights in land owned by the National Government within the State shall be 
exercised through the appropriate or designated level of government. 
 
There shall be established a State Land Commission in the State of 
Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, respectively. 
 
The State Land Commission shall be composed of persons from the State 
concerned. 
 
The State Land Commission shall exercise all the powers of the National 
Land Commission at the State level. 
 
The State Land Commission shall be competent to review existing land 
leases and contracts and examine the criteria for the present land 
allocations and recommend to the State authority the introduction of such 
necessary changes, including restitution of land rights or compensation. 
 
The National Land Commission and the State Land Commission shall 
cooperate and coordinate their activities so as to use their resources 
efficiently. Without limiting the matters of coordination, the National Land 
Commission and the State Land Commission may agree as follows:- 
 
To exchange information and decisions of each Commission; 
That certain functions of the National Land Commission, including 
collection of data and research, may be carried out through the State 
Land Commission; and 
On the way in which any conflict between the findings or 
recommendations of each Commission may be resolved. 
 
In case of conflict between the findings and recommendations of the 
National Land Commission and the State Land Commission which cannot be 
resolved by agreement, the two Commissions shall reconcile their 
positions. Failure to reconcile, the matter shall be referred to the 





10.1Without prejudice to the Agreement on the Security Arrangements 
and the right of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Command to deploy 
forces all over North Sudan as it deems fit, SAF troop levels in Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile during the Interim Period shall 




Pre-Election  Arrangements: 
 
 
As part of pre-election arrangements, the Parties agree on the following:- 
 
 
The Executive and Legislature in the two states shall be allocated as 
follows:- 
 
Fifty-five Percent (55%) to the National Congress Party; 
Forty-five Percent (45%) to the SPLM. 
 
 
There shall be rotational governorship in the two states with each 
Party holding the Office of Governor for half of the pre- election period 
in each of the two states. 
No one Party is to hold the Governorship in both states at the 
same time. 
 
The office of Deputy Governor is to be allocated to the Party that is not 
presently occupying the Office of Governor. 
The Parties are to decide upon the signature of the comprehensive 
Peace Agreement the time and order in which each party assumes the 
Governorship in each state. 
 
Pending general elections, and as part of affirmative action, the Parties 
agree that Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States shall 
be adequately represented in National Institutions targeting a percentage 







The Exclusive Executive and Legislative Competencies of the Two States:- 
 
The drafting, adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the state, 




State information, state publications and state media; 
Social Welfare, including state pensions; 
The Civil Service at the state level; 
The state judiciary and administration of justice at the state level, including 
maintenance and organisation of state courts, subject to national norms 
and standards of civil and criminal procedure; 
Cultural matters within the state; 
Religious matters, subject to the Interim National Constitution; 
Internal and external borrowing of money on the sole credit of the state 
within the national macro-economic framework, as set by the Ministry of 
Finance; 
The establishment, tenure, appointment, and payment of state civil service 
officers; 
The management, lease and utilization of lands belonging to the state; 
The establishment, maintenance and management of reformatory 
institutions; 
The establishment, regulation, and provision of health care, including 
hospitals and other health institutions; 
Regulation of businesses, trade licenses, working conditions, hours, and 
holidays within the state; 
Local works and undertakings; 
Registration of marriage, divorce, inheritance, births, deaths, adoption and 
affiliations; 
Enforcement of state laws; 
Statutes enacted under the penal law power, save for the penalization for 
the breach of National laws relating to the National competencies; 
The development, conservation and management of state natural 
resources and state forestry resources; 
Primary and secondary school and education administration in regard 
thereto; 
Laws in relation to agriculture within the state; 
Airstrips other than international and national airports within civil aviation 
regulations; 
Intrastate public transport and roads; 
Population policy and family planning; 
Pollution control; 
State statistics, and state surveys; 
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State referenda, in matters within the state’s competencies; 
State charities and endowment; 
Town and rural planning; 
State cultural and heritage sites, state libraries, state museums, and other 
historical sites; 
Traditional and customary law; 
Recreation and sport within the state; 
Firearms Licenses; 
State finances; 
State irrigation and embankments; 
State budget; 
State archives, antiquities, and monuments; 
Direct and indirect taxation within the state in order to raise revenue for 
the state; 
State public utilities; 
Vehicle licensing; 
Fire fighting and ambulance services; 
Flag and Emblem; and 
Community  empowerment. 
 
 
Schedule (B): Concurrent Powers 
 
 
The National and State Governments shall have concurrent Legislative 
and Executive competencies on any of the matters listed below:- 
 
Economic and social development within the state; 
Legal and other professions and their associations; 
Tertiary education, educational policy and scientific research; 
Health policy; 
Urban development, planning and housing; 
Trade, commerce, industry and industrial development; 
Delivery of public services; 
Banking and insurance; 
Bankruptcy and insolvency; 
Manufacturing licenses; 
Disaster preparedness, management and relief and epidemics; 
Traffic regulations; 
Electricity generation and water and waste management; 
Broadcasting and telecommunications utilities; 
Environmental management, conservation and protection; 
Relief, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction; 
The initiation and negotiation of international and regional agreements on 
culture, trade, investment, credit, loans, grants and technical assistance with 
foreign governments and foreign non-governmental organisations; 





Animal and livestock control, animal diseases, pastures and veterinary 
services; 
Consumer safety and protection; 
 
Women welfare and child protection and care; 
State courts responsible for enforcing or applying national laws; and 
Rehabilitation and care for disabled war veterans, orphans, widows and their 
dependants. 
 
Schedule (C): Residual Powers 
 
 
The residual powers shall be exercised in accordance with its nature and 
as to whether the power pertains to a national matter, requires a national 
standard or is a matter that cannot be regulated by a single state, in 
which case it shall be exercised by the National Government. If the 
power pertains to a state matter, it shall be exercised by the state. 
 
Schedule (D): State Revenue Sources 
 
 
The state shall be entitled to raise and collect the taxes and revenues 
from the sources listed hereunder:- 
 
State land and property tax and royalties; 
Service charges for state services; 
Licenses; 
State personal income tax; 
Tourism levies; 
Share of natural resource revenues; 
State Government projects; 
Stamp duties; 
State agricultural taxes; 
Loans and borrowing in accordance with the national macro- 
economic policy framework; 
Excise taxes; 
Border trade charges or levies in accordance with National 
legislation; 
Other state taxes which do not encroach on National taxes; and 
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The 1997 Nuba Mountains Peace Agreement 
 
 
THE  FASHODA PEACE AGREEMENT 
 
The delegations of the Sudan Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM-United) met 
in Fashoda on 18-20 September 1997 under the mediation and chairmanship of His Majesty Reth Kwongo Dak 
Padiet, the Reth of the Shilluk. The opening session was addressed by His Majesty the Reth of the 
Shilluk, Dr. Riek Machar Teny, President of the Co-ordinating Council on behalf of the Government of the 
Sudan, and Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, Chairman of the SPLM – United on behalf of the Movement. The two 
parties discussed the Sudan Peace Agreement of April 21, 1997. After serious and frank discussions the two 
parties agreed on the following amendments and additions to the said agreement. 
 
The SPLM-United shall be guaranteed full legality of status and participation in the political and 
constitutional processes in the Sudan during the interim period. 
The parties to the agreement shall have the right to freely propagate their respective options in the 
referendum among the people. 
The 14
th 
Constitutional Decree may not amended except by (2/3) two thirds majority of the Co-
ordinating Council and confirmed by a joint session of the 
advisory council and the ten Southern States’ Assembly in a meeting to be held for that purpose at the seat of the 
Co-ordinating Council. 
The office of the President of the Co-ordinating Council shall fall vacant on:- 
 
The end of the term of office. 
Death 
Permanent disability or incapacitation. 
Resignation. 
5)A motion of impeachment is carried by three quarters of the Advisory Council. 
SIGNED 
 
Cdr. James Gatduel Gatluak 1. Mr. Musa el Mek Kur 
Vice Chairman of SPLM – United Minister of Animal Resources, 
Sudan Government. 
Cdr. Akwoch Mayong Jago 2. Major General Bushra Osman Yousif 








1997 Peace Agreement 
 
Signed the 21st April 1997 between: 
 
The Government of Sudan; 
 
The South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) comprising: 
 
The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM); 
The Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP); and 
 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM); 
 
The Equatoria Defence Force (EDF); and 
 
The South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG) PREAMBLE 
We the parties to the conflict in the Sudan; 
 
Deeply committed to an immediate end  to  the  current  armed  conflict  through  
peaceful and political means; 
 
Aware that the attainment of a just and lasting peace requires courage,  
statesmanship, political daring and challenging vision from the parties; 
 
Aware that only a  sustainable peace  based  on  justice,  equality, democracy, and 
freedom can lead to a meaningful development and progress which would assist  in  the 
solution of the fundamental problems of the people of the Sudan; 
 
Fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan cannot be based  on  force  or  
coercion, but on the free will of the people; 
 
Hereby agree to make and abide by this agreement. CHAPTER ONE 
DEFINITIONS 
 
In this agreement unless the  context  otherwise  requires  the  following  words  shall  
have the same meanings assigned to it. 
 
“Southern States” means the ten Southern States arising  from  the  former  provinces  
of  Bahr el Gazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile with their boundaries as stood on 1st 
January  1956. 
 
“Interim Period” means the transitional period having the defined  functions  to  this 
agreement, the end of which shall be the announcement of the referendum results. 
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“Constitution” means the  constitution  of  the  Sudan  including  such  parts  or  articles  
of  the agreement as shall be designated to be part thereof. 
 
“Agreement” is this peace agreement signed on April 21st 1997, between the 
Sudan Government on the one hand and the UDSF, SPLM, SSIG and EDF on the 
other. 
 
“President of the Coordinating Council” refers  to  the  person  appointed by  the 
President of the Republic of the Sudan to preside over the Coordinating Council. 
 




The general principles contained in the political charter signed  in  Khartoum  on  10th 
April 1996 shall be part of this agreement and shall guide and explain its provisions. 
 
During a four-year interim period South Sudan shall enjoy a  special status as 
defined in this peace agreement. 
 
The interim arrangements shall  be  preceded  by  a  declaration  of  permanent  cease-  
fire and general amnesty proclamation. 
 
The people of South Sudan shall exercise the right of self-determination through a 
referendum. 
 
The problem of Abyei has been discussed and a final solution is  referred  to  a  






Parties to the Agreement: 
 
The Government of Sudan; 
 
The South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF)  comprising: 
 
The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM); 
The Union of Sudan African Parties (U.S.A.P); and 
 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM); 
 
The Equatoria Defence Force (EDF); and 
 
The South Sudan Independents Group  
 
 




CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MATTERS 
 
Religion and the State 
 
Sudan  is  a   multi-racial,   multi-ethnic,   multi-cultural   and   multi-religious   society. 
Islam is the religion of the majority of the population and  Christianity  and  the  African 
creeds are followed by a considerable number  of  citizens.  Nevertheless  the  basis  of  
rights  and duties  in  the Sudan  shall  be  citizenship,  and   all   Sudanese   shall   
equally share in all aspects of life and political responsibilities on the basis of citizenship. 
 
Freedom of religion, belief and worship shall be guaranteed. 
 
A suitable atmosphere shall be maintained for practising,
 worship, dawa, proselytization and preaching. 
 
No citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion. 
 





Sharia and custom shall be the sources of legislation. 
 
On the issue  of Sharia,  the parties  agreed  on a formula  under  which  Laws of  a 
general nature that  are  based  on  general  principles  common  to  the  States  shall 
apply at the national level, provided  that the States  shall  have the right  to enact any 
complementary legislation to federal legislation on  matters  that  are peculiar to them. 
This power shall be exercised in  addition  to  the  powers  the States  exercise  on  
matters  designated  as  falling  within  their   jurisdiction, including the development of 
customary law. 
 
The Constitutional Guarantees 
 
The Supreme Court is the  custodian  of  the  Constitution  and  is  thus  entrusted with  
the protection and interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
The Constitution shall enshrine the following principles: 
 
There shall be no punishment except as provided for by the law. 
 
Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 
 
Litigation before courts is a right guaranteed for every person. 
 
The Constitution  shall  guarantee  the equality  of  all citizens  before  law  without any 
discrimination; no immunity shall be without law. 
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The Constitution shall guarantee the application of the Rule of Law. 
 
The bill of rights and freedoms shall be enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
Any law or  decision  that  contravenes  the  Constitution  may  be  challenged  in  court  
by any aggrieved person. 
 
All personal matters such as marriage, divorce, parentage and inheritance shall be  
governed by the religion and custom of those involved. 
 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
Under the concept of the Rule of  Law, the  following  basic  human  rights  and  
fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed: 
 
The right to life and inviolability of the human person. 
The right to equal treatment irrespective of gender, race, colour,  religion  or origin. 
The right to family life and privacy. 
The right to freedom of thought and conscience. 
The right to property. 
Freedom of expression. 
Freedom of movement. 
Freedom of the press. 
Freedom of association and assembly as shall be regulated by the law. 
Immunity from arbitrary arrest, detention and torture. 
Freedom of religious worship, preaching, dawa,
 proselytization and religious propagation. 
Freedom of expression and development of cultures and languages. 
All other basic rights and freedoms that are recognised  by  and  guaranteed under the  




The Judiciary in the Sudan shall be independent and decentralised. 
 
Every State shall have judicial organ which is composed of a  Court  of  Appeal,  
Province Courts, District Courts and Local Courts. 
 
Appeals from the Court of Appeal shall be submitted to the Supreme Court. 
 
Administration of justice in the State shall be vested in the State Judicial Organ. 
 
Judges at all levels shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on the 
recommendation of the High Judicial Council. 
 
Matters related to qualification, emoluments, privileges, promotions,





Participatory democracy shall be realised through congresses and
 national convention or conference. 
 
In  promotion  of  participatory  democracy  the  congresses  and  national   convention 
shall be organised: 
 
to accommodate forums for all citizens. 
to discourage all forms of intolerance and totalitarianism. 
 
The parties to this  Agreement  shall  be  guaranteed  full  participation  in  the  political  







The following powers shall be exercised by the Federal institutions: 
 
Foreign Affairs. 
Armed Forces and Defence Affairs. 
Maritime Shipping and Navigation. 
Currency, Coinage and Bills of Exchange. 
Federal Budget and Federal Planning. 
External Communications, External and Inter-State Postal and Telecommunication  
services,   Civil   Aviation   and   the   operation   and maintenance of International 
Airports. 
The Judiciary. 
Federal Railways and Inter-State Highways. 
Weights, measures and determination of time. 
The National Census. 
Fishing and Fisheries in and beyond territorial waters. 
Mining. 
Inter-State Waterways. 
Federal Election Commission. 
Customs. 
External Trade. 




on matters within Federal Powers. 
on matters common to the States. 
Audit General. 
Education Planning. 
Attorney General and Advocacy 
National Electricity Network. 
Federal Taxation. 







State Security, Public Order and Good Governance. 
Wildlife, Tourism, Hotels, Inns, and so forth. 
Land use and conservation without prejudice to the Federal Policies. 
Local Government. 
State Taxes. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries including the establishment of Training Institutions in 
these fields. 
Promotion of Languages, Cultures, Folklore, Arts,  etc. 
State Radio, TV, Newspapers and Printing Press. 
Quarrying. 
Roads, Water Supply, Hydro-Electric Power. 
Irrigation and embankment pastures and their  development. 
Animal Health, Animal Husbandry and Animal Wealth. 
Libraries and Museums. 
Industrial and commercial development. 
Missionaries activities, Charities and  Endowments. 
Specialised Hospitals and Clinics. 
Establishment of Banks in accordance with the Central Bank Policies. 
State Public Audit. 
State Electricity Network. 
State Attorney General. 
State Legislation: 
In matters within State Powers. 
Complementary to Federal laws in matters peculiar to the State. 
Customary laws. 
State Economic development and Planning in accordance with Federal Planning. 
Recruitment of Specialised technical expertise in various
 fields of 
development. 
Health care and Establishment of all  types  of  medical  institutions  for  treatment and 
training of qualified medical personnel. 
Registration of Birth and Death, and Marriages. 
Statistics. 
Scientific Research and Development. 
Administration of Meteorological Services. 
Education  Management,  Planning  and Training  up  to  University  level  within the 




The State shall exercise the  residual powers  without  prejudice to  the  powers 
allocated to the Federal authorities. 
 
The Federal authorities  shall  exercise  the  residual  powers  without  infringing  on 
powers allocated to the States. 
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In case of any dispute over the residual powers between the State and  Federal  




The Federal  Government  shall  lay  down  a  comprehensive  economic  and  social  
plan to develop the country in general and to bridge the gap between the various States 
in particular, so that within a definite period, a parity in provision of basic needs such  as 
security, employment, water, food, education, health and housing could be  reached. 
 
In order to consolidate the economic policies: 
 
The economy in the Sudan shall be based on free market forces. 
The Federal Bank of  the  Sudan  shall  be  responsible  for  regulating  internal  and 
external value of the Sudanese currency. 
There   shall   be  an  independent   Stock   Exchange   Bureau   for   selling   and 
floating shares, bonds and premiums of companies and currency regulation to enhance 
free market economy. 
There shall be established development projects to  promote  and  maintain  peace and 
stability among the people of the Sudan. 
 
Major Federal development projects and big  mining and  oil  projects shall be 
considered national wealth and be managed on a national basis provided that: 
 
The  Federal  Government  shall  observe to  allocate  an  equitable  percentage   of the 
Returns to be fixed by the Revenue  Allocation  Commission  to  the  State where the 
project is located (see Annexe 3). 
Ensure participation of the States in the management of such projects. 
Ensure  recruitment  and  training  of  citizens  of  the  State  in  order  to participate in 
such projects. 
Any other fringe benefits. 
 
A Revenue Allocation  Commission  shall  be  established  to  recommend  revenue 
sharing  formula  for the whole   country.   The   Coordinating   Council   shall   be 
represented. 
 
The  Federal  Government  shall  observe  the  following  for  the  purpose  of  
distribution  of national revenue among the States and for site selection of major 
development projects: 
 
Giving priority to the less-developed States according to their state of 
underdevelopment. 
Economic feasibility of projects and their efficient functioning. 
The effect of the project on the realisation  of  self-sufficiency  in  the  basic  needs of 
the country. 
A   balanced   relationship   between   development   and   density   of population and 
environment. 
 
Establishment of a special fund to take care of crash development  programmes and 
maintenance of peace. 
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In the field of  rehabilitation  of  the  war-affected areas,  the  following  shall  be 
observed: 
 
The Federal Government and the Coordinating Council shall  work  to  attract loans  
and aid from  friendly   countries   and   international   benevolent   organisations to 
rehabilitate the economic projects which  ceased  to  function  or were damaged 
because of  the  war.  It  shall  also work  for the reconstruction  of the war-affected 
areas and resettlement of returnees and displaced persons. 
The Federal Government and the Coordinating  Council  shall  launch  a  plan and joint 
international  appeal for  the  reconstruction,  rehabilitation,  repatriation  and 
development of the Southern States and other war affected areas. 
The Coordinating Council shall also establish a  relief,  resettlement, rehabilitation,  
reconstruction  commission  to  manage   and   administer   the resources acquired for 
the above purposes. 
 
The sources of revenue of the Southern States shall consist of the following: 
 
State taxes and generated revenue. 
Fees, excise duties and licences. 
Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects based in the Southern 
States. 
Funds from the Federal treasury for  established  services  in  the  States  until  such a 
time when they become self-reliant. 
Any development assistance and donations from foreign sources. 
Revenue allocation from the Federal Government for socio-economic development. 
State share of Federal taxes levied on Federal projects  and  services  functioning 
within the Southern States. 
Business profit taxes. 
Corporate taxes on factories and  agricultural  enterprises  in  the  State,  other  than 
Federal ones, established in the Southern States. 
Property taxes. 
The share of fees  on  licenses  for  mineral  and  oil  explorations  (see  Annexe 3). 
Profits accruing from the Customs, Airports Services, Roads, Postal and 
Telecommunication  Services  and  River  Transport  in  the  Southern  States  shall   be 
allocated to Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, Repatriation  Commission. 
 
The State Government shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure on services, 
administration and development of the State to be  submitted  to  the  State  Legislative 
Organ for approval. 
 
No project adversely affecting the people, ecology and  natural  environment  of State 
may be implemented without consulting the State  concerned. 
 
The Federal Government and  the  Coordinating Council  shall  encourage  and  
promote    foreign    investment    and    procurement    of  development    assistance    
for  the Southern States and shall encourage establishment of branches of  public 
sector  institutions, development corporations and specialised  banks. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall prepare a  development  budget  for  the  Southern  
432  
States and submit the same to the President. 
 
5. PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUTHERN CITIZENS IN THE FEDERAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
Mindful  of  the  present  participation  of  the  Southerners  in  the  Federal  Institutions, 
this Agreement is putting forward further balanced representation in  the  Federal  
institutions. 
 
The participation  shall  be  based  on  values  of  efficiency,  qualification,  honesty, 
justice, responsibility and equality between all the citizens without  discrimination. 
 
The Southern citizens shall participate in all Federal, political  and  constitutional 
institutions  in  numbers  commensurate  to  the  demands  of  the  interim  period,   
taking   into consideration population size and provided that the criteria for eligibility are 
met. 
 




The Federal Council of Ministers. 
The National Legislative Assembly. 
The Federal Defense and Security Council. 
The Supreme Court. 
The Federal Planning Institutions. 
The National Elections Commission. 
Foreign Affairs. 
The Federal Career Selection Commission. 
Federal Universities and Research Institutions. 
The Armed Forces. 
Any other Federal Institutions. 
 
The Federal Career Selection  Commission  (FCC) shall have an office at the seat of     




THE INTERIM PERIOD 
 
The length of  the  interim  period  shall  be  four  years.  However,  it  may  be  
shortened or extended if need arises by recommendation from the Coordinating Council 
to the  President of the Republic. 
 
The interim period shall commence as from the date  of  the formation  of  the 
Coordinating  Council  and  shall  end  as  soon  as  the  referendum  is  accomplished  
and  the results are declared. 
 




To assist repatriate, resettle and rehabilitate the displaced and the  returnees. 
To reconstruct the war devastated areas. 
To remove effects of war by clearing mine fields, opening tip roads and waterways. 
To  promote    reconciliation,    peace    and    confidence-building   amongst  the 
Sudanese citizens. 
To draw development plans for the Southern States and solicit funds from national,  
regional  and   international   bodies   and   institutions   for   implementation of the peace 
agreement. 
To draw a political  mobilisation  plan to  strengthen  peace  and  unity  in different parts 
of the country. 
To strengthen the Federal rule in the Southern States. 
To reassemble and train manpower in  order  to  re-establish the  public service in 
the Southern States. 
To  strengthen  the  capacity  building  of  the  people  in  the  Southern  States  to 
become self-reliant. In this regard plans shall be drawn to receive support for 
educational, health, food security and social services  institutions. 
To educate and mobilise the people of Southern States on the process of referendum. 
To  provide  adequate  security  in  the  Southern  States  in  order  to  create  a 
conducive atmosphere for the referendum. 
To participate in conducting census in the Southern States. 




THE COORDINATING COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHERN STATES 
1.DEFINITION 
In accordance with this Peace Agreement, there shall be established a Coordinating 
Council  in  Southern  States  during  the  interim  period.  The  Coordinating  Council  
shall   be responsible for coordination,  supervision,  socio-economic  planning,  
confidence- building, peace-nurturing, policy-making as well as political mobilisation. 
 
The President of the Coordinating  Council  shall  be  accountable  to  the  President  of  
the Republic. 
 
The President of the  Republic  in  consultation with  parties  signatory  to  this  
Agreement shall appoint the President of the Coordinating Council. 
 
The President of the  Coordinating  Council  in  consultation  with Southern  political 
forces  shall  recommend  his  cabinet  including  the  Governors  (Wadis)  to  the  
President of the Republic for appointment. 
 
The Ministers in the Coordinating Council shall enjoy status of Federal Ministers. 
 
The Governors of the  Southern  States  in  consultation  with  the  political  forces  in 
their  respective  States shall recommend   appointment   of   members   of   their 
governments  including  commissioners  to  the  President  of   the   Coordinating   
Council who shall pass the same to the President of the Republic. 
 
Until the atmosphere is conducive  for  elections  of  State  Assemblies  to  take place,  
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the  President  of  the  Coordinating  Council,  in  consultation  with the   political   
forces, shall recommend  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  new  members  of  
legislative assemblies in the Southern States for appointment. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall act  as  a  link  between  the  Federal  Government  and 
the Southern States. 
 
The Coordinating Council has the right to choose its seat. 
 
FUNCTIONS OF THE COORDINATING COUNCIL The Coordinating Council 
shall have the following functions: 
General  Supervision  of  the  implementation  of  this  peace  agreement   as  well  as all 
peace matters. 
 
Voluntary repatriation of the returnees, and the displaced, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of war-affected areas in the Southern States. 
 
Ensuring confidence-building measures among the Sudanese citizens. 
 




The Coordinating Council shall establish an Advisory Council for perfection  of  the  
legislative process. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall coordinate legislation with the  Southern  States  
Legislative Assemblies in matters common to these  States. 
 
The Coordinating Council may request adjournment of any legislation tabled in the 
National Assembly if deemed to adversely affect  the  interests  of  the  Southern  States  
until such a time the Coordinating Council presents its opinion. 
 
Encourage establishment and supervision  of  foreign consulate,  UN  agencies and 
NGOs in South Sudan in  coordination  with  the  Federal  Government  in  
coordination  with the Federal organs concerned. 
 
POWERS OF THE COORDINATING COUNCIL 
 




Education Planning up to University level in accordance with National policies. 
Planning and supervision of Southern States security, public order and good  
governance. 
Economic development and planning in accordance with national policies. 
Planning and programming for electricity network and other public utilities  in  the 
Southern States. 




To conduct International agreements on culture, trade, including border trade, and 
technical  co-operation,  the  procurement  of   foreign   capital   investment   and   
development  assistance  from  governmental  and   non-governmental   organisations   




The Coordinating Council shall exercise the following powers concurrent with the  
Federal organs: 
 
Planning for survey and land disposition. 
Planning and supervision of the Public Service in the Southern States. 
Organisation of States Elections and Census. 
Drawing of environmental conservation policies. 
Cultural planning and regulation, supervision of Radio, TV, newspapers and printing 
press. 
Supervision of trade union disputes. 
Audit within the Audit General. 
Establishment of Banks. 
Air, Land and River Transport, Postal Services and  Telecommunication. 
Copyrights, Patents and Publishers’ Rights. 
 
In addition to the above-devolved and concurrent powers, the President of  the 
Republic and any Federal Ministry or Federal Organ may delegate powers to the 
Coordinating Council for policy, planning and general supervision in Southern  States. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall receive  regular  reports  from  the  Governments  and  
other Institutions of the  Southern  States  and  shall  report  the  same  to  the  President  
of  the Republic. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall take over the responsibilities and functions of the  
Supreme Council for Peace and its organs. 
 
COMPOSITION OF THE COORDINATING COUNCIL 
 
The Coordinating Council membership shall be as follows: 
 
The President of the Coordinating Council. 
The Vice President of the Coordinating Council and Minister of Local Government 
Affairs and Public Security. 
Minister for Cabinet Affairs. 
Minister for Economic Planning and Financial Affairs. 
Minister for Education and Instruction Affairs. 
Minister for Legal Affairs. 
Minister for Public Service and Labour. 
Minister for Information, Culture and Social Affairs. 
Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
Minister for Health Affairs. 
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Minister for Peace and Political Mobilisation. 
Minister for Wildlife Conservation, Tourism and Environmental Control. 
Minister for Engineering Affairs and Public Utilities. 
Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and Rehabilitation. 
Minister for Commerce, Supplies and Industry. 
 
Besides the members  mentioned above  the  Governors  (Walis) of  the  Southern  
States shall be members in the Coordinating Council by virtue of their  post. 
 
There shall be established  in Southern States a  Relief, Rehabilitation,  
Resettlement,  Repatriation  Commission   (SSRRRRC)   which   shall   be   supervised   
by   the Minister for Humanitarian Affairs. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall prepare its annual budget to be submitted to the  
President of the Republic. 
 
The Coordinating Council shall  issue  regulations  to  direct  its  activities  and  specify  
the functions, duties and roles of its various departments. 
 
The  President  of  the  Coordinating  Council  shall  recommend  to  the  President  of  
the  Republic  relief  from  office,  acceptance  or  rejection  of  resignation  of  any  
member  of the Coordinating Council including the Governors. 
 
The State Governors shall recommend to  the  President  of  the  Coordinating  
Council  relief  from  office,  acceptance  or  rejection   of  resignation   of  any  member  
of  the State governments including  commissioners.  The  President  of  the  




SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD 
 
The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) shall  remain  separate  from  the  National 
Army and be stationed in their locations under their command. 
 
Police, Prisons, Wild Life, Civil Defence, Fire Brigade and Public Security in the  
Southern States shall be drawn from the people of Southern Sudan. 
 
The size of the Sudanese Armed Forces in South Sudan  shall  be reduced  to peace- 
time level once peace is established. 
 
A Joint  Technical  Military  Committee  of  equal  numbers  shall  be  constituted  from  
the Sudanese Armed Forces on one hand and the SSDF on the other for the purpose 
of supervision and implementation of the security arrangements  in  this agreement  (see  
Annexe 1). 
 
The  Joint  Technical  Military  Committee  shall   oversee   and  supervise   the  activities 
of the Cease-Fire Commission and the peace-keeping observers. 
 
The Joint  Technical  Military  Committee  shall  coordinate  with  the  Army  General  
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HQs provision of supplies, training, armament, emoluments and other facilities  for  the  
SSDF. 
 
A Joint Military Cease-Fire Commission shall be established to monitor cease-fire 
violations and the disengagement of troops in Southern States (Annexe 1). 
 
The Movement of the armed parties  shall  be  coordinated  and  controlled  by  the  
Joint Technical Military Committee, and its subcommittees (Annexe 1). 
 
In accordance with this agreement the President of the Republic of  the  Sudan  shall 
declare general amnesty to members of SSDF from  any  criminal  or  civil  culpability  
relating to acts committed during the period of the war  with  effect  from  the  date  of  
signing this Peace Agreement (see Annexe 2). 
 
There shall be established a Joint Amnesty Commission  to  follow  up  the 
implementation of the General Amnesty Proclamation (see Annexe 2). 
 
There shall be established a Joint  Amnesty  Tribunal  to  receive,  examine  and 
determine cases which are covered by this Amnesty Proclamation (see Annexe  2). 
 
War wounded, widows, orphans and other war victims shall be rehabilitated with 
assistance from the national, regional and international humanitarian  agencies. 
 







10. THE REFERENDUM 
 
By this Agreement the right of the people of Southern  Sudan  to  determine  their  
political aspirations and to pursue their economic,  social  and  cultural  development  is  
hereby affirmed. 
 
The people of Southern Sudan shall  exercise  this  right  in  a  referendum  before  the  
end of the interim period. 
 





The referendum shall be free, fair and be conducted by a Special Referendum 
Commission (SRC) to be formed by a Presidential decree in consultation with the 
Coordinating Council. 
 
Eligible voters for the referendum shall be Southern Sudanese  people  who  have  
attained the  age  of  eighteen  years  and  above  and  who  are  residing  inside  and  
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outside of South Sudan. 
 
The vote shall be by secret ballot. 
 
To ensure free  and  fair  conduct  of  the  referendum,  the  SRC  shall  invite  observers 
as follows: 
 
OAU, Arab League, UN, Religious bodies, IGAD, National  and  Foreign NGOs and 
any other countries. 
 
National and international media and journalists. 
 









Arabic  shall  be  the official  language  of  the Sudan,  with  English  as  the second  
language of the Sudan. The government shall endeavour to develop other  languages. 
 
AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
No bill of amendment to this Agreement shall be presented  to  the  National 
Assembly without consulting the Coordinating Council. 
 
For amendment  on  this Agreement  the  Coordinating  Council  may  present  its  
petition to the President of the Republic provided that such a bill is passed in the  
Coordinating Council by a two-thirds majority. 
 
(signed) 
For The Sudan Government LT General 
EL Zuber Mohammed Saleh 
 
 
For United Salvation Front (UDSF) and 
South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A) 
 
 
Cdr Dr Riek Macher Teny D. Chairman & C-in-C 
 
For Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM/A) 
 
 
Cdr Karubino Kawanyn Bol Chairman C-in-C (SPLM/A) 
 




Cdr Kawac Makwei Chairman C-in-C (SSIG) 
For Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) 
 
 
Dr Theophilus Ochang Loti Chairman C-in-C (EDF) 
 
For the Union of Sudanese African Parties (U.S.A.P) 
 
 
Mr Samuel Aru Bol Chairman (USAP) 
 
 





Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and Cease-Fire Between South Sudan 
Defence Force (SSDF) and the Government of the Sudan 
 
In pursuance of the  Political  Charter  of  10th  April  1996,  the  following  Agreement  





In this agreement the following words shall have the meanings hereinafter assigned to 
them. 
 
The “Parties” means  the  parties  to  the  cease-fire agreement  that  are the 
Government of  the  Sudan  represented  by  the  Sudanese Armed  Forces  on one 
hand and the   United 
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Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), SPLM, SSIG and EDF represented by SSDF on     
the other. 
 
The “Joint Technical Military Committee” means the Joint  Technical  Military  
Committee consulted from officers of Sudanese Armed  Forces  and  SSDF  under 
Article 3 below. 
 
“Joint  Cease-fire  Commission”  means  Joint  Cease-fire Commission,  established  
under Article 4 below from officers of the Sudanese Armed Forces and SSDF. 
 
Cessation of Hostilities and Cease-Fire 
 
There shall be total  cessation  of  all  forms  of  hostilities  amid  a  permanent  Cease-  
Fire in all areas of conflict effective as from Hours,  , 1997; 
 
The parties shall promote peace through mass media, public rallies, conferences, 
seminars, etc., 
 
The parties shall refrain from any  propaganda  or  information  policy  that is  
inconsistent with the process of peace; 
 
Joint Technical Military Committee 
 
The parties shall constitute  a  Joint  Technical  Military  Committee  from capable 
officers of the parties as follows: 
 
Five (5) officers from each side; 
Other support staff; 
Headquarters; 
The Chairmanship shall alternate for three months; 
The HQ of the Joint  Technical  Military  Committee  shall  be  in  Khartoum  at the 
General Military Headquarters. 
 
Duties of the Joint Technical Military Committee: 
 
To supervises the work of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission; 
To  deal  with  any  administrative  matters  connected  with  implementation  of  the 
Cease-Fire; and 
Any  other   relevant  matters  pertaining  to  the  implementation  of  the   security 
arrangements. 
 
Decisions of the Joint  Technical  Committee  shall  be taken  unanimously  and  in case  
of disagreement such matters shall be referred to the leadership of the parties. 
 




It shall be constituted by the parties as follows: 
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Ten officers from each side. 
The Chairmanship shall alternate for three months period. 
The HQ of the  Joint  Cease-Fire Commission  shall  be at the headquarters of  the 
Coordinating Council and shall have  local  branches  at each  State,  Province and 
Local Council levels in the areas affected by the conflict. 
 
Duties of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission 
 
To ensure that the Cease-Fire is enforced and consolidated; 
 
To constantly observe and report any breaches of the Cease-Fire; 
 
To investigate alleged violations  of  the  Cease-Fire  and  to  take  appropriate 
measures; 
 
To send regular reports to the Joint Technical Military Committee on  the  general  
military and security situation; 
 
To supervise local Cease-Fire Committees at  State,  Province  and  Local  Council 
levels. 
 
Local Cease-Fire Commissions 
 
There shall be established local  Cease-Fire  Committees  at  the  State,  Province  or 
Local Council levels in areas where SSDF and Sudanese Armed Forces are  in  close 
contact. 
 
Each local Cease-Fire Committee shall consist of seven (7) members and  shall  be 
formed by the Joint Cease-Fire Commission, and its members  may  be  drawn  from  
Military personnel, civil administrators, chiefs and community leaders. 
 
Acts that are Prohibited As of that date in which the Cease-Fire and the cessation of 
hostilities comes into effect the forces of the  parties  to  the  agreement  and  any  allied  
militia shall refrain from the following: 
 
Hostile military operations against each other by means of  forces or  individuals 
under control; 
Acts of terrorism, sabotage or harassment against each  other; 
Acts of violence against the civil population; 
Interference with free movement of  the  civil  population  and  services  or  looting of 
their property; and 
Any hostile conduct  which  is  inconsistent  with the  spirit  of  peace  and stability. 
 
Free Movement of Forces 
 
Subject to the prior notification of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission, forces  of  the  
parties shall enjoy freedom of movement in areas controlled by each side  whether  as 
military units or as individuals for any of the following purposes: 
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To carry out troops rotation or relief; 
To carry out liaison  and  coordination  activities  between  command  and  units on the 
move; 
To  deliver  logistical  supplies;  and  iv)  To  go  on  leave  or  seek  medical care 
or for other humanitarian reasons. 
 
After  receiving  notification  of  troops   movement   the  Joint   Cease-Fire  Commission 
or the Local Cease-Fire Committee, as the case may be, shall acknowledge the 
information  and  shall  transmit  the  same  to  the  next  higher  authorities  for  
information and record. 
 
Individual members of SSDF and  the  Sudanese Armed  Forces exercising  the 
freedom of  movement  for  family,  humanitarian  or  whatever  reasons,  for  which  
they  have been granted  permission  by  their  military  units,  must carry   the   
necessary departure orders duly signed by the commanders of their units. 
 
The Joint Cease-Fire Commission shall systematically  evaluate  the  progress  being  
made in ensuring  compliance  with the  Cease-Fire  agreement.  If  it  notes that  a  
situation  is  developing  which  might  result  in  a  crisis,  it  shall  draw  such  
conclusions    and make recommendations as may be  necessary  to  prevent  a collapse  
of  the  Cease- Fire  or  a  crisis  of  public  order.  It  shall  transmit  its  conclusions  
and  recommendations  to the Joint Technical Military Committee and  subsequently  to  





GENERAL AMNESTY PROCLAMATION ORDER 1997 
 
The Parties agree that the President  of  the  Republic  of  Sudan  shall  declare  a  
general  and  unconditional  amnesty for  all  offenses committed  between 16th  May  
1983  through .......... 1997 in accordance with the common will of the people of the 
Sudan. 
 
The general  and unconditional  amnesty  shall  cover  the period  from 16th May  1983   
to .......... 1997 to all (SSDF) forces, to the effect that nobody shall be prosecuted or 
punished for acts or omissions committed during this period. 
 
No action or other legal proceedings  whatsoever,  civil or  criminal,  shall be  
instituted against any persons in  any  court  of  law  or  any  place  for,  or  on  account  
of, any  act,  omission  or  matter  done  inside  or  outside  Sudan  as  from  16th  May  
1983 to 
.......... 1997, if such act or omission or matter was  committed by  any  member  of 
(SSDF). 
 
Civil Actions: All  civil suits instituted  before ..........  1997, relating to  acts  
committed or matters referred to in Article 2 above or as scheduled in Article 8 in this 
Proclamation Order are  covered  by  this  amnesty  and  shall  be  discharged  and  




Discharge  of  Prisoners  and  Detainees:   All  persons  serving  terms  of  imprisonment   
or  being  held  in  detention  in  respect  of  offences  committed  in  relation  to  the  
war   or persons being detained or  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  political  or  
politically-  motivated  crimes,  and  falling  within  the  offences  mentioned  in  the  
schedule  in     Article 
8 below shall be discharged and  set  free  from  the  day  of  signature  of  this  
Proclamation. 
 
Freedom of Movement: There shall be freedom of movement of people, goods and 
services throughout the Sudan. The relevant authorities shall implement this provision 
accordingly. 
 
Joint Amnesty Committee: 
 
The parties shall set up an ad hoc Joint Amnesty Committee to follow  up  
implementation of the provisions of this Amnesty Proclamation  and  shall  compile  and  
report about all  those  persons  who  were  in  prison  or  under  detention, whether 
civilians or military personnel, and who should have  been  released  in  response  to  the  
terms of the amnesty, and the degree of freedom of movement of persons, goods, and 
services inside Southern States. 
 
The members of the Joint Amnesty  Commission  shall  be drawn  from  the  parties  to  
the conflict and members of the National Human Rights groups. 
 
The Joint Amnesty  Commission  shall  be  composed  of  three  from each of  the  
parties. 
 
Special Amnesty Tribunal: 
 
The  parties  shall  set  up  special  tribunal  with  judicial  powers  to  receive,  examine 
and determine cases which are covered by this Amnesty Proclamation. 
 
The tribunal shall be composed of three persons from each party. 
 
Schedule of offences covered by the Amnesty: The undermentioned  are  offences 
covered by the Amnesty Proclamation Order covering the period from 16th May 1983 














IGAD "Secretariat on Peace in the Sudan" Machakos Protocol 
July 20, 2002 
 
WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (the Parties) having met in 
Machakos Kenya, from 18 June 2002 through 20 July 2002 under the auspices of 
the IGAD Peace Process; and 
 
WHEREAS the Parties have reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, 
peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan; 
and 
 
WHEREAS the Parties discussed at length and agreed on a broad framework which 
sets forth the principles of governance, the general procedures to be followed 
during the transitional process and the structures of government to be created 
under legal and constitutional arrangements to be established; and 
 
NOW RECORD THAT the Parties have agreed to negotiate and elaborate in 
greater detail the specific terms of the Framework, including aspects not covered 
in this phase of the negotiations, as part of the overall Peace Agreement; and 
 
FURTHER RECORD THAT within the above context, the Parties have reached specific 
agreement on the Right to Self-Determination for the people of South Sudan, State 
and Religion, as well as the Preamble, Principles, and the Transition Process from 
the Draft Framework, the initialed texts of which are annexed hereto, and all of 
which will be subsequently incorporated into the Final Agreement; and 
 
IT IS AGREED AND CONFIRMED THAT the Parties shall resume negotiations 
in August, 2002 with the aim of resolving outstanding issues and realizing 
comprehensive peace in the Sudan. 
 
Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani For: The Government of Sudan 
 
Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit 
For: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army Witnessed by: 
Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo Special Envoy 
 
IGAD Sudan Peace Process and On behalf of the IGAD Envoys 
 
AGREED TEXT ON THE PREAMBLE, PRINCIPLES, AND THE TRANSITION 
PROCESS 
 
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN AND THE 





WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (hereafter 
referred to as the Parties) having met in Machakos, Kenya, from 18 June 2002 
through 20 July 2002; and 
 
WHEREAS the Parties are desirous of resolving the Sudan Conflict in a just 
and sustainable manner by addressing the root causes of the conflict and by 
establishing a framework for governance through which power and wealth shall be 
equitably shared and human rights guaranteed; and 
 
MINDFUL that the conflict in the Sudan is the longest running conflict in Africa, 
that it has caused horrendous loss of life and destroyed the infrastructure of the 
country, wasted economic resources, and has caused untold suffering, 
particularly with regard to the people of South Sudan; and 
 
SENSITIVE to historical injustices and inequalities in development between the 
different regions of the Sudan that need to be redressed; and 
 
RECOGNIZING that the present moment offers a window of opportunity to reach 
a just peace agreement to end the war; and 
 
CONVINCED that the rejuvenated IGAD peace process under the chairmanship of the 
Kenyan President, H.E. Daniel T. arap Moi, provides the means to resolve the 
conflict and reach a just and sustainable peace; and 
 
COMMITTED to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the conflict based 
on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) for the benefit of all the people of the 
Sudan; 
 








That the unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people democratic 
governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens of the Sudan is 
and shall be the priority of the parties and that it is possible to redress the 
grievances of the people of South Sudan and to meet their aspirations within such a 
framework. 
 
That the people of South Sudan have the right to control and govern affairs in their 
region and participate equitably in the National Government. 
 
That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, 




That religion, customs, and traditions are a source of moral strength and inspiration 
for the Sudanese people. 
 
That the people of the Sudan share a common heritage and aspirations and 
accordingly agree to work together to: 
 
Establish a democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural, ethnic, 
racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of the 
Sudan. 
 
Find a comprehensive solution that addresses the economic and social deterioration of 
the Sudan and replaces war not just with peace, but also with social, political 
and economic justice which respects the fundamental human and political rights 
of all the Sudanese people. 
 
Negotiate and implement a comprehensive cease-fire to end the suffering and killing of 
the Sudanese people. 
 
Formulate a repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development 
plan to address the needs of those areas affected by the war and redress the 
historical imbalances of development and resource allocation. 
 
Design and implement the Peace Agreement so as to make the unity of the Sudan 
an attractive option especially to the people of South Sudan. 
 
Undertake the challenge by finding a framework by which these common objectives 




(THE TRANSITION PROCESS) 
In order to end the conflict and to secure a peaceful and prosperous future for all 
the people of the Sudan and in order to collaborate in the task of governing the 
country, the Parties hereby agree to the implementation of the Peace Agreement in 
accordance with the sequence, time periods and process set out below. 
 
2. There shall be a Pre-Interim Period, the duration of which shall be six (6) 
months. 
 
2.1 During the Pre-Interim Period: 
 
The institutions and mechanisms provided for in the Peace Agreement shall be 
established; 
 
If not already in force, there shall be a cessation of hostilities with appropriate 




Mechanisms to implement and monitor the Peace Agreement shall be created; 
 
Preparations shall be made for the implementation of a comprehensive cease-fire as 
soon as possible; 
 
International assistance shall be sought; and 
 
A Constitutional Framework for the Peace Agreement and the institutions referred to in 
(a) shall be established. 
 
The Interim Period will commence at the end of the Pre-Interim Period and shall 
last for six years. 
 
Throughout the Interim Period: 
 
The institutions and mechanisms established during the Pre-Interim Period shall be 
operating in accordance with the arrangements and principles set out in the Peace 
Agreement. 
 
If not already accomplished, the negotiated comprehensive cease-fire will be 
implemented and international monitoring mechanisms shall be established and 
operationalized. 
 
An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the 
Pre-Interim Period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and 
conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the 
Peace Agreement. 
 
The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal 
representation from the GOS and the SPLM/A, and not more than two (2) 
representatives, respectively, from each of the following categories: 
 
 
Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Uganda); 
 
Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK, and US); and 
 
Any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the 
parties. 
 
The Parties shall work with the Commission during the Interim Period with a view 
to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and 
making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan. 
 
At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally 
monitored referendum, organised jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the 
people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt 
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the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for 
secession. 
 





(Structures of Government) 
 
To give effect to the agreements set out in Part A, the Parties, within a framework 
of a unified Sudan which recognizes the right to self-determination for the people of 
Southern Sudan, hereby agree that with respect to the division of powers and the 
structures and functions of the different organs of government, the political framework 




The National Constitution of the Sudan shall be the Supreme Law of the land. All 
laws must comply with the National Constitution. This constitution shall regulate 
the relations and allocate the powers and functions between the different levels 
of government as well as prescribe the wealth sharing arrangements between the 
same. The National Constitution shall guarantee freedom of belief, worship and 
religious practice in full to all Sudanese citizens. 
 
A representative National Constitutional Review Commission shall be established 
during the Pre-Transition Period which shall have as its first task the drafting of a 
Legal and Constitutional Framework to govern the Interim Period and which 
incorporates the Peace Agreement. 
 
The Framework mentioned above shall be adopted as shall be agreed upon by the 
Parties. 
 
During the Interim Period an inclusive Constitutional Review Process shall be 
undertaken. 
 
The Constitution shall not be amended or repealed except by way of special 





There shall be a National Government  which shall exercise such functions and 
pass such laws as must necessarily be exercised by a sovereign state at national 
level. The National Government in all its laws shall take into account the 
religious and cultural diversity of the Sudanese people. 
 
Nationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of the states outside 
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Southern Sudan shall have as its source of legislation Sharia and the consensus of 
the people. 
 
Nationally enacted legislation applicable to the southern States and/or the Southern 
Region shall have as its source of legislation popular consensus, the values 
and the customs of the people of Sudan including their traditions and religious 
beliefs, having regard to Sudan's diversity). 
 
Where national legislation is currently in operation or is enacted and its source is 
religious or customary law, then a state or region, the majority of whose residents 
do not practice such religion or customs may: 
 
Either introduce legislation so as to allow or provide for institutions or practices in 
that region consistent with their religion or customs, or 
 
Refer the law to the Council of States for it to approve by a two-thirds majority or 
initiate national legislation which will provide for such necessary alternative institutions 
as is appropriate. 
 
[sections 4 and 5 are not yet available; indications are that the subjects of these 
sections are still under negotiation] 
 
 
AGREED TEXT ON STATE AND RELIGION 
 
Recognizing that Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, 
and multi-lingual country and confirming that religion shall not be used as a 
divisive factor, the Parties hereby agree as follows: 
Religions, customs and beliefs are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the 
Sudanese people. 
 
There shall be freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all 
religions or beliefs or customs and no one shall be discriminated against on such 
grounds. 
 
Eligibility for public office, including the presidency, public service and the 
enjoyment of all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, 
beliefs, or customs. 
 
All personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, 
and affiliation may be governed by the personal laws (including Sharia or other 
religious laws, customs, or traditions) of those concerned. 
 
The Parties agree to respect the following Rights: 
 
To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and 




To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions; 
 
To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials 
related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; 
 
To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas; 
 
To teach religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 
 
To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and 
institutions; 
 
To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by 
the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 
 
To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance 
with the precepts of one's religious beliefs; 
 
To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters 
of religion and belief and at the national and international levels; 
 
For avoidance of doubt, no one shall be subject to discrimination by the National 
Government, state, institutions, group of persons or person on grounds of religion 
or other beliefs. 
 
The Principles enumerated in Section 6.1 through 6.5 shall be reflected in the 
Constitution. 
 
AGREED TEXT ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE 
OF SOUTH SUDAN 
 
1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, 
through a referendum to determine their future status. 
 
An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the 
Pre-Transition period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement during the 
Interim Period. This Commission shall conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity 
arrangements established under the Peace Agreement. 
 
The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal 
representation from the GOS and the SPLM/A, and not more than two (2) 
representatives, respectively, from each of the following categories: 
 
Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Uganda); 
 




Any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the 
parties. 
 
The Parties shall work with the Commission during the Interim Period with a view 
to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and 
making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan. 
 
At the end of the six (6) year interim period there shall be an internationally 
monitored referendum, organised jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the 
people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt 
the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for 
secession. 
 
The Parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the 
Peace Agreement. 
